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This thesis is a biographical study of a young Indonesian intellectual, Soe Hok-gie, 
set against the background of Indonesian politics during the 1960s.
The biography begins in Chapter 1 by sketching Soe's family background and 
considering those factors that moulded and conditioned his personality and his 
perceptions of the world around him: the immediate family circle, the particular Jakarta 
milieu in which he grew up, his early schooling and secondary education, and the impact 
of his own reading and the mass media. The aim is to detect the early glimmerings of the 
political activist of his mature years.
Chapter 2 offers a concise overview of Indonesian national politics during the 
1950s and 1960s, that period when Soe's own understanding of politics was steadily 
developing. The emphasis is on the Guided Democracy years and the rising tensions 
within the political system, especially after 1963.
Chapter 3 considers Soe's gradual emergence as a political activist in the early 
1960s after his enrolment as a student at the University of Indonesia. This part of the 
thesis describes his contribution to the assimilation movement within the Sino-Indonesian 
community, his initial contacts with student political activists, and his discovery of one 
small clandestine group of committed opponents of Sukarno and Guided Democracy. 
The chapter concludes by considering the escalating tension within student politics during 
the early 1960s and its impact on Soe's own campus.
Chapter 4 is a detailed account, largely from Soe Hok-gie's own perspective, of the 
student movement that emerged in response to the attempted coup of 1 October 1965. 
This chapter considers Soe's own participation and leadership role throughout the various 
phases of this movement, and describes the increasing chaos on the streets of Jakarta that 
culminated in Sukarno's granting of emergency powers to Soeharto on 11 March 1966.
Chapter 5 examines the protracted struggle throughout 1966 to force Sukarno from 
the presidency, and outlines Soe's own advocacy of a militant and uncompromising 
approach towards both Sukarno and the Old Order through his student radio broadcasts 
and his early journalism. His own aspirations for the post-Sukarno era are discussed, as 
are his initial anxieties about the course and direction national politics appeared to be 
taking.
Soe's own response to the emerging character of the New Order government is the 
central theme of Chapter 6. During the late 1960s, while rejecting the view that students 
had earned the right to play a permanent role in national politics, Soe emerged as a 
prominent public intellectual offering a critical independent commentary on some of the 
key moral, social and political issues of the day. Throughout this period his own life was 
marked by a growing sense of isolation from the world around him.
The epilogue considers the impact of Soe's life, both on those who knew him 
directly and on later generations of students and activists who learnt of him through his 
writings. The study concludes by reflecting briefly on certain characteristic features of 
Soe's approach to politics.
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A project that has taken as long as this one to bring to fruition inevitably racks up a 
large number of personal debts.
It was Herbert Feith who suggested Soe Hok-gie as a possible subject of research 
longer ago than he or I may care to remember. Herb was an inspiring teacher when I was 
an undergraduate at Monash University, and he has continued to offer his wisdom, 
judgement and insights throughout the course of this project. My understanding of 
Indonesia and my work on this biography has also been immeasurably enhanced by the 
contributions of Harold Crouch and Jamie Mackie. I thank all three for their 
encouragement, for their detailed and searching comments on my work, and especially 
for the example of their own scholarship on Indonesia. I consider myself extremely 
fortunate to have had these three people as my supervisors and to be able to count them 
among my personal friends.
Throughout the course of several visits to Indonesia I have received assistance from 
many quarters. Above all I would like to thank the immediate family of Soe Hok-gie: his 
mother Ibu Maria, his father the late Soe Lie Piet, Dien Pranata and Arief Budiman. Any 
qualms I had about invading their privacy were quickly dispelled by the openness and 
complete honesty with which they greeted my inquiries and the friendship which I 
received during my visits.
There have been a great number of others in Indonesia who have assisted me 
directly with my work. I think that it is some measure of Soe Hok-gie's own standing 
among those in his society who knew him personally that I found so many willing to 
share their impressions with me. Some of those mentioned below helped me in many 
small ways; others made major contributions to my knowledge of Soe's life and my 
understanding of Indonesia and its politics. In many places throughout the body of the 
thesis I have made reference to the assistance of specific individuals during formal
interviews. But I wish above all to mention the following people whom I thank most 
sincerely: Abdurrachman, Rudy Badil, Hendro Budidharmono, Nining Dinuth, Hadi 
Djojo, Joost Drost SJ, Ismid Hadad, Fred Hehuwat, Hidayat Sutamadi, M.H. Husino, 
Fahmi Idris, Aristides Katoppo, Josi Katoppo, Umar Kayam, Koy Gandasutedja, 
Herman Lantang, Jopie Lasut, Sri Lienau, Richard Leirissa, Mona Lohanda, Boelie 
Londa, Mochtar Lubis, Mulya Lubis, Goenawan Mohamad, Murdianto, Anwar 
Nasution, Onghokham, Doris Panjaitan, Haji Princen, Purnama, Bur Rasuanto, W.S. 
Rendra, Myra Sidharta, Harry Tjan Silalahi, Maruli Silitonga, Marsillam Simanjuntak, 
the late Siswadi, Kristoforus Sindhunatha, Sjafei, Sjahrir, Kartini Sjahrir, Soebadio 
Sastrosatomo, Slamet Sukimanto, Sulastomo, Parsudi Suparlan, Suripto, Luki Sutrisno, 
Tan Soe-djie, Rachman Tolleng, Henk Tombokan, Harry Victor, Firdaus Wadjdi, Jusuf 
Wanandi, the late Yap Thiam Hien, and M.T. Zen.
In addition to those listed above there are a small number of others to whom I have 
promised anonymity. Although I am not able to acknowledge their assistance in the way 
I would like, I am sure that if they read my work they will recognise their contribution.
During the course of my many visits to Indonesia I have received support and 
assistance from various people of a more general nature. Above all, I would like to 
single out my good friends in Bandung - the Hardjono family and the Lok family - for 
their friendship, their hospitality and their many kindnesses over the years. I also thank 
Lance Castles for providing me with a congenial place to stay during a visit to Jakarta in 
1985.
Since I did not make my first visit to Indonesia until 1972 I never had the 
opportunity to meet Soe Hok-gie in person. But during the researching and writing of 
his biography I have had the good fortune to discuss his life and its meaning with a 
number of people in Australia who were former friends of Soe's in Jakarta, including 
Ganjar Ilyas and Tuti Mitchell, and also with several visiting scholars - Ben Anderson, 
Dan Lev and Mary Somers Heidhues - who had come to know him well during the 
course of their own work in Indonesia. I thank each of these people for sharing their
impressions with me. I also wish to thank Charles Coppel, Angus McIntyre, Ruth 
McVey and Claudine Salmon for their encouragement, information and suggestions, and 
Thee Kian Wie for his helpful comments on a draft of the early chapters.
In Canberra I would like to thank all my friends in the Department of Political and 
Social Change and those within the wider community of Indonesian studies at the 
Australian National University for their support and friendship over the years and for 
helping make Canberra a lively centre for the study of modem Indonesia.
Finally, I wish to mention my family. Robyn and I discovered Indonesia together 
and have shared innumerable rich experiences over the years in many parts of the 
archipelago. Her support has been critical, especially in recent months. I know I have 
tried her patience with this thesis but I hope she will think that it has been worthwhile. 
Simeran has been a healthy diversion and a constant source of encouragement. I look 
forward to her reading some of this to discover for herself what the fuss was all about.
In writing these acknowledgements I recall an occasion many years ago when I 
attended a wedding feast in Banda Aceh. The host made a long speech during which he 
apologised most abjectly to the assembled guests about the quality of the food in case not 
enough salt had been added during the preparation. I also feel the need to make an 
apology, especially to all those people who have been encouraging me for so long to 
complete this study. The food in Banda Aceh on that occasion was magnificent. Recent 
events in Indonesia suggest to me that, despite the long procrastinations, a biography of 
Soe Hok-gie still has a special relevance. I just hope there is sufficient salt.
Note On Spelling
Indonesian language words and expressions used in this thesis have been rendered 
in accordance with the spelling reforms introduced in 1972 which are now standard 
practice in Indonesia and Malaysia.
There are two important exceptions. The titles of all published works (books, 
periodicals and newspapers) that appeared before the introduction of the spelling reforms 
have been reproduced here in their original form: for example, Harian Rakjat, 'ichtisar 
sedjarah tjita2 assimilasi’ etc.
Personal names present a different and perplexing problem. Some people changed 
the spelling of their names to conform to the new system (for example, Syarif Thayeb), 
while many others did not (for example, Sjahrir). Some have retained the old Dutch- 
derived oe (Soeharto), while others prefer to use the u form (Sumitro). Note that 
President Sukarno advocated that form as the correct spelling, even though he continued 
to sign himself Soekarno. Faced with such diversity, the only possible line of 
consistency is to render all personal names in accordance with each individual's preferred 
spelling, or at least as far as that has been possible to determine.
1INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a biographical study of Soe Hok-gie, an unusual and most remarkable 
young Indonesian intellectual and political activist of the 1960s.
Within the broad sweep of Indonesia's post-independence history, this particular 
decade was of profound importance for it was marked by the transition from the nation's 
first presidency to its second, as Sukarno was forced to concede office to General 
Soeharto. It was a period that encompassed the implementation, elaboration and collapse 
of Guided Democracy, that fatally flawed authoritarian system of government that saw 
President Sukarno attempt to balance the opposing left and right forces with whom he 
shared power, and also the establishment years of the self-styled New Order when power 
and authority shifted into the hands of the armed forces under Soeharto's leadership.
In between these two periods were the tumultuous and chaotic events of late 1965 
and early 1966, sparked off by the violent and controversial episode of 1 October 1965, 
which has passed into received history in Indonesia as 'Gestapu-PKX, an attempted coup 
said to have been masterminded by the Indonesian Communist Party. Throughout those 
months, and until well into the following year, the words and deeds of young people 
were an important part of the political life of the nation to a degree that had not been 
evident since the revolution and has only rarely been the case since. Many of these 
young people, men and women of roughly Soe Hok-gie's age who collectively came to 
see themselves as the '66 generation (to distinguish themselves from the '45 generation 
of their parents who had had direct experience of the revolution and the struggle for 
independence), later believed that they had played a path-breaking role in the critical 
months between January and March of 1966.
2The broad picture of this period of Indonesian politics has already been examined in 
considerable depth and detail in major works by a number of scholars.1 In addition, 
there is a rich vein of specialised monographs and shorter journal articles on selected 
issues and themes. As will be evident from the footnotes attached to the pages that 
follow, I have drawn extensively on the work of many of these authors and have 
acknowledged my debt accordingly.
In that particular respect this study does not break new ground. Yet biography - in 
this case political biography - does seek to achieve something distinctly different from 
other forms of social studies. By selecting out for closer scrutiny the lives of individual 
political actors, biographical studies seek to complement those more broadly-based forms 
of social-science analysis that are concerned with defining, probing and appraising the 
major social and cultural forces that have shaped and determined the course of history. 
Biography encourages us to factor into our analysis the relative weight to be accorded to 
specific individuals and the unique force personality plays in the collective human 
experience.
However, the study of modern Indonesia has not as yet been particularly well 
endowed with full length critical biographies of prominent figures. Among biographical 
studies so far are those of Sukarno by, respectively, Bernard Dahm (1969), J.D. Legge 
(1972), and C.L.M. Penders (1975), Penders and Sundhausen's biography of General 
Nasution (1985), Mavis Rose's study of Mohammad Hatta (1987), David Hill’s doctoral 
thesis on the journalist and publisher Mochtar Lubis (1988), Rudolf Mräzek's biography 
of Sutan Sjahrir (1994) and Legge's group biography of the Sjahrir circle (1988). In 
addition, there are a small number of shorter biographical portraits, such as Mräzek on 
Tan Malaka (1972) and Angus McIntyre on Soeharto (1995), and the collections by 
Andaya, Coppel and Suzuki (1976) and McIntyre (1993). As far as Indonesian language
1 I am thinking in particular here of the following studies: Herbert Feith (1963a, 1964 and 1968a), 
Daniel Lev (1966a), J.A.C. Mackie (1974), Rex Mortimer (1974) and especially the work of Harold 
Crouch (1975 and 1978).
3material is concerned, the publishing boom that has occurred in Indonesia over recent 
years has produced a flood of autobiographical and biographical literature, yet much of 
this material is either popular uncritical hagiography or reminiscences and reflections of a 
blatantly self-justifying nature of which President Soeharto's 1989 volume is 
undoubtedly the most prominent example.2
In several fundamental respects the present study of Soe Hok-gie provides a sharp 
contrast to all the major biographies referred to above. To begin with, the subject is a 
minor figure within the world of Indonesian politics. Although for a short period his 
journalism brought him a degree of prominence in certain quarters, especially among 
those Indonesians who were readers of the quality Jakarta press, Soe's was never a 
household name in Indonesia. Ethnically and culturally, as a Sino-Indonesian he began 
life as an outsider.3 Though by dint of energy, intelligence and force of personality he 
came into contact with many members of the political elite, he himself held no position in 
any political party or national body, except for his participation in the assimilation 
movement within the Sino-Indonesian community during the early 1960s, and his own 
place in national politics remained obscure. At certain points in his life he was actively 
engaged in politics, but unlike some other prominent members of his generation he never 
sought to make politics into a full-time vocation. Consequently, the most diligent reader 
will struggle to find his name even in the footnotes of the published literature on 
Indonesian politics during the 1960s. Moreover, Soe died prematurely, with an academic 
career scarcely begun and before he had achieved much either personally or politically in 
the course of his short life.
Nevertheless, Soe was a passionate and intense observer of his nation's affairs, 
even from his teenage years. And fortunately - almost uniquely - many of his innermost
2 See Soeharto 1989. Like other works of this genre Soeharto's personal reflections will undoubtedly be 
extremely useful as source material for future independent biographers to analyse.
3 Until the early 1960s the civic status of Indonesian residents of Chinese descent, even peranakans 
whose families had been there for several generations, was still under a cloud in strictly legal terms. On 
this issue see Somers 1965: 224-50; and Mackie 1976: 9-12.
4thoughts and reflections about the world around him, as well as his forcefully argued 
commentaries on unfolding political and social problems, have survived in a substantial 
body of private and public writings. In this regard, the existence of Soe's private diary, 
an unusual and rare document in Indonesian literature, has been of special importance.4 
In addition, Soe's network of family, friends and acquaintances have remained to provide 
their own insights and perspectives on the events of his life.
I have drawn extensively on both these sources in constructing the life history. It 
reveals one young man's emerging political consciousness as he attempts to respond to 
what is happening in the society around him and as he seeks to come to terms with the 
challenges of the nation's politics. In addition, Soe's personal experiences are also 
remarkably useful as a fresh perspective on a number of aspects of Indonesian politics 
during the 1960s, in particular the origins of organised student opposition to Sukarno's 
government, the role that students played in the transition to the New Order in 1966, and 
the debates within intellectual and activist circles about the direction of national politics 
throughout that entire decade. Since it is Soe Hok-gie's own understanding of politics 
that is at the centre of this work, and since it is rare in Indonesian studies to have access 
to such highly personal reflections, I have chosen to include a substantial number of my 
own translations of selected passages from Soe's own public and private writing.
To avoid misunderstanding about this life history I think that it is important at the 
outset to register what I see as several basic qualifications about the nature and scope of 
the present study. As far as the choice of subject is concerned, there may be some - 
especially in Indonesia - who will contend that this biography has resulted in a biased 
interpretation of certain aspects of politics, in particular in the account of the 1966 student 
movement. As one of my interviewees in Jakarta put it to me - he was no friend of Soe
4 The letters written by Sutan Sjahrir to his wife while in internment by the colonial authorities during 
the late 1930s are perhaps the finest example of material of this type. See Sjahrir 1949. The only 
comparable body of more recent published material of which I am aware are the edited diary essays of 
Ahmad Wahib, a young Muslim intellectual of almost the same age as Soe Hok-gie, who was tragically 
killed in a Jakarta road accident in 1973. See Wahib 1981.
5and was keen to persuade me of the inappropriateness of my choice of biographical 
subject - 'the locomotive will not be strong enough to pull the train!' While I did not 
accept his point of view (after all, I was well aware that he had his own political axe to 
grind) I am conscious that there is an important issue here that needs to be addressed. It 
is a dilemma that faces any biographer, for, by isolating out from the mainstream the life 
of the individual subject for special scrutiny, there is a risk that other voices may not be 
sufficiently heard or the causal power of other societal forces not be adequately 
addressed. All I can say is that I have tried to take this problem into account. Although it 
is essentially Soe's biography that is on display, at various points throughout the study I 
have tried to set the life-history dimension against the broader political narrative to 
achieve a certain balance. In the long run, however, what is really required is a set of 
additional biographies of other political figures so that their distinctive contributions can 
also be analysed and assessed.
A second matter worth noting concerns the problem of geographic perspective, for 
there is an inherently Jakarta-centric bias running throughout this study. Although the 
political high jinks of the national capital by no means constitute the totality of Indonesian 
politics, a preoccupation with events in Jakarta in this case simply cannot be avoided. 
Soe Hok-gie was himself very much a child of that city, his life lived out almost entirely 
within its boundaries. There were occasional brief visits to other urban centres, one 
overseas venture towards the end of his life, and, of special importance, his numerous 
excursions to the mountain peaks of Java. However, Soe's judgements, instincts and 
impressions about the world of politics were fashioned out of his own experiences within 
the national capital. In addition, most of the key political events that form the background 
to the personal history took place within the parameters of national elite politics with 
Jakarta as their physical epicentre.
Finally, there is the difficult question of how much scope and attention should be 
given to what I shall call the private realm. It seems to me to be self-evident that if we are 
to strive towards an understanding of another human being, particularly a young man of
6Soe's age, a biography must take into account questions of personality development, 
identity and the emotional life of the subject. Like many others who have turned to 
writing a life history I have been challenged by my reading of A.F. Davies' remarkable 
essay, The tasks of biography', which revives and expands upon the prescriptions for 
'systematic biography' advanced by John Dollard in the 1930s.5 Consequently, where I 
have found that there are sufficient source materials available I have tried to take account 
of the inner life of my subject, especially when this appears to have had some significant 
impact upon his emerging or shifting political outlook. Although the results may be 
disappointing to anyone seeking a more overtly psychological reading, I hope that I may 
have uncovered material useful to others better able to follow such a path.
5 Davies 1972: 108-17; also Dollard 1935
7Chapter 1 
ORIGINS
On 10 December 1959, a Jakarta schoolboy from a Sino-Indonesian family of 
modest circumstances, turned to the first page in a new notebook of a diary in which he 
had occasionally jotted down a few random thoughts over the previous two and a half
years. In the still immature handwriting of adolescence, he penned the following:
Earlier today when I was looking after my monkey, I met a man (not a beggar) in the 
middle of eating mango skins. It appears that he was starving. This is just one of the 
signs that are beginning to appear in the capital. I gave him 2.50 rupiah. It was all I 
had at the time. (15 rupiah in reserve.)
Yes, two kilometres away from this fellow eating peelings, 'His Excellency' is 
probably laughing again, feasting with his beautiful wives. And when I see incidents 
like this fellow eating peelings, I feel proud that our generation has been given the task 
of overcoming the older generation that has created such a mess. Our generation has to 
be the judge of the old corruptors - men like Iskak, Djodi, Dahjar and Ibnu Sutowo.
We will become the generation that will make Indonesia prosper.
Those in power now grew up during the era of the former Netherlands Indies. They 
were the stubborn fighters for independence. Look at Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Ali and 
the like. But now they have betrayed what they fought for. Sukarno has betrayed 
Independence. Yamin has falsified - or at least romanticised - Indonesian history. Hatta 
rarely dares to speak the truth. And as time passes our people are suffering more and 
more.
'I'm on your side, all you unfortunate ones.' Indonesia is sinking, sinking, and if the 
challenges of history remain unanswered, it will be destroyed. 'My unfortunate 
country.' The prices of goods are rising, everything is becoming increasingly difficult.
Gangs terrorise. The army terrorises. Terror is everywhere.
Who are responsible for all this? They are, the older generation - Sukarno, Ali, Iskak,
Lie Kiat Teng, Ong Eng Die - all of them leaders who should be shot at Lapangan 
Banteng.
We can still only hope for truth. And the radio still screams out, spreading lies. Truth 
only exists in the heavens. The world is false, false.1
1 Soe Hok-gie's diary (hereafter SHG Diary), 10 December 1959. For additional information on this 
journal and an account of its use in this thesis, see the bibliographical appendix.
'His Excellency' refers, of course, to President Sukarno. Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI was prime 
minister twice during the 1950s (July 1953 to July 1955 and from March 1956 to March 1957). Iskaq 
Tjokroadisurjo, lawyer and PNI politician, was Minister for Economic Affairs in the first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. He was accused of corruption but avoided investigation until 1959 when he was 
finally tried and convicted. Djody Gondokusumo, PRN politician and also a lawyer, had been Minister 
for Justice in the same cabinet. He was arrested and convicted on corruption charges in 1955. (On both, 
see Feith 1962: 422-3.) Colonel Ibnu Sutowo, previously territorial commander of South Sumatra and 
from 1957 head of Permina, a state-owned oil company, had been dismissed from his post as the army's 
chief of operations after a smuggling racket had been exposed in late 1958 in the port of Tanjung Priok. 
'Dahjar' is almost certainly Colonel Dachjar, the Jakarta military commander and one of the other senior
8This extraordinary passage was written a week before the author's seventeenth 
birthday and only a few months into his second year of senior high school. It makes 
abundantly clear not only his antipathy toward some of the most prominent political 
figures in Indonesia in the late 1950s, but also displays an unusually sweeping 
confidence and moral certitude, claiming for his generation the responsibility to set 
matters right.
Who was this young student and what had made him so extraordinarily self- 
assured? What kind of social background had moulded and conditioned his perception of 
the world around him? In particular, what had produced this strong sense of moral 
purpose, and what lay behind his hostility towards the course and direction of 
Indonesia's politics by the late 1950s and the qualities of its leaders? This chapter will 
attempt to provide some answers to these questions but it should be readily apparent that 
Soe Hok-gie in no way conformed to any stereotypical views about the Chinese minority 
in Indonesia as a materialistic group consumed by economic self-interest. This highly 
idealistic young man was possessed of a remarkably powerful social conscience which, 
as we shall see, guided his thoughts, his words and his actions.
A few years after these words were written, their author became deeply involved in 
political activities aimed at undermining the Sukarno government. In early 1966 he was 
one of those who played a prominent part in the turmoil on the streets of Jakarta, which
army officers caught up in the same racket. (See Lev 1966: 195-6 and Crouch 1978:78. On Ibnu 
Sutowo’s early career, see McDonald 1980: 143-6.)
Mohammad Hatta was Indonesia's vice-president until he resigned in November 1956 and withdrew from 
public life. Sutan Sjahrir had held the prime ministership from November 1945 to June 1947 and was 
the leader of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) in the parliament throughout the 1950s. Muhammad 
Yamin - lawyer, historian and nationalist ideologue - had twice been a cabinet minister during the 1950s 
and was widely believed to be close to the radical nationalist Murba party.
Dr Lie Kiat Teng (Mohammad Ali) of the PSII was Minister for Health and Dr Ong Eng Die of the PNI 
was Minister for Finance in the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet.
This entry was written a few months after the government's 'monetary purge' of August 1959, which had 
catastrophic consequences for the domestic economy and caused considerable hardship for many 
Indonesians.
Lapangan Banteng is a large square in central Jakarta that served as a bus station. It has frequently been 
used for political rallies.
was a catalyst in the chain of events that saw President Sukarno slowly but surely forced 
from power and the establishment of a new government led by armed forces commander, 
Major General Soeharto.
A distinctive peranakan heritage
Only the bare outlines of the early history of the Soe family in Indonesia are 
known. Soe Hok-gie's paternal great-grandfather, Soe Hoen Tjiang, was a native of the 
island of Hainan in southern China. He arrived in Batavia as a poor immigrant, probably 
during the 1870s, a time when thousands of Chinese, almost all of them unattached 
young men from the southern provinces, were starting to migrate to Southeast Asia 
looking for work and new opportunities. In the Netherlands East Indies only a small 
percentage of these new arrivals managed to find marriage partners from within the 
established peranakan Chinese community of acculturated overseas Chinese. Soe Hoen 
Tjiang must either have possessed some outstanding personal qualities or else he was 
very fortunate since he was an exception to this general pattem.2 34 According to the family 
stories, although like almost all of the new arrivals from China he was destitute when he 
arrived in Batavia and brought nothing from his homeland but the clothes he was 
wearing, he had the good fortune to marry the daughter of a prominent peranakan family. 
His in-laws looked with favour on their son-in-law, giving him the start he needed in his
2
This account of the early history of the Soe family is based largely on interviews with Soe Lie Piet 
(29 January 1982), Nio Hoei An (31 January, 5 and 21 February 1985), Dien Pranata (20 February 1982) 
and Arief Budiman (15 April 1979, 8 and 9 March 1982).
3
There is an extensive literature on the Indonesian Chinese community. For a sound overview see 
Skinner 1963. For a more recent comprehensive bibliographical survey see Oetomo 1989. The term 
peranakan has been used for those Chinese born in Indonesia into families where there has been some 
intermarriage with indigenous people, a degree of accommodation with local culture, and who use 
Indonesian or some other vernacular language as their mother tongue. Some of the older generation of 
peranakan had received a good education and were able to speak Dutch. By contrast, the term totok has 
been applied to those Chinese now residing in Indonesia who were born in China and who speak a 
Chinese dialect as their first language. For a clear account of the categories of totok and peranakan, see 
Coppell 1973.
Most of the totok newcomers did not marry at all (prostitution and opium abuse were rife within their 
ranks), though some took 'native' or pribumi wives or, if they were able, sent home to China for 
marriage partners.
4
There were only small numbers of Hainanese in the Netherlands East Indies. They were especially 
poor and regarded as outsiders. According to Somers Heidhues (1974: 6), Hainanese women did not 
migrate to Southeast Asia until the 1920s.
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adopted land where he soon established himself as a batik cloth trader. Soe Hoen Tjiang 
was apparently a shrewd and enterprising individual for within a short space of time he 
had amassed a considerable fortune. Yet his children and grandchildren failed to 
capitalise on these advantages, proving incapable of managing the wealth and property 
they subsequently inherited.
Soe Ho Soei, one of Soe Hoen Tjiang’s seven children and bom probably around 
1880, operated a bakery in the Tanah Abang area that prospered for a time during the 
early part of this century. Like his father before him, Soe Ho Soei married well within 
the peranakan community: his wife, Oei Tjit Nio, was the daughter of the second wife 
0bini muda) of a prominent Batavia peranakan landlord who owned large tracts of land in 
the Pasar Senen area. Despite these connections, his Tanah Abang bakery business 
ultimately collapsed when debts piled up that could not be repaid. Soe Lie Piet (Salam 
Sutrawan), the eldest of the couple's four children and father of Soe Hok-gie, was bom 
in Tanah Abang, Batavia, on 20 February 1904.5 As the first male grandchild he was the 
particular favourite of his grandfather, Soe Hoen Tjiang, who arranged for the boy to be 
raised in his own household. He was placed in the care of his maiden aunts who were 
responsible for his upbringing and for the apparent indulgence that he experienced during 
his childhood years. Consequently, Soe Lie Piet saw little of his own parents during his 
childhood and he grew up in relatively comfortable circumstances. Despite his totok 
grandfather, this was a peranakan environment so that Soe Lie Piet grew up speaking 
Malay, the characteristic Sino-Malay dialect of the Batavia peranakan Chinese 
community.6
5 Interview with Soe Lie Piet, 29 January 1982. See also Latief 1980. For brief biographical sketches, 
see Salmon 1981: 303-5 and Suryadinata 1981: 124, although many of the details in the latter, including 
his date of birth, are inaccurate. Like many Sino-Indonesians, Soe Lie Piet adopted an Indonesian name 
during the late 1960s when the government encouraged name-changing as an assimilation measure. He 
died in Jakarta in August 1988.
6 For a detailed account of this Sino-Malay dialect, its origins and its relationship with both other Malay 
dialects and modem bahasa Indonesia, see Oetomo 1991, and also Salmon 1981: 115-22.
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Soe Lie Piet received a rudimentary education at one of the elementary schools that 
had been established in Batavia early this century under the auspices of the Tiong Hoa 
Hwee Koan (the Chinese Association, THHK). Since the first four years of instruction 
were in Mandarin (Kuo-yii) the young peranakan learnt little of lasting value. However, 
during his final three years at school much of the instruction was in English, and Soe Lie 
Piet managed to absorb sufficient of this language to achieve an effective reading
g
knowledge in his adult years.
After he left school, Soe Lie Piet worked for a while in his parents' bakery in 
Tanah Abang, and later, probably under the influence of his grandfather, he also tried his 
hand at the batik trade. However he did not last long at either pursuit. Brought up in the 
comparative affluence of his grandfather's house where he had been indulged by his 
maiden aunts, he was not attracted by the idea of long hours of drudgery in the family 
bakery and he appears to have lacked the temperament for commercial work. His 
apparent aimlessness and his enjoyment of time spent in the company of a group of 
indolent friends contributed to his reputation within the family as something of a ‘black 
sheep’.
In fact, by his late teens Soe Lie Piet had decided that he really wanted to become a 
writer. As a child he had been attracted to the imaginative and creative world of books 
and ideas; then in his teenage years he began to write poems and short stories, some of 
which he managed to have published. In his youth, Soe was inspired by the example of 
older peranakan writers, journalists and publishers who were responsible for the 
impressive proliferation of newspapers, magazines and literary journals in the Sino- 
Malay language that sprang up throughout the Netherlands Indies during the first quarter
7
On the THHK schools and the problems of Chinese education in the Netherlands East Indies during 
this period, see Somers Heidhues 1965: 47-50; 1974: 39; Suryadinata 1972a: 49-54; and Nio 1940.g
English, rather than Dutch, was the preferred choice as a foreign language at THHK schools. See 
Suryadinata 1972a: 53-4; also Suryadinata 1981: 60.
 ^ See Salmon 1981: 303.
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of the twentieth century.10 In particular, Soe was influenced by the legendary writer and 
journalist Tan Boen Kim whom he appears to have known and sought out for advice.* 11
In the early 1920s, the young man left Batavia for what turned out to be an 
extended period of travel. By the mid 1920s he was in north Sumatra where he found 
employment for a time with a Medan newspaper, Tjin Po. Towards the end of 1926 he 
had moved to Palembang where he was appointed to the deputy editorship of a new bi­
weekly peranakan newspaper, Han Po, that had been launched by a group of peranakan 
businessman in that city. But in April 1927 he suddenly resigned and returned to 
Batavia.14 By the following year he had departed again, this time for Surabaya in East 
Java.
During the late 1920s Surabaya and nearby Malang were important centres of the 
burgeoning peranakan publishing enterprises in the Indies. Soe Lie Piet managed to 
secure an editorial position with Hoakiao, a prominent bi-monthly magazine, popular 
within the peranakan community. At the same time he began to devote himself seriously 
to his own writing, managing to have several of his works published. In October 1928 
he won first prize for an essay in a competition organised by the editors of Liberty, a 
monthly literary magazine.15
10 On the development of peranakan Chinese publications during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, see Salmon 1981: 33-46, 100-6; and Adam 1995.
11 Interview with Nio Hoei An, 31 January 1985. Also born in Batavia, the self-educated Tan Boen 
Kim was a prolific and popular writer of novels and stories from about 1912 onwards, many of them 
based on infamous crimes and other sensational events. Among his best known novels was Nona Fientje 
de Feniks (1915) based on the life of a famous Eurasian prostitute who was murdered by her lover. See 
Salmon 1981: 310-13.
^  Interview with Soe Lie Piet, 29 January 1982; Tjin Po 1925-1926. According to Suryadinata (1981: 
124), Soe Lie Piet was editor of Tjin Po from 1922-6, but the newspaper did not appear until 1925 and 
Soe Lie Piet's name never appeared on its editorial staff list. Since this appears to have been his first 
newspaper job, he was almost certainly employed there in a junior capacity.
13 See Han Po, 8 November 1926. This was the newspaper’s first edition, and its chief editor was Tan 
Thwan King. Salmon (1981: 303), however, dates Soe Lie Piet's appointment to 1927 and describes him 
as editor-in-chief. Soe contributed articles on a range of subjects and began to write a story set in the 
Glodok and Mangga Besar areas of Batavia entitled 'Dasarnja baik' (Good foundations), which appeared in 
instalments in each edition.
14 Han Po, 14 April 1927
15 The essay, entitled 'Pertjidra'an roemah tangga' (Household disagreements), appeared in Liberty, 
October 1928. Several further essays and a poem were published in the following months in the same
13
The Hoakiao  group was also the publisher of another literary monthly, 
Penghidoepan, that had been launched in 1925 in Surabaya. Soe Lie Piet was appointed 
editor in 1928 and 1929. The format of this publication was significantly different from 
most of the other peranakan literary magazines and periodicals, for each monthly edition 
of Penghidoepan actually consisted of a complete novel. The same formula was also 
adopted by a rival publication, Tjerita Roman, first established in Malang in December 
1929. Although a number of other competitors appeared throughout the 1930s, none 
was as successful as these two literary monthlies, which together published many novels 
by most of the leading peranakan authors during that period.16
Soe Lie Piet's own experiences in Surabaya and the contacts he made there drew
him into this literary circle, and in 1929 his first full length novels, Takdir!? (Fate) and
Oeler Jang Tjantik (The Beautiful Snake), were published by Penghidoepan. From this
promising beginning Soe quickly established himself as a popular author within the
peranakan community. During the 1930s he joined that select band of writers whose
18work was regularly published by the leading peranakan literary journals of the day. 
Most of his novels were sentimental love stories taking place in a familiar Indonesian 
setting and frequently ending in tragedy. Although the main protagonists were invariably 
peranakan Chinese, Soe's stories frequently turned upon magical and mystical elements 
drawn from indigenous society. Throughout this period he maintained a prolific literary
journal. In July 1929 he repeated the effort of the previous year, again securing first prize for his essay 
’Pergaoelan’ (Social relationships).
16 On Penghidoepan and Tjerita Roman, see Salmon 1981: 429-33 and 447-51; also Nio Joe Lan 1962: 
24-6.
17 Takdir!? appeared in Penghidoepan. March 1929; it is the sad story of a young woman forced into 
concubinage by a rich and unscrupulous merchant when the young man to whom she is betrothed is 
reported to have been killed while studying in Shanghai. Oeler jang tjantik, the story of a peranakan 
Chinese who abandons his wife for a Sundanese mistress, appeared in Penghidoepan, May and June 1929.
18 See the notice announcing the tenth anniversary of Tjerita Roman in its January 1939 edition. Soe 
Lie Piet is listed as one of the most prominent authors of the day, along with Njoo Cheong Seng 
('Monsieur d’Amour'), Pouw Kioe An, Chen Wen Zwan, Ong Khing Han and Liem Khing Hoo 
('Romano').
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output. In addition to another fifteen published novels during the next ten years, there 
was a steady stream of short stories, essays, translations and travel writing.19
In 1930 Soe moved to Bandung and attempted to establish a publishing venture of
his own in that city with the aid of friends. However, the venture failed through financial
mismanagement and lack of capital.“ For a time he worked in the printing establishment
of a friend, while continuing to write novels and collaborating with others in their
21attempts to launch literary journals in both Bandung and Batavia.
In early 1933, Soe Lie Piet was married in Bandung. This was not a love match, 
for the couple had never met before the betrothal that had been arranged principally by 
one of Soe's aunts who had Bandung connections. The bride, Nio Hoei An (Maria 
Sugiri), was bom in Bandung in 1907, the third child of a family of ten. Her father, Nio 
Boen Kie, who had died when she was about eleven, had been born in the Hokkien- 
speaking region of Fujian in southern China. He had come to the Netherlands Indies 
alone as a young man, establishing himself as a cloth trader to the Sundanese villages in 
the Bandung hinterland. Around the turn of the century, he married into an old 
established Bandung peranakan family. Together with his wife, Tan Lin Nio, he built up 
a thriving business buying, selling and processing a wide range of rural produce from 
their shop-house in Jalan Kelenteng, near the Andir produce market in central Bandung.
19 Unfortunately, nothing is known about the size of the print run of these novels or the reception they 
received from their peranakan readers. Two of his novels are briefly described in Nio Joe Lan's pioneering 
study (1962: 79 and 124-5) and most of his literary output is listed in Salmon's invaluable annotated 
bibliography (1981: 303-5).
20 This was probably known as Library, which Salmon (1981: 303) describes as ’a monthly....with 
articles on a wide range of subjects'. Soe Lie Piet is described as its former chief editor in a note on the 
facing page of Tjerita Roman, April 1934. It is not known how many issues appeared but it was almost 
certainly shortlived. There are no copies of Library in any of the established collections of Sino-Malay 
publications.
21 These include the literary monthlies Goedang Tjerita and Tjerita Novel that both first appeared in 
Bandung in 1930, and Sunrise launched in Batavia in the following year. Soe Lie Piet appears to have 
been the editor of the latter, which was published by Kwee Khe Soei. Another six novels by Soe were 
published in these monthlies between 1930 and 1932, including one based on his Bandung experiences, 
Bandoeng di Waktoe Malem (Bandung by Night), which appeared in Goedang Tjerita, January 1931. For 
the other works see the attached bibliography.
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Despite her father's totok origins, Nio Hoei An grew up in a thoroughly peranakan 
environment dominated by the traditions of her mother's family where Sundanese was 
the everyday language and Chinese was unknown. As a young child, she received 
several years basic education in the Malay language at a Dutch Protestant mission school, 
followed by a further four years at a THHK school. Until her marriage, she had led a 
fairly sheltered life helping in the family business.
In 1933 Soe Lie Piet again found himself unemployed and was forced to live with 
his in-laws. He returned briefly to Palembang that year hoping to find further 
employment with Han Po but its publishers had been declared bankrupt. However, in
1934 he secured some work as an editorial assistant with the Surabaya literary monthly
23Tjerita Roman ~
In August of the same year, Soe set out for Bali, accompanied by his wife and their 
eight-month-old daughter, Soe Lian-hiang (Dien Pranata).24 He had arranged to act as a 
correspondent for several Java-based publications and intended to explore the 
possibilities of establishing a newspaper in Denpasar, where he and his family lived for 
nearly a year. Although his plans for a publishing venture never materialised, Soe used 
his time in Bali productively. He wrote several short stories and novels, including some 
that were inspired by his Balinese surroundings. He also spent a considerable amount 
of time visiting places of interest throughout the island, collecting material for travel
22 Interview with Nio Hoei An, 31 January 1985. She recalls that her father had worn the queue and 
practised Buddhism. However, he also spoke Sundanese fluently and discouraged his children from 
attempting to learn Chinese. Among her mother's family there had been a high degree of intermarriage 
with pribumi Indonesians, and for several generations the family had acted as suppliers of goods and 
services to the local Sundanese aristocracy.
23 See the announcement on the facing page of Tjerita Roman, April 1934. Several more of Soe's 
novels appeared in 1934, including one that drew upon his experiences in Sumatra. See Bidadari dari 
Telaga Toba (The Beautiful Spirit from Lake Toba) in Tjerita Roman, May 1934.
“4 The couple's first child was bom on 27 December 1933.
25 See Lejak (The Evil Spirit) in Tjerita Roman, April 1935. This is a rather fanciful story of 
unrequited love involving a Balinese dancing girl and a Chinese man. It became one of his best known 
novels.
16
writing and guide books that subsequently appeared in several editions in the following
26years.
Upon their return to Java at the end of June 1935, Soe and his wife settled in 
Batavia, at first renting a simple one-room house in a kampung area of central Jakarta, 
then known as Pondok Rotan. The following years were not especially easy for the 
family. Unlike the period in Bali where food and lodging had been cheap and they had 
been able to live comfortably on the little that Soe Lie Piet was able to earn from his 
writing, in Batavia this was now insufficient to meet the needs of his young family, 
especially since he was unable to find regular employment as a journalist. For a time,
he obtained work writing advertisements for small Chinese firms producing commercial 
publications but this was not an activity he enjoyed. Despite these setbacks, he 
succeeded in having four more novels accepted by publishers in the late 1930s, although 
the amount of money he was able to earn from his literary work was small. Family life 
was further unsettled by the difficulties Soe and his wife experienced finding a suitable
permanent home in Batavia, forcing the family to move from one unsatisfactory rented
29house to another on several occasions during the late 1930s.
With war threatening to erupt in the Pacific, a third child and their first son, Soe 
Hok-djin (Arief Budiman), was bom on 3 January 1941. After the surprise assault on 
Pearl Harbour by the Japanese on 7 December 1941, the landings in Malaya the 
following day and the fall of Singapore in February 1942, an invasion of the Netherlands 
Indies was clearly imminent. As a mood of great uncertainty and rumours of impending 
danger gripped the city, Nio Hoei An decided to retreat to her mother's home in Bandung
26 See Melantjong ke Bali [dari pengalaman sendiri 1 taon berdiam di Bali] (Sightseeing in Bali [based 
on a year’s personal experience living in Bali]) in Penghidoepan, November 1935. In the same year the 
Paragon Press in Malang published his guide book, Pengoendjoekan (sic) Poelo Bali atawa Gids Bali 
(Guide to the Island of Bali or the Bali Guidebook). These were probably the first travel guides on Bali to 
appear in Malay; one of them was reprinted in revised form in the 1950s.
27 A second daughter, Soe Lian-eng (Mona Sugiri), was bom in 1936.
28 Interview with Nio Hoei An, 5 February 1985 
9 9
One house in the Petojo area was situated close to the Batavia gas works in Jalan Ketapang and the 
family was unable to endure the smell; another kampung house was too hot and crowded, while a third 
had to be vacated when it was sold.
17
with her three young children, leaving her husband behind in Batavia to continue to 
search for a suitable place to live.
The arrival of the Japanese Imperial Forces in Java in March 1942 was the 
beginning of a difficult period for the Chinese section of the local population and many 
suffered at the hands of the Japanese during the years of the occupation. Chinese 
intellectuals, writers and journalists fell under immediate suspicion, many were arrested 
and most of the existing peranakan newspapers and publishing houses were closed 
down. By a stroke of good fortune, however, Soe Lie Piet and his family were not 
adversely affected by these events. Some time before the Japanese occupation, Soe had 
managed to secure a job with a recently established Batavia daily, Hong Po. Its publisher 
and chief editor was Oey Tiang Tjoei, who was not only an outspoken critic of Dutch 
colonialism but also an ardent supporter of the Japanese. In 1941 Oey was arrested by 
the colonial authorities for his pro-Japanese activities, but the newspaper continued to 
appear under its deputy-editor, Suma Tjoe Sing. After the arrival of the Japanese Oey 
was quickly released. While other established peranakan newspapers such as Sin Po and 
Keng Po were forced to close, Hong Po was one of the few permitted to continue,
becoming a vehicle for pro-Japanese news and articles exhorting the Chinese community
32to support the war effort.
Soe Lie Piet was employed on the Hong Po editorial staff for about two years. 
Protected by his employer’s strong support for the Japanese, he and his family did not 
experience any special difficulties throughout the war-time occupation. For a brief period 
later in the occupation, he joined his younger brother Soe Lie Foo, who had established a 
successful business as a supplier to the Japanese armed forces at Tanjung Priok, the port 
area of Jakarta, as the colonial city was now called. When the British arrived in Jakarta
^  See Somers 1965: 105.
^  Hong Po first appeared in 1939. On Oey Tiang Tjoei (1893-1977), see Salmon 1981: 278. For an 
account of his political role before and during the Japanese occupation, see Somers, 1965: 104-5.
32 In September 1942, Hong Po was merged with the Japanese-controlled Chinese-language daily, Kung 
Yung Pao, as its Malay-language edition. See Gani 1978: 95 and 106-7; and Latief 1980: 28-9, 121 and 
129.
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in September 1945, Soe Lie Piet continued to work for some time at Tanjung Priok doing 
routine clerical and administrative work.
Kebon Jeruk
In the middle of 1942 and several months after the Japanese occupation had begun, 
when Soe had finally located a suitable house for his family in an area of Jakarta known 
as Kebon Jeruk, Nio Hoei An returned from Bandung with the three children. She was 
already pregnant with her fourth child and on 16 December that year another boy, Soe 
Hok-gie, was born in the newly established family home. This area of Jakarta, its 
narrow and crowded streets filled with becak drivers and street hawkers, was a critical 
part of the children's experience during their formative years. This is especially 
important in the case of Soe Hok-gie, for unlike each of his siblings, he never really left 
this neighbourhood. He was to remain living in his parent's home throughout his short 
life and was buried from there twenty-seven years later.
The Kebon Jeruk area of modern day Jakarta had its origins back in the mid 
eighteenth century as the colonial city of Batavia gradually expanded southwards from its 
earliest beginnings in and around the port settlement at Sunda Kelapa. It is located about 
half-way along and on the eastern side of Jalan Hayam Wuruk, a major thoroughfare 
running alongside the long canal (formerly known as the Molenvliet) that connects the old 
commercial and administrative area of Kota (formerly Benedenstad) and Sunda Kelapa 
(also known as Pasar Ikan) with the complex of government and administrative buildings 
surrounding the Medan Merdeka square and its towering national monument. The 
block of narrow criss-crossing streets that comprises the greater Kebon Jeruk area - 
roughly a square kilometre - has clearly defined boundaries on every side. To its west is 
the busy Jalan Hayam Wuruk lined with shops, offices and commercial buildings; to the 
north is Jalan Mangga Besar Raya (formerly Prinsenlaan), another busy commercial 
street; to the east is Jalan Taman Sari Raya flanked by the main railway line running up to
33 On the history of Jakarta's growth, see Abeyasekere 1989: 3-130.
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the Kota central station; and to the south is Jalan Sukarjo Wiryopranoto, known 
originally as Jalan Sawah Besar and with a bustling market place of that name.
Although from the early nineteenth century this has been an ethnically mixed area, 
Kebon Jeruk has always had a significant Chinese community,34 and a large and famous 
mosque stands here that was built in 1786 by peranakan Chinese Moslems. In the 
early 1940s, there were no longer any signs of the citrus groves that had given the area its 
name, but although Jakarta was rapidly expanding, there were still some open spaces to 
the east not far from the Soe family home, the remaining evidence of the semi-rural 
kampung origins of this particular region.
Soe Lie Piet had located a suitable house for his family in Jalan Kebon Jeruk IX, a 
narrow street running parallel with Jalan Hayam Wuruk but set back about three hundred 
metres from that main thoroughfare. The house, rented from a certain Tuan Abdullah 
Bey, a prominent peranakan Arab landowner in the area, was a modest, mostly timber 
dwelling, probably built in the early years of the century. According to the 
recollections of the Soe family, in the early 1940s it was one of the more substantial 
houses in the immediate neighbourhood, although it was certainly not large and was 
nothing more than adequate to meet the family's needs. A low iron fence presented a 
token barrier from the street, and the house itself - set back only a few metres - was 
approached by a low flight of steps. The whole structure was built up more than a metre 
to provide some protection against the ever present possibility of flooding. During the 
wet season, the street's drains and the nearby canals - frequently choked with refuse - 
were unable to cope with sudden monsoonal downpours and often broke their banks 
causing swirling murky floodwaters to invade many of the houses in this low-lying 
region of the city.
34 See Castles 1967: 162.
33 See Salmon and Lombard 1977; also Heuken 1982: 109.
36 The monthly rent was originally Rp 12. Eventually the rent was pegged by the government at Rp 
1000 and could not be increased. Interview with Soe Lie Piet, 29 January 1982
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A narrow, bare-swept yard ran down most of one side of the free-standing house 
with several large foliage trees providing some relief from the scorching tropical sun. At 
the top of the steps was a broad open verandah, its floor, like that of the rest of the 
house, covered with the ubiquitous polished ceramic tiles. The verandah served as the 
place to receive visitors and provided a suitable vantage point to observe the parade of
street vendors and itinerant hawkers who passed the front door from early in the morning
37until late at night.
This was not a house or a neighbourhood in which it was possible for young 
children to grow up cocooned from the harsher realities of the world around them. 
Throughout the 1940s and the early 1950s, a series of crudely-constructed bamboo 
shacks lined the street immediately opposite the Soe's Kebon Jeruk house and these 
served as the semi-permanent homes for a number of struggling families. Some of these 
people were petty traders from distant villages who brought goods to sell at the nearby 
Kaligot market in Sawah Besar just a few minutes walk away through the side streets, 
and who found it more convenient to overnight nearby until their transactions were 
completed. In addition to produce vendors, there were also handicraft producers and 
peddlers (tukang bakul) who traded in basketry and simple kitchen utensils made from 
bamboo, products for which the Kebon Jeruk area and its markets were well known. 
There were also other more or less permanent occupants of these rough dwellings, some 
of them poor Betawi people, who eked out a precarious existence doing casual menial 
work in the neighbourhood as domestic servants, gatekeepers, nightwatchmen and odd- 
job men.
Despite their mother's occasional expressions of half-hearted disapproval about 
playing with the kampung children, her two small boys, Hok-djin and Hok-gie, found
37 When visited in January 1982, the house retained an old-world, slightly dilapidated charm that was in 
sharp contrast to the signs of modern urban ugliness fast closing in on all sides. By early 1985 the Soe 
family had moved from the neighbourhood, the old house had been completely demolished and a concrete 
multi-storied structure with a fortress-like facade occupied the site.
38 The Betawi were the original ethnic inhabitants of the Jakarta area. Abeyasekere (1989: 65-7 and 
191-2) notes their decline in the face of the city’s growth.
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their earliest playmates on the streets outside their front gate among the children of their 
poor neighbours. The Soe family itself was certainly not well-off: the children grew 
up in an environment where there were few material possessions, and where their mother 
performed most of the daily household chores with minimal assistance from servants. 
Yet there was a solid roof over their heads, and the children were always adequately 
though simply clothed and fed. Consequently, throughout their childhood years, the two 
brothers steadily came to appreciate the contrast between their own apparent good fortune 
and the constant struggle faced by their poorer neighbours. Their growing awareness of 
the harsh realities of the world around them was one of their most important childhood 
experiences.
Early school years
I have been unable to establish precisely when Soe Hok-gie and his brother and 
sisters began to attend school but it was probably no earlier than late 1947, and in Hok- 
gie's case, perhaps not until at 1948. After the arrival of the Allied Forces in late 1945 
and the gradual return of the Dutch, the city of Jakarta became contested territory. The 
Republican-appointed Mayor, Suwiryo, who was tolerated until the First Dutch Police 
Action of July 1947, established Republican schools in the parts of the city under his 
control, but none were available in the Soe's neighbourhood.40 Before the war, the 
eldest child in the family, Lian-hiang, had attended a Dutch-medium government school 
for girls (HCS) and Nio Hoei An was keen to have all her children attend school as soon 
as possible. By late 1947 the only school available was a 'Hsin Hwa' school in the Kota 
area operated by the Chinese community. Much of the tuition was conducted in English, 
there was some Indonesian, and Chinese was also taught. Several of the Soe children
39 SHG Diary, 3 September 1960. More than a decade later, Soe Hok-gie was still able to recall the 
names of these children and the memories of these early childhood experiences remained vivid. One 
neighbour, Pak Hassan, the father of one of their special friends, Mamat, had been swept up in the 
romusha slave labour program during the Japanese occupation; he worked as a nightwatchman, and also 
cut grass and cleared garbage, including that of the Soe household. Interviews with Arief Budiman, 5 
March 1982 and Nio Hoei An, 21 February 1985
40 See Abeyasekere 1989: 156-7.
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attended but gained little from the experience 41 When the Dutch finally conceded the 
inevitability of independence in November 1949, the new government was in a position 
to organise a system of national education and government schools quickly opened all 
over Jakarta.
As far as the Soe family was concerned, there was no cultural imperative or 
commitment encouraging the pursuit of a Chinese-language education. Nio Hoei An, 
despite her own limited education, immediately sensed the importance of enrolling in a 
government school where instruction would be in the new national language, 'bahasa 
Indonesia'. When the possibility of attending one of the recently opened government 
elementary schools (sekolah dasar negeri) presented itself, Soe Hok-gie, his brother 
Hok-djin and their two older sisters were quickly transferred there, probably early in 
1950. The school they attended operated in an old Chinese-medium school building in 
Gang Komandan, a narrow lane on the far side of Jalan Mangga Besar Raya, a short 
distance to the north.4“ Reflecting the area from which the children were drawn, most of 
the students and almost all of the teachers were from Sino-Indonesian backgrounds. 
Hok-djin, almost two years older, had been one class ahead at the 'Hsin Hwa' school but 
now both brothers were enrolled together in the first grade. Both were bright students, 
and they performed well enough at elementary school to show their future potential.
Of particular importance, both boys learnt to read early and quickly became eager to 
search out books from wherever they could find them 43 They became regular visitors to 
public libraries and patrons of the small lending libraries (taman bacaan) that sprang up in 
shops and on street comers in Jakarta and where, for a small sum, books could be
41 SHG Diary, 3 September 1960. Soe Hok-gie could recall little about it beyond the names of a few of 
his teachers.
4~ This lane was later widened and is now known as Jalan Mangga Besar I.
43 Interview with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979. On the subject of books and reading Arief recalls his 
mother reading to them from Chinese comic books bought or rented from the Sawah Besar market, with 
stories about classical heroes and the struggle between the forces of good and evil. He also recalls two 
particular lending libraries, one operated by an elderly Chinese lady in the Taman Sari area and another in 
Jalan Hayam Wuruk where they found translations of popular English language works such as The Last 
of the Mohicans and the stories of Karl May, a German writer of Western adventure stories. Many of 
these were translations printed by the local publishing house, Jembatan.
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borrowed for a fixed period. The boys organised a group of their friends to pool their 
meagre resources for this purpose. Both boys began with adventure stories, especially 
the martial arts stories known as cerita silat and the work of popular Western writers 
translated into Indonesian-language editions. However, before long - and certainly while 
he was still at elementary school - Soe Hok-gie had started to read some of the serious 
works of Indonesian literature that were then appearing in cheap editions, including the 
writers of the 1945 generation such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer.
At the Gang Komandan school there were many friends, but the two brothers 
formed a close companionship with one particular classmate that was especially 
important. Their friend, Tjioe Tjin-hok, came from a very poor family in Karawang and 
lived with an aunt who ran a small business somewhere in their neighbourhood. The Soe 
brothers were shocked to discover that their friend was being harshly treated. Each day, 
under threat of punishment by his aunt, Tjin-hok was forced to work for long hours to 
the point of exhaustion. Hok-gie, in particular, incensed by such blatant exploitation, 
was determined to do what he could to help his friend.44 At first he persuaded his older 
sister, Lian-hiang, to remonstrate with the boy's aunt. When, predictably, this had no 
effect, he convinced his mother to allow Tjin-hok to stay with them at Kebon Jeruk. A 
few weeks later, when the boy's aunt discovered his whereabouts, the police were sent to 
bring him back. Angry confrontations followed and the local lurah, the senior district 
official, was called in to settle the matter. Ultimately, since he was still a minor, the boy 
had to be returned to his aunt's house. The unpleasant affair was a salutary learning 
experience for the young Hok-gie for it impressed upon him the harsh reality of poverty 
and injustice that was evident in the world around them. It was also an early sign that he 
was prepared to confront such difficult issues.
44
The incident was recalled vividly by several family members, and although noone can remember 
exactly when it took place, it was almost certainly while Hok-gie and his brother were still at the Gang 
Komandan school.
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During the early years of the 1950s while the two boys were still at elementary 
school, the family circumstances were made considerably more difficult by Soe Lie Piet's 
inability to secure regular employment. Around 1950 he found a position on the editorial 
staff of a new Jakarta publication, Sedan, under the chief editorship of Thio In Lok 45 
But six months later, after a dispute erupted between staff and management, Soe Lie 
Piet's employment was terminated. He subsequently obtained work as a clerical assistant 
and typist with the Jakarta branch of the Chartered Bank but this lasted only briefly. 
From this point, though only in his late forties, Soe drifted into permanent retirement.
Consequently, the family's eldest daughter, Lian-hiang, a talented and studious 
girl, was forced to abandon her much interrupted schooling to look for work to support 
the family.46 Lian-hiang, then seventeen, soon found secretarial work with a Chinese 
firm. Shortly afterwards, her younger sister Lian-eng, who was not especially 
enthusiastic about school work, took a course as a seamstress and also began to 
supplement the family income.
Soe Lie Piet had never succeeded in establishing himself in a career either in
journalism or in publishing. Athough in the late 1940s he had written two further novels
and several short stories, now his literary career also rapidly came to an end.47 Like
many other peranakan writers of his generation who wrote in the Sino-Malay dialect, he
found it impossible to adjust to the post-independence era and the challenge presented by
48the new national language, bahasa Indonesia.
This publication only survived for about a year, though there is some confusion about when it first 
appeared and whether it was a daily or a weekly: according to Salmon (1981: 303) it was 1951, while 
Suryadinata (1981: 124 and 145) suggests 1949 or 1950. It seems to have been the successor to a weekly 
magazine, Sunday Courier. It was printed and published by PT Rakjat, a company directed by Siauw 
Giok Tjhan, which also printed the PKI’s daily newspaper Harian Rakjat. See Bara Eka, No 8-9-10, Oct- 
Nov-Dec. 1965, p.5.
46 The Soe’s fifth child and their third daughter, Soe Lian-sian (Jeanne), was bom in 1945.
47 In 1948 Soe submitted four short stories to a short-lived literary magazine, Tjantik. A novella, lchlas 
Berkorban (Sincere Sacrifice), also appeared that year in the September edition of Goedang Tjerita. 
Several years later, in 1954, two books drawing on his Balinese experiences were published: one was a 
revision of his tourist guidebook, the other his final novel, Dewi Kintamani (The Goddess of Kintamani), 
a story drawing on the 1926 eruption of Mount Batur for its setting.
4  ^ For a thorough and incisive analysis of the way Sino-Malay literature was eventually marginalised, 
see Maier 1991; also Salmon 1981: 79-91 and Kwee 1977: 221-3.
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Instead, from the early 1950s Soe Lie Piet became absorbed by religion and 
introspection, occupying his time by investigating a variety of religions, including 
Christianity in both its Protestant and Catholic forms, mysticism, and the theosophy of 
Annie Besant and Krishnamurti. Soe never became deeply involved with any 
organised religion and ultimately he seemed most comfortable with the philosophical 
flexibility of theosophy where Eastern and Western beliefs found common ground. For a 
time in the early 1950s when he attended a Protestant church in Mangga Besar, the 
children followed along, going to Sunday School there. Later they joined the children of 
a neighbour at another Protestant church in Gang Ketapang, but neither of these brief 
encounters generated any commitment to Protestant Christianity.50
The children grew up knowing that their father had been a writer and had worked 
as a journalist, a fact that undoubtedly helped to legitimise these occupations as acceptable 
careers even though it does not appear that the children ever read much of their father's 
literary work.51 In any case, by the time his two sons were moving through their early 
years at school, their father had all but abandoned these pursuits and had, in effect, 
retreated into a private world. By middle age Soe Lie Piet appeared to his children as a 
reserved, gentle man absorbed in his own thoughts. As a father he was certainly never a 
dominant figure in their lives, and he rarely if ever attempted to enforce his will upon 
them or offer advice or opinions about the direction they might take in life. When it came 
to practical matters affecting the family and the children's welfare it was always their 
mother who assumed the active role. Nio Hoei An, a warm and caring parent, was the 
figure who loomed largest on the children's horizons, for it was usually she who was
49 Interviews with Dien Pranata, 20 February 1982, and Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979 and 9 March 
1982. Arief Budiman also recalls his father's interest in a Javanese mystic, Kyai Agung Suria Mataram. 
Some of the booklets he wrote in response to these interests are listed in Salmon 1981: 305.
50 Interview with Arief Budiman, 9 March 1982
~1 The children's education was in modern bahasa Indonesia while their father's novels were written in 
the Sino-Malay dialect of his generation. Arief Budiman remembers, however, as a young boy watching 
his father at work at the typewriter and reading some of his stories as the pages were completed. 
Interview, 15 April 1979
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responsible for organising their schooling, attending to their problems and administering
52punishment on the rare occasions this was required.
One slightly unusual aspect of family life as far as the children were concerned was 
the almost complete absence of extended family ties. By the 1950s Soe Lie Piet's 
grandfather and both his parents were long dead and he was not on close terms with the 
other members of his family in Jakarta, including his younger brother Lie Foo, who had 
become a successful businessman. The children always enjoyed visiting their mother's 
relatives in Bandung but this was a rare occurrence. Consequently, there was almost no 
close contact with grandparents, uncles or aunts; for better or for worse, the children
grew up without other voices of family authority to encourage, advise or otherwise
53influence them.
Secondary school begins
Towards the end of 1955 both Hok-gie and Hok-djin completed elementary school 
with such high grades that they were able to apply for admission to the best secondary 
schools in Jakarta.54 The elder brother, Hok-djin, immediately enrolled at Canisius 
College55, a Catholic secondary school for boys operated by the Jesuit order and widely 
regarded as the best school in Jakarta. However, his younger brother, Hok-gie, opted to 
enrol at a different junior secondary school (SMP), situated opposite the Gambir railway 
station on the edge of the elite suburb of Menteng. This SMP was part of the Strada
52 Arief Budiman remembers an incident from his childhood when his mother tied him up and 
administered a thrashing after he had been caught stealing. Interview, 15 April 1979
53 As a young boy growing up, the only older generation figure of significance in Soe Hok-gie's life 
was an elderly and impoverished friend of his father who was known to the family as Empek Khe Hin. 
He had been one of Soe Lie Piet's companions in their younger days and was reputed to have led a wild 
life in his youth. In the 1950s he was a frequent visitor to Kebon Jeruk and enjoyed reminiscing about 
the past. Hok-gie became a favourite with the old man, listening to his stories and talking to him about 
the books they had both read. Interviews with Arief Budiman, 8 March 1982; and Dien Pranata, 20 
February 1982. Also SHG Diary, 27 August 1960 where he recalls their friendship on the occasion of 
his death.
54 Interview with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979. In December 1954, after a problem had arisen over a 
corrupt teacher the brothers had moved from the Gang Komandan school and completed the important 
final year of elementary level at a school in Jalan Pembangunan.
55 It is now known as SMP/SMA 'Kanisius'.
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network of diocesan schools also administered by the Jesuits. It did not have the prestige 
reputation of Canisius but was a school where boys could also expect to receive a sound 
education.56
The question immediately arises as to why the two brothers did not attend the same 
school. Competition for scholarships to enter Canisius on a reduced fees basis was 
extremely tight and it is possible that Soe Hok-gie’s marks were not high enough, 
although his elementary school results also appear to have been excellent. It seems more 
likely that this was a deliberate decision on his part to seek out a different school to his 
elder brother, for around the time when the two boys were beginning their secondary 
school years, the petty disputes and seemingly trivial squabbles that are a common feature 
of many children's lives had hardened into something more serious. Tension between 
the two brothers arose and bitter quarrels occurred with increasing regularity. Ultimately, 
relations between the two boys deteriorated to the point where, after one especially angry 
explosion during their early teens, the brothers virtually stopped speaking to one 
another. This state of affairs was to continue for ten years.
It is difficult to understand completely the complex personal and emotional 
chemistry that was at work here. Both boys were obviously highly intelligent, sensitive 
individuals and yet at the same time intensely determined and competitive. By their early 
teens both were already displaying the characteristic differences of personality that were 
noted and remarked upon by their friends during their adult years. Hok-djin was the 
quieter and less communicative individual, appearing a reserved and somewhat aloof 
figure to his family. By contrast, his younger brother, Hok-gie, was more outgoing and 
exuberant and touched with a streak of impulsiveness. Both boys were strong-willed and 
stubborn, especially when it came to dealings with each other.
Interview with Father J. Drost S.J., 14 February 1985
57 These paragraphs are based on interviews with various members of the Soe family.
58 Interviews with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979; and Dien Pranata, 20 February 1982
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It seems probable that the two brothers were competing for their parents' attention, 
and that a smouldering sibling rivalry prevailed between them throughout their teenage 
years. In a family not characterised by outward signs of emotion or spontaneous 
gestures of affection and where their father seemed a somewhat distant figure, a special 
bond steadily developed between Nio Hoei An and her youngest son, who talked openly 
and freely with her about his friends, his school experiences, and the problems of 
everyday life. While continuing to live under the same roof, the two brothers simply 
avoided further unpleasant confrontations by going their separate ways and ignoring the 
other's presence whenever their paths crossed. The underlying emotional tension, 
however, continued unresolved.
Soe Hok-gie entered the Strada SMP at Gambir in the latter part o f 1955. 
Attendance at this school brought him into contact with boys from a wider range of 
backgrounds both socially and ethnically than at the schools he had attended in the 
vicinity of Kebon Jeruk. Despite his previous good school record and his obvious 
abilities, it was not long before he began to experience serious difficulties. The reasons 
for this are not entirely clear but a brief entry - the very first - angrily recorded in his diary
early in his second year at the school gives some inkling of his problems:
Today's the day when resentment begins to harden. 8 for my geography exam but 
reduced by 3 leaving me with 5. I'm not pleased about this. I'm annoyed because I was 
third in the class in that exam and I believe I'm about the cleverest at geography in the 
whole class. Resentment wells up, then sinks to the heart and hardens like stone. I
tossed my paper away. Let them punish me, I've never yet failed any exam.^
59 Interview with Nio Hoei An, 31 January, and 21 February 1985. She recalls that as a small boy 
Hok-gie was remarkably generous. Yet he also had the capacity to be immensely stubborn; when angered 
he would lapse into silence for lengthy periods.
^  SHG Diary, 4 March 1957. There are a mere thirty-four diary entries - many of them brief - written 
throughout the four and a half year period from March 1957 until Soe Hok-gie finished school in 
September 1961. Many of these entries are concerned with mundane and seemingly trivial day-to-day 
matters, and there is insufficient material here to reconstruct the events of these teenage years or to give a 
coherent understanding of his thought world during adolescence. Here and there, however, in a number of 
isolated snapshots the teenage schoolboy expresses himself with remarkable force and candour. These 
passages provide some insight into his inner thoughts, developing personality, and in particular, his 
emerging moral outlook. In addition, there are important implications here for his views about the wider 
political world and the political activism of his adult years.
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At the Strada school Soe Hok-gie formed a close friendship with one particular 
classmate, Effendi, a Javanese boy with special talent at music and with whom he also 
shared a keen interest in literature and films. Both boys became regular visitors to the 
library attached to the Central Museum on Jalan Merdeka Barat and Hok-gie continued to 
read widely in Indonesian literature and began to take a serious interest in history. A few 
authors' names appear here and there in his early diary entries but the exact details of the 
books he read during this period are unrecorded. However, some years later he was to 
recall at least one book that had made a profound impression. During his second year at 
SMP, Soe obtained a copy of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's collection of short stories, Cerita 
dari Blora (Stories from Blora), and he was deeply stirred by three stories in particular, 
'Dia yang menyerah' (The vanquished), 'Inem' and 'Pelarian yang tak dicari' (The 
fugitive no-one bothered about), in which Pramoedya writes movingly about the lives of 
ordinary Indonesians swept up by the force of events and circumstances outside their 
control. It was this kind of Indonesian literature that appeared to inspire a deeper interest 
in contemporary Indonesian history, especially the circumstances surrounding the 1945 
revolution.61
His friend Effendi's own family life had been marked by tragedy and he appears to 
have been a somewhat rebellious boy. “ Whether it was the influence of his friend or his 
refusal to accept without question the strict discipline imposed by the Catholic broeders 
who taught at the Strada school, Hok-gie began to do badly: by the end of his second 
year his grades were so poor in several subjects that the school insisted that he repeat the 
year. His mother tried to persuade him to accept the decision but Hok-gie was furious, 
claiming that he had been treated unfairly and that several teachers had been vindictive
61 See his article Tjita2 Kartini dim pengalaman seorang mahasiswa Indonesia' (Kartini’s ideals in the 
experience of an Indonesian university student), Kompas, 20 April 1968.
69
SHG Diary, 14 February 1958. According to Soe Hok-gie's mother, Effendi's parents had both been 
killed during the 1948 Madiun rebellion, and he grew up as an orphan living in Jakarta with an uncle who 
had quarters in one of the Catholic institutions. He was a frequent visitor at Kebon Jeruk during these 
years. Interview with Nio Hoei An, 21 February 1985. Is it possible that Hok-gie recalled his friend's 
circumstances when he turned to the study of the Madiun affair during his university years?
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63towards him. ~ Rather than repeat the year at Strada, he found a Christian Protestant 
school in Jalan Pembangunan III that would allow him to enrol in the third year of SMP.
It is apparent from several of his diary entries written during the following year that 
Soe Hok-gie had already entered that troubling period of adolescence when an awareness 
of sexuality was a central factor in his life. Since the school he attended during that year 
was co-educational, the issue was brought into sharper focus. Beyond a certain natural 
curiosity and the crude adolescent schoolyard banter in which he shared, his diary entries 
record a glimpse of the struggle to come to terms with those strange and powerful new 
emotions that had suddenly clouded his mind with doubts and confusion. In particular, 
he was drawn to reflect on the problems posed by the nature of human love: did such a 
thing really exist, and how was it to be distinguished from those seemingly baser human 
instincts for sexual gratification that now stirred within him? At first he was inclined to
deny emphatically the possibility of any fine or noble sentiments in human relationships:
I said there is no such thing as love (my firm belief)- Marriage is morally nothing 
more than prostitution by contract every night. Love is nothing more than sexual 
desire made to appear as something beautiful.... Pure love might as well be put in the
64rubbish basket. It doesn't exist. It's just something that is imagined.
Two years later, by the time he was seventeen, he retained a cynical attitude towards
marriage, but had clearly changed his understanding of love:
Marriage for me is identical with sexual relations, so it's also identical with lust.
Human beings are conscious of this, but they are embarrassed and are reluctant to admit 
this phenomenon. They are embarrassed about being compared with their 'nephews and 
nieces'. So for me, marriage has no purpose for what is called love with its ridiculous 
variations. Marriage is driven by biological instincts.... For me love is not marriage.
About a year or two ago I was sure that love = lust. However, I doubt the truth of that 
now. I think that there is something called pure love. But this is defiled by marriage.
I have already experienced falling in love with certain individuals, and I'm sure this
wasn't lust.^
It would be foolhardy and unnecessary to take this matter too far. These are, after 
all, nothing more than two isolated entries in a teenager's diary, and there is no
63 Interview Nio Hoei An, 5 February 1985. In a diary entry written several months later he described 
the majority of teachers at Catholic schools as 'dictators'. SHG Diary, 14 February 1958
64 SHG Diary, 9 March 1958
65 SHG Diary, 27 May 1960. This diary entry was prompted by a debate with a staunchly Catholic 
school friend about the purpose of marriage.
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substantive evidence to explain how or why he arrived at such views about love and 
marriage.66 However, the intensely felt emotions revealed in these diary entries are the 
earliest evidence of his attempts to grapple with some of the most fundamental problems 
of human relationships. Furthermore, these issues were to remain an important leitmotiv 
in both the private and public realm throughout his life. In particular, Soe's judgement 
about prominent figures in Indonesian public life was profoundly influenced by his 
perceptions of both their personality and their moral probity.
For a time he found it difficult to overcome the negative attitude towards school that 
the Strada experience had engendered. Returning to school seemed like 'returning to 
prison' and he found many of the lessons dull and boring. His new school did not 
have such a good reputation as the Catholic school and there was a rougher element
among the students who attended. For several months Hok-gie continued to complain
69about petty injustices and incompetent and overbearing teachers. He found it difficult 
to curb his natural impulsiveness and it was not in his nature to accept without challenge 
teachers' opinions when he believed them to be wrong. This often led to trouble. The 
details of one angry confrontation with a teacher in an Indonesian literature class are
recorded in his diary, concuding as follows:
Now I'm going to decide whether to be active or passive. If my grades are withheld 
(typical of the sort of teacher who can't accept criticism) I'll prepare a complete critique 
and I'll point out his slightest mistake. In fact this isn't my intention and it depends 
entirely on him. I don't wish to apologise. Certainly this is the case when he is not a 
clever teacher. But he has forgotten even about essay-writing and I believe on literature 
I'm more knowledgeable than he is. This sort of teacher who can't bear criticism might 
as well be tossed on the scrap heap. Teachers are not gods who are always right. And
pupils are not fools.7^
Were these thoughts merely a response to recent conversations with his peers? Or were they also a 
reflection of his judgements about his own parents’ relationship? Although his mother’s opinions are 
quoted (and dismissed contemptuously) on the first of these occasions, the diary evidence is inconclusive.
67 SHG Diary, 24 and 28 October 1957
68 There were frequent disruptions to classes, especially from a delinquent (crossboy) element, and 
fighting in the playground between rival gangs. SHG Diary, 12 November, 12 December 1957; 16 and
17 January, 9 March 1958
69 SHG Diary, 12 December 1957; 26 January, 4 February 1958
70 SHG Diary, 8 February 1958
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Yet his pride had been stung by the events of the previous year. Concern over his
results at examinations is a consistent theme in many of his diary entries during these
71months for he was too intelligent not to realise the importance of success at school.
Despite the distractions posed by many of his classmates, around the middle of the year
he arrived at a conscious decision to work as hard as possible. Consequently, by the
end of the academic year he passed all his examinations easily, including those subjects
that had troubled him in the previous year. In fact, his results at the State Examinations
were so outstanding in several subjects that he had no difficulty being accepted for
74admission as a student in the senior secondary school (SMA) at Canisius College.
Canisius College and beyond
The school that Soe Hok-gie entered in the latter half of 1958, several months 
before his sixteenth birthday, was an old established educational institution with a proud 
record. Founded during the late 1920s, Canisius originally functioned as a 
Hogereburgerschool (HBS), providing a secondary education for the children of the 
colonial elite. After independence the Jesuit order had continued to operate the school 
as a private institution within the Indonesian state education system, and it had acquired a 
sound reputation for strict discipline and high academic standards. The school campus 
was located on Jalan Menteng Raya, south-east of the Medan Merdeka square. Behind 
the rather sombre facade presented by the oldest part of the school to the main road, the 
remainder of the classrooms, offices and other school buildings were unremarkable and 
utilitarian. These were arranged in one and two stories around each side of two 
quadrangles, one of them large enough to contain a football pitch. By Jakarta standards, 
the school was well-equipped, possessed good facilities and, above all, retained the 
services of competent, well-qualified teaching staff. In the late 1950s its director was a
SHG Diary. 12 November 1957; 4 February and 9 March 1958
72 SHG Diary, 24 March 1958
73 SHG Diary, 16 July 1958
74 Interviews with Arief Budiman, 5 April 1979; and Nio Hoei An, 5 February 1985
75
Interview with Father J. Drost S.J., SMA Director, Kamsius College, 14 February 1985
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Dutch Jesuit, but very few of the staff were either Dutch or in religious orders. Of the 
predominantly Indonesian lay teaching staff perhaps about ten per cent were Sino- 
Indonesians.
The student body was already quite large, probably not far short of a thousand 
boys enrolled at SMP and SMA level, some of them out-of-town students accommodated 
in student dormitories within the school grounds. Over a third of them were Sino- 
Indonesians but there were also significant numbers of Javanese, Bataks and other Outer 
Islanders. Only about half the boys who attended Canisius were practising Catholics. 
Catechism classes were available but these were voluntary. The school attracted many 
non-Catholic children, including some from Islamic backgrounds. Indeed, the school's 
superior academic reputation made it a desirable place for the sons of many well-to-do 
families in Jakarta, including political leaders, senior bureaucrats, doctors, lawyers and 
other professionals. Although school fees were high for such students, a certain 
number of places were also made available for children from poorer backgrounds -
especially those who were academically gifted - under a sliding scale of charges. It was
78through such an arrangement that the Soe brothers were able to gain admission.
Soe Hok-gie was accepted as an SMA student in the humanities stream. His older 
brother, Hok-djin, who had successfully completed his SMP years at the school, had 
chosen the science stream, so there was little contact between the two boys even though 
they were in the same year. By the time Hok-gie began at Canisius he had already read 
many of the best known works of modern Indonesian literature, while his interest in 
history, especially the modern history of his own country, was well advanced. During 
his SMA years he was fortunate to find at least one teacher - a certain Pak Atja - who
76 There are no reliable school records covering the years when Soe Hok-gie attended the school. Many 
of these details are based on an interview with Father J. Drost S.J., 14 February 1985.
77 During the period that Soe Hok-gie and his brother were students at Canisius, the son of the Foreign 
Minister, Dr Subandrio, was also a student there. Interview with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979
78 Interview with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979. He recalled that they paid the minimum fee, Rp 9 per 
month.
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79commanded his respect and nurtured his interest in this particular subject. Throughout 
his three years at Canisius, Soe Hok-gie distinguished himself as a serious and 
thoughtful student. Increasingly confident in his own academic abilities, he worked hard 
and graduated from the school in August 1961 with superior results in all subjects and as 
the outstanding student in his year.
Despite their considerable success at the school, the experiences of three years at a 
Jesuit college did not make either brother any more responsive to the claims of religion. 
Although both boys attended a few religious classes out of courtesy, they firmly 
remained non-believers. Hok-gie, probably still smarting from his treatment at the
Strada school, was especially scornful of the Catholic priests he observed at Canisius:
In the past I thought that priests belonged to the people, that they were one with the 
people. But after I entered Canisius my impression changed. Priests are a new class.
The class in authority in religion. They are the ones who monopolise the truth. Just 
look at the way they live: in luxury and as flatterers to those in power. To enter SMA 
one condition is absolutely essential, a father in a powerful position. So my initial
good impressions have evaporated.^1
Hok-gie's awareness of the social and economic disparities within his society was 
undoubtedly sharpened by his experience at Canisius. Many of the boys who attended 
the school came from comparatively rich and privileged backgrounds, some of them 
living in the imposing houses of the well-to-do suburb of Menteng. Hok-gie saw them 
as part of what he disparagingly termed 'bourgeois society' (masyarakat borjuis). While 
at Canisius, he wrote the following impassioned poem in his diary which he dedicated to 
one of his school friends who came from just such a background:
Bourgeois Society 
For L.B.S.
There is something worthy of tears
I think you also know
79 . 
Interview with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979. By his SMA years Hok-gie appeared to have acquired
a little more control over his natural predeliction for argument. Privately, however, he remained highly
critical of many teachers, especially those he found wanting as regards critical thinking and wide reading.
SHG Diary, 13 August 1960.
80 Their parents had become Catholics after the boys had been accepted at Canisius, and Nio Hoei An did 
for a time make an effort to practise that religion.
81 ^
SHG Diary, 18 June 1960. Anger over the failure of several friends from poor backgrounds to gain 
entrance to Canisius led to this outburst.
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Your society, bourgeois society 
There is no truth there 
And you always evade it
I always cry out (in my heart)
'Hey, proletarians of the world'
Pray for bourgeois society.
There's a class that has abandoned truth
That stands on false values
I think there is no happiness there
For there is no love, truth and beauty in falseness
I will always pray for it
(I personally don't believe in prayer, sorry)
I don't believe you know about love 
(Lust certainly)
What is precious about money 
And to you, friend
Everything is money, balance sheets
There is no beauty in falseness 
(Are you really certain?)
Here amorality covers amorality 
Here, the visible screens
Often I'm cycling in the afternoon 
And I meet your girl (also bourgeois)
I feel so sad and full of pity
Yes, God (I don't believe in God) give them the truth 
I know
A pretty girl in a car, wearing a grey gown 
82But for me it's nothing.
The label borjuis had a sharp ring of disapproval about it that contained a personal edge. 
By the late 1950s, Hok-gie's uncle Soe Lie Foo - the brother of his father - had 
established himself as a successful businessman in the import-export trade and lived in a 
large and comfortable house in the Menteng area. The two families had never been close,
although during the late 1950s his uncle began to make occasional visits to Kebon Jeruk.
83Hok-gie appears to have disliked him intensely, avoiding him whenever he arrived.
Despite his years at an elite school and his new found friends there, Hok-gie 
continued to identify with his Kebon Jeruk surroundings, remaining in touch with many
82 He also jotted down the title of a companion piece, 'Masyarakat proletar (Proletarian society) but 
never completed it. SHG Diary, 12 June 1960
83 SHG Diary, 30 March 1958; also 24 July 1960:
'My uncle is gossiping loudly at the front. He also belongs to that clique of 
extortionists and big shot bourgeoisie.'
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of his friends in the neighbourhood, in particular his old friend Tjioe Tjin-hok whom he 
had tried to protect from his cruel aunt during their elementary school days. Tjin-hok had 
left school early and found a job. While Hok-gie was a student at Canisius, he was again 
called to come to his friend's aid when Tjin-hok found himself in serious trouble with the 
police. According to him, his employer, in an act of revenge arising from a personal 
conflict between them, had accused him of a theft he had not committed. Hok-gie
believed his friend to be innocent. Despite his age and youthful appearance he argued the
84case for the defence when the matter was heard by a local magistrate.
Political awakening
It was during his SMA years that Soe Hok-gie's consciousness of the world 
around him began to find political expression. The dramatic denunciation of President
Sukarno and other political figures that appears in his diary entry of 10 December 1959 is
85the first explicit statement in his journal of his understanding of the world of politics. 
And it is significant that it was the sight of a starving man searching for food scraps 
among the rubbish near his house in Kebon Jeruk that prompted this tirade.
To what extent were his views about politics shaped and influenced by those 
prevailing within the family? Although it is difficult to provide a completely satisfactory 
answer to this question it appears most unlikely that he was influenced directly by his 
parents, neither of whom were actively involved in political life and who do not seem to 
have been especially interested in political issues. Certainly, politics was not a prominent 
topic of discussion within the Soe household during Hok-gie's childhood years. Soe 
Lie Piet does not appear to have been interested in political questions during either the 
colonial era or the immediate post-independence period. In any case, by the mid 1950s 
when Hok-gie's perceptions of politics began to sharpen, his father had become
84 Interview with Dien Pranata, 20 February 1982; and Nio Hoei An, 5 February 1985
85 oSee page 7.
86 Interviews with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979; and Dien Pranata, 20 February 1982
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thoroughly absorbed by mysticism, numerology and various other strands of 
metaphysical philosophy. If the parents had any impact at all upon their children's 
perceptions of the external world of politics it was probably a more indirect and diffuse 
influence, resulting from their own moral code of behaviour that by teaching and example 
they tried to instill in their children: attitudes of basic honesty and fair-mindedness 
towards others, and the sense of personal self-respect and moral integrity that infused 
their attitude towards the world around them.
In this regard, Nio Hoei An played a crucial role as the parent who was most 
involved with their upbringing during their early childhood, and who helped to shape 
their attitudes towards their immediate environment. By the time Hok-gie began to 
display an interest in political issues, the bond between mother and son was a secure one. 
Although her formal education was limited and her understanding of politics and national 
affairs unsophisticated and rapidly overtaken by that of her teenage son, Nio Hoei An
nevertheless enjoyed gossiping with him about some of the important political issues of
87the day, while Hok-gie listened respectfully to his mother's opinions.
By the time he was a student at SMP level, Hok-gie was already a keen reader of 
the press. At his home at Kebon Jeruk throughout the 1950s there was always Keng Po, 
the cautious but widely respected newspaper popular among the Sino-Indonesian 
community. However whenever he could, Hok-gie eagerly scanned the pages of those 
newspapers that adopted a more openly critical stance towards the government and its 
policies. The two he particularly sought out were Indonesia Raya and Pedoman. As a
87 Many years later, Soe Hok-gie was able to recall that in the mid 1950s, when Jakarta newspapers 
were clamouring to support Fatmawati after the shock announcement of the president's marriage to 
Hartini, it was his mother who had reminded him about Sukarno's earlier marriage to Inggit Garnasih. 
See his article 'Tjita2 Kartini dim pengalaman seorang mahasiswa Indonesia' (Kartini’s ideals in the 
experience of an Indonesian university student), Kompas, 20 April 1968.
88 Interviews with Arief Budiman, 15 April 1979; and Dien Pranata, 20 February 1982. Keng Po had 
supported the PSI during the 1955 general elections. For commentary on the vigorous free press that 
prevailed in Indonesia until the late 1950s, see Feith 1962: 323-4 and 576.
89 'Tjita2 Kartini dim pengalaman seorang mahasiswa Indonesia', Kompas, 20 April 1968. See also 
'Mengapa saja memilih pendjara - Mochtar Lubis dan politik' (Why I chose jail - Mochtar Lubis and 
politics). Mahasiswa Indonesia, 31 July 1966.
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thirteen-year-old schoolboy he sought to avoid the conductor collecting the fares on the 
Jakarta tram he took to school each day so he could use the money to buy these particular 
newspapers. Indonesia Raya, a provocative and occasionally sensationalist daily edited 
by Mochtar Lubis, was renowned for its scathing attacks on the government. It had 
broken the story about President Sukarno's secret marriage to Mrs Hartini Suwondo in 
September 1954. Pedoman, edited by Rosihan Anwar and widely associated with the 
small but influential Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), was less sharply critical but often 
very penetrating in its analyses. On 21 December 1956 Mochtar Lubis was arrested in 
one of the early manifestations of a new authoritarian trend that became very strong in 
1958. He was held for more than four years without any charges ever being announced. 
Indonesia Raya staggered on despite numerous temporary bans, but finally had to cease 
publication in January 1959. When President Sukarno officially opened a Department 
of Mass Communications at the University of Indonesia in late 1959, Soe saw a bitter 
irony in this event:
The opening of that department is meaningless because independence of the press does 
not exist. This is the state of independence of the press in Indonesia - cut off a person's 
arms and legs, then put him in a 2 x 3 metre cell and give him his freedom. This is 
press independence in Indonesia.
Anyone courageous enough to attack corruption is then arrested without cause. 
Mochtar Lubis is arrested without reason. Marian Rakjat is muzzled because it’s bold 
enough to publish articles that are unfavourable to the government. I'm not a 
communist but muzzling Marian Rakjat is a violation of democracy. We make a big 
fuss about our basic human rights but then we tear them to sheds. We praise 
democracy but cut out the tongue of anyone daring enough to express an opinion that is
damaging to the government.91
Six months later, when the executions were announced of three young men who 
had been convicted of attempting to assassinate President Sukarno in Jakarta on 30 
November 1957, Hok-gie recorded his disappointment over the president's refusal to 
accept a plea for clemency, reiterating his sense of disillusionment with what he believed
90 See Lubis 1980; also Hill 1988: 87-96.
91 SHG Diary, 12 December 1959. The new department was located in the Faculty of Law and Social 
Sciences. (See Oei 1971: 185-6.) Marian Rakjat was banned briefly on several occasions during the 
1950s. Its editor was jailed for three months in December 1957 following his conviction for libelling 
Mohammad Hatta. (See Smith 1969: 234.)
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to be the failure of Indonesia's leaders to live up to the high ideals that had surrounded
9?the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule.
In addition to newspapers, Hok-gie's thinking about the direction that Indonesian 
politics had taken since independence was informed by his wider reading, especially of 
modem Indonesian history. During his final year at SMP he was profoundly influenced 
by his reading of Sutan Sjahrir’s Renungan Indonesia (Indonesian reflections). As a 
result, he gradually began to identify with the PSI cause. He was clearly deeply 
disturbed by the rapid political changes that were taking place during the late 1950s 
following the collapse of Western-style parliamentary democracy. In a long passage 
written in mid 1960, the seventeen-year-old tried to clarify for himself what he thought
the independence struggle had been about and what had subsequently gone wrong:
As human beings we have certainly thought about the '45 Revolution. Was it the 
means (to achieve a more noble purpose) or was it the objective of the entire people? If 
victory in the revolution is considered to have been the objective then the '45 
Revolution was a success. But I think that the revolution was only the means to 
achieve justice and prosperity. It is clear that we were not just concerned about the 
economy. Under colonialism we had already achieved economic success. A prosperous, 
secure Indonesia and so forth.
However Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Tjipto and others demanded something that was not 
merely concerned with the stomach but rather freedom in the wider sense, including the 
right to determine our own destiny. It was at this point apparently that these ideas were 
about to be implemented and the '45 Revolution was the means to bring this about.
The objective of the '45 Revolution was political independence and this was also the 
means for attaining the supreme ideal of justice and the realisation of humanitarian 
ideals of the highest order. We have already achieved political independence. But this 
doesn't mean that the purpose of the revolution has been fulfilled. That's still a long 
way off. We tried to bring about those noblest humanitarian ideals (my understanding 
of this also includes democracy, politics, individuality, social justice, the elimination of 
class differences and such like) with the acknowledgement of sovereignty. But what we 
find is a tragedy. We could only survive for eight years like this. In 1958 our 
independence and human liberty ended. Since 1958 Indonesia has been colonised by its 
own people but this colonisation is identical with the exploitation of man by man 
(/'exploitation de l'homme par I'homme). The reality of our revolution is quite tragic.
The French Revolution sought liberty, equality and fraternity but what resulted was the 
totalitarianism of Napoleon from then on; the aggravation of class differences (as 
opposed to equality) and the terror of their peers (Robespierre, Danton and the like).
The October 1917 Revolution sought to wipe out class society but what resulted was a 
new class within the Communist regime exactly as described in The New Class by 
Milovan Djilas.
92 SHG Diary, 12 June 1959. On this occasion Hok-gie expressed his anger over Sukarno's refusal to 
commute the death sentences handed down by the court in the following unfortunate terms: 'I think 
President Sukarno's morals are no better than those of a becak driver'.
On the assassination attempt and subsequent trial, see Surjo Sediono 1958.
^  See his article 'Kenang^an untuk seorang kawan - Zainal Abidin' (Reminiscences for a friend - Zainal 
Abidin), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No 49, Week 4, May 1967. See also Sjahrir 1947.
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The Indonesian Revolution, however, was even more tragic. Yes, the tragedy of all 
tragedies. During the Dutch period we already had security, economic stability and the 
rest. We desired something more noble. Not just these basic values.
Unlike the French and Russian Revolutions where they faced the irony of opposition to 
their own ideals, the Indonesian Revolution not only experienced that but also lost 
something it had already possessed during the Netherlands Indies period, namely that 
most valuable commodity national unity.
So the Indonesian Revolution was more tragic than the French and Russian revolutions. 
Indonesians have lost their spirit. We know that our independence (the means) is not 
yet 100% lost. Remnants of it still survive in certain places. Because of that the 
results of the '45 Revolution must be rescued by restoring democracy in Indonesia as Dr 
Hatta wrote in Demokrasi Kita. We have not yet been able to weigh up the '45 
Revolution. But so far we find:
a. Disintegration on almost every side
b. An attitude of indifference and its consequences such as corruption, bureaucracy, anti­
democratic trends, and so on.
In the past we fought for independence of the press, and what we have got is censorship 
in the name of public security. The same sort of label that was used by the old 
Netherlands Indies government. We have experienced fundamental change. In the past 
the colonisers were the Dutch and the Japanese, and now a small group of intoxicated
94individuals. They are not leaders, but imposters.
It is evident from these passages in his diary that during his teenage years Soe had 
become strongly committed to democracy and individual rights and freedoms. 
Consequently, he viewed with growing alarm the manner in which the democratic system 
was being systematically dismantled and freedom of speech and the press eroded. 
Closely related to this was his strongly expressed antipathy for totalitarian forms of
government, in particular communism:
I can only think how unfortunate is the fate of those nations that only have one 
alternative: totalitarianism. Let's hope especially for Indonesia that there is only one
choice: democracy
It must be kept in mind that although he was extremely critical of many of his 
teachers throughout his secondary schooling and remained unpersuaded by the claims of 
its religious environment, five of those years were spent in the Catholic school system 
where the prevailing view of the world was extremely hostile to Marxism and radical
94 SHG Diary, 24 July 1960. Dr Tjipto Mangunkusumo was a prominent radical nationalist during the 
pre-war period. Note Soe's sarcastic repetition of one of President Sukarno's favourite foreign-language 
political slogans. The diary entry was written only a few weeks after Mohammad Hatta’s critical article 
'Demokrasi Kita' (Our Democracy) appeared in the Jakarta weekly Pandji Masjarakat on 1 May, 1960.
^  SHG Diary, 9 August 1960
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social revolutionary parties and movements. During at least one of his years at 
Canisius, Hok-gie was taught civics by a highly articulate University of Indonesia law 
student, Liem Bian Kie, who was already active in anti-communist Catholic political 
organisations and who was to play key roles during the 1960s and in later decades as a 
political activist. A lively and popular teacher, Liem was admired by his students at 
Canisius for his forthright opinions and open criticism of public figures.
Much of Soe's opinions and his growing understanding of politics also drew
heavily upon his own reading during his frequent visits to the Museum library. He had
developed a good general knowledge of historical developments in other parts of the
world, including Europe, China and the Soviet Union, although it seems doubtful that his
views were based on any close reading of political theory or a systematic study of the
history of revolutionary movements in other societies. He was also certainly strongly
influenced by the outlook of particular sections of the Jakarta press, especially those
opposition newspapers that had attracted his attention from the mid 1950s and which
combined hostility to the government and President Sukarno on the one hand with
suspicion of communism on the other. Soe Hok-gie, along with many other young
intellectuals of his generation, read the translations of Milovan Djilas' book, The New
Class, which appeared in Indonesia Raya in serialised form in late 1957 and was deeply
98influenced by its scathing attack on the communist party in Yugoslavia.
96
96 Based on his interviews with a group of 1966 generation leaders, Frank Weinstein (1976: 61) makes 
the following interesting observation about Catholic schools in Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s:
'Of the various Indonesian schools, only the Catholic ones appear to have had much 
impact on their students' view of the world; their explanations of Marxism and 
descriptions of the horrors of life in Communist countries instilled a strong anti­
communism in the students'.
97 Interviews with Jusuf Wanandi (Liem Bian Kie), 22 February 1985; and Arief Budiman, 15 April 
1979
98 SHG Diary, 24 July 1960. The English edition of Djilas' book had appeared in the West earlier in 
1957 and had created something of a sensation in intellectual circles for its insider revelations. The book 
quickly provided ammunition for the Cold War offensive against international communism. Mochtar 
Lubis, despite his arrest, remained able to write and had prepared a translation which appeared in Indonesia 
Raya towards the end of 1957.
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At this point it is necessary to turn aside from Soe Hok-gie's own life and examine 
the broader context of Indonesia's post-independence society and politics. It is only by 
considering some of the key events in Indonesian political life during this period, and by 
paying special attention to the fundamental changes that were taking place after 1957, that 
it is possible to understand more completely this particular young man's intellectual 
development and emerging political perceptions. It is only with this background in mind 
that it is possible to appreciate why Soe Hok-gie was drawn to certain kinds of political 
activism and involvements during the early 1960s, leading on to his participation in the 




Early in the morning of 17 August 1945, two days after Japan's capitulation, 
Indonesia's independence was declared by Sukarno and Hatta in a brief, simple but 
dramatic proclamation read from the steps of Sukarno's house in central Jakarta. In the 
weeks and months that followed, as the Japanese occupation ended and Allied forces 
began to arrive throughout the region, it became clear that a further period of intense 
struggle would have to be endured before these nationalist aspirations could be translated 
into reality. In fact, it was to take more than four years before the Netherlands 
government was to concede that its reign as a colonial power in Southeast Asia had 
ended. Throughout this period of 'the revolution', protracted diplomatic negotiations 
were punctuated by bitter fighting between the Dutch and the Republican forces, although 
some of the bloodiest conflicts occurred within the Indonesians' own ranks as the result 
of the deep internal political divisions that erupted in several parts of Java and Sumatra.1
During the early stages of the revolution the city of Jakarta became contested 
territory between the returning Dutch civil administration and the Republican-appointed 
officials. Acts of violence and terror on the part of Republican supporters and counter­
terror by Dutch troops became commonplace in certain parts of the city, including the 
crowded streets and alley-ways leading from the Molenvliet, not far from the Soe family 
home in Kebon Jeruk.2
When these climactic events were occurring, Soe Hok-gie was a small boy growing 
up in Jakarta; but there is no mention of this early period in his life in either his diary or
1 The classic account of Indonesia's quest for independence is Kahin 1952. See also Anderson 1972 and 
Reid 1974 for substantial reinterpretation, and Kahin 1985 for an account of developments in the regions. 
For a study of the revolution from the perspective of the Jakarta region, see Cribb 1991.
2 Cribb 1991: 63-7
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his other writings, and so there is no way of knowing what impact, if any, these events 
may have had upon the young boy.3 Nothing is known about his impressions of the 
wider political world until the mid 1950s - his early teenage years - when there is firm 
evidence for an awareness of national affairs and the shaping of a political consciousness. 
Yet a general overview of the turbulent world of post-independence Indonesia during the 
1950s and early 1960s is essential to any attempt to understand Soe's developing political 
outlook and his eventual emergence as a committed political activist in the years that 
followed.
The collapse of parliamentary democracy
At the Round Table Conference that was convened at The Hague between August 
and November in 1949, the final terms of Indonesia's independence from the 
Netherlands were thrashed out.4 The Indonesian delegates, both from the Republic of 
Indonesia and from a group of fifteen Dutch-established states, were persuaded 
eventually to accept some important compromises - principally, the deferral of a decision 
over the status of West Irian, and the acceptance of a burdensome Netherlands Indies 
debt. Yet this settlement represented a victory for those Indonesian leaders who had 
championed the cause of negotiation and diplomacy and who had a strong personal 
commitment to seeing the consolidation of a post-revolutionary state based upon 
Western-style democratic values. It was this relatively small group of politicians who 
were in the ascendancy during the first years of independence and who held the key 
positions in the cabinet of the short-lived federal Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia (December 1949 - August 1950) and in the first three cabinets of the unitary
3 During his university years, however, the revolution became a subject of serious academic interest to 
him. See Chapters 3 and 6.
4 See Kahin 1952: 433-45 on the terms of the agreement. Within eight months, the Dutch-imposed 
federal structure, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), had collapsed under the impact of 
a surge of nationalist resentment after an attempted coup d'etat involving a recently demobilised officer of 
the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, Captain Westerling and Sultan Hamid, the federalist leader from West 
Borneo. The unitary Republic of Indonesia was inaugurated on 17 August 1950.
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Republic under Prime Ministers Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo.5 Yet during the middle 
years of the 1950s - the period when Soe Hok-gie was beginning to display a keen 
interest in the wider world around him - parliamentary democracy was under assault from 
many quarters throughout the country. By March 1957, when Prime Minister Ali 
Sastroamidjojo resigned his mandate, Indonesia had experienced the rise and fall of seven 
different governments in little more than seven years. None of these cabinets had lasted 
more than two years. Whatever positive achievements they were able to claim, this was a 
depressing record of instability, contributing to the sense of disillusionment that pervaded 
the political elite and spread throughout the wider political public. Within the broader 
reaches of traditional Indonesian society, there was little understanding or appreciation of 
the conventions upon which a Western-style democracy depended, such as the concept of 
an institutionalised opposition. Dutch colonial rule had generated a widespread belief in 
democracy but little experience of its practices, while some pre-colonial traditional 
political institutions based upon strong authoritarian rule had been reinforced.6 
Consequently, when the assault on parliamentary democracy began few Indonesians 
were disposed to come to its defence.
Fragmentation and disunity had characterised the nationalist movement before 
1942. Throughout this period no single united nationalist organisation had emerged with 
sufficient kudos and broadly-based support to form the basis for the development of a 
strong political party in the post-independence period. Instead, the competing claims of 
regional, ethnic and religious loyalties produced a cluster of political parties, each with 
strong bases of support but none powerful enough to make any claim on forming 
government in their own right. Consequently, throughout the 1950-57 period, cabinets 
were based on a shaky series of coalitions between several parties. Given the shifting 
power balances within the political parties making up these coalitions, the low level of
5 For the most comprehensive account of the period of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, see Feith 
1962.
6 See Anderson 1966 for an account of the way anti-democratic and authoritarian elements had been 
encouraged during the Japanese occupation.
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party discipline and the inability of cabinet to exert any authority over party members 
sitting in the parliament, instability was almost guaranteed.
During the early 1950s, especially under the first four cabinets led by Prime 
Ministers Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, the administrative machinery of 
government was strengthened and a start was made on the difficult tasks of rebuilding the 
national economy after the devastation of war and revolution. These successes, 
however, were largely offset by the abject failure of government to solve some of the 
difficult and potentially divisive issues that were increasingly demanding attention. Some 
of these problems were caused by the inflated expectations of former revolutionary 
fighters who believed that independence would guarantee new opportunities and instant 
rewards. In particular, successive cabinets were unable to control the rapid expansion in 
the size of the government bureaucracy or to rationalise and reorganise the armed forces, 
which required the demobilisation of large numbers of personnel. One cabinet, that of 
Wilopo, was forced to resign when it attempted to clear large numbers of squatters from 
government estate lands in North Sumatra, but was constantly thwarted by the strength of 
parliamentary opposition.
None of the cabinets of the 1950-57 period was able to deal effectively with two 
issues, both of which had the potential to split the country asunder. There was a 
seemingly insoluble wrangle about the nature of the Indonesian state and society and the 
place of Islam within it. The increasingly sharp divisions between the major parties, 
especially between the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) and 
the Muslim Masyumi, made it impossible to achieve any solution to this issue inside the 
parliament. The other major divisive issue was regional rebellion. At no time throughout 
the 1950s was Indonesia ever free from this problem. Islamic extremists had taken up 
arms against the Jakarta government under the banner of Darul Islam in both West Java 
and South Sulawesi beginning in 1948, while Acehnese dissidents had joined this 
rebellion in 1953. In addition, the South Moluccas in eastern Indonesia was also in 
rebellion against Jakarta throughout the 1950s. The inability of the central government to
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deal effectively with these challenges to its authority did nothing for its declining prestige. 
In fact, by the mid 1950s the conflicts between the centre and the regions had increased 
dramatically as a number of other provinces - South, North and Central Sumatra and 
North Sulawesi - became the focus of renewed discontent as 'native son' regional army 
commanders began to give voice to various grievances arising from within their 
territories.
After the formation of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet in August 1953 - a coalition 
between the PNI, the Muslim Scholars' party (Nahdatul Ulama, NU) and some of the 
minor parties - there was an alarming increase in instances of patronage, nepotism and 
institutionalised corruption involving the government and its political supporters.7 The 
exposure of many of these scandals in the free press then in operation further tarnished 
the reputation of civilian politicians, political parties and the system of government of 
which they were a crucial part.
The fundamental cleavage within political system and the inability of the political 
parties to produce an effective formula that would render cabinet government workable 
were clearly demonstrated at the 1955 elections.8 Although the holding of these 
elections, the first in the country's history, was something of a triumph in the face of 
adversity, the occasion did not provide the panacea for Indonesia's problems that some 
were expecting. Not only did the long period of campaigning exacerbate existing political 
party rivalries, but the tensions and animosities were spread throughout the country, right 
down to the small towns and villages in rural areas.
The results merely confirmed what many feared. No single party received anything 
like a mandate to govern in its own right. Four parties - the PNI, Masyumi, NU and the 
Indonesian Communist Party ([Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) - won significant blocs of 
seats in the new parliament. Almost half of the Masyumi total vote came from the outer
7 See Feith 1962: 366-84.
8 For a thorough analysis of the 1955 elections, see Feith 1957.
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islands while the other three parties each received 85% of their vote from Java. The 
elections reduced several parties, such as the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia, PSI), to minor party status and obliterated several others that had played 
important parts in previous coalition cabinets. The strong electoral support for the PKI, 
especially in Central and East Java, was a shock to many of its political opponents. This 
unexpected result was confirmed in the elections for regional assemblies held in mid 1957 
when the PKI increased its support, securing the largest percentage of votes of any party 
in Java.9
Despite an attempt in March 1956 to cobble together a coalition under Prime 
Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, with participation from all the major parties except the PKI, 
the result soon proved unworkable. The government, racked by internal dissension and 
under attack from its critics, especially those in the regions, barely managed to struggle 
on. Towards the end of 1956 it was obvious that the system was untenable, and by 
January of the following year the Masyumi cabinet ministers had all resigned.
One of the most significant factors contributing to the eventual collapse of 
parliamentary democracy in Indonesia was the existence of two powerful political forces 
that were ultimately to be ranged against it. Both President Sukarno and the country's 
armed forces were deeply troubled by the direction of national affairs. During the first 
half of the 1950s both had been effectively excluded from playing any active role inside 
government and parliament. President Sukarno, despite his great prestige and 
considerable popularity, had been effectively elbowed to one side to a purely formal role 
as head of state by those Westernised political leaders who had held high office in most 
of the revolutionary cabinets of the 1945-49 period.10 It was this group who had 
concluded the negotiations with the Dutch at The Hague and who continued to be 
primarily concerned with the technical, legal and administrative problems of government
9 See Feith 1962: 582.
10 For a study of Sukarno's life and political career, see Legge 1972; also Dahm 1969. For a colourful 
but not necessarily historically accurate autobiographical account, see Adams 1965.
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during the early years of the 1950s. Sukarno, however, believed that many national 
causes that he personally held to be of supreme importance, such as the pursuit of 
Indonesia's claim to West Irian, had been abandoned by those who held office during 
those years. In such circumstances he was not content with his role as a figurehead 
president. Although cabinet and parliament were the foci of executive and legislative 
authority under the 1950 Constitution, there was sufficient ambiguity about the position 
of the presidency for Sukarno to adopt the role of a spoiler whenever he chose to do 
so.11 To a very large extent, the successful operation and the longevity of successive 
cabinets throughout this period was dependent upon the personal relations between 
Sukarno and the prime ministers and their circle of senior advisors. As a Javanese, 
Sukarno's relations with most Masyumi leaders, many of whom were Sumatrans and 
devout Muslims, were poor. In those cabinets where Masyumi politicians were 
prominent, he contributed to the undermining of their authority through his frequent 
speeches and public commentary upon cabinet decisions and government policy.
The Indonesian armed forces had been established during the struggle for 
independence against the Dutch between 1945 and 1950. Their own perceptions of the 
critical role the military had played throughout the revolution led many of the senior 
members of its officer corps to believe they were entitled to express their views about 
national policies. For much of the 1950s, however, the leadership of the armed forces 
was deeply divided on many issues.12 As well as certain personal rivalries between 
senior military figures and inter-service tensions, especially between the army and the 
other services, there was growing antagonism between the small group of officers in 
senior command positions who had been educated in Dutch military academies and the 
much larger group who had received their military training under the Japanese during the
11 Under the 1950 Constitution the position of the president was 'inviolable': there was no clear 
provision for removing him from office, and there was nothing to prevent the president vetoing or 
refusing to approve legislation of which he did not approve. Furthermore, only the president had the 
power to dismiss parliament. For a succinct discussion of the terms and provisions of this constitution, 
see Mackie 1963.
12 For an account of the development of the armed forces after the revolution, see McVey 1971 and 
1972; and Sundhaussen 1982:51-111.
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occupation period. Some of these conflicts were reflected in the divisions between those 
senior members of the officer corps who were close supporters of the president and those 
who were bitterly opposed to him.13 In addition, there were also serious disagreements 
between the army's central leadership and many regional army commanders, especially 
those who shared the concerns and grievances of those areas of the outer islands for 
which they were responsible.
Despite this disunity within the armed forces, there was widespread dissatisfaction 
among senior officers about the political problems that the parties and parliament seemed 
unable to solve. There was also growing contempt for the civilian politicians and the 
political parties for their corruption and self-serving ambitions. Increasingly, senior army 
officers began to feel that they must assume responsibility for rescuing the nation from 
the political morass into which they believed it was sinking.
The push to Guided Democracy: 1957-1959
As political instability increased in the latter half of 1956, President Sukarno began 
to show signs that he would move to play a more active role in political life than the 
constitutional constraints of the presidency had so far permitted. In several rousing 
speeches Sukarno delivered in October and November, he began to make explicit his 
criticisms of Western-style parliamentary democracy.14 He attacked the ’disease' of the 
political parties and called for them to be 'buried'. He also criticised 'liberal democracy' 
and advocated for the first time what he called 'guided democracy', that is democracy
13 Many of these conflicts came to a head during and after the 17 October Affair in 1952, when a group 
of senior army officers, frustrated by the weight of political opposition to their plans for the creation of a 
more modern, skilled and professional army, attempted to pressure President Sukarno into dissolving the 
parliament. For a full account of this complex affair and its impact on factionalism within the armed 
forces, see Feith 1958: 103-39; Feith 1962: 246-73; McVey 1971: 143-52; and Sundhaussen 1982: 69- 
79.
14 For translated excerpts from two of these speeches, see Feith and Castles 1970: 81-3. Sukarno's 
criticisms of parliamentary democracy helped widen the breach with his vice-president Mohammad Hatta 
who resigned in late November 1956. The standard account of this 1957-9 period in Indonesian politics 
is Lev 1966a.
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with leadership. As to what he thought should happen next, Sukarno informed the nation 
that he had his own 'concept' (konsepsi) that he would soon reveal.
In late December the long-simmering resentment felt in the outer islands towards 
the central government moved a stage closer towards open conflict. Regional councils 
were established in North, Central and South Sumatra, calling for the resignation of the 
Ali government and its replacement by a non-party 'working cabinet' led by Hatta.15 At 
the same time, the regions began to bypass Jakarta by trading directly with foreign buyers 
in export commodities. Sympathetic to many of the regions' grievances, the Masyumi 
cabinet ministers resigned early in January 1957.
On 21 February, Sukarno delivered his long-awaited konsepsi speech in which he 
not only continued his attack on the unsuitability of Western-style democracy for 
Indonesian conditions, but also revealed his alternative proposals.16 The president called 
for the establishment of a 'Mutual Assistance' (Gotong Royong) Cabinet in which all 
four major parties, including the PKI, would be represented. He also proposed the 
formation of an entirely new body, a National Council, with representation from a wide 
cross-section of 'functional groups' within society, such as workers, peasants, youth and 
women. This body, Sukarno suggested, should arrive at decisions by consensus rather 
than voting, and he would himself lead such a council.
Only weeks later, with regional resistance to central government authority also 
spreading to Eastern Indonesia, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo formally resigned, 
having first agreed to sign a martial law decree. Both Sukarno and the armed forces were 
now in a position to begin to move against the existing system. The army chief of staff, 
Major General Nasution, was appointed as Central War Administrator and the armed 
forces were empowered by the martial law regulations to become involved in civilian 
affairs. Sukarno, appointing himself formateur as 'citizen Sukarno', established a
15 North Sumatra was quickly enticed back into the fold by the central government.
16 For a translation of sections of Sukarno's speech, see Feith and Castles 1970: 83-9.
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'Working' Cabinet (Kabinet Karya) under the prime-ministership of Djuanda, a widely 
respected engineer who was not aligned with any political party and a minister in the 
previous Ali cabinet. The structure of the new cabinet fell rather short of the principles 
Sukarno had outlined in his konsepsi, for the Masyumi refused to participate and PKI 
members were not included.17 But the other half of Sukarno's plan was put into effect in 
May 1957 with the establishment under emergency decree of a 45-member National 
C ouncil.18 This body had wide representation, including several PKI members, 
although what role it would play in national politics vis-a-vis either the elected parliament 
or the Djuanda Cabinet was not immediately clear.
For the next few months attention was directed at attempting to solve the serious 
conflict between the regions and the central government. These efforts were largely the 
work of Prime Minister Djuanda who was responsible for convening a National 
Conference (Musyawarah Nasional) to which both civilian and military regional leaders 
were summoned. The conference, held in Jakarta from 10-14 September, was an attempt 
to examine the range of issues that were dividing the regions and the central government, 
including the serious problem of military dissension between the army's central 
leadership and its regional commanders.19 At the same time, efforts were made to bridge 
the differences between Sukarno and his former vice-president, Hatta.
The possibility of a compromise between Jakarta and the regions dwindled in late 
November and early December when a series of dramatic events suddenly created an 
atmosphere of political crisis throughout the country. On 30 November there was an 
attempt to assassinate Sukarno in Jakarta when a group of Islamic extremists tossed hand 
grenades into a crowd outside a school in Cikini during a presidential visit. Sukarno 
escaped unscathed but a number of innocent bystanders were killed or seriously injured. 
Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, a longstanding rival of the army chief of staff, Major General
17 For further details, see Lev 1966a: 18-23.
18 Lev 1966a: 23-8
19 For details of the conference and subsequent initiatives, see Lev 1966a: 31-2.
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Nasution, and an officer with close ties to the disaffected regional commanders, was 
quickly implicated in the affair.20
The day before the assassination attempt, Indonesia had failed to gain the required 
two-thirds majority in the United Nations General Assembly for its motion requiring the 
Netherlands to negotiate a settlement to the West Irian dispute. Sukarno had been 
threatening that Indonesia would take decisive action if no satisfactory progress on the 
West Irian issue was forthcoming, and this was a diplomatic rebuff to one of his long- 
cherished political goals. On 3 December, left-wing unionists and youth, apparently 
acting with Sukarno's tacit approval, began to take over Dutch businesses in Jakarta. 
These actions rapidly spread throughout the country, and within days virtually all Dutch 
factories, plantations, banks, trading firms, and shipping companies had been seized and 
placed in indigenous hands. During the following weeks tens of thousands of Dutch 
nationals were forcibly expelled. Although the president certainly encouraged these 
events, there was also a strong element of spontaneity about them. Many members of the 
government, including Prime Minister Djuanda and Nasution, were alarmed by the 
seizures and quite unprepared for what occurred. In an attempt to halt the resulting 
confusion, Nasution acted under his martial law powers to authorise army commanders 
throughout the country to take over all seized Dutch enterprises in a caretaker capacity 
until the situation could be clarified. It was soon apparent, however, that the radical 
actions had widespread popular support and the nationalisation of Dutch interests was 
quickly accepted as a fait accompli.
These dramatic events had a number of important consequences. In a single blow, 
the Dutch economic stake in Indonesia was completely destroyed. Although this 
appealed to those who had long regarded Dutch control over the commanding heights of 
the economy as inimical to Indonesia's nationhood and an unwanted legacy of the 
colonial past, it had disastrous consequences for an economy that was already
20 This was the first of five assassination attempts on the president. For details of the incident and the 
subsequent trial, see Surjo Sediono 1958.
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experiencing serious difficulties. The country's transport and communications networks 
were seriously disrupted, there was an immediate shortage of technical and managerial 
expertise, and production levels of crucial export-earning commodities gradually sagged 
over the following three years.21
The anti-Dutch campaign also served to drive a wedge between the president and 
his critics, thereby guaranteeing that any flickering hope of a solution to the regional 
crisis was quickly snuffed out. Masyumi and PSI leaders criticised the takeovers as 
extreme and economic madness, and they in turn were attacked and harassed for their 
lack of patriotism.
The crisis also inadvertently played into the hands of the armed forces and its 
central command. The emergency martial law measures that had been adopted in March 
had resulted in the army becoming actively involved in civilian affairs with very wide 
powers. The caretaker role it now assumed in a number of key economic enterprises was 
a further significant enhancement to its power.
By the beginning of 1958 the deadlock between Jakarta and the regions quickly 
moved towards open rebellion. In early February the dissident Colonels Hussein, 
Simbolon and Lubis had been joined in Padang by several senior Masyumi leaders, 
including ex-Prime Ministers Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap, and the prominent PSI 
politician and former cabinet minister, Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. The 
December-January crisis precipitated their decision to force a showdown with Sukarno 
and the left. After issuing a defiant ultimatum on 10 February, calling for the resignation 
of the Djuanda Cabinet and its replacement by one led by Hatta and/or the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta, a final breach was announced five days later with the proclamation of the 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner
21 For an account of the nationalisation measures and further discussion of the impact these actions had 
upon the economy, see van der Kroef 1958a: 59-63; and Thomas and Glassburner 1965: 158-79.
Republik Indonesia, PRRI), led by the then Governor of the Central Bank and former 
Finance Minister, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, as Prime Minister.22
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The rebellion drew support initially from Central Sumatra, certain parts of North 
Sumatra, and North Sulawesi. Other regions expected to join, such as South Sumatra, 
adopted an ambivalent attitude.23 Although the central government reacted cautiously, 
when it finally engaged the rebels, it met with little serious resistance in Sumatra though 
there was stiffer opposition in North Sulawesi. The rebellion dragged on until 1961, but 
all major towns and cities in rebel areas were under central government control by mid 
1958 and the challenge to Jakarta was effectively over. Although the rebellion was a net 
drain on national resources, politically the position of both the president and the central 
army leadership was significantly strengthened. President Sukarno's regional critics 
were crushed, while his most outspoken political opponents, the Masyumi and the PSI, 
had been compromised by the participation of their leading members in the rebellion.
As far as the armed forces were concerned, the central army command was more 
united than it had been at any time since independence. The power and authority of the 
dissident regional commanders was substantially broken and the military career of 
Nasution’s rival, Zulkifli Lubis, was destroyed. The regional rebellion and martial law 
had created a situation where a united army leadership was able to play a more active and 
self-confident role in politics, in public administration and in economic affairs. By the 
end of 1958, Sukarno and the army were effectively partners intent on finding a way to 
build a new and more authoritarian political structure that would guarantee the primacy of 
their own power and authority.24
22 For an account of the course of the rebellion and its resolution, see Feith and Lev 1963; also van der 
Kroef 1958a and 1958b. For a detailed study of the rebellion in North Sulawesi where resistance was 
somewhat stronger, see Harvey 1977.
23 Much later, in February 1960, the PRRI joined forces with the Darul Islam rebels in Aceh and South 
Sulawesi to form the Indonesian Federal Republic (Republik Persatuan Indonesia, RPI). See Feith and 
Lev 1963; 38-40.
24 For a thorough account of the complex manoeuvrings in Indonesian politics that culminated in the 
decisions taken by Sukarno in July 1959, see Lev 1966a.
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The immediate problem was how to achieve these goals. Sukarno realised that the 
Djuanda Cabinet and the National Council that had been created back in 1957 had fallen 
far short of the plans that he had announced in his konsepsi. What was required was 
some means of increasing the representation of the so-called 'functional groups' in the 
formal councils of government to achieve a political system that was more amenable to 
Sukarno's personal guidance and reflected his increased authority. Such a change, 
however, could only be achieved at the expense of the existing political parties who 
controlled both parliament and the Constituent Assembly. Although the president's 
strongest critics within the political parties had been mortally weakened by the events of 
1958, the parties as a whole were resistant to any proposals by which their position 
would be seriously eroded.
Beginning in late December 1958 and continuing into early 1959, Sukarno held 
wide-ranging discussions with a broad cross-section of party leaders and political figures 
in an attempt to persuade them to accept and implement his proposals for new electoral 
arrangements. The president was seeking to reduce the parliamentary representation of 
the political parties by half and to replace them with representatives from the functional 
groups. Slightly less than a quarter of the functional groups were to be allocated to the 
armed forces and the remainder were to be chosen by a national front organisation. 
When it became clear that with the single exception of the PKI, the parties were either 
stalling on the proposal or, as in the case of the Masyumi and NU, were fundamentally 
opposed to it, the president decided to push for a more dramatic means of securing his 
political objectives. In February he took up a cabinet proposal for a return to the 1945 
Constitution. This idea had the strong support of the army; it had first been floated in 
cabinet during 1958 by Nasution. Under the 1945 Constitution, which had operated 
throughout the period of revolutionary struggle, the president was vested with much
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stronger executive powers. Returning to it would enable Sukarno to play the more 
central role in national politics that he desired.25
A campaign to restore the 1945 Constitution quickly gathered pace, putting the 
political parties under mounting pressure to accept both this proposal and also the 
changes to the electoral system. Sukarno himself, in a major speech to the Constituent 
Assembly on 22 April, put the case for constitutional change. Over the following two 
months the president's proposals were exhaustively debated inside and outside the 
Constituent Assembly.26 The issue was finally put to a vote at the end of May, but on 
this and two subsequent attempts the proposal failed to gain the two-thirds majority 
required for ratification. The political situation was now at an impasse, with the civilian 
politicians weakened and discredited but refusing to approve any further diminution in 
their power.
Sukarno, who had been on an extensive overseas tour for the previous two 
months, returned to Indonesia at the end of June. On 5 July, without any constitutional 
authority but with the full backing of the armed forces, the president dissolved the 
Constituent Assembly and proclaimed the 1945 Constitution by presidential decree. 
Guided Democracy was now a reality.
Guided Democracy becomes established: 1959-1963
Although Guided Democracy may be said to have properly begun with President 
Sukarno's bold initiatives taken on 5 July, the institutions of the new system of 
government were only gradually put in place over the following two years. An account 
of the institutional structure of Guided Democracy alone does not fully come to terms
25 For details of the 1945 Constitution and an account of the powers of the presidency compared with 
the legislature, see Mackie 1963.
26 For the proposal to gain acceptance, it became clear that the support of the NU representatives would 
be the critical factor. During the debate, however, a deadlock arose over the question of the place of Islam 
in the constitution. The Djuanda government refused to accept the inclusion of a subsidiary clause in the 
constitution based on the so-called Jakarta Charter. The Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly held 
firm to the end in their opposition over this ideological principle. See Lev 1966a: 257-68.
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with the real nature of politics during these years. Of critical importance were the 
complex relationships between the main power holders within the system: the president, 
the army and the PKI.27 Furthermore, the nature of these relationships was a changing 
one, so that throughout the six years of Guided Democracy the character of the system 
itself underwent a significant transformation.
On 9 July, under the new presidential system of government that gave him wide 
executive powers, Sukarno appointed a 43-member cabinet, with himself as Prime 
Minister but with Djuanda retained as First Minister. Eleven posts went to military 
personnel, reflecting the key power-sharing role the armed forces were playing. Cabinet 
ministers, like all senior officials in government posts, were henceforth required to resign 
their party affiliations. Throughout the course of Guided Democracy, cabinet was forced 
to compete for power and authority with a range of other institutions of government and 
never really operated as an effective decision-making body.28
The existing National Council was transformed into a 45-member Supreme 
Advisory Council, headed by Sukarno and with Roeslan Abdulgani as its vice-chairman. 
This body became a central element of Guided Democracy, since many crucial aspects of 
state policy were canvassed at its meetings and it was deeply involved in the fashioning 
of state ideology. A new body, the National Planning Council, was established at the 
same time under the chairmanship of Muhammad Yamin, and charged with responsibility 
for drawing up ambitious national development goals and strategies.
In a system where Sukarno sought to play the central role in the political life of the 
nation, presidential speeches and public utterances played a major part in the fashioning 
of symbols and ideological constructs. The president's Independence Day speech, 
delivered on 17 August 1959, was an especially significant event in the development of 
Guided Democracy. The speech, 'The Rediscovery of Our Revolution', quickly
27 For a full explanation of the structure and political character of Guided Democracy up to 1963, see 
Feith 1963a.
28 By the end of the Sukarno era, cabinet had become an unwieldy body with almost a hundred members.
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assumed the status of an ideological tract for the entire nation.29 The Supreme Advisory 
Council declared it to be the Political Manifesto (Manifesto Politik, Manipol) of the state. 
Its five central principles, enunciated as the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, 
Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and National Identity, quickly became known by 
their Indonesian acronym USDEK.30 Although Sukarno's domestic political opponents, 
especially the Masyumi and the PSI, were dismissive of what they regarded as the 
intellectual shallowness and empty sloganeering of this and other ideological planks of 
Guided Democracy, it was taken up with considerable enthusiasm. To many Indonesians 
who had been dismayed by the bitterness and divisions that had plagued the nation over 
the previous four years, the stress placed on unity and forward movement, and the appeal 
to national pride were reassuring.
The parliament (the Peoples' Representative Council, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
DPR) that had been established on the basis of the 1955 elections continued for a time to 
operate as a temporary body. In March 1960, however, when the parliament refused to 
accept what was judged to be a quite unsatisfactory budget placed before it for 
ratification, President Sukarno immediately acted to dissolve it. By June a new 'Mutual 
Assistance' Parliament (DPR-Gotong Royong) was established with half its members 
appointed from the 'functional groups'. The remaining seats were allocated to the 
political parties, but the Masyumi and the PSI were not included. In this new parliament 
there would not be voting; instead its decisions were to be arrived at through consultation 
and consensus (musyawarah, mufakat). In fact, the DPR-GR was a weak and ineffectual 
body, playing a relatively minor role in Guided Democracy politics.
Under the 1945 Constitution, representive and elected bodies had only a very 
limited role. Early in 1960 Sukarno established an Interim Peoples' Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratari Rakyat Sementara, MPRS), the highest organ of
29 See Feith and Castles 1970: 99-111.
3  ^ USDEK: Undangan-undangan dasar 1945; Sosialisme ä la Indonesia; Demokrasi terpimpin; Economi 
Terpimpin; Kepribadian Indonesia. The whole was generally referred to as Manipol-USDEK.
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state under the constitution. It was required to meet at least once every five years, and 
was formally responsible for electing the president and setting the 'broad outlines of state 
policy'. Although it was supposed to be an elected body, Sukarno invoked certain 
transitional provisions to ensure that a large bloc of its members were appointed from the 
so-called 'functional groups'. It did not actually meet in session until the end of that 
year, when, under the chairmanship of Chaerul Saleh, a radical leftist associated with the 
small national-communist Murba Party, it endorsed both the political program of 
Manipol-USDEK and the grandiose Eight Year Development Plan that had been drawn 
up by the National Planning Council.
After July 1959 the political parties remained under something of a cloud. Despite 
Sukarno's earlier demand for the parties to be 'buried', by 1960 he had come to realise 
that they were a necessary element on the political landscape. Their survival - or at least 
the survival of those parties he believed he could control - was essential if the growing 
power of the army was to be balanced with a countervailing political force. Sukarno 
continued to promote the role of 'functional groups', establishing a National Front in 
August 1960 to coordinate the activities of all such groups in line with Manipol-USDEK 
and his renewed emphasis on the spirit of the revolution. Yet the president was 
concerned about the possibility that the army would use its organisational and 
administrative reach throughout the country to build an effective 'functional group' 
organisation of its own.31 Consequently, political parties remained a necessary evil, 
although the two parties that Sukarno regarded as implacable enemies, Masyumi and the 
PSI, were both banned in August.32 A month earlier, in July, Sukarno had issued a
31 The army had established its own functional group umbrella organisation, the Body to Develop the 
Potential of Functional Groups (Badan Pembina Potensi Karya, BPPK). For a full account of the 
background and development of the functional group concept and its application under Guided Democracy, 
see Reeve 1985: especially 108-262.
32 In addition to the participation of some of their principal leaders in the regional rebellions, activists 
from both parties had further angered the president by their participation in a short-lived oppositional 
movement known as the Democratic League (Liga Demokrasi). Organised in April 1960 after Sukarno's 
dismissal of the elected DPR, it had come into existence while Sukarno was away from the country on 
one of his overseas tours. Though it briefly attracted support from some sections of the military, it was 
quickly eliminated once Sukarno returned. See Feith 1963a: 343-4.
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presidential decree on 'party simplification', aimed at restricting and managing those 
parties that were to be permitted to remain legal.33 By April of 1961, eight parties were 
declared to have fulfilled these requirements, including the three largest parties the PNI, 
PKI and NU.34
The central feature of Guided Democracy politics throughout its early years was the 
relationship between its two principal architects, the president and the army. Both had 
wanted a more centralised and authoritarian form of government and both needed the 
other to make the system work.
Sukarno's power and authority derived from his skills as an orator and a 
manipulator of ideological symbols. His personality, his words, his actions were central 
to the way Indonesian politics were conducted during this period. Although he shared 
power with various other forces, especially the army, when it came to matters of 
ideology, the direction of domestic politics and the pursuit of foreign policy, Sukarno's 
views usually held sway. He was the creator of Manipol-USDEK, the central ideological 
plank of Guided Democracy. But above all there was his deep and abiding conviction 
about the need to return to the spirit of the 1945 revolution. Sukarno constantly evoked 
the symbolism of the revolution in his public addresses, as he berated those who had held 
office throughout the 1950s. Fired by 'the romance of the revolution', he claimed for 
himself the titles of Great Leader of the Revolution and Mouthpiece of the Indonesian 
People. He also presented himself as bearer of the Message of the People's Suffering 
(.Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat, Ampera). Under his leadership the 'exploitation de 
l'homme par I'homme' would be eliminated.35 These were bold and dramatic gestures
33 According to presidential decree, political parties were forced to declare their allegiance to Manipol- 
USDEK, submit their membership lists to the government, and fulfill certain minimum-size 
requirements.
34 The other five parties were the League of the Upholders of Indonesian Independence (Ikatan 
Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, IPKI), Murba, the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik), the small leftist 
Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia, Partindo), and the Indonesian Islamic Association Party (Partai Sarikat 
Islam Indonesia, PSII). Three months later the total number of legal parties was increased to ten when 
the Indonesian Christian Party (Partai Kristen Indonesia, Parkindo) and the small Islamic Educational 
Movement (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Perti) were added to the list.
35 For details of these political symbols, see Feith 1963b.
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and Sukarno, a brilliant orator, was able in the early years of Guided Democracy to 
appeal to and unite many Indonesians, providing them with reassurance following the 
doubts and uncertainties of the 1950s.
The armed forces, its power flowing ultimately from its control over the means of 
coercion, but with a stronger legal basis than previously for its involvement in civil 
administration and politics, was now more united than at any time in the previous decade. 
Under martial law it had acquired a zone of authority that it was determined to preserve. 
During the first two years of Guided Democracy the army became an increasingly 
powerful element in the regional government structure, while it also cornered a 
controlling interest in the state enterprise sector of the economy, a direct result of the 
nationalisation of Dutch assets.
Although both Sukarno and the armed forces began as partners sharing power, 
there was a high degree of suspicion on both sides. Many senior army officers regarded 
the president as an unreliable and unpredictable figure, and there was increasing concern 
in military circles about his apparent attraction towards the PKI, or at least to leftist 
political symbols and ideas. Sukarno, for his part, was wary of the possibility of the 
armed forces dominating the political landscape. Without any obvious power base of his 
own, and requiring an ally to balance this threat, he found the political parties an essential 
tool for this purpose. The PKI, in particular, provided him with strong support and soon 
began to play a critical role in Guided Democracy politics.
Although the PKI had been caught off-guard by the collapse of constitutional 
democracy in 1957-59, under the astute leadership of Aidit and his fellow politburo 
members, the party quickly managed to trim its sails to the prevailing political winds of 
Guided Democracy.36 Of all the parties, the PKI had given the most unqualified support 
for the proposed changes Sukarno was signalling in early 1959, and it rallied to support
36 The most complete account of the PKI during the Guided Democracy era is Mortimer 1974. See also 
Hindley 1964.
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the president in his establishment of Guided Democracy. For Sukarno there were 
obvious attractions. With his fascination for the symbolism of the revolution and his 
fondness for Marxist imagery and rhetoric, the president and the PKI appeared to speak 
much the same language. But more importantly, the PKI as the largest and best 
organised of all the political parties was able to provide the mass following throughout 
the country that Sukarno needed at his public appearances and rallies.37
For these reasons, the president gave the party his support and protection against its 
natural enemy, the armed forces. As early as September 1959, the army had moved to 
prevent the holding of the PKI’s sixth national congress. Not only did Sukarno intervene 
to permit the congress to go ahead, but he addressed its closing ceremony, speaking with 
great enthusiasm about the party and its leaders. This set the pattern for the following 
years, as Sukarno not only fought to protect the PKI from army harassment, but moved 
steadily to bring the party into all the central councils of Guided Democracy 
government.38 Towards the end of 1960 the president began to canvass the idea of 
bringing the PKI into the cabinet in accordance with Nasakom, the principle of 
cooperation between the nationalist, religious and communist streams that he regarded as 
crucial for the achievement of national unity.39 Although the army was able to oppose 
this move successfully, when the cabinet was reshuffled in March 1962 Sukarno 
managed to give the PKI two minor posts.40
Delighted as the PKI was to have the president's protection, this was not achieved 
without important concessions. In order both to remain legal and retain Sukarno's
•r>7 By 1960, the PKI's membership had grown to over 1.5 million. The party membership continued to 
grow rapidly over the next five years to the point where it claimed a membership of 3.5 million by 
August 1965 with another 24 million in affiliated bodies and front organisations. See Mortimer 1974: 
366.
38 The communist daily Harian Rakjat was banned on several occasions for short periods during the 
early 1960s, while regional commanders in several areas used their martial law powers to prohibit all PKI 
activity in their area of authority.
39 Sukarno's ideas about Nasakom were first enunciated in an essay written in 1926. For an English 
translation of this work and a perceptive introduction to Sukarno's ideas, see McVey 1970.
40 PKI Chairman Aidit was appointed Third Deputy Chairman of the MPRS, and his deputy Lukman 
was appointed Third Deputy Chairman of the DPR-GR. These positions were accorded ministerial rank 
in the new cabinet and membership of the newly created State Leadership body.
support, the party had not only to fulfill the same bureaucratic conditions as the other 
parties, but it also had to give its public support to Manipol-USDEK and eschew class 
struggle in favour of national interests.41
By the end of 1960 the formal structures of Guided Democracy were more or less 
established and the general character of the regime was becoming increasingly evident to 
Indonesia's people. In contrast to the sober and pragmatic style of government pursued 
by most of the cabinets during the period of parliamentary democracy, the Guided 
Democracy years were characterised by a high degree of political theatre as Sukarno 
strove to create and then manipulate the symbols of his office.
Although many Indonesians, especially among the broader reaches of society, were 
attracted by Sukarno's leadership and rhetoric, there remained a significant minority who 
were implacably opposed to him. Many people in academic and intellectual circles were 
quietly cynical of Guided Democracy ideology, suspicious of Nasakom, and resentful of 
the loss of freedom of speech and the press and the destruction of those democratic 
values that had largely underpinned the political order throughout most of the previous 
decade. Fear of reprisals on the part of the government, however, ensured that such 
people did not express their opinions publicly.42
It would be a gross exaggeration to see Indonesia as a totalitarian state during this 
period, for power was too diffuse and the implementation of control measures was often 
lax and inconsistent. Yet under Guided Democracy, the government made some effort to 
indoctrinate certain sections of society, especially through courses in Manipol-USDEK 
for students and civil servants. At the same time, various control measures were put in 
place. The activities of political parties were carefully controlled and in January 1962
41 For an account of the PKI's ideological position towards Guided Democracy during this period, see 
Mortimer 1974: 77-140.
42 The repressive nature of Guided Democracy politics was quickly evident. The former vice-president, 
Mohammad Hatta, broke a long public silence with a sober and carefully worded critique of Guided 
Democracy and President Sukarno's political reforms that appeared in an article entitled 'Demokrasi Kita' 
(Our Democracy) published in the Jakarta weekly Pandji Masjarakat on 1 May 1960. The issue was 
immediately banned.
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certain leading members of the Masyumi and PSI were arrested and held without trial.43 
The Indonesian press, which since the implementation of martial law in 1958 had already 
been working under strict constraints, was now more closely controlled than ever before. 
Certain newspapers deemed hostile were closed down permanently, while the editors of 
those newspapers that were permitted to continue were required to give an undertaking of 
their loyalty to Manipol-USDEK and were ultimately forced to publish a large amount of 
government news and propaganda.
Although propaganda and indoctrination appeared to be working in the lower 
reaches of the education system, the universities and institutes of higher education 
remained bastions of doubters and cynics. At the onset of his attack on parliamentary 
democracy, Sukarno had railed against the limitations of 'text-book thinking'. In March 
1961 he appointed the radical-nationalist Iwa Kusumasumantri to the post of Minister of 
Higher Education and Science in an attempt to intensify the Guided Democracy 
indoctrination campaign in the universities. Although this move was largely unsuccessful 
- Iwa was replaced a year later with a more moderate minister - university lecturers 
realised that promotion depended upon a display of active loyalty to the person of the 
president and to state ideology. Those seen to be out of step with the regime through any 
expressions of criticism or opposition risked being branded as 'anti-Manipol' or opposed 
to the revolution (kontra-revolusi). As in other areas of the civil service, such charges 
could lead to demands for 'retooling'.
The growing authoritarian trend in Indonesian politics was matched by the 
government's failure to address the serious and rapidly deteriorating conditions of the 
Indonesian economy. Throughout the 1950s successive governments had struggled to 
rebuild the economy, at times with moderate success, despite massive problems inherited
43 Included among those detained was the PSI’s leader and former prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir. Other 
high profile political prisoners during the Guided Democracy years were newspaper editor, Mochtar Lubis, 
and several senior army officers who had been involved in the PRRI regional rebellion.
from the years of war and revolution. In the late 1950s, however, the national economy 
was thrown into disarray by a series of sudden and dramatic measures.
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The considerable chaos and confusion accompanying the seizures of Dutch 
enterprises that occurred in December 1957 have already been referred to earlier. Then in 
May 1959 the Minister for Trade announced a ban on retail trade by 'aliens' in rural areas 
that was aimed directly at Indonesia's ethnic Chinese community.44 Ultimately, this led 
to the exodus of about 100,000 Chinese out of the country, raised tensions between the 
governments of Indonesia and China and seriously disrupted the local economy creating 
difficulties both for Chinese traders and shopkeepers and Indonesians everywhere who 
were dependent upon them for the distribution of goods and services.
In August 1959, in a desperate attempt to check spiralling prices and arrest 
inflation, the government launched a sudden 'monetary purge'.45 These drastic measures 
caused widespread hardship to many individuals and had a disastrous effect on many 
private firms and small businesses that were faced with min.
In a sense the economy never recovered from the cumulative effect of these three 
shocks. The impact of the August 1959 measures on prices and inflation was short-lived 
and ultimately futile. By late 1961 the economy had again slipped into a period of rapid 
decline that was marked by sharp price rises, chronic inflation, serious shortages of many 
essential items and a slump in production of those commodities on which the national 
economy depended for foreign exchange earnings.
Given the great stress placed on political slogans and national symbols under 
Guided Democracy, and the stepping up of the campaign to wrest West Irian from the
44 The ban was finally promulgated in November 1959 as a presidential regulation, known as 
PP10/1959. For a detailed account of this issue and the complex mix of racial, political and economic 
factors involved, see Mackie 1976a: 82-97; and Somers 1965: 194-223.
45 On the August 1959 'monetary purge' and its consequences, see Mackie 1963: 28-30. The Indonesian 
rupiah was devalued by nearly 400% against the US dollar, while 90% was wiped off the face value of 
large denomination banknotes. Bank accounts with more than Rp 25,000 were confiscated by the 
government.
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Dutch throughout 1961, those members of the government who were seriously 
concerned about the grave problems facing the economy found it increasingly difficult to 
instigate effective reforms. As far as economic development was concerned, the 
government's principal focus of attention was the Eight Year Development Plan that had 
been drawn up in 1960 by the National Planning Council. Yet this was a totally 
unrealistic document that bore no relationship to the country's actual problems. When the 
plan was inaugurated at a hoe-swinging ceremony on 1 January 1961, President Sukarno 
himself described it as 'rich in fantasy'.46 By the end of 1961 and throughout the 
following year, the effect of the serious structural problems of the economy were being 
felt throughout Indonesia as the prices of key commodities and the cost of living rose 
alarmingly, and as the rupiah was put under substantial pressure.47 Shortages of basic 
foodstuffs and consumer goods affected all Indonesians on salaries and fixed incomes 
who were increasingly forced to resort to a range of emergency measures to supplement 
their salaries.
Guided Democracy moves towards crisis: 1963-1965
The year 1963 was a critical turning point in Indonesian politics. By the end of that 
year the balance of forces appeared to shift significantly in favour of the left48 Yet at the 
beginning of the year, there were several hopeful signs that serious attention might at last 
be directed towards solving the problems of the Indonesian economy. With the 
successful resolution of the West Irian conflict in Indonesia's favour in August 1962 49
46 The plan had been prepared without the advice of any expert economists. Its importance lay in its
symbolic aspects: it was presented to the president in eight parts, seventeen volumes and 1945
paragraphs, representing the date of Indonesia's declaration of independence. For a summary and 
evaluation of the plan, see Pauker 1961. For a more realistic assessment of its economic and political 
context, see Mackie 1967: 26-8.
47 For a sound overview of the deteriorating state of the economy in the 1961-2 period, see Mackie 
1967: 30-7.
48 The changing balance of forces in Indonesian politics in this period is discussed in Feith 1964.
49 An agreement was reached with the Netherlands on 15 August whereby the United Nations was to 
administer the disputed territory until 1 May 1963 when it was to come under Indonesian control. A 
plebescite was to be conducted under UN supervision before 1969 to determine whether the inhabitants 
wished to remain part of Indonesia.
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many Indonesians, including some of the more pragmatic government leaders, such as 
First Minister Djuanda, began to urge such a course of action.
Much depended, however, on the views of President Sukarno, at the apex of the 
Guided Democracy system and the skillful balancer of the political forces with whom he 
shared power. For several months it seemed that the president would indeed direct 
Indonesia down the path of urgently needed economic reform. Against the backdrop of 
negotiations between the Indonesian government and officials from both the International 
Monetary Fund and the United States government and after careful consultation with 
government councils, the president announced his long-awaited Economic Declaration 
(.Deklarasi Ekonomi, Dekon) on 29 March. Despite its Guided Democracy rhetoric, the 
Dekon gave considerable weight to the economic stabilisation measures that the IMF and 
US officials were recommending. After further consultation, on 26 May the government 
announced a package of economic reforms, including a drastic devaluation, the abolition 
of price controls, and measures to liberalise foreign trade, increase domestic competition 
between government firms, and stimulate production. These reforms, underwritten by 
guarantees of US-backed IMF support, were a dramatic reversal of the Guided Economy 
principles that had prevailed since 1959. But the reform package also aroused 
considerable opposition from various quarters, with the PKI being the most outspoken in 
its criticism.50
At the same time as the possibility of a new economic direction was being 
contemplated, President Sukarno was toying with the adoption of an aggressive stance 
towards the proposal to create a new state of Malaysia from the existing Federation of 
Malaya and the British Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah. After the Azahari revolt 
in Brunei in December 1962 by opponents of the Malaysia proposal, the Indonesian 
government had denounced the scheme as a neo-colonial project, and began to talk of a 
campaign of confrontation (konfrontasi) against the new state.51 During the first four
50 On the 26 May reform package and its impact, see Mackie 1967: 37-40.
51 For the most complete account of the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, see Mackie 1974.
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months of 1963, as the economic reforms were being considered, Indonesian leaders 
continued to make hostile noises culminating in the first military incursion into Sarawak 
by Indonesian-led insurgents on 12 April. However, at the end of May when Sukarno 
unexpectedly invited Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to meet him in 
Tokyo for private talks, it seemed that Sukarno was preparing to back away from foreign 
policy adventurism and embark instead on the implementation of the pro-Western 
economic reforms that had just been announced. Further hopeful signs emerged during 
the following months.52 However, when Kuala Lumpur announced on 29 August that 
Malaysia would be formed on 16 September in advance of the release of a UN fact­
finding report, Sukarno seized the occasion to renew the offensive. Indonesia rejected 
the UN report's pro-Malaysia findings isssued on 14 September, condemned Malaysia as 
a neo-colonial puppet state, and announced it would press ahead with its konfrontasi 
campaign to 'crush' its new neighbour. These announcements were accompanied by 
violent demonstrations against Malaysia and Britain in Indonesia, including the burning 
of the British embassy and attacks on British houses and property throughout Jakarta on 
18 September.53
These actions signalled the death knell of the economic stabilisation program. The 
IMF-US aid package was immediately cancelled and the May program of economic 
reforms was quickly abandoned, setting off a new round of price rises and a rapid surge 
in inflation. The defeat of the economic reform measures was soon accompanied by a 
more aggressive posture by the PKI within domestic politics, as the party's leaders seized 
the opportunity to strengthen their position.
The reasons why Indonesia rejected the economic stabilisation measures in favour 
of what appeared to be a risky and adventurist foreign policy are complex and not easily 
reducible to simple or brief explanation. It is apparent, however, that each of the three
52 Foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines met for talks in Manila in early June 
which resulted in a request to the United Nations to send a mission to determine the wishes of people in 
the Borneo territories.
53 For an account of these events and their immediate consequences, see Mackie 1974: 183-94.
70
key power holders in Guided Democracy had convincing reasons to support 
confrontation. The attitude of President Sukarno was a crucial element in Indonesia 
adopting the course it ultimately chose to follow. Although for several months he had 
appeared to give serious consideration to the arguments of those proposing domestic 
economic reform, the path of konfrontasi was more in keeping with Sukarno's 
personality and temperament and his own anti-colonial experiences. More importantly, 
the domestic political conflict that the proposed economic reforms had already unleashed 
alerted him to the fact that his own position would be threatened by these potential 
uncertainties. By contrast, the anti-Malaysia campaign offered Sukarno a situation ideally 
suited to his skills as an agitator and balancer of the conflicting forces within the system. 
It enabled him to demand the involvement of the armed forces as defenders of the national 
interest and allowed him to continue his encouragement of the PKI.
The reaction of the armed forces to these issues was also a mixed one. Although 
most senior army officers did not want konfrontasi to lead to outright war, given the anti­
colonial origins of the Indonesian armed forces there was a certain amount of support in 
military circles for the anti-Malaysia campaign. Some senior army officers were 
undoubtedly in favour of economic reform, but it was also widely recognised that this 
would involve a sharp reduction in the armed forces' budget and probable 
demobilisation. There was already mounting concern that the lifting of martial law on 1 
May 1963 would effectively reduce the political power of the military throughout the 
country. Most senior officers quickly appreciated that konfrontasi would enable them to 
continue to play a major role in the nation's affairs and prevent the armed forces from 
being sidelined in Indonesian domestic politics.
The PKI was also initially equivocal about the anti-Malaysia campaign, fearing that 
konfrontasi would justify a return to martial law and repression of the party by the army; 
but its leaders soon realised that the agitational politics of the konfrontasi campaign were
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a golden opportunity to involve its large mass base in political action.54 Support for 
konfrontasi would be a clear demonstration of the PKTs commitment to national goals, 
further entrenching the party within the Guided Democracy power structure and making it 
harder for its enemies in the army to attack it.
By the end of 1963 it was evident that the PKTs tactics - an extension of its long 
held 'national unity' strategy - were paying handsome dividends as Sukarno began to 
shift the Guided Democracy power balance in favour of the left. Defence Minister 
Nasution had already been outmanoeuvred by Sukarno in June 1962 when he had lost his 
command post as chief of staff of the army to a rival, Colonel Achmad Yani. Following 
the death of First Minister Djuanda in early November, the resulting cabinet reshuffle saw 
Nasution emerge in a weakened position when he was not included in a newly created 
presidium of Deputy Prime Ministers, made up of Foreign Minister Subandrio, Leimena 
and Chaerul Saleh. Encouraged by these moves, and the president's 'retooling' of a 
number of strongly anti-communist governors and regional heads, the PKI began to 
press its claims for greater influence within the government itself.
The president's leadership of the konfrontasi campaign and his spirited support for 
what he identified as the New Emerging Forces of the world encouraged the PKI to adopt 
a more militant campaign against the Old Established Forces of colonialism, neo­
colonialism and imperialism (Nekolim) in Indonesia.55 In early 1964 PKI unions 
embarked on takeovers of British plantations in Indonesia, while PKI leaders began a 
vociferous anti-American campaign with a series of demonstrations against the import of 
US films and attacks on United States Information Service centres and US property in 
Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Medan. At the same time the PKI sought to exploit 
the substantial gains it had made domestically, especially its growing strength in rural 
areas where the party's effective organisation and dedicated cadres had been responsible
54 See Mortimer 1974: 203-26 and 239-46.
55 On Sukarno's definition and exploitation of these ideological constructs, see Modelski 1963 and 
Weatherbee 1966; also Mackie 1974: 329-34. For a general survey of Guided Democracy foreign policy, 
see Bunnell 1966.
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for recruiting and building an impressive following within the Indonesian peasantry. In 
early 1964, PKI leader Aidit responded to pressure from the party's rural cadres to 
conduct a land reform campaign based upon the land reform and share-cropping 
legislation that had been promulgated by the government in 1959 and 1960 but never 
properly implemented.56 This was a bold and potentially dangerous step by the PKI 
leadership for it was a significant departure from the 'national unity' policy that had 
brought it so much success throughout the previous decade.57
By April 1964 the land reform campaign was underway in many rural areas 
throughout Java, Bali and North Sumatra. Violent clashes soon erupted as PKI-led 
landless peasants attempted to seize and redistribute land in a series of unilateral actions 
(aksi sepihak). In certain areas, especially where the PNI and NU had a strong 
following, the PKI cadres met with active resistance. The land reform campaign 
continued throughout 1964, but the increasing number of violent incidents and the bitter 
communal tensions that were aroused, caused widespread concern and finally led to the 
land reform issue being discussed at a special meeting of party leaders called by President 
Sukarno in December. In East Java in particular, santri Muslims began to organise 
themselves effectively and were beginning to get the better of the PKI in the rural 
struggle. The PKI leadership, recognising the danger signs, finally decided to scale 
down the campaign in early 1965. The failure of this class-based political campaign had 
important implications for the PKI's subsequent policies. But the intense passions that 
had been aroused by the aksi sepihak campaign in many areas were also to have their 
denouement in the wholesale slaughter of communist-aligned peasants at the end of that 
year.
The steadily rising political profile of the PKI under Guided Democracy, resulting 
from the outbreak of konfrontasi and President Sukarno's continued support and 
protection, was deeply disturbing not only to the strongly anti-communist senior army
56 For a detailed account of the PKI's land reform campaign, see Mortimer 1972 and 1974: 276-328.
57 The PKI leadership's change of direction is discussed in Mortimer 1974: 300-3.
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officers but also to many of the civilian politicians who saw their own power and 
positions threatened and recognised the need to undermine the PKI and check its 
momentum. Throughout 1964, a group of these politicians - principally Murba Party 
activists led by Trade Minister Adam Malik - attempted to outmanoeuvre the PKI by 
projecting President Sukarno's own utterances and previously expressed ideas and 
opinions as an ideological counterweight to communism.
One such initiative was a proposal to set up a one-party system - based on 
Sukarno's 1957 notion that the parties should be 'buried'. Another was the Body to 
Support Sukarnoism (Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme, BPS) initiated in September 
1964, which drew support from the Deputy Prime Minister, Chaerul Saleh, a number of 
prominent newspaper editors and some army leaders.58 There were several months of 
vituperative exchanges in the Jakarta press between PKI leaders and BPS supporters as 
the latter attempted to demonstrate the ideological superiority of Sukarnoism. It was not 
long, however, before the president denounced this as an attempt to undermine his 
Nasakom policies. On 17 December the BPS was banned, and in early January 1965 a 
number of Murba leaders were arrested and the Murba Party was declared 'frozen'. By 
February more than twenty newspapers in Jakarta and Medan that had supported the BPS 
campaign had been banned, including the prominent and influential Jakarta dailies, 
Merdeka and Berita Indonesia.
By 1965 the principle of Nasakom had been confirmed as a fundamental element of 
Guided Democracy politics. To question Nasakom was now to risk the charge of 
'communist-phobia'. The PKI began to press home its advantage with demands for the 
'retooling' of its political opponents in the government.59 In addition, the PKI leaders 
launched vociferous attacks on those it labelled as capitalist-bureaucrats within the armed
58 For an account of the BPS affair, see Crouch 1978: 64-6; Mortimer 1974: 375-9; and Pauker 1965: 
88-95.
59 Both Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh were singled out for 'retooling'. Although they survived the 
PKJ's campaign against them, each received demotions in the March 1964 Cabinet reshuffle.
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forces and angry denunciations of other so-called counter-revolutionary elements within 
society such as the Islamic Student Association (.Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI).
The first six months of 1965 were marked by the aggressive posture of the PKI 
under Sukarno's patronage, its apparent dominance over its political rivals, and the 
dramatic leftward thrust of foreign policy as Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations 
in January and moved into closer alignment with the People's Republic of China. It 
seemed to some observers that there was a sense of inevitability about an eventual PKI 
victory.60
However, there was still considerable evidence that the PKI remained as far as ever 
from being able to achieve ultimate power. The party's single foray into class-based 
political action during the aksi sepihak movement of 1963-64 had been checked by 
Muslim assertiveness. Various of President Sukarno's initiatives had been to the PKI's 
advantage, but the party was still dependent upon his support for its present position and 
future survival.61 Despite Sukarno's calls for increased PKI representation in the various 
high councils of Guided Democracy government, a fully Nasakom cabinet remained far 
away. Most importantly, the PKI faced a major problem as regards arms. In the event of 
a showdown, its opponents within the armed forces retained a monopoly over the use of 
force. Despite the public political role played by PKI leaders and the party's significant 
organisational growth - all signs of the party's obvious successes in the agitational 
politics of Guided Democracy - the PKI appeared unprepared for an armed struggle.
Throughout 1965 politics became increasingly polarised as the PKI continued to 
exploit its favoured position with the president in an attempt to weaken its enemies within 
the armed forces. PKI leaders called for the president to extend the principle of Nasakom 
into all fields, including the armed forces through the establishment of Nasakom advisory 
boards in each of the four services. At the same time the PKI proposed that workers and
60 For assessments of this kind, see van der Kroef 1965 and Pauker 1965.
61 A case for the 'domestication' of the PKI had been first argued by Hindley 1962.
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peasants be given military training to form a 'fifth force'. Although there was serious 
concern within military circles about both the leftward drift of Indonesia's foreign policy 
and the PKI's apparent ascendency in domestic politics, senior army officers remained 
confident of the army's ability to match the PKI in any ultimate showdown.
The army command had been caught off guard by the escalation of the konfrontasi 
campaign to a dangerous level with landings of Indonesian-led insurgents on the Malay 
peninsula in August and September of 1964. Consequently, the army leaders had moved 
to ensure that the conduct of the anti-Malaysia campaign was placed firmly under its own 
control.62 Several trusted senior officers were transferred to key command posts to 
ensure that matters did not again get out of hand. Major General Soeharto, the head of 
the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, 
Kostrad) was appointed as deputy commander of the Mandala Vigilance Command 
(.Komando Mandala Siaga, Kolaga) formed in October 1964 to pursue the operation of 
the konfrontasi campaign. Soeharto's appointment was a check to the authority of 
Kolaga's Sukarnoist commander, Air Marshal Omar Dhani. Brigadier General Kemal 
Idris, a long-standing opponent of the president, was appointed to head the North 
Sumatra Kolaga combat command. In addition, the establishment in September 1964 of 
a new military command structure as part of the konfrontasi campaign, the Regional 
Authority to Implement Dwikora (Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora Daerah, Pepelrada), had 
restored to the army most of the martial law powers it had lost in the previous year.
Throughout 1965 the senior army leadership moved to check the PKI's challenge to 
the armed forces' military supremacy. With a combination of skillful manoeuvring and 
determined defiance, the Nasakom threat and the proposal for a 'fifth force1 of armed 
workers and peasants were both dealt with effectively.63 Against a backdrop of rapidly 
rising prices, spiralling inflation, falling production, and the collapse of much of the 
country's essential economic infrastructure, Indonesian politics began to take on an air of
62 See Crouch 1978: 69-75.
63 For details of the army leadership's tactics against the PKI and the president, see Crouch 1978: 86-94.
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heightened expectancy.64 In August and September there was new evidence that 
Sukarno was seriously ill. As tension mounted, the possibility of a coup was the subject 
of frequent speculation and rumour.
It was against this background of political turmoil that a new generation of young 
Indonesians grew up in the years after their country's achievement of independence. Soe 
Hok-gie was one member of that generation, but one who took an unusually keen interest 
in political events and national affairs. Some of this is reflected in the strong moral views 
and political judgements about the country's leaders that from time to time he had jotted 
down in his private diary. During the early 1960s Soe made the transition from school to 
university where he was to find a larger and more diverse circle of friends and 
acquaintances to stimulate his thinking about the world around him. It was here also that 
he was to be confronted with the opportunity to translate his ideas into political action.
64 The rapid deterioration of the economy during 1964 and 1965 is outlined in Mackie 1967: 41-2.
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Chapter 3
THE EARLY UNIVERSITY YEARS: A POLITICAL 
ACTIVIST EMERGES
In August 1961, both Soe Hok-gie and his older brother successfully completed 
their secondary schooling and decided to continue their education at university. The 
pressure for admission to Indonesia's state and private universities had increased 
dramatically by the beginning of the 1960s as the rapid expansion of secondary schooling 
began to be felt at the tertiary level.1 Each of the Soe brothers applied to a number of 
institutions to ensure a place. During September both learned that they had been admitted 
to the faculties of their first choice at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. Hok-djin, 
who had taken the science stream at Canisius, entered the Faculty of Psychology, while 
Hok-gie elected to pursue the subject that had captured his interest during his final school 
years by enrolling in the Faculty of Letters (Sastra ) as a student in the History 
Department.
Entrance to the university and participation in its community added an important 
new dimension to his intellectual and emotional world. The debates and discussions on 
and around the campus in which he eagerly took part, and the new friendships and 
alliances he formed there with a range of groups and individuals, gave shape and 
meaning to his germinating perceptions of Indonesian politics and society. Above all, 
these experiences stiffened his determination to reject the policies of the Sukarno 
government and ultimately led to his commitment to work actively to bring about its 
downfall.
1 For a general discussion of the impact of demographic trends on the Indonesian education system 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, see Harsja Bachtiar 1968, and Thomas 1969.
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Rawamangun
Despite the rapid expansion in the number of state and private universities and other 
institutions of higher education during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the University of 
Indonesia occupied a commanding position as one of the prestige tertiary institutions in 
the country.2 Though established as a university only in January 1946, during the Dutch 
re-occupation of Jakarta in the midst of the independence struggle, it traces its origins 
back to the establishment in Batavia of a Higher Law School in 1924 and a Higher 
Medical School in 1927. The only other institutions to rival its position in the tertiary 
education sphere in the early 1960s were the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), 
which emerged from the Higher Technical School that had been established there in 
1920, and Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta, established in the late 1940s when that 
city was the Republican capital during the independence struggle.
During the 1950s the University of Indonesia was emerging only gradually from its 
colonial origins. Until the mid fifties, many of its senior teaching staff were Dutch and 
the Dutch language remained the medium of instruction in many areas of the curriculum.3 
However, after the takeover of Dutch firms in late 1957 and the subsequent sudden 
exodus of Dutch nationals, the character of the institution changed rapidly as Indonesian 
staff assumed all senior positions within the university and teaching came to be conducted 
entirely in the national language.
Of the various faculties that had been established, Law and Medicine remained the 
most prestigious, although Economics steadily developed in size and reputation 
throughout the 1950s. In contrast with Bandung, which had become the centre for the
2 For a brief account of the meagre colonial origins of the Indonesian university system and its
subsequent development and expansion after independence, see Bachtiar 1968: 180-6. See also Thomas
1973.
3 Bachtiar 1968: 184
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pure and applied sciences, Faculties of Science and Technology were slow to develop on 
the University of Indonesia campus and were not actually formed until the late 1950s.4
The development of the social sciences and the humanities was also strongly 
influenced by the university's colonial beginnings. Although a Faculty of Letters had 
been established in Jakarta as early as 1940 as part of the plan to establish a single 
institution based on the existing Higher Schools, the departments it encompassed and the 
teaching and research it conducted were dominated by Dutch colonial academic traditions 
where philology, languages and literature were the principal areas of interest. 
Consequently, disciplines such as political science, sociology and modem history were 
not included in the structure of the curriculum during the first phase of the institution's 
development.
When Soe Hok-gie enrolled as a student in late 1961, the Faculty of Letters was 
one of the smallest and least prestigious in the university.5 The largest of its departments 
seems to have been anthropology, and the remainder, apart from archaeology and 
history, were concerned with the teaching of languages and literature. These included 
Indonesian, English, Chinese, Javanese, Arabic and Russian. Some departments had no 
more than a handful of students in any year and the total enrolments in the whole faculty 
probably never rose much beyond five or six hundred during the early 1960s.
Nevertheless, the Faculty of Letters possessed a certain esprit de corps that was 
readily apparent to each new intake of students. The small numbers of both students and 
staff created a greater sense of intimacy where individuals were soon known by most 
other members of the faculty. In addition, a separate institutional identity prevailed after 
the Faculty of Letters was relocated in 1960 away from the main University of Indonesia 
campus at Salemba, on the edge of Menteng in central Jakarta, to an entirely new campus
4 A Faculty of Agricultural Science at Bogor, which was originally part of the University of Indonesia, 
was transformed into the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) in 1963.
5 This account of the Faculty of Letters is derived from a number of interviews in Jakarta and elsewhere 
with students who were Soe Hok-gie's contemporaries during the early 1960s.
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at Rawamangun, several kilometres away on the eastern perimeter of the city. The 
faculty's various departments were established there in a complex of new buildings 
containing classrooms and offices, a central library, and a large auditorium. There was 
also a housing complex for staff and dormitories for students nearby. The buildings on 
the new campus, though adequate, were hardly inspiring and lacked the imposing scale 
and sense of tradition associated with the university's Salemba headquarters.6 
Nevertheless, the isolation from the university's main campus reinforced a sense of 
distinctiveness that pervaded the Faculty of Letters, which to a very large extent operated 
as a separate and autonomous unit under the control of its dean and with its own bureau 
of student affairs handling admissions and registration.
Soe Hok-gie began his university career there by taking part in the faculty's 
initiation program in the final week of September 1961. Mapram (Masa Prabakti 
Mahasiswa), the period of initiation for new university students most commonly known 
as perpeloncoan, had become a traditional and indeed a compulsory part of the university 
calender by the late 1950s. An essential feature of the program was a series of ordeals 
directed by senior students that were designed to intimidate and ridicule the newcomers, 
who were often compelled to shave their heads and wear absurd costume.7 Like most of 
the other initiates Soe found much of the process humiliating and degrading. Yet he was 
determined to endure the taunts and insults of the senior students since he realised that it 
was something that all students had to experience, even those from privileged and 
protected backgrounds. In any case, Mapram was an opportunity to meet students from 
across the faculty, including many of the senior students. Soe made the acquaintance of
6 The University of Indonesia's Faculty of Medicine occupied buildings at Salemba which had once been 
the headquarters of the STOVIA, the original school established in the late nineteenth century for training 
'native' doctors and from where, in 1908, a group of aristocratic Javanese medical students had launched 
Boedi Oetomo, one of the earliest manifestations of the nationalist movement.
7 Mapram had its origins in the practices of some of the early elite student clubs and societies where 
initiation activities were modelled on Dutch student fraternities. In most cases the program consisted of 
harmless pranks, although in some institutions matters occasionally were taken to extremes. Soe's 
experiences during his Mapram are described in his diary (SHG Diary, 20 October 1961).
several individuals during that week who were to become close friends over the next few 
years.
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History had only emerged as a distinct discipline within the Faculty of Letters in the 
late 1950s.8 The fledgling department, headed by Dra Marwati Pusponegoro, was still 
very Dutch, had only a few trained historians able to offer courses and the number of 
students was still small. In keeping with the style of education offered by other 
departments within the faculty, Soe and his fellow history students received a remarkably 
narrow and rigid training in their chosen discipline during the five years of study that was 
required for the full sarjana degree.9 There was little opportunity to supplement their 
study of history with any sociology, economics, or philosophy, although there were 
additional courses in foreign languages such as English for those students who needed 
them. Students were required to take several history courses each year. Ancient and 
European history was taught but the emphasis was on Indonesian history, with courses 
covering the history of the archipelago from ancient times to the modem era. Since there 
were so few trained historians in the department, some courses were offered by members 
of other departments such as Chinese and Indonesian Studies.
In spite of these limitations Soe threw himself into his studies with great 
enthusiasm during his first year at university. A serious and committed student, he was 
eager to follow his own interests and intent on creating his own challenges through his 
wide reading and independent study. He soon came to the attention of his teachers and 
contemporaries as one of the most promising students in the faculty.
8 This paragraph draws on interviews with Onghokham, 5 February 1982, and R.Z. Leiressa, 20 
February 1985.
9 After three years of formal study and the successful completion of a minor thesis, students were 
accredited with the sarjana muda degree. After a further two years of courses and the submission and 
defence of a major thesis, students were admitted to the full sarjana degree. Although in theory this was a 
five-year program, in practice most students took much longer to complete their studies. There was also 
a significant number who never reached the final stage of thesis work and who never qualified for the full 
sarjana.
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Pessimism and a crisis of confidence
Yet below the surface, he seems to have found the first months of student life 
deeply troubling. During his reflective moments Soe's private thoughts were clouded by 
anxiety and confusion, while his mood was one of growing pessimism as he 
contemplated the world around him. A number of prominent themes recur in the 
occasional diary entries written during these months, some of them reflections upon 
problems that had been troubling him since his Canisius years. There is a repeated 
rejection of any belief in a God in the conventional sense and a strong hostility towards 
organised religion, Christianity in particular, which he regarded as a total distortion of 
Christ's teaching.10 His own kernel of belief centred around a firm commitment to 
certain essential human values:
For me there is something that is of the utmost value and reality in life: 'the capacity 
to love, to be compassionate, to feel sorrow'. Without all of that, we would be nothing 
more than inanimate objects. Fortunate is the person who still possesses feelings of 
love, who has not yet lost this thing of supreme value. If we lose that, then our lives 
become absurd.)^
In addition, Soe remained perplexed and troubled by several fundamental problems . 
of human existence. To what extent, he wondered, are men and women capable of 
controlling their own destinies - or is everything guided and controlled by some greater 
power beyond human experience? His thoughts on this dilemma were compounded by a 
deep sense of pessimism about the meaning and purpose of life.12
These inner doubts and confusion and his overriding pessimism are evident in one 
long diary entry written at the end of March 1962, and prompted by a conversation with a
fellow student and Catholic activist, Harimurti:
According to Professor Beerling, a person can only live as long as he still has hope.
But now I'm wondering how far anyone can remain genuine when he doesn't get 
anything. Anyone is prepared to make a sacrifice for something, say ideas, religion,
10 SHG Diary, 10 and 16 December 1961
11 SHG Diary, 16 December 1961
12 Futility, emptiness, misery, suffering, treachery, tragedy: these are the words that are prominent in 
the intense and often confused diary entries Soe wrote during these months as he attempted to grapple 
with his own gloom and apparent despair. There are also several reflections upon death. SHG Diary, 5, 
15 and 22 January 1962
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politics or a lover. But can they make a sacrifice for nothing? I'm now in the midst of 
thinking about this. Extremely pessimistic and hoping for nothing. I don't have any 
faith in the integrity of prevailing ideas, I don't believe in God in the sense of religion 
as such. But I want to live. I don't know what motive lies in my own unconscious 
mind. My rather gloomy opinions, in fact this scepticism, Harimurti calls destructive. 
He says that in the past he was influenced by Berdjajev nihilism but now he possesses 
something positive (Catholicism perhaps). But what if life is one debacle after another? 
Must we ignore these facts? I think not. As far as I'm concerned a religious person 
doesn't face up to this. Yes, why must we ignore it? Harimurti also says, so that as a 
history student I look for something [that] lies in our future, but what if there is 
nothing there. The more I study history, the more pessimistic I am, the more critical 
and sceptical I am about anything. But surely there is some reason why I'm like this. 
It seems as though I have already accepted life for nothing as a fact. Perhaps there is 
some other motive behind it. Maybe I want to make a sacrifice or feel like a hero ... 
[illegible] is understood. Who knows? Will peace of mind be achieved if I make a 
sacrifice? For instance, always burdening myself in situations that people find most 
disagreeable. If this really is to be the basis of my outlook on life, the situation will 
be rather peculiar. I've never done anything just for show. A moral perspective only 
feels content with the happiness of all. Now it seems too soon to analyse myself. 
Moreover in the past I always ridiculed older people who talked about and believed in 
destiny. The more I read the more I realise that there is some supernatural force, 
irrational and unable to be understood, that is controlling the whole of society and all 
individuals. It's as if human beings are unable to prevent it. Is the sense of betrayal an 
absolute force? I don't know. But I think it is. Several months ago I believed history 
was a locomotive created by human beings, but humans themselves are unable to 
control it. Now I'm more inclined to say that human beings are commanded to create 
such a locomotive, that cannot be restrained or resisted by its own circumstances and 
humanity is unaware of this. Why did inventing the wheel unconsciously change small 
groups of contented people in the past, creating a hell within society? Harimurti also 
says that we (he means the intelligentsia) are the makers of society. But are we able to 
plan something? If I become part of the making or shaping [of] the society it would be 
a very peculiar situation. Man in the past had to read a magic formula to awaken 
Dracula but he himself was unable to restrain him and dies. Histoire se repete is more 
and more logical for me. Who can forget the saying of Herodotus (or Thucydides) The 
king that had been is that shall be. I add to be human is to be destroyed. ^  ^
This and other diary entries written during these months reveal a very serious and 
intense young man struggling to come to grips with some of the deep and abiding 
dilemmas posed by human existence. His own reading of history appears to have 
concentrated his attention on such issues, but in any case it would be astonishing, in view 
of his already declared opinions while still a schoolboy, if the conditions of his own 
society and the direction of Indonesian politics during the early 1960s were not 
contributing both to his own gloom and sense of foreboding and also to his thoughts 
about what active role he himself might play in the near future.
1 SHG Diary, 30 March 1962. Professor Beerling was a philosopher who taught at the University of 
Indonesia. Harimurti was chairman of the Catholic university students' association (Perhimpunan 
Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI).
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Resistance to Sukarno's ideology
As is clear from the discussion in the preceding chapter, the figure of President 
Sukarno and his Guided Democracy ideology and political rhetoric had already begun to 
have an enormous influence on intellectual life, both depressing to orthodox PSI-type 
liberals and exhilarating to PNI and more radical elements. Consequently, the academic 
world was also affected to an increasing degree after 1959. The Faculty of Letters at 
Rawamangun was not immune to this influence. Soe saw this predominantly as a 
corrupting process. Two incidents in particular stand out in his diary.
On 27 January 1962 in a public lecture delivered at the University of Indonesia on 
the occasion of his promotion as a full Professor (Guru Besar), the recently appointed 
Dean of the Faculty of Letters, Sutjipto Wirjosuparto, launched an extraordinarily 
personal attack on several of his fellow academic colleagues, in particular Dr G.J. 
Resink, a professor of international law in the University of Indonesia's Faculty of Law. 
Resink had rejected as myth the widely held claim that the Indonesian region had been 
colonised for 350 years.14 In his public lecture, Sutjipto took issue with Resink's views 
and sought to undermine them with a variety of historical evidence. However, to the 
alarm of many of his listeners, including Soe Hok-gie, he went further, claiming that 
Resink and his supporters held views which were out of step with the opinions of 
Indonesia's own president and the central ideological tenets of the state. Soe's response
was unusually independent for an Indonesian student at that time:
But Sutjipto's method was extremely naive and constituted a debasement of scholarship.
He claimed that they were not Manipol-USDEK, not in accordance with Pancasila and 
so forth. This is a political issue and it was improper in such circumstances to accuse a 
person of being anti-USDEK. USDEK is a trauma and anyone who is branded non- 
USDEK is placed in a dangerous position. And he said ’In other words Resink has 
claimed that 350 years of colonial rule is incorrect, whereas His Excellency, the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno has acknowledged this in such and 
such, page so and so, etc, etc.' Heaven knows how many dozen times he quoted and 
cited Sukarno as the justication for his theories. Sukarno is an inadequate human being
14 See Resink 1968: vi-vii and 15-25.
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but Sutjipto treated him like a prophet and the source of truth. This is the tone of a
bootlicker.
Such a performance by a senior member of his own academic community shocked and 
appalled him, for it seemed to him no different from attempts elsewhere in the world to 
defend totalitarianism by stigmatising independent thought and dissident opinions as 
'anti-Party' or 'anti-national'.
Two months later Soe was himself directly on the receiving end of exactly the same 
kind of treatment when he became embroiled in an unpleasant and protracted argument 
with a group of fellow students about the nature of Indonesian politics and society. He
quickly found himself isolated and attacked for his opinions:
I said that I didn't believe that Bung Karno was a socialist, considering the situation in 
Indonesia at the present time.... One of their number, Adam Batubara, said that we 
could only accept matters passively without criticism. We only have duties and have 
no rights whatsoever. According to him, Guided Democracy is nothing more than 
dictatorship. And humanitarianism (I had said that I placed emphasis on that aspect) 
was something that has to be tossed aside during the process of development. We have 
to be ready to shoot 10 million for the sake of the other 80 million. Look at Bung 
Amir [Sjarifuddin], shot because he committed treason. Basically, in the person of 
Batubara, we encounter the elements of a dictator. I argued with these views by keeping 
right away from the present political situation. He had already threatened to report me 
because I had 'insulted' Bung Kamo (not believing that he was a socialist). I don't want 
to get involved in this but if I have to face jail because of my convictions I wouldn't be 
too upsetJ ^
The discussion then switched to the question of the ethnic Chinese inhabitants of 
Indonesia. Soe immediately found himself confronted by blind prejudice and racist 
stereotypes, for his opponents, insisting that all Sino-Indonesians were materialistic and 
treacherous, refused to accept his counter arguments about the changing nature of 
national identity:
How hard and difficult the struggle for truth is. How persistently pseudo-scientific 
thinking endures. And how we must fight against it. We act correctly adopting the 
side of reason and intuition, while they only inflame opinions and then leave just like 
that. How antagonistic Batubara is towards the Chinese. And his group have not yet 
been able to learn from Hitler and the experience of history. Now I can understand how 
the scapegoats of society (in Indonesia = the Chinese) are so easily victimised. Yes, 
and we must clear a path struggling to eradicate the roots of prejudice which are deep
15 SHG Diary, 27 January 1962. Sutjipto also included in his attack Dr Mohammad Ali (Head of the 
National Archives in Jakarta), the prominent PSI intellectual Soedjatmoko, and Dick Hartoko, a Catholic 
teacher and writer in Yogyakarta.
16 SHG Diary, 12 April 1962
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inside the unconscious realm. The weeds of prejudice grow easily while the trees of 
truth are so difficult.17
Soe's reaction to both these incidents was a clear indication of those unique 
personal qualities that were to contribute to his stature as a political activist in the years to 
come, in particular his social conscience and his concern for his responsibilities as an 
intellectual. Both of these aspects of his personality were reinforced by his evident 
intelligence and the breadth of his own reading and knowledge.
Yet exposure to hostile anti-Chinese sentiments was clearly a troubling experience. 
Such an episode undoubtedly contributed to his decision to join a group of like-minded 
individuals a few months later as they set about establishing an organisation to promote 
the idea of assimilation as the solution to the problems facing Indonesia's ethnic Chinese 
community.
The assim ilationists
Soe Hok-gie's participation in the political manoeuvring within Indonesia's ethnic 
Chinese community in the early 1960s was prompted initially by his friendship with two 
fellow students in the Faculty of Letters, Onghokham and Tan Hong-gie.18 When Soe 
first met them in late 1961, both Ong and Tan had already been involved for some time in 
the continuing public debate about the problems facing the Chinese in Indonesia.
Throughout the 1950s the position of Indonesia's Chinese inhabitants had been 
called into question on two fronts. Firstly, there was the confused issue of their legal and 
civil status in the new Republic, centring on the problem of deciding who already 
legitimately held Indonesian citizenship and who should be entitled to claim it in the near
17 SHG Diary, 12 April 1962
18 Onghokham was born in Surabaya in 1933, and came from an old peranakan family. After 
completing high school in Bandung, he arrived in Jakarta in 1956, initially to study law at the University 
of Indonesia. However, after a period working as a research assistant for the American scholar, William 
Skinner, he abandoned his law course in favour of history, beginning in the Faculty of Letters in 1960. 
Tan Hong-gie had worked as a journalist for Star Weekly during the 1950s before enrolling as a student in 
the Department of Archaeology in 1960. Interviews with Onghokham, 5 February 1982; and Siswadhi 
(Tan Hong-gie), September 1978
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future.19 These questions also required complex and protracted negotiations with the 
Peoples' Republic of China over the issue of dual nationality. Secondly, there were the 
problems surrounding the Chinese penetration of all sections of the Indonesian economy. 
Chinese economic activity aroused considerable antagonism in many quarters, especially 
from the smaller and less successful indigenous or pribumi Indonesian business class. 
This was most clearly in evidence during the Assaat movement of 1956 (an attempt by a 
group of pribumi businessmen to pressure the government into providing stronger 
support for their cause), and the moves to ban aliens from conducting retail trade in rural 
areas that came into effect with the PP10 regulations in late 1959.20 Towards the end of 
the 1950s, the heightened tension and emotional trauma surrounding these events 
contributed to a growing sense of insecurity on the part of the Sino-Indonesian 
community. As public expressions of hostility and anti-Chinese sentiments became more 
commonplace, a new debate developed within the Chinese community on proposals for 
Chinese to become more assimilated to indigenous Indonesians.
Star Weekly, a popular magazine widely read by the peranakan Chinese throughout 
Indonesia, was one of the forums where this new approach was canvassed.21 Towards 
the end of 1959 and again in early 1960, the magazine published a series of articles by 
Onghokham that attempted to address some of the serious problems facing Indonesia's 
ethnic Chinese community. In the last of these articles, Ong suggested that the only way 
for the Chinese to overcome the prejudice and discrimination that were so widespread in 
Indonesia was for the members of the minority Chinese community to 'assimilate' 
themselves into the majority indigenous community.22
19 On the citizenship issue, see Somers 1965: 224-50.
2,9 On the Assaat movement, see Feith 1968: 481-7; and Somers 1965: 154-7. On the retail trade ban, 
see Mackie 1976a: 82-97; and Somers 1965: 194-223.
21 Star Weekly, edited by Auwjong Peng Koen (P.K. Ojong, 1920-80), was published by the same 
company that produced the Jakarta daily Keng Po. Both Star Weekly and Keng Po were forced to cease 
publication during 1960 after contravening martial law press regulations.
22 Star Weekly, 27 February 1960
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A month later, in March 1960, a group of ten prominent Sino-Indonesians signed a 
manifesto advocating voluntary assimilation as the solution to the Chinese community's 
problems.23 During the months that followed, the correspondence columns of Star 
Weekly were filled with letters by supporters and opponents of the assimilation concept. 
The strongest criticism came from spokesmen representing Baperki (Badan  
Permusjaxvaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, the Consultative Body for Indonesian 
Citizenship), the organisation that had been founded in 1954 to promote Indonesian 
citizenship for ethnic Chinese and combat all forms of discrimination.24
Baperki had come into existence as a broadly-based and ideologically non-aligned 
body with the quite specific mandate of representing the interests of the ethnic Chinese. 
However, as politics became more strongly polarised in the 1956-58 period it had moved 
to a left position, partly because of the close personal relations between its chairman 
Siauw Giok Tjhan and President Sukarno. Consequently, a number of prominent figures 
with links to the PSI and others who were Catholics and Protestants had resigned their 
membership. Nevertheless, Baperki retained firm support within the Chinese community 
since it continued to provide a strong public defence of Indonesia's Chinese against all 
forces of discrimination.25
The critics of assimilation claimed that any such policy would be a fundamental 
infringement of individual human rights, arguing instead for the acceptance and 
integration of the Chinese within the Indonesian nation as a separate and distinct ethnic 
minority (or suku bangsa) retaining its own social and cultural identity.26 The
23 Star Weekly, 26 March 1960. The signatories included Onghokham, Auwjong Peng Koen and Injo 
Beng Goat, the editor-in-chief of Keng Po. The remainder were prominent peranakan academic and 
professional identities. A key participant was Drs Lauw Chuan Tho, an economist educated at the 
Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool in Rotterdam who had only recently returned from the Netherlands. 
Lauw was already an ardent advocate of assimilation, and quickly became one of the leading organisers of 
the movement during the following months.
24 See, in particular, the letters in Star Weekly by Siauw Giok Tjhan (2 April 1960) and by Yap Thiam 
Hien (16 and 30 April, and 21 May 1960).
25 On Baperki's formation and development, see Coppel 1976: 44-50; and Somers 1965: 143-73.
26 For a detailed account of the conflicting views of the assimilationists and the integrationists, see 
Coppel 1976: 44-63; Coppel 1983: 43-51; and Somers 1965: 251-81.
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integrationists had the support of the majority of the Sino-Indonesian community in this 
debate. The assimilationists, however, began to attract some followers. By the end of 
1960 they were able to organise a 'National Consciousness' seminar that met at 
Bandungan in Central Java in January 1961 with participants from various parts of Java.
The seminar produced an Assimilation Charter that called for
... the entry and acceptance of individuals of Chinese descent into the single body of the 
Indonesian nation in such a way that the special group they have originally belonged to 
will eventually cease to exist.22
When Soe Hok-gie entered the Faculty of Letters in late 1961 the debate over 
assimilation was well under way. As a result of his friendship with Ong and Tan, Soe 
quickly became a participant in their discussions about the Sino-Indonesian 
community.28 During the following months he was introduced to some of the older 
supporters of the assimilation movement, including Auwjong Peng Koen.
As a young and idealistic Indonesian, educated in Indonesian-language schools 
during the post-war period, without any strong ties to the wider peranakan Chinese 
community, and with little interest in its distinctive traditions and culture, Soe was easily 
drawn to the assimilation cause. In a sense he was already a perfect example of an 
assimilated Chinese. He identified completely with the country of his birth and was 
intensely concerned about its history, its present condition and its future. He mixed 
easily with Indonesians from across a wide ethnic spectrum. At the university, although 
some of his close friends were ethnic Chinese, many more were not. Yet these same 
qualities made it hard for him to be sympathetic or understanding of those Sino-
22 The Assimilation Charter was issued on 15 January 1961. For the complete text and a list of the 
thirty signatories, see Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1965: 29-31. An English translation 
appears in Suryadinata 1979: 152-3. As Coppel (1978: 54) has observed, the advocates of assimilation 
never came to grips with certain fundamental questions about what such a process actually involved. In 
particular, they failed to identify the nature of the cultural identity that they were expecting Sino- 
Indonesians to adopt. Was it one of the numerous indigenous suku cultures such as Javanese, Sundanese, 
Balinese or Malay? Or was it the modernised and Westernised superculture of Indonesia's major urban 
centres? This was never made explicit and neither were the other numerous practical problems associated 
with such a policy.
28 Interviews with Onghokham, 5 February 1982; and Siswadhi (Tan Hong-gie), September 1978. Soe 
Hok-gie's diary entries during this period contain only a few scattered cryptic comments on this issue, 
although there is one lengthy account of a discussion with Tan about the reasons why Sino-Indonesians 
were invariably among the best students in the Faculty of Letters (SHG Diary, 8 February 1962).
90
Indonesians from quite different social backgrounds. He rejected the exclusivism that he 
observed among many of his fellow Sino-Indonesians, especially when it was combined 
with what he judged to be an obsession with the world of business and money, qualities 
that he believed contributed to the prejudice and racism that was so widespread within the 
community. Since he himself did not come from a family with a background in trading 
or commerce, he was inclined to be dismissive of those Sino-Indonesians who were 
involved in these pursuits, judging them to be too 'money-minded' or 'middle-class'.29
Soe's interest in the issue of assimilation in particular and his understanding of the 
position of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese community in general were given a further 
stimulus in mid 1962 when he began to work as an assistant for Mary Somers, an 
American doctoral candidate in political science who was conducting research on the 
politics of the peranakan Chinese.30 For the next twelve months he was employed on a 
part-time basis to read the files of various peranakan Chinese newspapers of the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s held in the Central Museum Library, in particular the Surabaya daily 
Sin Tit Po, and the Jakarta Hong Po and Kung Yung P a o ? x This research work 
strengthened Soe's commitment to the discipline of history and gave him skills that he 
was to apply in pursuing his own research interests in the years that followed. It also 
deepened his understanding of the historical processes that underpinned the politics of the 
peranakan Chinese community in Indonesia throughout the twentieth century and 
extended his knowledge of some of the most important figures in that circle. These were 
insights that Soe was soon able to place at the disposal of the assimilation movement, for
29 SHG Diary, 22 July and 12 August 1962. These diary entries contain cryptic comments about his 
'aversion to peranakan society' for these reasons. As for the totok Chinese community, Soe seems to 
have had no point of contact whatsoever.
30 Soe had been recommended to Somers by his friend Onghokham who was already well known to 
Cornell scholars since his work for G. William Skinner several years previously. Although Soe was 
already nineteen at the time, his slight figure and boyish appearance made him look much younger and 
Somers at first doubted that he would be mature enough for the task. However, he not only soon proved 
to have good judgement and a keen sense for the issues in which she was interested, but he also helped 
her establish contact with older peranakan leaders who had been active in politics or journalism during the 
pre-war and World War II periods. Personal communication, Mary Somers Heidhues.
31 Coincidentally, Hong Po was the newspaper where his father Soe Lie Piet had been employed as a 
journalist for some time from the late 1930s. Yet there is nothing in the careful notes he took for 
Somers to indicate whether he was aware of this fact or discussed his research with his father.
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in the latter half of 1962, steps were taken to place that movement on a proper 
organisational footing.
After signing the Assimilation Charter in January 1961, Lauw Chuan Tho and 
others had established a Committee for Assimilation Information (Panitia Penyuluhan 
A sim ilasi) and had set about looking for wider support for the movement. In the 
politically charged atmosphere of Guided Democracy it was essential for the movement to 
have powerful supporters if it was to survive (especially since Baperki had the strong 
support of the PKI). Not surprisingly, the assimilationists approached certain sections of 
the armed forces and found that General Nasution (Minister of Defence and army chief of 
staff) and a number of his subordinates were supportive. As a result, the Bureau for the 
Promotion of National Unity (Urusan Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, UPKB) was 
established under the sponsorship of the army's front organisation, the Body for 
Developing the Potential of Functional Groups (Badan Pembina Potensi Karya, BPPK), 
which was the army's counterweight to the National Front. Early in August 1962 Soe 
attended the formal installation in Jakarta of the UPKB, where he met Lauw Chuan Tho 
and some of the other supporters of assimilation, including a number of pribum i 
sympathisers.32
When it was announced several months later that martial law would end in May of 
the following year - a victory for Sukarno over his army partners in power - it became 
clear that the assimilationists would have to find a new patron since the increasingly 
powerful National Front appeared likely to take advantage of this situation to eliminate the 
BPPK, its army-sponsored rival.33 From this point on Soe became closely involved 
with the core group of assimilation activists who decided that it was necessary to 
establish an independent body to promote the cause.
32 SHG Diary, 12 August 1962
33 Coppel 1976: 56. Many of the leading figures in the National Front, such as its Minister, Sudibjo, 
were ardent leftists who were believed to be unsympathetic to the assimilation cause.
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After seeking and obtaining President Sukarno's approval for their ideas in 
February 1963, this group hastily arranged an Assimilation Conference (Musjawarah 
Asimilasi) for 10-12 March in advance of a Baperki congress that was to begin several 
days later. At the conference, the formation of an Institute of Promoters of National 
Unity (Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa, LPKB) was announced.34 Soe was one of 
those elected to the organisation's central leadership which was headed by a Navy legal 
officer, Sindhunatha.35
This appeared to be a promising beginning, but the following weeks and months 
proved to be an extremely difficult period for the new organisation.36 Despite his early 
expression of support for assimilation, President Sukarno continued publicly to praise 
Baperki and its policies. When serious anti-Chinese riots broke out in several parts of 
West Java in May, Baperki leaders projected themselves as defenders of the rights of 
Indonesia's Chinese community. Consequently, the LPKB leaders felt dangerously 
isolated and began to press for some formal association with the government. On 18 July 
the LPKB (the organisation's name now changed to Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan 
Bangsa, the Institute for the Promotion of National Unity) was placed by presidential 
decree under the control of the Department of Information and its minister, Roeslan 
Abdulgani.37
34 In addition to the continued backing of their allies within the army, the assimilationists had actively 
canvassed support from other quarters. Various prominent political figures including Sunarjo of the PNI, 
Ipik Gandamana (Minister for the Interior and Regional Autonomy), Roeslan Abdulgani (Minister for 
Information), Chaerul Saleh (Minister for Basic Industries and Mining, and chairman of the MPRS) and 
Muljadi Djojomartono (Chairman, Muhammadiyah) either attended the conference or sent messages of 
support. For details of the conference and its resolutions, see Assimilasi dalam rangka pembinaan 
kesatuan bangsa 1963.
35 Kristoforus Sindhunatha (formerly Ong Tjong Hai) was born in Jakarta in 1933. He studied law at 
the University of Indonesia during the late 1950s when he became deputy chairman of PMKRI, the 
Catholic university student society. After graduating in 1961, he joined the legal affairs bureau of the 
Indonesian Navy. Interview, 1 March 1985; Apa dan Siapa 1986: 852-3
Onghokham and Tan Hong-gie were also elected to the LPKB leadership along with several pribumi 
supporters of assimilation. See Assimilasi dalam rangka pembinaan kesatuan bangsa 1963: 58 and 70.
36 Coppel 1976: 56-8
37 On this change in the organisation's status, see Assimilasi dalam rangka pembinaan kesatuan bangsa 
1964.
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During the following two years Soe played a prominent part within the councils of 
the LPKB. He was particularly active in the planning and research section of the 
institute's work, where his knowledge of history and his research skills were called upon 
and where a number of academics and intellectuals collaborated on specific projects.38 
Soe helped produce a number of information booklets and pamphlets setting out the 
LPKB's views on assimilation.39 He was especially concerned to locate the issue of 
Chinese assimilation within the broader context of Indonesia's historical development as 
an independent nation. Soe argued that national unity had been threatened throughout the 
course of the nationalist movement and the subsequent struggle for independence by 
groups attempting to maintain narrow sectional interests. In addition, the policies of the 
Dutch colonial government had promoted divisions within society along racial, ethnic and 
regional lines. This had been a deliberate tactic to maintain colonial power by 
strengthening ethnic identities and fostering racial prejudice to the detriment of national 
unity. Viewed from this perspective, 'assimilation' was a policy that was inherently 
patriotic, drawing inspiration from the example set by such early nationalist figures as 
Douwes Dekker, Dr Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. On the other 
hand, the LPKB argued that 'integration' had more in common with those who had tried 
to elevate minority interests over the interests of the nation at large.
In the latter half of 1963, Soe was appointed to the editorial board of Gelora 
Minggu, an apparently short-lived weekly published by the private foundation established 
to support the LPKB's work. In May of the following year, the LPKB established its 
own journal, Bara Eka. Soe, who was also a member of its editorial board, wrote a
38 This section of the LPKB was initially under the leadership of Drs Jahja Wullur (formerly Oei Tjin 
San), a social psychologist at Padjadjaran University, Bandung, and the president of the LPKB's West 
Java branch. For certain details of the LPKB's operations and Soe Hok-gie's role within the organisation 
in this and the following paragraphs, I am indebted to Charles Coppel who made available information he 
obtained from LPKB official archives held by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta.
39 See Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1964. Soe was one of the compilers of this anthology 
which combined excerpts from the speeches and writings of Sukarno, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Muhammad 
Yamin and Roeslan Abdulgani. Soe included an article he had written himself on the Youth Oath of 
1928, 'Sumpah Pemuda (28 Oktober 1928) detik kelahiran bangsa Indonesia sebagai satu nasion' (The 
Youth Oath [28 October 1928] the moment of birth of the Indonesian people as one nation), pp 65-71. 
See also Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1965a. This was a shorter pamphlet written with Drs 
C.S.T. Kansil. The material was reprinted in an article of the same title in Bara Eka, 3/13, March 1966.
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number of articles for this monthly magazine throughout the following eighteen months. 
These included brief studies of the work of particular individuals whom he believed were 
among the pioneers of the spirit of assimilation and national unity that the LPKB's work 
was directed towards promoting.40
Soe was one of the youngest of the LPKB's activists. Despite this, his views were 
listened to with respect by the older members of the organisation who recognised his 
intelligence and his seriousness of purpose. However, difficulties arose between Soe 
and his fellow assimilationists once the LPKB was placed under the authority of the 
Department of Information in July 1963.41 The LPKB's political rival, the left-aligned 
Baperki, was a larger and much more powerful organisation. It continued to have the ear 
of President Sukarno, and also received substantial financial support from the Sino- 
Indonesian business community. The LPKB, on the defensive politically and with 
limited financial resources, was struggling to build an effective national organisation with 
branches throughout the country. Consequently, the institute's leadership was eager to 
secure whatever recognition and material and financial resources it could through 
becoming an official organ of government.
But the LPKB's acquisition of official status caused Soe some uneasiness. That 
uneasiness turned to alarm during 1965 when he discovered that the private foundation 
that had been established to support the LPKB's work had arranged to accept a 'deferred 
payment permit' from the government's Central Bank.42 After his appointment as 
Minister for Central Bank Affairs in November 1963, Jusuf Muda Dalam had 
transformed the bank into his personal political fiefdom. His own profligate life-style
40 'Pelopor kesatuan bangsa: Dr Tjipto Mangunkusumo' (Pioneer of national unity - Dr Tjipto
Mangunkusumo), Bara Eka, 1/1, May 1964; 'Liem Koen Hian dan perdjuangan pembinaan bangsa' (Liem 
Koen Hian and the struggle for nation building), Bara Eka, 2/6, July-August 1965. See also his article 
'Ichtisar sedjarah tjita— assimilasi' (An outline of the history of assimilation ideals) in the same issue.
41 Interview with K. Sindhunatha, 1 March 1985
42 As the Indonesian economy plummeted into decline in the final years of Guided Democracy and as 
inflation rocketed out of control, the value of the rupiah was rapidly eroded and foreign exchange became 
increasingly difficult to obtain. In such circumstances, bureaucrats and government officials with the 
right connections were able to obtain these permits and sell them on at high profits to businessmen 
urgently in need of foreign exchange credit facilities.
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and corrupt reputation were common knowledge in Jakarta political circles. The bank's 
resources were used to finance many of the president's favourite grandiose construction 
projects but it was also a source of patronage and largesse for those with political 
connections.43 Consequently, Soe regarded any LPKB involvement in such dubious 
business affairs as totally unacceptable. When he spoke out against the matter within 
LPKB circles in the latter half of 1965 he was opposed by those who adopted a more 
pragmatic point of view, and who argued that the organisation urgently needed these 
funds if it was to operate effectively.44 Soe, however, refused to compromise with what 
he regarded as a matter of principle. After a bitter confrontation inside the LPKB 
leadership, in particular with the Catholic Party activist Harry Tjan who was a prominent 
member of the LPKB's supporting foundation, Soe finally tendered his resignation at an 
LPKB meeting in January 1966.45
The LPKB involvement was Soe's first practical experience of political activism. 
Although the LPKB circle included a few individuals who shared many of Soe's views 
about the Sukarno government, the assimilationists as a group were forced to court the 
president's support if their movement was to survive. Ironically, it was this political 
imperative that provided Soe with several unique opportunities to meet face to face with 
the man whose personal style and policies he had come to despise.
43 On Jusuf Muda Dalam's period in charge of the Central Bank, see Glassburner 1971: 363-83.
44 Interviews with K. Sindhunatha, 1 March 1985; and Harry Tjan Silalahi, 22 February 1985. Some 
of the funds that the LPKB obtained were used to purchase vehicles for the institute's work. Soe Hok- 
gie's mother (interview with Nio Hoei An, 5 February 1985) recalled that he had been given an LPKB 
motor-scooter in 1965 but passed it on to a friend in the organisation. According to Arief Budiman 
(interview, 12 September 1995) Soe had learned of a plan to purchase houses which were to be made 
available to some of the LPKB pribumi supporters. Correspondence in the LPKB archives indicates that 
the organisation was certainly involved in some questionable financial dealings.
43 SHG Diary, 8 January 1966. Soe's diary entry mentions a conflict and his resignation but gives no 
details.
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Meeting the Great Leader of the Revolution
On 22 February 1963, Soe was one of the small group of assimilationists who 
visited President Sukarno to seek his endorsement for their activities.46 The deputation 
had been arranged suddenly by an intermediary and there was some initial uncertainty 
about who should represent their movement. At first Soe’s friend Onghokham was 
considered, but because of his authorship of the Star Weekly articles that had created so 
much controversy, it was finally decided that it would be more prudent not to include 
him. Soe himself had no suitable clothes for such an occasion but at the last moment a 
jacket several sizes too large was hastily borrowed. The party, consisting of five Sino- 
Indonesians and four pribumi supporters, assembled at the presidential palace in Jakarta 
at 6 am before being ushered in to Sukarno's presence for an early morning meeting.47 
Also present throughout the discussions were Chaerul Saleh, the Minister for Basic 
Industries and Mining and Chairman of the Provisional Peoples' Consultative Assembly, 
and Dasaad, a wealthy businessman. Both men were prominent members of the 
presidential palace circle during the early 1960s.
The members of the delegation were introduced by Colonel Soetjipto, one of the 
senior army officers who had supported the assimilationist cause during the previous 
year.48 Sindhunatha, as spokeman for the group, then outlined the assimilationists' 
position and explained their proposal for solving the problem of minorities in Indonesia.
46 Soe's detailed account was written two days later (SHG Diary, 24 February 1963). According to a 
later diary entry (7 January 1966) he visited the presidential palace on at least three separate occasions, 
although this is the only visit described in his journal. In contrast to the candid comments recorded there, 
the occasion is also mentioned - in more positive terms - in Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1965: 
22-3.
47 The delegation consisted of Soe, Sindhunatha, Junus Jahja (the economist, Lauw Chuan Tho, who 
had only recently changed his name), T.A. Hardjanegara (formerly The Han Liem, a Bandung 
businessman with interests in the transport sector) and a Dr Arifin. The pribumi members were Soeharto 
Hasirin (a Department of Foreign Affairs official, recently returned from a posting in the Indonesian 
embassy in Moscow), Anis Ibrahim (a Minangkabau student who headed the Indonesian Student Press 
League, IPMI) and Safioedin (an official of the Department of Home Affairs, who was in charge of a 
bureau with responsibilities for ethnic minorities).
48 Soetjipto was the chief of staff of the Supreme War Command (Peperti) and general secretary of the 
Consultative Council of the Leadership of the Revolution (MPPR, a Guided Democracy body advising 
the president).
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He concluded by asking for the president's comments and invited his admonishment if he 
believed that they were in error.
The assimilationists were delighted with Sukarno's response. In general terms the 
president expressed his agreement with their ideas. He emphasised that he had always 
been opposed to racism in any form, so any initiative that would strengthen national unity 
such as intermarriages between ethnic groups had his blessing. During the discussion 
that followed, the delegation extracted from Sukarno his own novel explanation of 
Indonesia's national motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). The president, 
with his usual love of foreign words and phrases, explained that the Bhinneka (Diversity) 
should be regarded as das Sein (what is), while the Tunggal Ika (Unity) implied das 
Sollen (what shall be). Here was a presidential statement that could be used to justify 
assimilation and undermine the integrationist policies of their Baperki opponents.
Once the delegation's serious business had been dealt with, the conversation 
became more informal. Sukarno, who apparently had no pressing matters of state that 
morning, was obviously enjoying himself. Discussion about the problem of the Chinese 
minority had involved consideration of the issue of marriage. This naturally led the 
president to reflect on matters in which he claimed special expertise. He began to regale 
his listeners with his own impressions of how female beauty, as he had observed it at 
close quarters in various parts of the world, had been enhanced by inter-ethnic marriages.
The president was also eager to hear the latest Jakarta gossip about his Foreign 
Minister, Dr Subandrio, and his affairs with various prominent local film stars, one of 
whom was rumoured to be of part-Chinese descent. The conversation turned to 
homosexuality. Sukarno gave his views on its causes, described how a homosexual 
foreign state guest had savagely beaten a local transvestite, and declared that he had been 
reliably informed that Arab countries were full of transvestites. He was now warming to 
one of his favourite subjects, sex. To the acute discomfort of at least one member of the
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assembled company, he went so far as to reflect on
... what it would feel like to fondle the breasts of a woman who had been injected with 
plastic.
Soe remarked in his diary:
Throughout the course of the conversation whatever seemed inviting was taken up by 
Bung Karno, Chaerul Saleh and Dasaad (and Hardjo also it appears) with complete 
freedom. I felt rather strange...
As a human being I think I like Bung Karno, but as leader, no. How can there be any 
social responsibility with the state led by people like that? Bung Karno, like Ariwijadi, 
full of jokes with obscene mobs and with such immoral interests. Especially seeing 
the pot-bellied Dasaad who is still attracted to pretty girls. He declared that he would 
also have married a Japanese if he had still been young. Bung Karno said that he 
wanted something (a helicopter?) as a present and Dasaad said, everything will be fine 
when the papers are clear...
I only have one impression, I cannot believe in him as a leader of state because he is so
immoral .49
By the time they left the palace, the audience with the president had lasted nearly 
three hours. Soe came away feeling angry and disturbed. Sukarno's sexual exploits 
were common knowledge in Indonesia, especially among Jakarta's political public. Yet, 
even allowing for Soe's own strong streak of moral prudishness and his relative 
innocence with the ways of the world, it had been a bizarre experience. He was shocked 
by the president's behaviour, his open display of braggadocio, his obvious coarseness 
and his crude immorality. Moreover, this had occurred at a time when publicly Sukarno 
was forever promoting the cause of Indonesia's cultural identity (kepribadian Indonesia) 
and attacking Western culture for its immorality and decadence.50 Soe was also 
dismayed by the other signs of sordid venality he had observed: the easy familiarity of 
corrupt figures like Dasaad who were so clearly entrenched within the palace circle; the 
sycophantic demeanor of the president's aides; and the female assistants he treated as his 
personal sex objects.51
40 SHG Diary, 24 February 1963. Ariwijadi was a friend of Soe's at Rawamangun; 'he would also have 
married a Japanese' is a reference to Sukarno's fourth wife, Dewi, whom he had met in Tokyo in 1959.
50 Kepribadian Indonesia was the 'K' in Sukarno’s Manipol-USDEK.
51 Soe's views about the president's personal flaws were further strengthened by a chance meeting in 
Bandung during the following year with Sukarno's long-forgotten first wife Inggit Garnasih. Soe's 
account of their meeting, during which Ibu Inggit described her feelings when Sukarno had abandoned her 
for Fatmawati, are related in his Kartini Day essay: 'Tjita2 Kartini dim pengalaman seorang mahasiswa 
Indonesia' (Kartini's ideals in the experience of an Indonesian university student), Kompas, 20 April 
1968.
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Soe's diary entry does not indicate what conversations he himself had with 
Sukarno on this occasion, although his appearance in an ill-fitting jacket guaranteed that 
his presence did not pass unnoticed. The president, an intensely vain man, punctilious in 
his own personal appearance and a fastidious dresser, singled out the young student for 
some humorous banter.52
Little is known about Soe's other meetings with Sukarno, though these may have 
occurred at the presidential palace in Bogor. On 18 July 1964, the president hosted a 
reception for LPKB delegates who were attending a conference held to mark the first 
anniversary of the organisation's formation. Soe was almost certainly present on this 
occasion.53 According to LPKB official records, on 21 January 1965 Soe travelled to 
Bogor with Sindhunatha, Anis Ibrahim and members of the Liem family, including Liem 
Bian Khoen, to present President Sukarno with a bronze deer, a Liem family heirloom.54
Although these visits to the presidential palace did nothing to enhance Soe's 
opinion of the Great Leader of the Revolution, Sukarno, for his part, apparently found 
something attractive about the sharp-eyed young student with the borrowed jacket. After 
one of his meetings with the president, Soe was offered an official position in a history 
museum planned to be part of the National Monument in Merdeka Square, one of 
President Sukarno's favourite construction projects.55 But by the time even the first of 
these visits to the presidential palace took place, Soe was already thinking about ways 
and means to involve himself in practical efforts to oppose the Sukarno regime. The 
president's offer was quietly ignored.
52 SHG Diary, 24 September 1963
53 The Bogor reception is reported in Bara Eka, 1/3, August-September-October 1964.
54 The visit is recorded in a note in the LPKB archives. Catholic supporters of the assimilation 
movement - both Chinese and pribumi - were actively involved in the LPKB's affairs, though more 
particularly in the private foundation that supported its work. Liem Bian Khoen (Sofjan Wanandi) is a 
younger brother of Liem Bian Kie, and had also been a student at Canisius College. In 1965 he was 
studying economics at UI and was already a prominent activist in PMKRI. Soe also met other Catholic 
activists in LPKB circles including Cosmas Batubara and Jakob Oetama.
55 It is not known precisely when this occurred, although the presidential offer was common knowledge 
among Soe's family and friends. Arief Budiman (interview 11 September 1995) believes that it may have 
been after a subsequent meeting in Jakarta and may have involved his teacher at the Faculty of Letters, 
Nugroho Notosusanto, who was a member of the museum's planning committee.
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Gemsos and the urge for action
One group of people who greatly influenced Soe’s responses to Sukarno was the 
Socialist University Students' Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis, Gemsos), a 
small student political organisation that attracted those in student circles who were 
supporters of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). As a schoolboy, Soe had already 
been drawn to the PSI, especially since he saw in its leader, Sutan Sjahrir, those qualities 
of integrity and honesty that he admired but seldom found in political leaders.56 In the 
period from late 1956 onwards, when President Sukarno began his drive for greater 
power and authority that led to his eventual successful assault on Indonesia's fragile 
democratic institutions, it seemed to Soe that the PSI leaders were among the very few 
politicians who were prepared publicly to voice their opposition. The fact that the PSI's 
hostile stance towards Sukarno and his policies eventually resulted in its being declared 
illegal in August 1960 probably contributed to his admiration for the party as a principled 
political underdog of the Guided Democracy system.
Since its foundation in 1955, Gemsos had never attempted to attract large numbers 
of students to its membership.57 Although no formal affiliation with the PSI existed, that 
party’s declining fortunes under Guided Democracy ensured that Gemsos remained a 
weak and ineffectual organisation. When Soe became a student at the University of 
Indonesia in the final months of 1961, Gemsos was a small and fairly inconspicuous 
group. The arrests of PSI leaders, including Sjahrir and the party's former parliamentary 
leader Soebadio Sastrosatomo, in January 1962 was further reason for Gemsos and 
campus-based supporters of the PSI to adopt a low profile.
Soe was attracted to Gemsos initially through the friendship he struck with one of 
its leading Jakarta organisers, Zainal Zakse.58 When they met at Rawamangun in
56 See Chapter 1, p.39.
57 Interview with Maruli Silitonga, 16 February 1982
58 Zainal Abidin Katung Sikumbang Enang ('Zakse') was born in Binjai, North Sumatra in 1938, the 
eldest son of a Minangkabau trading family who had settled in that area. For a colourful pen-portrait, see
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October 1961, Zakse was already in his second year in the History Department. After 
completing his secondary schooling at an SMA in North Sumatra where he had already 
been active in student affairs, Zakse had arrived in Jakarta in 1960 and had immediately 
joined Gemsos. On the campus he quickly developed a reputation as something of a 
Bohemian. Like many students from humble out-of-town backgrounds who came to the 
national capital to further their education, Zakse barely managed to eke out a precarious 
existence there. His clothes were shabby, he had few personal possessions and he was 
perpetually short of money. Many students in the faculty regarded him as an oddball. 
For Soe, whose own family circumstances were relatively modest and who was inclined 
to regard many of his fellow students as far too bourgeois, these were qualities to be 
admired.
He was immediately drawn to the Gemsos circle when he learned that Zakse was a 
determined and principled opponent of the Sukarno regime, for he was delighted to have 
found someone on the campus with whom he could share his contempt for what he 
regarded as the hypocrisy and shallowness of Guided Democracy ideology. Zakse, who 
had managed to find a room in the building that had been the PSI's national headquarters 
on Jalan Cisadane in Menteng, was able to introduce Soe not only to other Gemsos 
students in both Jakarta and Bandung but also to some of the older PSI activists who 
took an interest in building up support within the younger generation.
Towards the end of 1962, as Soe entered his second year at university, he began to 
look for ways of encouraging his fellow students to adopt a more positive and critical 
attitude towards the world around them.59 It was already apparent to him, as it was to 
others in his circle, that President Sukarno's two Guided Democracy partners, the 
military and the PKI, would face one another in a struggle for power at some time in the
Soe Hok-gie’s own posthumous tribute, 'Kenang2an untuk seorang kawan - Zainal Abidin' 
(Reminiscences for a friend - Zainal Abidin), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No 49, Week 4, May 1967.
59 SHG Diary, 4 December 1962
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future.60 By early 1963, impatient with the stultifying limits upon free speech that 
Guided Democracy enforced through its censorship of the press and its harassment of 
political opponents, Soe began to question the role independent-minded intellectuals 
should play in these circumstances:
Now the situation is increasingly serious. Apparently the struggle between the military 
and the PKI must reach a decisive point. Whether this will take the form of a clash or 
just an internal struggle, who knows. Prices are increasingly on the rise, the capitalists 
are more and more rapacious destroying the people and the nouveau riche are beginning 
to cause trouble. In this situation, the intelligentsia ought to act, do something. Under 
no circumstances do I intend to tell them to do something foolish. The scholar's task is 
to think and be creative. They must be free from all disturbing social pressures. They 
should be able to think calmly because of that scholarly status (even if they are not 
scholars). But they cannot escape their social function, to act responsibly when the 
situation is urgent. Intellectuals who remain silent in such circumstances have lost all 
their humanity. When Hitler's cruelty began, the Inge School group said no. These 
German young people had the courage to say 'no'. Although still young they were 
brave enough to oppose the gangster leadership, that was identical with the Nazi 
regime. That they died is not a problem for me. They had fulfilled their calling as 
thinkers. There was no beauty (in the romantic sense) in their punishment but what 
could be more poetic than speaking the truth.
In Indonesia I think that we have also arrived at the moment to say 'no' to Sukarno. Of 
course Sukarno is no Hitler. In fact he's a tragic figure and ought to be pitied. But the 
people around him, both military and civilian, are thieves and scoundrels of no more 
value than mongrel dogs. I don't know what measures these humanitarian thinkers 
should take. Do they exist and are they brave enough to speak the truth?...
In a situation like this they should say no to Sukarno's monuments, Sukarno's palaces 
and Sukarno's wives and prostitutes. Now we need factories, roads, education and moral 
standards. And Sukarno offers palaces, immorality and monuments that are of no 
benefit to the people. We are all starving. And in this situation, intellectuals [must] 
speak honestly and truthfully. That they are frightened, perhaps, but about...? They 
must overcome fear. Recently I have wanted to issue an appeal concerning the courage 
to speak out, and if possible have it published. I don't think there is anyone who would 
want to print it. We need an intellectual framework at the present time. Every effort 
we can possibly make must be directed towards its creation. And for me, what must be 
done is to study and try to understand present-day problems.61
Drawing on their Gemsos connections, Soe and his friend Zakse decided to 
organise a discussion group, as a first step towards a more activist approach to these 
problems. A number of fellow students and young intellectuals were invited to take part 
and arrangements were made for various prominent Indonesian intellectuals to address 
the group.62 The first of these meetings was held at the home of Gemsos's Jakarta
60 SHG Diary, 31 December 1962; 14 January 1963
61 SHG Diary, 14 January 1963
62 Interview with Onghokham, 5 February 1982; and Maruli Silitonga, 16 February 1982. See also 
Soe Hok-gie, 'Kenang2an untuk seorang kawan - Zainal Abidin’ (Reminiscences for a friend - Zainal 
Abidin), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No 49, Week 4, May 1967. Other prominent figures invited to speak at 
this forum included the journalist Rosihan Anwar, the economists Mohammad Sadli and Sarbini, and the 
literary critic Wiratmo Soekito.
103
chairman, Maruli Silitonga, only days before Soe's visit to the presidential palace in 
February 1963. The prominent PSI intellectual and publisher, Soedjatmoko, addressed 
the meeting and took as his theme the role of intellectuals in Indonesia's development and 
their failure to comprehend the real nature of its problems.63 A lively discussion 
followed as various members of the group attempted to press him on the position they 
should adopt in facing the current situation and the sort of ideas that should be guiding 
their actions:
Koko [Soedjatmoko] denied that intellectuals did not have an intellectual framework 
[konsepsi]. He himself has a konsepsi. The problem now is how to revive Indonesian 
intellectual life from its paralysis. I then stressed that the people had suffered so much 
and needed rapid improvements and if we were hoping for a konsepsi that was ready to 
put into action/mature from the intelligensia then maybe it would be a long time. If 
we don't have a plan for the future who does? Saudara Soedjono also spoke in the same 
vein. Koko replied rather hotly. He said that that was their characteristic weakness at 
present, waiting for a konsepsi. We cannot entrust our fate to a konsepsi, but must be 
inspired and bear it mind.6^
The group met on a number of subsequent occasions in the following months. However, 
after the May 1963 anti-Chinese riots in Bandung in which a number of Gemsos activists 
were involved and subsequently arrested, their meetings were temporarily abandoned.65
In fact 1963 proved to be a decisive year for Soe and other young intellectuals who 
shared his views about Sukarno and the direction in which the country seemed to be 
headed. After a period of uncertainty, in September of that year Sukarno decided to press
63 Soedjatmoko (1922-1990) was from an aristocratic Javanese family background. His father, K.R.T. 
Saleh Mangundiningrat, was a medical practitioner educated in the Netherlands who later served in one of 
the royal courts of Surakarta. Soedjatmoko had abandoned his own medical studies in Jakarta during the 
Japanese occupation, eventually becoming part of Sutan Sjahrir's circle. He represented the new Republic 
overseas, including at the United Nations, from 1947 to 1951. As a prominent member of the PSI 
throughout the 1950s, he was active in both publishing and journalism, editing the weekly Siasat and the 
daily Pedoman. He was involved in the 'Liga Demokrasi affair' in 1960; after the PSI was banned he 
spent a semester as a visiting lecturer at Cornell University. See Apa dan siapa 1986: 896-7, Feith and 
Castles 1970: 482-3.
64 Soe recorded his own summary of Soedjatmoko's talk and the discussion that followed in his diary. 
SHG Diary, 19 February 1963. Koko was Soedjatmoko's nickname. Soedjono was the Gemsos 
secretary-general. The term konsepsi is not easy to render simply in English. It was in vogue after 
President Sukarno's use of it in important political speeches in 1956 and 1957. Soedjatmoko's use of the 
term in 1963 was an indication of the intensely ideological atmosphere of that time with Sukarno laying 
down an official position and the PKI strongly asserting an alternative ideology. Their opponents were 
shackled by their inability to offer a rival set of democratic or liberal ideas that would make any headway 
against either.
65 See Soe Hok-gie, 'Kenang2an untuk seorang kawan - Zainal Abidin' (Reminiscences for a friend - 
Zainal Abidin), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No 49, Week 4, May 1967. According to Soe, the meetings were 
resumed later that year in the form of a cultural discussion group.
104
ahead with his 'Crush Malaysia' campaign, thereby turning his back on the IMF rescue 
package for the ailing Indonesian economy that had been announced several months 
earlier. As the president and his supporters began to direct their energy towards 
konfrontasi, economic conditions in Indonesia rapidly deteriorated with sharp price rises 
of basic commodities and an upward surge in inflation. By the end of the year it was 
clear that Sukarno had significantly shifted the domestic political balance in favour of the 
left because of the collapse of the Djuanda-led stabilisation scheme. In the highly charged 
political atmosphere that prevailed, those daring to question the policies of the 
government ran the danger of being denounced as counter-revolutionaries (kontra- 
revolusi) who had departed from the 'rails of the revolution'. Such individuals had to be 
'crushed' or at least 'retooled'.
One of the most striking illustrations of the ideological conformity that the regime 
attempted to impose occurred during the 'Manikebu affair' of late 1963.66 In August a 
small group of writers and artists associated with the literary journal Sastra, many of 
them young and relatively unknown figures, joined together to produce what they called a 
Cultural Manifesto (Manifes Kebudayaan) in support of the cause of freedom of 
expression and what they called 'universal humanism' in art and literature.67 Although 
on the surface the manifesto’s principles seemed innocuous (and the accompanying 
explanatory statement was deliberately couched in obscure language that was difficult to 
penetrate), it was quickly identified as a direct challenge to the leftist advocates of social 
realism and 'art in service of the people', in particular those writers and artists who were 
members of the Peoples' Cultural Institute (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Lekra) that 
was closely aligned with the PKI.68 In the months that followed a bitter campaign was 
waged against the manifesto and its signatories with a series of vitriolic attacks in the
66 Manikebu was the acronym coined from Manifes Kebudayaan and quickly became a term of abuse 
used by the group's political opponents. For one account of the affair, including the events that led to it, 
see Foulcher 1969. For an insider's view, see Goenawan Mohamad 1988 and 1993: 11-54.
67 The text of the Cultural Manifesto appears in Sastra, 9/10, 1963, with the names of twenty-two 
signatories, explanatory notes and an account of its formulation.
68 On Lekra, see Foulcher 1986.
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press and angry denunciations in public speeches. Finally, on 8 May 1964 the Cultural 
Manifesto was banned by presidential decree. As a result, all the participants found that 
their artistic work was no longer publicly accepted and several individuals were 
dismissed from their official positions.
Soe Hok-gie had good reason to be alarmed by these developments. Although he 
himself was not directly involved in the Manikebu affair', his older brother Hok-djin, 
one of the young writers and essayists associated with Sastra, was among those who had 
signed the manifesto.69 Soe also knew several of the other participants. Some, like 
Wiratmo Soekito, the Catholic intellectual who was the principal author of the document, 
had also taken part in Soe and Zakse's study group during the previous year. Others, 
like Goenawan Mohamad and Bur Rasuanto, were known to him through his brother 
Hok-djin.70
Since the long silence between the brothers that had begun in their teenage years 
continued unabated throughout their early university years (a situation that was 
recognised but not really understood by friends who knew them both), the issues of the 
Cultural Manifesto and Hok-djin's participation were never openly discussed between 
them. It appears that Hok-gie did not agree with the Cultural Manifesto group's actions 
although his reasons for this are not entirely clear.71 It seems unlikely that he would 
have had any fundamental objection to the views of the group or the ideas expressed in 
the published manifesto itself; he may well have considered their actions ill-timed or
69 As a schoolboy, Soe Hok-djin had made the acquaintance of H.B. Yassin, the prominent literary 
critic, and began to submit stories and essays for publication in literary journals. At the University of 
Indonesia, Hok-djin had pursued an interest in philosophy and aesthetics in the Department of 
Psychology. When the crackdown on the Manikebu circle began in 1964, he accepted an offer of a year's 
overseas study in Europe supported by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Interview with Arief 
Budiman, 8 March 1982
70 Interviews with Goenawan Mohamad, 14 February 1982; and Bur Rasuanto, 17 March 1982. Many 
of the Manifesto's younger supporters also used to meet at Jalan Cisadane where Soe's friend Zakse was 
living.
71 There is an oblique reference to his opposition in his diary (28 February 1964) but the issue is left 
unexplained.
politically inept, playing into the hands of their political opponents and presenting 
themselves as an easy target to attack.
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Whatever his own opinions about the manifesto actually were, the reaction it 
provoked was a clear demonstration to him of the escalating tensions and deepening 
political divisions that were emerging within Sukarno's Guided Democracy by the early 
months of 1964. The fundamental issue was how to respond to this situation. In the 
middle of March, after a long argument about Sukarno with his friend and fellow history 
student Onghokham (who was trying to convince him to consider the president as a
successor to the traditional rulers of Java), he wrote in his diary:
If we accept the notion that he is in fact nothing more than a traditional ruler, the 
problem now is whether we can put the entire future of Indonesia in the hands of a 
person like this. As far as I'm concerned, clearly not. I also accept Pancasila and 
Manipol in an honest fashion. However I think these are things that have to be fought 
for as Indonesia's ideals. If Pancasila and Manipol are just slogans then it's a different 
matter. The problem now is that we must give meaning to these aspirations to achieve 
the objective of the revolution. Previously Wiratmo had said to Peransi that we are 
committed to the aims of the revolution but not to the leadership of the revolution.
And as members of the younger generation we have to provide it with some content. 
Wiratmo really tried to do this with his Cultural Manifesto.
When I spoke with Peransi this afternoon, he was also feeling the same way I was. We 
have grave doubts about whether there is still any point studying, discussing and so on, 
while the people are starving everywhere. He was gripped by a powerful urge to act, to 
take an action.
I told him that these problems had also been bothering me several weeks ago. The 
important thing is to gather together the necessary forces, because if we don't look after 
our forces and just continue to study, we will be wiped out by the opposition group. I 
have already accepted Soedjono's principles that now we must really marshal our forces.
In politics morality doesn't exist. As far as I'm concerned politics is something that's 
utterly dirty, it's filthy mud. But at a certain moment where we cannot restrain 
ourselves any further, then we will leap into it. Sometimes the moment arrives, as it 
did previously in the revolution. And if by some chance this moment comes I'm going 
to leap into this mud.72
72 SHG Diary, 16 March 1964. D.A. Peransi was a student in the Department of Indonesian Language 
and Literature at the Faculty of Letters at UI and a friend of the Soe brothers. He had known them both 
for some years since he had taught art classes at Canisius College. Though a member of the circle of 
young artistic and literary figures in which Hok-djin moved, he appears to have shared Hok-gie's doubts 
about the Cultural Manifesto and was not a signatory. He was, however, an active member of the 
discussion group that Soe and Zakse had formed early in 1963 (SHG Diary, 14 and 19 February 1963; 
Foulcher 1969: 440). Soedjono was the Gemsos activist who was also a prominent member of that 
group.
The full impact of Soe's final sentences is lost in translation:
Dalam politik tak ada moral. Bagiku sendiri politik adalah barang yang paling kotor, 
lumpur-lumpur yang kotor. Tetapi suatu saat dimana kita tak dapat menghindari diri 
lagi maka terjunlah. Kadang-kadang saat ini tiba, seperti dalam revolusi dulu. Dan jika 
sekiranya saatnya sudah sampai aku akan terjun ke lumpur ini.
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It seemed to Soe that the time for talking about Indonesia's deteriorating fortunes 
had long passed. What was now required were practical measures to set matters right. 
Like his friend Peransi, there was an urgency to become directly involved in these events. 
Nevertheless, the final sentences of this passage are a powerful reflection of the tension 
between engaged commitment and a deep sense of revulsion for what he regarded as the 
corrupting influence of the world of politics. This tension was to re-emerge as a 
prominent leitmotiv in Soe's experiences throughout the years that followed.
For the moment, however, the heightened sense of urgency and the desire for 
political action increased his frustration with what he had come to regard as certain critical 
failings within the Gemsos-PSI circle. Although Soedjatmoko continued to command his 
respect, he was dismayed by the sense of intellectual superiority and arrogance that he 
believed many PSI people displayed. How far this reflected Soe's own social 
background in Kebon Jeruk is difficult to say, but he was certainly contemptuous of the 
life-style and values of many in this circle, seeing them as too comfortable and too
bourgeois to have a serious commitment to political action:
They think that they are the greatest. Their group (the remnants of the PSI) are so 
comfortable and highly regarded, so bourgeois, that they have become cowards. 
Socialism for them is just slogans and lip service. 'Our enemy is poverty and 
ignorance' is the emptiest slogan that has ever been touted. That's the reason the PSI 
has been defeated and is disliked by the people.7^
Their socialism he believed was now that of the armchair. Frustrated by their lack of 
action, he was one of those who popularised the derisive label 'kaum sosialis salon 
(salon socialists) for the PSI remnant.
Were there other options in 1964 for a man who saw the mainstream PSI people as 
ineffectual and incapable of providing the kind of active leadership he believed that the 
situation required? Were there any other political forces inside Indonesia with the 
courage and political will to oppose the regime, to whom he might give his support?
7  ^ SHG Diary, 20 March 1964. His diary entry singles out the former editor of Pedoman, Rosihan 
Anwar, for some especially sharp criticism. Soe saw him as a prime example of someone displaying 
many of those qualities he deplored about the PSI circle.
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The radical left: an alternative path?
Of late I have become more sympathetic to the left. I can accept the arguments of the 
communist side’s literature more easily than that of their opponents. I think this is 
because between us there is a lot in common. We are both moved by feelings of 
justice, by social injustice of the crudest kind. We are equally opposed to and revolted 
by bourgeois morality. And we both have the same ideals of freedom. It's a pity our 
methods are different. In the present critical situation they are the only ones to strike 
out and talk boldly about land reform and the corruption of the big shots. Yes, Nyoto 
has even attacked the immoral goings on at the Hotel Nirwana. Where are the voices of 
the other parties? Apart from that there are only bold and honest noises from Pak 
Said...
In my opinion one day there will be a conflict between the populist left and the 
capitalist right. The beginning of this is already starting to be felt now.74
As a profoundly idealistic young man, moved by a deep sense of social justice, 
Marxism and the radical aspect of politics it expressed must have exerted considerable 
appeal to him. This diary entry indicates that Soe was certainly attracted by certain 
elements of the PKI's radical reform agenda. From his capital city perspective, he was 
strongly in sympathy with the communists' frequent vigorous attacks on big business, 
bureaucratic capitalists and official corruption. Although he had no real understanding of 
rural affairs or first-hand experience of the problems of village Indonesia, his 
commitment to notions of equality led him to support the PKI's land reform campaign 
when it was first announced by the party's chairman, Aidit, in the final months of 1963.
Soe would almost certainly have been quite aware that of all the political parties, the 
PKI alone had earned a reputation for the dedication, hard work and moral probity of its 
leaders and senior cadres. Furthermore, his own study of modern Indonesian history - 
both in the formal courses he took at the Faculty of Letters and during his frequent visits 
to the Museum Library - had alerted him to the important role that a number of radical 
nationalists and early communists had played during the course of the struggle against 
colonial domination. These included some of the earliest advocates of racial equality and 
social justice, men such as Douwes Dekker, Soewardi Soerjaningrat (Ki Hadjar 
Dewantoro) and Dr Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo who had together founded the Indische
74 SHG Diary, 28 February 1964. Nyoto was the PKI's second deputy chairman. Mohamad Said was a 
prominent educationist and a leader of the Taman Siswa movement noted for his simple style of life.
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Partij (Indies Party) in 1912. But he also came across other lesser-known figures, 
including Mas Marco Kartodikromo, the radical writer, journalist and Sarekat Islam 
activist who had joined the PKI after its formation in 1920 and who had ultimately 
perished in Boven Digul following his exile there after the abortive PKI rebellions of 
1926. Attracted by his principled opposition to poverty and injustice, Soe prepared a 
paper on Mas Marco during 1963 for a course he was taking on the history of the 
nationalist movement. The paper was later rewritten and published in 1965.75
This small piece of research encouraged him to look more closely at the important 
role that a group of committed radicals had played within the Semarang branch of Sarekat 
Islam in the years prior to the formation of the PKI in 1920. Towards the end of his third 
year in the History Department, as part of the requirements for the sarjana muda degree, 
Soe had to write a short thesis based on original research. This was an ideal opportunity 
to examine this local strand of the nationalist movement. Detailed studies of this 
particular episode had not yet appeared and there was only a brief outline of these events 
in the general accounts of the nationalist movement.76 Soe relied heavily on the available 
contemporary newspaper sources, especially Sinar Djawa and Sinar Hindia. He also 
sought out and interviewed both Semaun and Darsono, two of the principal protagonists 
in these events.77 The thesis, entitled Di Bawah Lentera Merah: Riwayat Sarekat Islam 
Semarang 1917-1920 (Under the Red Lantern: An Account of the Sarekat Islam in 
Semarang 1917-1920), was successfully submitted in early September 1964.78
75 See 'Mas Marco Kartodikromo: pahlawan jang dilupakan' (Mas Marco Kartodikromo: A forgotten 
hero), Indonesia, No. 2, August 1965: 100-7. See also his brief essay 'Mas Marco Kartodikromo' 
published in Komunikasi, 10 February 1970. On Mas Marco, see also Tickell 1981.
76 Ruth McVey's masterful account of the early history of the communist movement in Indonesia, 
encompassing the political role of the Semarang Sarekat Islam activists, did not appear until the 
following year. See McVey 1965.
77 The two ex-revolutionaries were both then in their mid-sixties and living quietly in Jakarta. Both had 
retired from active politics, although Semaun had maintained ties with the Murba Party during the 1950s. 
On the acknowledgements page of his thesis, Soe thanks both of them profusely for their invaluable 
assistance and for their willingness to read and comment on his work. See Soe 1990.
78 The original copies of this thesis have disappeared from the Faculty of Letters library. In 1990, 
however, Soe's study unexpectedly appeared as a slim volume published by a group calling itself the 
Frantz Fanon Foundation. The book was banned by the authorities some months later. See Soe 1990.
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Although by no means an uncritical account, the thesis remains a largely 
sympathetic study of the activities of the Semarang radicals. Soe points out the rather 
limited understanding of orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory of many of the leaders and the 
disparate sources of discontent on which the movement drew for its support, including 
disaffected Islam and traditional Javanese strains of protest. Yet Soe also recognised the 
idealism of the principal activists, their patriotism and the strength of their determination 
to fight against poverty, ignorance and social inequality.
In spite of his admiration for some of these pre-war communists, his own fairly 
humble background and his attraction to some of the causes that the PKI leaders were 
espousing during the 1960s, Soe never seriously considered joining forces with the 
radical left-wing forces in Indonesian politics.79 Although he remained unconvinced by 
the claims of organised religion, Soe's Catholic education had almost certainly laid the 
foundations for a deep suspicion of the totalitarian dimension to communism that had 
emerged in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.80 By the early 1960s he was evidently quite 
strongly influenced by some of the critiques of Stalinist-style communism to which he 
had access. His diary entries indicate that he had read and been impressed by Koestler's 
Darkness at Noon and some of the works of George Orwell.81
At the Faculty of Letters, Soe never came under the influence of any lecturers or 
formed close friendships with any fellow students who might have offered him a 
different perspective on Marxism or the PKI’s role in Indonesian politics. There was a 
small number of known left-wing sympathisers on the teaching staff but none in the 
History Department and Soe appears to have had little contact with them.82 As for the
79 'It's a pity our methods are different'. Apart from this enigmatic sentence, nowhere in his own 
writing does Soe provide an explicit discussion of his attitude towards communism and the PKI during 
this period of his life. His diary entries suddenly stop after 20 March 1964 and are not resumed until 
January 1966.
80 See Chapter 1, pp.40-1.
81 SHG Diary, 27 January 1962
82 The Indonesian Scholars' Association (HSI), the academic body promoted by the PKI, had attracted 
less than a dozen members in the Faculty of Letters, mostly in the Departments of Chinese Studies, 
Anthropology and Indonesian Language and Literature. The group was never very active and only began 
to hold meetings during 1965. Confidential interviews, December-January 1984-5
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student body at the Faculty of Letters, Soe developed no close relationships with anyone 
who held strong left-wing convictions.83 The communist-oriented student association, 
CGMI, attracted only a small number of followers - mostly students from small-town and 
village backgrounds or students who were implacably opposed to the compulsory 
initiation program that occurred at the beginning of each academic year.84 Soe knew the 
most prominent students in this circle but never became close to any of them.
Outside the campus world, there was much about the PKTs political role during the 
Guided Democracy years that he would have found extremely distasteful. He probably 
found the rabble-rousing, the demonstrative political slogans and the highly emotional 
and aggressive speeches of many PKI leaders to be excessive and an unnecessary fueling 
of the already highly-charged politial tensions. However, above all he was almost 
certainly repelled by the alliance that the PKI had managed to forge with President 
Sukarno during those years. For an uncompromising idealist such as Soe, this was a 
cynical political power play that betrayed all claim to political principle.85
The single most important influence on his own intellectual development in those 
years was undoubtedly Drs Nugroho Notosusanto, the outstanding lecturer in the History
83 There was one important exception. One of Soe's closest friends in the faculty had been very closely 
involved with the left in campus politics during his early student years. However, by the early 1960s he 
had distanced himself from his left-wing acquaintances and had joined the independent-minded students in 
Soe Hok-gie's circle. Confidential interviews, January 1985.
84 The Unified Movement of Indonesian University Students (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa 
Indonesia, CGMI) was formed in 1956 as a result of an amalgamation of three small, local student 
organisations in Bandung, Bogor and Yogyakarta. It only emerged as a communist-oriented body after 
1960, and even then only a small fraction of its members could really be said to be communists. Its 
leaders were strongly opposed to what they regarded as the pseudo-Dutch attitudes and elitist behaviour of 
students in the established universities. By 1964-5 it claimed a membership of over 35,000 but few of 
these were in Jakarta and fewer still at elite institutions such as the University of Indonesia. Most of its 
support came from places like Yogyakarta and from private institutions such as the Baperki-sponsored 
Res Publica Universities. Confidential interviews, 14 March 1982 and 23 February 1985. See also 
Hindley 1964: 196-8; and McVey 1990: 20. The total membership of CGMI at Rawamangun was never 
more than about twenty. Confidential interviews, December-January 1984-85.
85 Ruth McVey (1990: 20) makes the following astute comments on the PKI's failure to attract support 
among students in the established universities:
University students, from elite families and with their eyes on bureaucratic careers, were 
also not attracted to the PKI. Moreover, the idealists among them were alienated by the 
corruption and hypocrisies of Guided Democracy, and they considered the PKI 
particularly culpable for supporting that system, so that (as the post-coup student 
demonstrations would show) class attitudes and anti-Establishment ideals combined 
among them to produce a virulent anti-communism.
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Department after his return from overseas in 1962.86 Nugroho's own research interests 
were military history, principally the origins and role of the Indonesian armed forces 
during the revolution. As a former member of the Student Army himself during those 
years, Nugroho had maintained strong links within the armed forces.87 In 1964, he was 
appointed to a research post as head of the Armed Forces History Centre (Pusat Sejarah 
Angkatan Bersenjata) while remaining in his university position. In addition he took up 
teaching positions at the Armed Forces Staff and Command College in Bandung and at 
the National Defence Institute (Lemhanas) in Jakarta.88 Nugroho's outlook was pro­
military and strongly anti-communist, but he was also a man of wide intellectual interests 
and a mentor of Soe's friend Onghokham. Soe came to his attention as one of the most 
promising students in the faculty and Nugroho soon singled him out for special attention.
Soe regarded Nugroho as an excellent teacher and valued his advice and 
encouragement. He would have been impressed by Nugroho's experiences as a youthful 
nationalist during the struggle for independence, and he knew of and admired his strong 
anti-Dutch and anti-colonial stance as a student activist throughout the 1950s.89 From 
1963 the teacher-student relationship between the two was an especially close one. In 
1965 Soe assisted in one of Nugroho's military research projects by preparing a short
8() Nugroho Notosusanto (1931-1985) was bom in Rembang, Central Java, into an aristocratic Javanese 
family. His father, R.P Notosusanto, was Professor of Law at Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta. 
Nugroho's life was deeply influenced by his period of fighting in the Student Army (Tentara Pelajar) 
during the revolution. After completing his schooling in Yogyakarta in 1951, he came to Jakarta where 
he established a reputation as a short-story writer and student leader. Upon graduating from the Faculty of 
Letters at the University of Indonesia in 1960, he spent two years of post-graduate study at the University 
of London. In addition to his teaching responsibilities in the History Department, in 1964 Nugroho was 
appointed Assistant Rector in charge of student affairs. See Apa dan Siapa 1986: 602-3.
87 Nugroho was close to and a great admirer of Brigadier General Suwarto, the deputy head of the Army 
Staff and Command College (Seskoad), to whom he was related through marriage. In the early sixties, 
Suwarto was directly responsible for forging close ties between sections of the army and sympathetic 
academics in the universities, especially at the University of Indonesia. He was the principal architect of 
the scheme whereby university staff members conducted courses and seminars at Seskoad in Bandung. 
See Sundhaussen 1982: 138-41. The cooperation between Seskoad and academia is noted in Soe's diary 
in late 1962. SHG Diary, 31 December 1962
88 In mid 1967 Nugroho was awarded the titular military rank of Colonel. See Harian KAMI, 17 
January 1968.
89 Nugroho had been involved in a sharp exchange with a Dutch writer during the early 1950s for his 
opposition to the teaching of Dutch in Indonesian schools. See Feith and Castles 1970: 68-71. Soe 
comments in his diary on Nugroho’s role as a leader of the demonstrations to the French embassy in 
Jakarta in 1958 during the struggle for independence in Algeria (SHG Diary, 7 January 1966).
account of the military campaign against the 1950s regional rebellion in the South 
Moluccas.90
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Although certain unresolved inconsistencies in his political outlook remained, Soe 
never found sufficient cause to consider seriously joining forces with the left in those 
years. Despite his admiration for some of the early left-wing nationalists and his 
sympathy with some of the policies advocated by PKI leaders of the 1960s, events 
during 1964 and 1965 pulled him into closer alignment with those elements in Indonesian 
politics that would ultimately set about the complete destruction of the PKI throughout the 
country.
Gerakan Pembaharuan: conspiratorial politics
During his occasional visits to Jalan Cisadane 6, the ex-PSI headquarters where his 
friend Zakse had lodgings, Soe had made the acquaintance of an older Gemsos activist 
whom he was delighted to find shared his views about the state of domestic politics and 
the failure of the PSI to respond effectively. Henk Tombokan was then in his late 
twenties and fairly recently returned from Makassar where he had been deeply involved 
in pro-Permesta activities.91
The regional rebellions that had broken out in Sumatra and Sulawesi during 1956- 
58 had had serious consequences for the PSI, for one of its most prominent figures, 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, former Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of
90 See Soe 1965. This appeared as part of a series under Nugroho's general editorship.
91 Henk Tombokan was born in Manado in 1935. After schooling there and in Makassar he moved to 
Jakarta in the late 1940s to continue his education but never completed his tertiary studies. Soon 
attracted to the cause of the PSI, he had become a Gemsos activist after that party's failure at the 1955 
elections. Detained briefly in Jakarta in March 1957 for distributing the Permesta Charter issued on 2 
March, he had joined a small Jakarta student contingent who attended the 'Bhinneka Tunggal Ika' 
conference held in Makassar in May to attract support for the Permesta cause (Harvey 1977: 58). After 
several visits to Manado that year, he joined other young people working for Permesta in Makassar until 
arrested in May 1958 during the crackdown by army elements loyal to the central government. After 
serving eighteen months in gaol, he finally returned to Jakarta in 1961 following the collapse of the 
Permesta rebellion.
When he first met Soe Hok-gie is unclear, but it was probably not until late 1962 or early 1963, during 
the period when Soe began to take a serious interest in Gemsos. Interview with Henk Tombokan, 18 
February 1982
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Indonesia and a cabinet minister on three occasions during the 1950s, had fled Jakarta to 
join the rebel cause.92 Sumitro's participation in these events provoked a bitter schism 
within PSI ranks. Despite the strong denial of its leader Sjahrir, the party was thereby 
exposed to the accusation of its political opponents that it was directly supporting the 
rebellions. This ultimately led to the PSI being declared illegal in August 1960. After the 
PRRI-Permesta rebellion ended in 1961, Sumitro chose to remain in exile rather than 
return. From various bases abroad he kept up a steady propaganda barrage against the 
Sukarno government, pouring scorn on the rhetoric of Guided Democracy and especially 
on its grandiose economic plan.
Tombokan, who had first met Sumitro in Jakarta and had visited him again on one 
of his visits to Manado in 1957, re-established contact after his return to Jakarta from 
Makassar in 1961. As he finally revealed to Soe, Sumitro had managed to set up an 
underground network of supporters throughout Indonesia known as the Reform 
Movement (Gerakan Pembaharuan) who were working to undermine the Sukarno 
regime.93 This network allegedly consisted of a whole series of autonomous cells led by 
'case officers' (CO) who were in regular contact with Sumitro overseas. Since there was 
no direct contact between the groups, it was not known exactly how many there were and 
what - if anything - they actually did. However other 'case officers' were believed to 
exist elsewhere in Jakarta, and also in Bandung, Surabaya and Medan.
Sumitro, based in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Hong Kong and various parts of 
Europe where he claimed to be working as an economics consultant, despatched his 
instructions to his supporters in Indonesia from what he mysteriously termed MHQ
92 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo was Minister for Trade and Industry in the Natsir Cabinet in 1950-1, and 
Minister for Finance in the Wilopo Cabinet in 1952-3 and the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet of 1955-6. 
He had attempted to challenge Sjahrir's leadership of the PSI after the party's poor showing in the 1955 
general elections. See Apa dan Siapa 1986: 193-4; Feith and Castles 1970: 141-6 and 487. Sumitro, 
whose wife is from North Sulawesi, appears to have had particularly strong links with the Permesta part 
of the regional rebellion. See Harvey 1977: 69 and 110.
93 This underground network appears to have been established in late 1961. The first of a series of 
monthly bulletins entitled Pembaharuan (Reform) and issued by the Reform Movement, appeared in 
October of that year.
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(Mobile Headquarters). He had prepared a 22-page manifesto for the movement in 1961 
which Soe was able to read.94 In addition to a bitter attack on Sukarno for the political 
and economic chaos that his Guided Democracy had caused, the document contained a 
long list of essential reforms. These were divided into urgent, short-term and long-term 
measures that were required to return Indonesia to a state of political, social and economic 
stability and prosperity.
Henk Tombokan was the acknowledged leader of one of these small groups of 
Sumitro supporters, operating under the code name CO5 . When Soe was actually 
recruited into the group is not entirely clear but it was probably late 1963 or early 1964.95 
The other members of the group were almost all young Manadonese, some of whom had 
drifted to Jakarta after the collapse of the Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi. Two of 
the most active members of the group, Boelie Londa and Jopie Lasut, quickly became 
close friends.96
No doubt the need for secrecy drew the members of the group together, but Soe 
clearly felt comfortable with his newly-found political allies. There was a frankness and 
an honesty about their dealings with each other that appealed to his own sense of 
openness and candour. All were implacably opposed to Sukarno and regarded Guided 
Democracy as a hollow sham that had brought Indonesia to the edge of political disaster 
and economic ruin, and all saw themselves as outsiders - ethnically, socially, and 
politically - with little to lose by way of status or position.
94 See Sumitro Djojohadikusumo 1961.
95 There is no reference to the Reform Movement in Soe's diary during this period, although the entry 
written on 20 March 1964 (the last entry until the diary was resumed in 1966) is, in part, an account of a 
conversation with Henk Tombokan about the failure of the PSI and the weaknesses of its leaders. Even 
by 1966, when describing his friendship with a member of the group, Soe can only bring himself to 
write '...we are together in a certain organisation...' (SHG Diary, 16 January 1966).
96 Boelie Londa was born in 1939 in Manado, North Sulawesi, and had completed SMA in Jakarta 
before enrolling at the University of Indonesia in 1960. However he soon dropped out and found 
employment on various Jakarta construction projects. Jopie Lasut was born in 1941, also in Manado. 
His family moved to Jakarta while he was a small boy. His father had been Professor Sumitro's secretary 
in the Economics Faculty at UI during the 1950s. Jopie's secondary schooling was interrupted by the 
outbreak of the Permesta rebellion. He returned to North Sulawesi in August 1957 and fought in the 
rebel guerilla forces until 1961 when he arrived back in Jakarta. Soe's own assessment of both young 
men appears in a diary entry, SHG Diary, 11 January 1966.
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Despite their commitment to bringing about change, there was not much room for 
effective political activity during 1964 and 1965.97 The Sukarnoists and the PKI totally 
dominated the public politics of Guided Democracy and any open expression of dissent 
risked instant repression. Each month, copies of the movement's newsletter 
Pembaharuan were smuggled into Indonesia from overseas using airline crew as 
couriers. Most of the group's activities were directed towards spreading these around 
Jakarta. During 1964 they received funds enabling them to buy a duplicator and printing 
materials, to rent a safe place to store them and to reproduce copies of the newsletter 
locally. Soe began to prepare additional articles for inclusion in Pembaharuan as well as 
writing a few anonymous political pamphlets of his own.98
During 1965, the CO5 group recruited another member to the cause whom Soe had 
already met a year earlier. Suripto was a Bandung law graduate who had been one of the 
Gemsos activists implicated in the anti-Chinese demonstrations and riots in Bandung 
which became known as the 10 May affair of 1963." He had moved to Jakarta after 
completing his studies and was actively involved in building up close ties with anti­
communist and anti-Sukarnoist elements within the armed forces. He used his 
connections with the Siliwangi Division to secure a position as a civilian adviser within 
the political section of Koti. Early in 1965 he had taken up a position with Kolaga, that 
part of the armed forces with the responsibility for the conduct of konfrontasi.10° Under 
the guise of the Crush Malaysia campaign and with the active encouragement of 
sympathetic army officers such as the Kolaga's Colonel Soedharsono, during 1965
97 This account of the Reform Movement's activities is based on interviews with Boelie Londa, 4 
February 1982, Jopie Lasut, 2 March 1982, and Henk Tombokan 18 February 1982.
98 Some of this activity is referred to in Jopie Lasut's article, 'Perseroan terbatas pamplet gelap' (The 
underground pamphlet company), Sinar Harapan, 4 January 1970.
99 Suripto was born in Bandung in 1936. As a student in the Law Faculty at Padjadjaran University he 
had studied International Law and was an assistant to Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja until his 
politically-inspired dismissal in 1962. Fie was the Bandung chairman of Gemsos and had been arrested 
along with about ten other Gemsos activists after the 10 May anti-Chinese riots. Soe Hok-gie visited 
him in Bandung shortly afterwards. Interview with Suripto, 2 and 19 March 1982. Also SHG Diary, 16 
January 1966
On the establishment of Kolaga and the political intrigue within the army over konfrontasi, see 
Crouch 1978: 70-4.
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Suripto organised a series of covert anti-communist cadre-training courses for selected 
groups of university graduates and students at a military complex near Senayan in 
Jakarta.101 Suripto’s military connections were to be important to Soe and his friends in 
the months that followed.
In one sense there was nothing unusual about the activities of Soe and his co­
conspirators within the Gerakan Pembaharuan circle. Since the nature of the Guided 
Democracy system prevented the open expression of political dissent, opposition groups 
were forced into clandestine activity. As events in late 1965 revealed, there were many 
other groups - including Catholic activists and Islamic students - plotting and scheming 
away from public scrutiny. Behind the facade of Manipol-USDEK, konfrontasi and 
Nasakom, even the major players had begun to draw up contingency plans of their own. 
As political tensions within Indonesia created a sense of impending crisis, most astute 
observers realised that a confrontation between the PKI and the armed forces was not too 
far away. For the time being Soe and his friends could only bide their time, quietly 
encouraging those around them not to lose heart while they waited for a crack to open in 
the system.
Campus politics in the early 1960s: the GMNI offensive
The establishment of Guided Democracy had resulted in the rapid politicisation of 
university campuses and university student forums throughout the country. During the 
early 1960s pressure steadily grew on all student bodies to express publicly their 
unqualified support for the central ideological planks of Guided Democracy, in particular 
Manipol-USDEK and Nasakom, and after 1963 to swing behind the campaign to crush 
Malaysia and condemn the forces of Nekolim.
101 Interviews with Suripto, 2 and 19 March 1982; and Rachman Tolleng, 6 and 22 March 1982. 
Suripto called on the assistance of several Bandung activists who shared his anti-communist perspective. 
During 1965 two courses of several months duration were conducted at Senayan for groups of 
approximately fifty volunteers. In addition to lectures on ideology and politics, the courses included basic 
military training.
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With the significant shift to the left that had occurred in national politics during 
those years, the initiative in student forums increasingly lay with those organisations that 
were able to demonstrate their unquestioned allegiance to President Sukarno and his 
policies. Easily the most prominent and powerful student organisation in that category 
was the Indonesian Nationalist University Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa 
Nasional Indonesia, GMNI).102 Claiming a membership of over 100,000 students in the 
early 1960s and strongly represented in nearly every tertiary institution in the country, 
GMNI leaders had close ties with several PNI cabinet ministers and were frequently 
singled out for special attention by the president himself. Consequently, GMNI had 
particular appeal for those students who wished to establish useful connections for the 
future within government or the bureaucracy.
GMNI's largest rival, the Islamic University Students' Association (.Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam , HMI), found itself under mounting pressure when questions began to 
be raised about the genuineness of its commitment to Guided Democracy and its loyalty 
to the president.103 Although HMI had never been formally affiliated with any political 
party, it was widely alleged to have strong links with Masyumi, the Islamic political party 
banned in 1960 following the participation of many of its key leaders in the PRRI 
rebellion of 1958. HMI leaders and intellectuals and the Islamic modernists within 
Masyumi undoubtedly shared a common political outlook, and there was widespread 
sympathy and support for Masyumi among HMI rank and file members. Consequently, 
HMI was increasingly thrown on the defensive after 1960. In July 1961 at the fifth 
national congress of the Federation of Indonesian University Student Organisations
102 GMNI was founded in 1954 and was formally affiliated with the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). 
Its leaders were a prominent 'young Turk' element in the PNI ranks, intent on challenging the old guard 
leadership and reforming the party from within. See Rocamora 1975: 265-9.
The membership figure of 100,000 is based on the claims of the GMNI leadership. However, given the 
intense rivalry and jostling for power and prestige between student organisations in those years, the 
accuracy of all 'official' membership figures should be treated with a degree of caution. Rocamara (1975: 
358) gives a more conservative estimate of 77,000.
103 HMI was founded in Yogyakarta in February 1947, the first new student organisation to be 
established after independence. By the 1960s it was probably the largest student organisation in the 
country with a membership reported to be well in excess of 100,000. On HMI see Tanja 1982 and 
Sitompul 1982.
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(.Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, PPMI), HMI lost its position on the 
executive while GMNI's Bambang Kusnohadi was elected general chairman of the new 
PPMI provisional executive.104
Tension within student politics increased rapidly after 1963, as GMNI, supported 
by the other leftist student organisations such as CGMI, Germindo and Perhimi,105 set 
out to dominate Guided Democracy student forums both on and off the campus. In 
tertiary institutions across the country the student-elected faculty-level senates and the 
university-wide student councils (dewan mahasiswa) rapidly came under the control of 
GMNI supporters. This was usually at the expense of both HMI and groups of students 
organised in intra-campus bodies.106
At the fourth national congress of the Indonesian University Student Assembly 
0Majelis Mahasiswa Indonesia, MMI) held in April 1964 at Malino in South Sulawesi, 
representatives from institutions where the student councils were controlled by GMNI 
won 18 out of the 24 positions on the newly-elected executive.107 However a conflict
104 founded in March 1947 at a conference of Indonesian students in Malang, was the peak
organisation to which all university clubs and societies belonged. (See Amstutz 1958: 237-8 and Paget 
1970: 153-61) Throughout the 1950s it had claimed the right to speak on behalf of all Indonesian 
university students as a kind of national union of students, sending delegates to international student 
forums such as the International Student Conference (ISC) and the International Union of Students (IUS). 
As a national body it was the forum where all member organisations competed for authority and 
influence. HMI's failure to gain a position on the executive was a serious blow to its prestige, since it 
had been one of PPMI's founding members.
106 The Indonesian University Students' Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Germindo) was the 
student affiliate of Partindo (Partai Indonesia, the Indonesia Party), a political party founded in 1956 and 
claiming to be the embodiment of Sukarno's left-wing, radical-nationalist, non-communist ideology. 
Germindo never attracted more than a few hundred members. The Indonesian University Student 
Association (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Perhimi) was a small leftist student body that had been 
formed during the late 1950s out of an earlier Dutch-oriented and exclusively Chinese organisation, by a 
small group of radical Sino-Indonesian students. Most of its approximately 2000 members came from 
the Baperki-sponsored Res Publica university system. Confidential interview, 18 March 1985
106 The term intra was widely used throughout Indonesia for all political activity within the campus at 
the level of the various internal student-elected representative bodies (faculty senates and university 
student councils). The various student clubs, societies and associations that were linked either formally 
or indirectly to external organisations (political parties, religious bodies) were referred to as extra. Such 
organisations (eg GMNI, CGMI and HMI) invariably had their headquarters outside the university 
campus. The tension between intra and extra was a dominant theme in Indonesian student politics.
107 MMI was an intra university forum established in 1957 under the auspices of the Department of 
Higher Education and Science and was intended originally to make the universities more accessible to 
government influence. Under Guided Democracy it became even more heavily politicised and a degree of 
competition emerged between MMI and the exfra-oriented PPMI as to which body spoke on behalf of all 
Indonesian students. See Paget 1970: 161-3.
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immediately erupted within the congress when it was discovered that representatives from 
the student councils of the University of Indonesia and the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB), both controlled at the time by non-GMNI student groupings, had 
failed to gain a place on the new body. Consequently, as the congress was closing, the 
ITB and the University of Indonesia representatives moved a minority report refusing to 
accept the election results on the grounds that this was an insult to two of the oldest and 
most prestigious institutions in the country. As a result, both student councils were 
suspended from MMI membership, with serious consequences for the independent 
students at these two institutions.108
The anti-HMI campaign gathered pace in early 1964, with frequent public 
accusations that its supporters were anti-Manipol and counter-revolutionary and 
suggestions that it was an affiliate (onderbouw) of Masyumi. Leftist students and their 
supporters began to demand that HMI be banned. In May the acting secretary of the Law 
Faculty at the Jember campus of Brawijaya University in East Java, Professor Ernst 
Utrecht, suspended HMI from all activities within that institution, sparking off a fierce 
public campaign against HMI in other cities.109 In October, the PPMI executive 
increased the pressure by suspending HMI from membership of the federation.
Student politics at Rawamangun: preserving independence
For some time, Soe Hok-gie's small campus at Rawamangun remained at a 
distance from the escalating tensions that were in evidence in other parts of the student 
world in the early 1960s.110 The politics of the GMNI-HMI contest did not intrude as 
much into students' lives at Rawamangun as it did on the main campus at Salemba. The
108 The University of Indonesia Student Council, then under the leadership of Bakir Hasan (HMI), soon 
fell to a GMNI-controlled group led by Bambang Harianto, a law student and GMNI activist. The ITB 
Student Council under the control of independents led by Muslimin Nasution managed to survive but was 
subjected to intense pressure and constant demonstrations by leftist opponents. Interviews with Bambang 
Harianto and other former GMNI activists, 27 February 1985; and Fred Hehuwat, 29 January 1982.
109 Utrecht was a staunch PNI activist. For his own version of this incident (including the suggestion 
that he was encouraged by senior NU figures), see Utrecht 1984.
110 The following account is based on a number of interviews with former students from various 
backgrounds and political affiliations who were at Rawamangun during the 1960s.
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physical separation of the faculty and its comparatively small number of students is a 
partial explanation. More important, however, was the fact that the vast majority of the 
students there, a high proportion of whom were female, were simply not interested in 
politics. As a result, membership of student political organisations was extremely low 
and only the Indonesian Catholic University Students' Association (Perhim punan  
Mahasiswci Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI) 111 and GMNI succeeded in attracting 
members in any numbers. PMKRI, an efficient and well-organised association, naturally 
appealed to Catholic students of whom there was a significant minority, while GMNI 
attracted those students who were interested in increasing their career chances. Of the 
other nationally important student bodies, HMI had only a small membership in the 
faculty, while CGMI, always poorly represented at elite universities, never attracted more 
than a handful of followers.
Despite his own strong political convictions, Soe never tried to convince large 
numbers of other students to become political activists or to win them openly to his own 
political views. He was undoubtedly aware that many of his fellow students at 
Rawamangun were cynical and apathetic about politics; it seems that he began to sense 
that these attitudes could be turned to positive effect by encouraging students to believe in 
the idea of the university as a place free from the tainted, corrupting influences of the 
external world .112 Although he was probably aware that politics beyond the campus 
would ultimately beckon and demand his involvement, such views were also in keeping 
with his own inner doubts and his deep sense of moral ambivalence about that prospect.
With the support of prominent students who were determinedly non-political, the 
notion of pride in their own institution - their alma mater - gradually emerged. These 
students became the hard core of the so-called ’independent group' (go longan
111 PMKRI was affiliated with Partai Katolik and had been formed in 1947. It had a national 
membership of around 10,000 students.
112 Unfortunately it is impossible to illustrate this by pointing to anything Soe wrote along these lines 
at the time. However, I think it is implicit in all that is known of his activism and expressed opinions 
during these years and it is perfectly consistent with his post 1966-67 position on the university and its 
place in political life.
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independen) within the Faculty of Letters. Some of these ideas developed during 
informal gossip on the campus and the leisure activities that Soe began to share with 
some close campus friends. Of these easily the most important was the founding within 
the faculty of a club to promote hiking, mountain-climbing and the love of nature. Soe 
was a central figure in this venture. Mapala (Mahasiswa Pencinta Alam, the University 
Student Nature Lovers) was established in November 1964 with only a handful of actual 
members, but soon large numbers of students were taking part in the club's activities.113 
It set out to develop not the technical side of mountain-climbing but rather the free, 
spontaneous comradeship that the hiking trips encouraged. It had as its ideals simple and 
healthy living, courage, comradeship and a love of nature.
To some extent it was a deliberate reaction against the values and behaviour of 
some of their student contemporaries whose bourgeois urban life-style attempted to 
imitate the younger generation of Western countries. Yet it was also a rejection of 
ideology and politics that were saturated with hypocrisy. In an account of an early 
expedition Soe explained:
The purpose of Mapala is to try to restore idealism in student circles for an honest and 
true way to love nature, country, people and alma mater. This group of students does 
not believe that patriotism can only be implanted by slogans and on car windows.
They believe that only by getting to know the people and land of Indonesia in a broader 
sense can a person become a real patriot.114
Mapala was important to Soe in several ways. The group included some of his 
closest personal friends, students of his own age who became bound to one another over 
the years by a simple genuine friendship. Away from the tensions and constrictions of 
Jakarta they were able to discuss the problems of their own personal lives and those of 
the wider society around them with a frankness and honesty that would not have seemed 
possible elsewhere:
It's really strange. Matters that are never thought about in Jakarta suddenly emerged in 
the middle of the orchid slopes of Mount Pangrango. Certainly many matters of great
113 See Dwi windu Mapala Universitas Indonesia for details of the formation and development of 
Mapala.
114 'Mengikuti kembali djalan jang sudah hilang di Pangrango' (with Mahasiwa U.I.) [Rediscovering 
lost trails on Pangrango (with U.I. students)], Bara Eka, 3/13, March 1966
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importance to human life have been stunted by the atmosphere of Jakarta, full of 
falsehood and materialism.
As a campus-based organisation Mapala existed on a basis of complete autonomy: 
it kept itself apart from the party-linked student organisations, and students of different 
religious and political affiliations were always welcome to take part in its activities. It 
also represented resistance to the attempt of the government to diffuse its ideology into all 
areas of activity, all clubs, societies and organisations. Mapala was thus a rejection of 
two kinds of politicisation of society, one flowing from the political parties and the other 
from the regime itself.
One of Soe's closest campus friends was a collaborator in the Mapala venture. 
Herman Lantang was a tall, physically imposing young man who had entered the Faculty 
of Letters in 1960, a year earlier than Soe, as a student in anthropology.115 During 1964 
a warm friendship steadily developed as they discovered a mutual respect and a shared 
moral outlook, and as they began to confide in each other about the problems and 
dilemmas of their personal lives.
Herman was a gregarious, socially confident figure at Rawamangun with a wide 
circle of friends. He was also a typical example of those students who were not 
interested in politics and strongly opposed to the party-linked organisations meddling in 
campus affairs. Consequently, when the chairmanship of the student senate fell vacant at 
the end of 1964, Herman was a logical candidate. Sensing that his personal qualities 
would ensure that the independent group's interests were well represented, Soe 
encouraged his candidature. Throughout the election process, which he won comfortably 
by defeating an old friend who had drifted into the GMNI camp, Soe was a close 
supporter and advisor.
115 Herman Lantang was born in Manado in 1940 into an elite Dutch-educated family. Both his father 
and grandfather had served as officers in the KNIL. Brought up in a privileged conservative background, 
he moved to Jakarta in early childhood and completed his education there while living in the elite area of 
Menteng. During his SMA years, however, contact with peers began to provide new perspectives, and he 
became sympathetic to people with a broader outlook on the world around him. Interview with Herman 
Lantang, 10 February 1982
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Herman's speech at the ceremony marking the transfer of office and announcing the 
installation of the new senate was a clever piece of work. Although dressed up in the 
language of Guided Democracy, it nevertheless contained a strong appeal to his fellow 
students to guard against allowing the divisions and conflicts of outside political forces to 
disrupt campus life:
In preparing this list, we are also very pleased because it appears that the proposal of 
the faculty leadership and formateur to form a senate based around Nasakom has been 
sympathetically received by all comrades. But Nasakom is not a koe-handel, alias the 
long out of date political horse-trading ä la liberal. Nasakom is the samen bundeling 
van alles revolutionäre krachten, the union of all revolutionary potential within our 
faculty. And as Bung Karno, the Great Leader of the Revolution, stressed in his Tavip 
speech, revolutionaries are those who are anti-imperialist and therefore whoever is 
opposed to colonialists, neo-colonialists and their lackeys is a revolutionary. We invite 
every member of the Faculty of Letters who is an anti-colonialist and a revolutionary to 
join in playing an active part in this senate. But we stress here that the comrades in 
this senate sit as the Faculty of Letters family and do not sit as representatives of 
particular groups. Therefore all problems that arise we will solve in a family 
atmosphere. Our expectations are also shared by our faculty's leadership, and we are 
sure that together we can fulfill these expectations4 ^
But although Soe and his circle did what they could to limit the influence of the 
party-based student bodies, given the conflicts occurring on other campuses between 
GMNI and its allies on the one hand and HMI students and independents on the other, it 
was almost inevitable that problems would eventually arrive on their own doorstep. 
Early in 1965 GMNI and its allies attempted to 'retool' the newly-formed senate of its
allegedly 'counter-revolutionary' elements:
The senate leadership was summoned by the dean of the Faculty of Letters because of a 
resolution from GMNI, Germindo, Perhimi and CGMI demanding that the senate be 
cleansed of HMI-Manikebu counter-revolutionary elements. The CGMI-GMNI- 
Germindo representatives were present. I was also present as one of the senate leaders.
Before we entered the dean's office I said to the senate chairman, saudara Herman, that it 
would be better to be destroyed than to comply with the demands of this 'revolutionary' 
group. During the 'konfrontasi' I explained (it so happened that my senate chairman 
was not very clever at talking) that in the senate there were no HMI representatives.
There was only A or B and 'we chose them not as representatives of organisations but 
as individuals of ability'. In that confrontation I was victorious because no HMI 
members or Manikebu sympathisers were removed. 1 7^
116 This excerpt is from a typescript copy of Herman Lantang's speech, 23 December 1964, kindly 
provided by its author. Soe had a strong hand both in the preparation of Herman's speech and in the 
selection of the senate and its office-bearers, which they jokingly referred to as 'The Cabinet of a Hundred 
Ministers'.
117 Soe related the incident several years later in a newspaper article. See 'Mimpi1 2 terachir seorang 
mahasiswa tua' (Final dreams of an old student), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No 107, 30 June 1968. In his 
essay he castigates those other student organisations who had failed to defend those under attack.
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Further trouble erupted, however, in mid September 1965 during the initiation 
week activities to mark the start of the new academic year. Mapram presented an ideal 
opportunity for all clubs and societies to recruit members by adopting a high profile on 
the campus. Soe and his friends tried to ensure that the party-based student groups did 
not dominate proceedings but on this occasion an open conflict emerged. When one of 
Soe's friends tore down an allegedly illegal GMNI poster, he was ’retooled’ from the 
orientation week program committee. Soe tried vigorously to defend him and as a result 
was dismissed as well.118
These may have been relatively trivial events but in the context of events occurring 
elsewhere they were a part of a worrying trend. The 1965 Mapram was a tense and often 
angry affair on the main Salemba campus and in other universities throughout the 
country. At a ceremony to mark the opening of the Mapram at Salemba on 22 
September, the chairman of the MMI executive, police officer Drs Basirun Nugroho, was 
dragged from the stage by an angry HMI activist when he delivered a speech containing 
anti-HMI remarks.119 In Bandung, where the incumbent student council had been in 
conflict with the MMI since the Malino congress in April of the previous year, there were 
almost daily angry protests as leftists burnt effigies of the officebearers during rowdy 
demonstrations.120 On 29 September in Jakarta, PKI leader Aidit spoke at a CGMI mass 
rally at Senayan where he issued the CGMI students with a challenge: if they could not 
’get rid of HMI they might as well put on sarongs’.121
More than most of his fellow students, Soe was well aware of the wider political 
tensions that underpinned these developments. He knew that the situation was moving 
quickly towards open conflict between the army and the PKI, though he had no way of 
knowing when this would occur. Early on 30 September he and a group of friends left
118 See 'I remember Merapi', Mahasiswa Indonesia, No 58, Week 4, July 1967. The incident is also 
recalled in a diary entry written a few months later. SHG Diary, 11 January 1965
119 Interview with Fahmi Idris, 28 February 1985
120 Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 19 March 1982
121 Bachtiar 1968: 190
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Jakarta for Central Java on a Mapala hiking trip. It was a chance to escape from the 
unpleasant experiences of the recently concluded Mapram.
When a series of cataclysmic events erupted on the streets of Jakarta early the next 
morning, Soe and his friends were already heading for the slopes of Mount Merapi 
outside Yogyakarta. It was to be several days before they discovered that a leftist group 
had attempted a coup against the army leadership and that the long-expected showdown 
between the army and the PKI was underway. When he heard the news Soe may well
have thought of the promise he had made to himself eighteen months before:
As far as I'm concerned, politics is something that's utterly dirty, it's filthy mud. But 
at a certain moment where we cannot restrain ourselves any further, then we will leap 
into it. Sometimes the moment arrives, as it did previously in the revolution. And if 
by some chance this moment comes I'm going to leap into this mud.122
122 SHG Diary, 16 March 1964
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Chapter 4
INTO THE CAULDRON OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM: 
THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS OF 1966
Early in the morning of 1 October 1965 six of Indonesia's most senior army 
generals, including its commander Lieutenant General Yani, were seized from their 
homes by armed squads of soldiers and taken to the Halim airforce base on the southern 
outskirts of Jakarta. Three of the generals were killed during the struggle to capture 
them, while the remainder were murdered shortly after their arrival at Halim.1 All the 
bodies were then thrown into an abandoned well.
The instigators of this violent assault on the army senior command were a group of 
mainly middle-ranking officers of the four services led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, a 
battalion commander in the Cakrabirawa presidential palace guard. Also involved were 
air force commander, Air Marshal Omar Dhani, and the commander of the Kolaga 
Combat Command in Kalimantan, Brigadier General Supardjo. Calling themselves the 
Thirtieth of September Movement (Gerakan 30 September),2 the group claimed that they 
were acting to protect the president from a right-wing 'Council of Generals' that was 
intending to seize power around Armed Forces Day on 5 October. President Sukarno, 
whom the plotters had hoped would give his blessing to their actions, arrived at Halim 
during the morning and remained at the air force base throughout the day. Meanwhile, 
troops supporting the Thirtieth of September Movement had taken up strategic positions 
in Merdeka Square and had seized control of adjacent key facilities including the 
government radio station. In several radio broadcasts during the day the movement
1 The only senior officer who managed to elude his pursuers was the Minister of Defence, General 
Nasution.
-  The movement was soon to be referred to throughout Indonesia by the acronym Gestapu, a term coined 
deliberately for its sinister connotations. It was also widely referred to as G30S.
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announced its existence and proclaimed the formation of a 45-member Revolutionary 
Council which was to hold power pending national elections.
Despite his seniority within the army hierarchy, the Kostrad commander, Major 
General Soeharto, had not been among those targeted by the Thirtieth of September 
Movement. From his headquarters on the eastern perimeter of Merdeka Square, Soeharto 
immediately assumed de facto command of the army, and moved adroitly to suppress the 
Thirtieth of September Movement. By late afternoon he had persuaded the troops 
occupying offensive positions in Merdeka Square to abandon the cause without the need 
for a violent confrontation. Soeharto was then in a position to issue an ultimatum to 
those at Halim. President Sukarno, whose own instruction appointing Major General 
Pranoto as army commander had been issued earlier in the day and deliberately ignored 
by Soeharto, immediately left Halim for his palace in Bogor, while the movement's 
ringleaders quickly dispersed. By dawn the next morning the air force base was taken 
with only slight resistance. The Thirtieth of September Movement had been effectively 
routed but this was merely the prelude to far greater political upheaval throughout the 
country.
Pointing to strong circumstantial evidence, such as the presence of PKI leader, 
D.N. Aidit at Halim, and the participation of communist women and youth in the murder 
of the generals, the Thirtieth of September Movement was quickly condemned as an 
attempted coup masterminded by the PKI.3 This led to a full-scale frontal assault on the 
party, its leadership, its administrative and bureaucratic apparatus and its mass 
membership. Thus the fragile political framework of the final years of Guided
3 The complex web of events surrounding the alleged coup attempt, the exact movements of the key 
figures in the days before, on and after 1 October, the degree of foreknowledge of the various major actors, 
the motivations of the disaffected officers who carried out the kidnapping of the six generals, and above 
all, the extent and degree of involvement of the PKI, are all matters which have been the subject of 
intense debate. A more detailed account and analysis of this saga is quite outside the scope of the present 
study. For the most comprehensive and balanced account of the coup, including a lucid analysis of the 
various alternative theories about its origins, see Crouch 1978: 96-134. For a range of other views see 
the following: Anderson and McVey 1971; Dake 1973; Hindley 1970; Kami 1974; van der Kroef 1966; 
Lev 1966b; McVey 1968; Mortimer 1968 and 1971; Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismael Saleh 1968; 
Pauker 1969 and 1971; Rey 1966; and Wertheim 1966 and 1970.
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Democracy, which had seen President Sukarno balance the opposing forces of left and 
right - the army and the PKI - was almost immediately in tatters.
The destruction of the PKI was to clear the way for a more protracted struggle that 
was ultimately to reshape the alignment of political forces in Indonesia. Yet this 
reshaping did not occur immediately and was not achieved without great difficulty. In 
October 1965 President Sukarno's prestige was still immense and he could count on the 
support of a wide cross section of society. Even among his most implacable opponents 
few would have envisaged more than a restructuring of the existing system with Sukarno 
remaining as president. In the political upheaval that was to occur throughout the months 
that followed, however, some new voices were to make themselves heard. For the first 
time since Indonesia's independence struggle, large numbers of students and youth acting 
outside the formal political structures were to become a vital element in the political 
process.
The destruction of the PKI
A distinctive student response to the events of 1 October did not become apparent 
for some time. The initial reaction to the abortive coup was orchestrated by other forces. 
While President Sukarno appealed for calm and attempted to play down the involvement 
of the PKI, the army gave maximum public exposure to the discovery and exhumation of 
the bodies of the six slain generals at Halim on 3 and 4 October and to a massive funeral 
the following day, which coincided with Armed Forces Day. Through its own 
newspapers, Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha, the army began to attack the PKI 
and Aidit; by 8 October editorials in the army press were accusing the party directly of 
involvement in the coup attempt. PKI newspapers were banned and a roundup of 
prominent communists began throughout lakarta.
The army's campaign had an almost immediate impact as emotions began to reach 
boiling point in Jakarta among those sections of society where resentment and hostility 
towards the PKI had long remained suppressed. Public anger found an outlet with the
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appearance of an ad hoc body known as the Action Front for the Crushing of the Thirtieth 
of September Movement (Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu, KAP-Gestapu).4 
Formed with army backing and drawing support from a variety of anti-communist 
elements, its leading figures were a young maverick NU politician Subchan and the 
Catholic activist Harry Tjan. Launched on 3 October, KAP-Gestapu held public rallies 
on 4 and 8 October. The second of these rallies attracted a huge crowd of thousands of 
angry demonstrators that filled the small Taman Surapati park in Menteng to overflowing. 
After the anti-PKI speeches and resolutions, sections of the crowd marched on the PKI 
headquarters in Jalan Kramat Raya, which they attacked and set on fire. During the 
following week, and often after similar rallies, further attacks were launched on a number 
of other buildings occupied by PKI-affiliated bodies. These included the headquarters of 
the party's youth, women, students and labour union organisations, and the PKI's senior 
cadre training centre, the Aliarcham Academy in Pasar Minggu. Homes of PKI leaders 
were also ransacked in this outpouring of anger and emotion.
The KAP-Gestapu rallies were attended by a broad cross-section of anti-communist 
political parties, student bodies and mass organisations. Among the most militant, 
however, were young Muslim students, many of whom were members of the Indonesian 
Islamic Students (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII). Its membership was mostly composed 
of young high school students but among the leaders was a small group of slightly older 
Muslim activists, young men in their early to mid twenties with Masyumi connections, 
who were determined to use this opportunity to hit back at their principal political 
enemy.5
By at least the second of these KAP-Gestapu rallies Soe Hok-gie had returned from 
his Mapala trip to Central Java. He immediately joined forces with groups of PII
4 For an account of the KAP-Gestapu phase of the anti-PKI movement see Hindley 1970: 40-6; Crouch 
1975: 254-6; and Paget 1970: 57-63. By late October, KAP-Gestapu was transformed into a body known 
as Front Pancasila.
5 PII students were responsible for the first anti-PKI street banners and posters that appeared in 
prominent places in central Jakarta around 6 October with messages such as 'Hang Aidit' and 'Ban the 
PKI'. Interview with Bur Rasuanto, 17 March 1982
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students in their various attacks on PKI buildings, for he too obviously sensed that a 
critical moment had now arrived compelling him to engage in whatever measures were 
necessary to intensify the crisis to a point where a far-reaching transformation of the 
political landscape might be possible.6
The ransacking and burning of buildings associated with the PKI appears to have 
been relatively spontaneous action; it seems doubtful that these young activists bothered 
to consult older political figures or the army leadership before they began. But whether 
they were consulted or not, the military certainly did nothing to prevent these incidents 
from occurring. In fact, the army had already decided to do everything in its power to 
destroy the PKI throughout the length and breadth of the country.
From mid October until late December, elite RPKAD para commando units swept 
through both urban centres and rural areas of Central Java, East Java and Bali in an 
extensive campaign to obliterate the communist party in those areas. Operations were 
also conducted in the Outer Islands, especially in Aceh and North Sumatra.7 The exact 
pattern of events varied from place to place and seems to have been governed by specific 
local conditions: the nature and intensity of the conflict between supporters and 
opponents of the PKI in the recent past; the strength of the PKI's following and the 
extent of the resistance encountered by the army units; the infiltration of certain regional 
army commands by left-wing elements and the intense loyalty of many senior officers in 
these commands towards President Sukarno. However, the overall picture was a 
demonstration of the PKI's abject vulnerability in the face of such a concerted physical 
assault. By the end of 1965 the party apparatus had been completely destroyed
6 There is no diary record of this period of Soe's life but several close friends knew about his 
participation in these attacks, including the invasion of the PKI headquarters on 8 October. The PKI’s 
youth organisation, Pemuda Rakyat, was another obvious target of the young Muslim students. Soe 
joined a small group of PII activists who used a pick-up vehicle for a sudden assault on the Pemuda 
Rakyat headquarters. Although the raiders were thoroughly outnumbered by the building's occupants, the 
PKI youth were caught by surprise and soon scattered leaving the invaders to ransack the premises. 
Interviews with Jopie Lasut, August 1978; and Bur Rasuanto, 17 March, 1982
7 For an account of the October to December anti-PKI campaign see Crouch 1978: 134-57. See also 
Feith 1966 and Cribb 1990.
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throughout the country, its leaders arrested or summarily executed, hundreds of 
thousands of its mass membership slaughtered and thousands more held in detention 
centres.
While this brutal campaign of retribution was exacting its toll on the left, all political 
leaders, parties and organisations were compelled to come to terms with a rapidly 
changing and uncertain political landscape where one of the principal elements in the 
Guided Democracy power structure had been suddenly eliminated.
The student response: the birth of KAMI
From early in October, anti-communist student groups were looking for ways to 
contribute their voice to the wave of public condemnation of the PKI for its alleged role in 
the failed coup. Some university student activists attended the KAP-Gestapu rallies and 
signed statements on behalf of their particular student organisations. However PPMI, the 
peak student body and the forum outside the university campuses which had become the 
centre of student political debate under Guided Democracy, remained conspicuously 
silent on the matter. Consequently, during mid October a group of anti-communist 
Jakarta student leaders - principally Catholic activists and a small number of students who 
held prominent positions in the local student organisations clustered under the umbrella of 
SOMAL - joined forces to pressure the PPMI executive (which remained under the 
control of GMNI and its leftist allies) into declaring its position on the events of 1 
October.8 A series of meetings were held at the PMKRI headquarters in Jalan Sam
8 The Joint Secretariat of Local University Student Organisations (Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi 
Mahasiswa Lokal, SOMAL) has been formed on June 1965 as an umbrella body for the following six 
local student organisations: the Bandung University Student Corps (Corpus Studiosorum Bandungense, 
CSB); the Bandung University Student League (Ikatan Mahasiswa Bandung, IMABA); the Bandung 
University Student Association (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Bandung, PMB); the Bogor University 
Students' Society (Masyarakat Mahasiswa Bogor, MMB); the Jakarta University Student League (Ikatan 
Mahasiswa Djakarta, IMADA); and the Surabaya University Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa 
Surabaya, GMS). These were all very small bodies with no more than a few hundred members that drew 
their support from particular geographic areas. Members were almost exclusively from privileged and 
elite backgrounds, and joined these organisations for social reasons. Although some of the students were, 
broadly speaking, PSI in outlook, most of the members were not really interested in politics at all 
though quietly cynical about the government and its ideology. The formation of SOMAL had been a 
defensive measure to preserve the member organisations' independence by complying with the 
government's insistence that organisations at all levels of society fit into the Nasakom ideological
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Ratulangi and the IMADA headquarters in Jalan Palem with HMI student leaders also 
participating in the discussions. Finally the PPMI executive was presented with an 
ultimatum: if it refused to issue a statement clarifying PPMI's position on Gestapu, 
SOMAL would call a special plenary session of all member organisations to discuss the 
issue.9
As a result of this conflict within student ranks, the Minister of Higher Education, 
Brigadier General Syarif Thayeb, was prevailed upon to intervene. Syarif Thayeb found 
himself in a very awkward position. As a medical doctor with military rank, he had been 
outraged by the murder of six of his fellow senior officers and had acted quickly to close 
the leftist Baperki-sponsored Res Publika University system and to 'freeze' CGMI and 
Perhimi. However it was rumoured that the minister's actions had displeased the 
president who continued to refuse to blame or condemn the PKI for the events of 1 
October. Since Syarif Thayeb knew that the GMNI student leaders were strong 
supporters of the president and had good access to the palace, he tried to avoid doing 
anything that might further antagonise Sukarno.10
On several occasions in late October the minister held discussions with groups of 
student leaders, finally suggesting a compromise course of action. He persuaded the 
anti-communist student activists to postpone their attempts to pressure the PPMI 
executive into holding a special congress, proposing instead a separate action command 
that could be used as the vehicle to condemn the PKI and Gestapu. After a final meeting
structure. SOMAL had arranged a tenuous connection with the army-backed functional group body 
Sekber-Golkar. Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 17 February 1982
9 Although SOMAL and its constituent member organisations had been an insignificant factor in student 
politics to this period, the anti-communist student activists realised that the SOMAL group's six votes 
could be used to call a special plenary session and undermine GMNI's dominant position on the PPMI 
executive. Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 17 February 1982. See also Paget 1970: 224-5; and 
Ahmaddani G. Martha 1984: 298-311.
10 GMNI leaders were arguing that they were waiting for guidance from the president before making any 
statement on the Gestapu affair.
of student leaders at his home on 25 October, the formation of the Indonesian University 
Student Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, KAMI) was announced.
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Syarif Thayeb tried to persuade GMNI to accept a place on the new action front's 
presidium but after consideration the GMNI leadership declined to participate. 
Consequently, KAMI’S four-member presidium was composed of nominated 
representatives from the following student organisations: PMKRI, SOMAL, the NU- 
affiliated Indonesian Islamic University Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam 
Indonesia, PMII), and the Pancasila University Students (.Mahasiswa Pancasila, 
Mapancas).11 Outside the leadership group a number of other student bodies were 
regarded as 'supporting elements'. Of these the largest and most important were HMI 
and the Indonesian Christian University Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen 
Indonesia, GMKI).12
The minister released a statement on KAMI'S behalf couched in Guided 
Democracy-style language, announcing that one of its tasks was to help the armed forces 
destroy the 'counter-revolutionary Gestapu'. This was, however, preceded by a 
reference to intensifying the crushing of the Nekolim project, Malaysia. Although the 
KAMI leaders were quick to attack the PKI in more forthright language, they too were
11 PMII claimed a membership of around 20,000. It had a strong following among Javanese students, 
especially at the state Islamic institutes, the IAIN; but it was not as prominent in the elite universities 
where HMI had garnered the strongest support among Muslim students. Mapancas had hardly been heard 
of in university student circles before the formation of KAMI and its membership was almost certainly 
inconsequential. Its rise into public prominence and its position within KAMI was a result of its 
powerful military connections: it was affiliated with the army-backed IPKI party and its chairman, David 
Napitupulu, was close to both Brigadier General Sukendro (who had been a minister of state in the 
cabinet since 1964) and General Nasution. See Paget 1970: 242-3.
12 In fact GMKI was ambivalent and divided about the KAMI venture for quite some time. As the 
student affiliate of Parkindo, it had a solid base of support among Protestant Christian students. 
However, some of its leaders were very close to Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena who was known 
to be a loyal subordinate of the president. HMI’s position was quite different. Behind the scenes its 
leaders had been active in the moves against the GMNI-controlled PPMI executive and had been part of 
the negotiations with Syarif Thayeb, but HMI was still technically under suspension by the PPMI, and 
this hampered its capacity to adopt a public political profile. As KAMI expanded its organisation and 
activities during the following year, HMI steadily assumed a key role within the action front that was a 
reflection of its size and stature within university student politics. For a slightly different interpretation 
of HMI's position, see Paget 1970: 223-4.
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careful to praise Sukarno and his government in their public statements and speeches 
during the weeks that followed.
Throughout November and December KAMI branches sprang up in major cities 
and in universities and institutes all over the country, while the central presidium and its 
secretariat operating out of the PMKRI headquarters came to be known as KAMI Pusat. 
The branches were supposed to mirror the structure and composition of the central body 
and were in theory subordinate to it. In practice, however, there was a considerable 
degree of autonomy. In Jakarta a city-level branch (KAMI Jaya) and a University of 
Indonesia branch (KAMI UI) became important centres of independent activity with HMI 
activists assuming a leading role in both of them from the outset, while in Bandung 
militant anti-communist students were quick to form their own branch and use it to hold 
public rallies.
Yet apart from this organisational expansion, by early December the KAMI leaders 
were uncertain about what their next move should be. Some of them continued to believe 
that it was important to maintain good relations with the president and arrangements were 
made through Syarif Thayeb for a mass rally of KAMI supporters which Sukarno would 
address on 21 December. However, during December many of the KAMI leaders - 
especially those who were privately contemptuous of Sukarno and his government's 
policies - were angered and alarmed by the growing tone of intransigence in the 
president's public speeches as he began to defend the PKI in quite explicit language.13 
Fearing that he might also use the occasion to attack KAMI and give encouragement to 
their opponents, some of the KAMI leaders decided not to attend the rally and advised 
their followers accordingly.14
As a result there were many empty seats in the Senayan sports centre when 
Sukarno arrived to address the rally. The president, who had probably heard about the
13 Crouch 1978: 163-4
14 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 17 February 1982. The Jakarta army command had agreed to 
provide transport for the rally, but on the day many of the trucks were not required.
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dissension KAMI was causing within student circles through its conflict with PPMI, was 
further angered by the poor attendance. In his speech he attacked the students directly as 
quarrelsome troublemakers manipulated by their political party masters, and reiterated the 
central place of Nasakom in Indonesian society; but on this occasion he went further than 
ever before, claiming the contributions and sacrifices made by the communists during the 
struggle for independence were greater than those of other groups.15
The 21 December rally had a significant impact on the immediate direction of the 
KAMI-led student movement. Sukarno's remarks, deeply offensive to many and 
especially to the armed forces, hardened the resolve of those KAMI activists who 
privately despised him. In addition, the KAMI leadership now had a point to prove to an 
angry and embarrassed Syarif Thayeb who accused them of lacking the support of rank 
and file students.16 Both factors played a part in KAMI'S decision to make the 
government’s own handling of the economy the target of a new campaign.
Towards the end of 1965 as the state of the national economy began to deteriorate 
alarmingly, the government had no alternative but to raise the prices of state-controlled 
commodities and services in an attempt to check spiralling inflation. On 23 November 
Chaerul Saleh, as Coordinating Minister for Development, announced that the price of 
petrol would rise from Rp 4 to Rp 250 per litre. On 13 December the same minister 
released details of a currency reform (Rp 1000 Old = Rp 1 New), but even this had little 
effect on the soaring rate of inflation. So on 3 January, Brigadier General Ibnu Sutowo, 
Minister for State Oil and Gas, announced that the petrol price would rise yet again, this 
time to Rp 1000 a litre while the price of other essential commodities would also increase. 
Simultaneously, government charges for postal and telecommunication services rose 
steeply, while train and bus fares were also increased. The cost of a ticket on the Jakarta
15 President Sukarno's speech, 21 December 1965
16 The organisers of presidential rallies were expected to ensure that the venues were filled to capacity. 
When Syarif Thayeb was berated by Sukarno who held him personally responsible for the poor attendance 
at the KAMI rally, he turned on the KAMI Jaya organisers, abusing them for their incompetence and 
accusing them of being incapable of mobilising their supporters. Interview with Marsillam 
Simanjuntak, 17 February 1982
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buses, which large sections of the city's populace depended upon every day, rose from 
Rp 200 to Rp 1000.
Dramatic price and fare increases were almost certainly unavoidable but bound to be 
unpopular. Thus in an effort to boost their own movement's flagging momentum, KAMI 
Pusat decided to make the price rises the focus of a mass student demonstration. The 
KAMI leaders approached the Jakarta army command for permission to hold a public 
demonstration, as they were required to do under martial law regulations. However the 
command's chief of staff, Colonel Witono, who was already known to many of the 
KAMI leaders and believed to be in sympathy with their movement, at first refused to 
accede to the students' requests. Witono and his officers argued that the KAMI plan 
would only divert public attention away from the campaign to destroy the PKI. The 
students were forced to accept the army's insistance that the banning of the PKI and the 
restructuring of the cabinet to eradicate those ministers who were believed to be 
supporters of the PKI had to be given precedence over the issue of prices. Having 
agreed to these changes the KAMI leaders set about informing prominent activists to 
spread the word on the campuses, for they intended this demonstration to create as much 
impact as possible.
The Tritura campaign begins
In early January Soe heard from a friend, Ismid Hadad, who was in charge of 
KAMI'S Information Bureau, about the plans for a new campaign against the recent 
increases in bus fares and fuel prices.17 He also heard of the initial opposition to this 
from the Jakarta army command. Soe determined to support KAMI'S campaign and
17 This account of the January phase of the demonstrations draws heavily upon Soe's diary, which 
provides a detailed description of his own activities during this period, and a stencilled broadsheet he 
prepared under the auspices of Gema Psychologi and Mapala. See his 'Demonstrasi mahasiswa', Gema 
Psychologie January 1966. The following secondary sources are also useful: Paget 1970; Wibisono 
1970; and Yozar Anwar 1980.
Ismid Hadad was an economics student at the Christian University of Indonesia (Universitas Kristen 
Indonesia, UKI) and deputy chairman of the Indonesian University Student Press League (Ikatan Pers 
Mahasiwa Indonesia, IPMI). During KAMI'S organisational expansion in December, an Information 
Bureau (Biro Penerangan) had been established to coordinate publicity and press releases.
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immediately began to discuss these problems with friends and fellow student leaders at 
Rawamangun.18 On 7 January he held a lengthy campus meeting at which he informed 
those present of the KAMI leaders' proposal. The group enthusiastically agreed to his 
suggestion to hold a march from the main University of Indonesia campus at Salemba to 
their own campus at Rawamangun to draw attention to the rise in bus fares. Soe and his 
friend Herman Lantang, chairman of the student senate, immediately went to the house 
on the campus of Drs. Nugroho Notosusanto to inform him of the group's decision and 
to seek his approval.19
When the two returned to the senate office they found that a minor crisis had 
erupted. The senate had received an urgent letter from the Coordinating Minister for 
Education and Culture, Professor Prijono, requesting the Faculty of Letters to send a 
group of twenty female students to attend an all-night wayang performance at the 
presidential palace. When no positive response was forthcoming, an angry minister had 
attempted to bully the students into submission on the grounds that this was an official 
request from the president himself.
Soe, Herman Lantang and the others saw this as a heavy-handed attempt at 
coercion and responded to it with moral outrage: Prijono's action seemed grotesque 
coming at a time like this and was interpreted as a clumsy attempt to use the Faculty of 
Letters as a potential source of high-class prostitutes for the palace. Soe did everything 
he could to fuel his fellow students' anger for he had himself already experienced the
atmosphere of the Sukarno court circle:
Yes, these are the stories we always hear about the obstinacy and indecency of the 
palace. I've met and talked with Bung Kamo on three occasions. And I've been revolted 
to see the way his assistants licked his boots. (I, a student, didn't attempt to flatter 
him, but those colonels and ministers were doing just that.) I also noticed his private 
secretary with her tight kebaya and tempting breasts. Frankly, I couldn't help stealing a 
glance at her though I usually couldn't care less about such things. She was certainly 
pretty but I can imagine how grubby the sex life is there. Every time I left the palace I
18 SHG Diary, 7 January 1966
19 Nugroho was immediately supportive. Since in addition to his responsibilities at the Faculty of 
Letters and as assistant rector in charge of student affairs at the University of Indonesia, he also had such 
good contacts within the military, it was considered important to gain his approval.
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felt sad and disappointed, though others are usually proud of being able to shake hands 
with Bung Karno.2®
Although Sukarno's popularity remained high in early 1966, and few students 
dared to criticise him publicly, Soe could see that the president's profligate lifestyle was 
an issue to be exploited by people wanting far-reaching political change.
The KAMI-led campaign against the bus and petrol price rises officially began on 
the following Monday, 10 January. Soe and his friends from the Faculty of Letters 
joined a large crowd of students who assembled at 8.00 am in the courtyard of the 
Faculty of Medicine at the Salemba campus to hear an address by the RPKAD 
commander, Colonel Sarwo Edhie, recently returned from the campaign in which a huge 
number of PKI supporters had been massacred throughout Java and Bali. Sarwo and his 
fellow RPKAD officers were greeted as returning heroes and received an enthusiatic 
reception.21 After speeches by the KAMI leaders, including Cosmas Batubara, one of 
the four KAMI Pusat chairmen, the student throng adopted a three-point slogan which 
Ismid Hadad and a Catholic fellow student, Savarinus Suardi, had drafted the previous 
day: ban the PKI, reform the cabinet and lower prices.22
After listening to the speeches, the students prepared to march out into the streets to 
the State Secretariat building in Jalan Veteran where they planned to present their 
demands to Chaerul Saleh, the Third Deputy Prime Minister, one of the key ministers 
responsible for the recent emergency economic measures. Soe and Herman, however, 
had a strategy of their own. Despite a protest from the head of KAMI Sastra, they 
directed the Faculty of Letters students back to Rawamangun to discuss their own plans
20 SHG Diary, 7 January 1966
21 Sarwo Edhie's presence is not mentioned in Soe's diary, which refers only to 'speeches opposing the 
PKI and the price rises'. Yet the RPKAD commander's visit to the campus was certainly a most 
significant event and must have raised expectations that an ABRI-student axis was emerging. Sarwo 
Edhie responded to the students' shouts of 'Where's Aidit?' with 'You know where he is!' To excited 
applause and cheering he reminded them of the PKI leader’s recent challenge to CGMI to put on sarongs if 
they could not secure the banning of the HMI. This was first-hand confirmation of the reports that Aidit 
had been captured and executed. Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982
22 Ismid Hadad and Savarinus Suardi had been appointed by KAMI Pusat to draft these demands which 
quickly became known as the Tritura (Tri tuntutan rakyat, The people's three demands). See Wibisono 
1970: 14.
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for the coming days.23 At an extraordinary meeting of the faculty senate, Herman and 
Soe persuaded the students to declare a 'Week of Mourning' ('Minggu Berkabung').2A 
During this period, students were urged to boycott the Jakarta buses as a protest against 
the price rises.
Meanwhile the main demonstration had converged on the State Secretariat building 
where it continued for the rest of the day.25 Several thousand students congregated on 
the streets around the building and in the vicinity of Harmoni behind the presidential 
palace in central Jakarta while military personnel nervously watched from the perimeter. 
Traffic in this crucial thoroughfare linking the north and south of the city ground to a halt 
throughout the afternoon, as the students sat down on the road, chanted their three 
demands and waved two fingers in the air signifying that they were only prepared to pay 
200 rupiah on the buses. Chaerul Saleh was not in his office and the students refused to 
be fobbed off onto a subordinate. Instead they sat down on the street to wait, amusing 
themselves by chanting slogans. The Islamic students maintained their fast (it was the 
fasting month of Ramadan) and performed their prayers on the street, in that context a 
gesture against the godless PKI. Finally, late in the afternoon, a student delegation led 
by Liem Bian Khoen, one of the chairmen of KAMI Jaya, was sent to Chaerul Saleh's 
house in the nearby suburb of Menteng. Chaerul, a man of strong populist background, 
agreed to address the waiting crowd. Cosmas Batubara then announced the beginning of 
a strike. The students would not attend lectures until all their demands were met and they 
would not pay more than 200 rupiah on the city's buses. At around 4.30 pm they
23 This was an early indication of intra-extra rivalry: although Soe and Herman were in general 
agreement with KAMI'S aims, they wished to maintain control over the participation of the Faculty of 
Letters' contingent as an independent group. KAMI had, in theory, established 'branches' in each of the 
faculties as well as city level and institutional level branches. However, the PMKRI student who had 
been appointed as the chairman of KAMI Sastra, Tojib, was not an influential figure among the 
independent-minded 'Alma Mater' group on the Rawamangun campus.
24 It is not clear what this actually implied: perhaps the students were supposed to be in mourning for 
the loss of cheap bus fares.
25 Soe and many of the Letters students rejoined the main demonstration later in the day and his diary 
entry briefly describes what occurred (SHG Diary, 10 January 1966). For other detailed accounts, see 
Wibisono 1970: 15-16; and Yozar Anwar 1980: 6-10.




These events set the tone for the days that followed. The next day, 11 January, a 
group of about fifty students from the Faculty of Letters led by Soe and Kerman Lantang 
set off on a four kilometre march from Salemba to Rawamangun, disrupting as much 
traffic as possible en route.26 At Rawamangun, an open meeting of all students was held 
at which Soe announced the senate's plans for a week of demonstrations that had been 
decided upon the previous day. A larger contingent of about two hundred students then 
made the return journey to Salemba, arriving around midday to find that other groups of 
University of Indonesia students had been engaged in similar action elsewhere around the 
campus. Traffic had been halted in the immediate precincts of the university, and cars 
and trucks had been daubed with anti-govemment graffiti and the Tritura slogans.
On his way back to Kebon Jeruk shortly after midday, Soe met a group of 
Psychology Faculty students who were continuing to disrupt traffic at the Harmoni 
intersection. Earlier that morning, Soe learnt, a small but boisterous group of these 
students had invaded Hotel Indonesia,27 where they had rejected offers of food and 
demanded paper, glue and writing materials for their placards from the startled staff, 
before continuing up Jalan Thamrin pasting placards on passing vehicles.28
Throughout the rest of the afternoon and until late into the night, Soe spent the time 
in excited consultation with a number of his closest friends, in particular seeking out his 
old Gerakan Pembaharuan associates, Boelie Londa and Jopie Lasut, whom he urged to
26 SHG Diary, 11 January 1966
27 Hotel Indonesia was a major architectural landmark in the mid 1960s. Its construction had been a 
favourite project of the president. As a place where ministers and high government officials were often 
seen at lavish receptions, it was a symbol of 'big shot' luxury.
28 According to Soe's account (SHG Diary, 11 January 1966), some of the messages were implied 
attacks on Sukarno himself, for example jual emas Monas buat bayar gaji pegawai (sell the gold of the 
National Monument to pay civil servants' salaries); stop import istri (stop the importing of wives).
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join the student ranks. It was now becoming evident to him that the student protest was 
gathering a momentum that could bring about the fundamental political change that they 
had long been working towards.29
Early next morning Soe heard about the KAMI plan to lead a demonstration to the 
DPR-GR parliament at Senayan. In comparison with the relatively small and 
spontaneous street actions that had occurred the day before, this was a large and well- 
organised affair indicating that it had the explicit blessing of certain sections of the 
military. Around 10,000 students headed out of the University of Indonesia grounds at 
Salemba about 8.30 in what they termed a 'long march' to the parliament building about 
eight kilometres away. The route taken by the demonstrators took them through the 
centre of the elite suburb of Menteng. The Faculty of Letters students, who had 
combined forces with those from the Faculty of Psychology, occupied a position 
somewhere near the rear.30
As the students marched down Jalan Diponegoro, they passed by the houses of 
several cabinet ministers. Soe, remembering Professor Prijono’s role in trying to recruit 
female students for the palace, led the students in singling out Prijono's house for 
specific attention with chants of 'Crush the wishy-washy ministers!'31 However, at 
Roeslan Abdulgani's house further along Diponegoro the jeers turned to cheers, 
indicating that Roeslan was still a popular figure in student circles.32
29 SHG Diary, 11 January 1966
30 Joint action between these two faculties continued throughout the rest of the demonstrations. Both 
were small faculties where the external student organisations did not have a strong following, and there 
were many personal ties of friendship linking both student bodies.
31 'Ganyang menteri plintat-plintutY During the demonstrations, the students became adept at turning 
Guided Democracy language and rhetoric on the government itself. Ganyang had been a popular term of 
abuse in mass rallies and was usually directed at the enemies of the regime such as Malaysia or the agents 
of Nekolim. Plintat-plintut is one of those delightful Indonesian expressions, for which there is no 
completely accurate succinct English equivalent. It literally means 'one who sways with the wind'!
On the return journey that day, as the students passed the minister's house, the taunts were even sharper: 
'Prijono - palace pimp!'
32 Perhaps this was because Roeslan was closely associated with Nasution and known to be an enemy of 
Foreign Minister Subandrio. Soe, however, had already formed a quite different opinion based on what he 
knew of Roeslan's earlier political career and his own first-hand observations of his role in the LPKB: 
'But I know all about the opportunism of people like Roeslan...’; but for the time being he kept this 
opinion to himself.
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As the march proceeded, Soe noticed with some concern that the students were 
becoming noisier and more excited. It was as if the habits of years of harshly imposed 
constraints were being suddenly cast off. In addition to several variants on the Tritura 
slogans ('Ban the PKI', 'Crush the PKF, 'Lower petrol prices', 'Crush the stupid 
ministers'), there were chants which hinted at President Sukarno himself: 'Stop
importing wives', 'One minister, one wife'. Vehicles w'ere stopped and covered with 
posters or daubed with painted graffiti. In Jalan Imam Bonjol, the car of a government 
official attempted to drive through the procession and was quickly surrounded by 
students threatening the driver and kicking the vehicle. More extensive damage was 
prevented by swift action on the part of members of the University Regiment who were 
accompanying the demonstrators.
At this point Soe and his friends became concerned that pro-Sukarno students 
hostile to their cause might attempt to infiltrate their ranks and provoke action which 
would discredit their cause. Soe feared an anti-Chinese riot or serious damage to the 
parliament building. As the demonstration approached Senayan, he intervened to prevent
a student from lighting a fire in the street:
If the demonstration is transformed into chaos, then the entire student struggle will fail.
Everything will be like 10 May 1963.’33
However, despite these concerns and the obvious signs of defiance, the 
demonstration was handled skilfully by the officials of the parliament led by its chairman 
and cabinet minister, Arudji Kartawinata, who received a delegation and defused the 
tension. After listening to an aggressive speech by Cosmas Batubara, who spelled out 
their demands, the minister told the demonstration he would forward the students' three 
demands to the president. To rousing cheers, he declared: 'If there is no result in three 
days then there is no point in having a parliament. The building might as well be burnt 
down!'34
33 SHG Diary, 12 January 1966. Soe knew several of the Bandung Gemsos activists who had been 
involved in the 10 May affair. It had made him very conscious of the way politically-inspired 
demonstrations could easily degenerate into racial anarchy.
34 For a similar but slightly different account of these events, see Yozar Anwar 1980: 14-19.
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Several hundred demonstrators then entered the parliament chamber, scribbling 
graffiti on the walls. In addition to the three principal demands, they scrawled other 
messages deliberately insulting to the government: The people are destitute, the 
ministers are squandering money at Hotel Indonesia' and 'Ministers - don't just fuck 
around: ban the PKI!'35 They then streamed out of the complex, flagging down buses 
and trucks and commandeering their startled drivers to take them back to the campus at 
Salemba.
Early the next morning, 13 January, Soe Hok-gie prepared two articles on the 
demonstrations for the Catholic daily Kompas. Some of the senior staff there, including 
its publisher Auwjong Peng Koen, wanted to publish them but the editor, Jakob Oetama, 
decided it would be too dangerous to print such blatantly anti-government material.
After the excitement of the huge mass rally of the previous day, many students 
elected to stay on campus to greet General Nasution who was scheduled to address a 
week-long seminar on the Indonesian economy that was being sponsored jointly by 
KAMI and the Faculty of Economics. The economics seminar, which ran from 10-20 
January, was part of KAMI'S strategy to appear prestigious and well-protected. A 
written address by Major General Soeharto was read to the gathering. There were a large 
number of participants and papers were delivered by academics and senior government 
officials. The most important feature of the seminar, however, was the opportunity it 
gave for a number of senior economists to speak openly about the serious problems 
facing the Indonesian economy. The address by Dr. Emil Salim was particularly hard­
hitting. Nasution made a late appearance on the third day of the seminar, apparently after 
being warned earlier that morning by Sukarno not to give further encouragement to the 
students. Consequently, the speech he delivered was something of a disappointment and 
not the one that appeared in the published volume.36
33 'Rakyat melarat. Mentri-mentri foya-foya di H.I.'; 'Menteri jangan nyabo melulu - buburkan PKT. 
36 See KAMI 1984; also Paget 1970: 305-12.
145
While this was occurring, Soe and a small group of Letters and Psychology 
students went on a self-styled aksi bersepeda, riding their bicycles through the streets of 
central Jakarta chanting and singing, deliberately interfering with the traffic flow and 
plastering notices on passing vehicles. This time the principal target was the Attorney 
General's office near the central bus station at Lapangan Banteng. A statement by the 
Jakarta Chief Public Prosecutor, Dan Sulaiman, had appeared in the previous day's press 
declaring that the student demonstrations were illegal.37 The students were met by one of 
his subordinates who agreed to forward their protest to the Attorney General.38 After a 
speech from the chairman of the University of Indonesia's Student Council, Suwarto, the 
bicycle contingent headed off on their mobile demonstration. After passing through the 
shopping area of Pasar Barn, then conspicuously quiet, the students stopped for a short 
rest at Wisma Nusantara, a well-known night spot near the Harmoni intersection that had 
been occupied by students on the first day of the demonstrations. Again Soe imposed 
restraint on the demonstrators:
I told the students quite firmly that they were only allowed to drink tap water. Nothing 
more. From the kitchen I only took the dregs of some coffee. Everything was designed 
to prevent the impression that we, the students, were thieving drinks. And I wanted to 
show the Wisma Nusantara staff that in addition to the dancing 'crocodiles' that are 
always throwing their money around in bars, there was also a layer of student society 
that was idealistic and honest. I think they were impressed. The lemonade that was 
offered I rejected. We are only drinking tap water, I announced firmly.3^
On their way back to the University of Indonesia Salemba campus the students 
continued to disrupt traffic and scrawl their demands on vehicles. The Jakarta populace 
appeared to greet their activities with good-natured tolerance.40 Later in the afternoon, 
Soe prepared an account of the student protest to the Chief Public Prosecutor. This time 
he was successful in persuading Kompas to accept it for publication as a news item, 
though not until he had accepted some deletions.41
37 Berita Yudha, 12 January 1966
38 On this demonstration, see also Wibisono 1970: 24-5.
30 SHG Diary, 13 January 1966
40 Here and there, however, a driver impatient with the delays and inconvenience tried to argue with the 
demonstrators. Soe, himself, was involved in such an altercation, threatening to shatter the windscreen 
with a rock if the driver persisted in attempting to force his way through the demonstration. SHG Diary, 
13 January 1966
41 Kompas, 14 January 1966
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The same afternoon, KAMI Pusat leaders held discussions with officials 
representing bus companies and the Jakarta Transport Enterprise (PPD) and persuaded 
them to bring the bus fares back to 200 rupiah. In return the students agreed to do what 
they could to reduce petrol prices so that these fares could be maintained.42 This 
apparent success encouraged KAMI Pusat activists to step up their campaign of 
opposition to the price rises.
The following morning, Friday 14 January, Soe arrived at Salemba to find that 
some of the KAMI leaders were intending to lead a student demonstration to the office of 
Drs. Surjadi, the Minister for State Budget Affairs. However, Surjadi's office was in 
Jalan Pintu Besar Utara at Kota, in the northern part of Jakarta. The planned route would 
take the students through Glodok, one of the largest concentrations of Chinese shops and 
businesses in the city. Soe's friends Jopie Lasut and Boelie Londa told him of rumours 
that Chaerul Saleh had arranged for hired thugs to turn the demonstration into an anti- 
Chinese riot for which the students would be blamed.43
Soe attempted to warn Abdul Gafur, a medical student and HMI activist who was 
one of the KAMI leaders at the University of Indonesia, about the dangers, but Gafur 
seemed unconcerned and insisted on going ahead as planned. Soe immediately 
telephoned Sindhunatha, the LPKB chairman and a naval legal officer with good military 
connections. At Soe’s request Sindhunatha contacted the Jakarta army command's chief 
of staff, Colonel Witono, requesting extra security lest the demonstration be disrupted.
The small Letters-Psychology contingent readily agreed to Soe's suggestion that 
they again separate themselves from the main KAMI-led demonstration and embark on 
their own action to the offices of the Ministries of Oil and Gas and Central Bank Affairs, 
both situated in buildings near the edge of the Merdeka Square in central Jakarta.44
42 Wibisono 1970: 25
43 SHG Diary, 14 January 1966
44 SHG Diary, 14 January 1966. Wibisono 1970: 25-26 also mentions the demonstrations but gives 
the wrong date.
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The Letters-Psychology contingent again set off on bicycles. Though relatively 
small in number in comparison with the larger student demonstration that day, the group 
was able to surprise both of the ministries with a noisy and belligerent demonstration, 
plastering buildings and the parked cars of officials with their Tritura posters. Outside 
the Oil and Gas office Soe spoke to the assembled students through a megaphone, and 
then persuaded anxious officials to allow him inside the building to negotiate a meeting 
with the minister, Brigadier General Ibnu Sutowo, who had been responsible for 
announcing the rise in petrol prices on 3 January. When the minister agreed to see them,
Soe spoke on behalf of the student delegation:
Briefly and politely I explained the purpose of our visit and asked the minister to revoke 
the petrol price regulations that were burdening the people and requested that tough 
action be taken within his department against the PKI. The minister promised to 
forward the matter on and said that, because he was not the only one to make such 
decisions, he would have to consult first. From outside Nining's shrill voice could be 
heard singing above the rest 'Stupid minister, stupid minister...'. The minister's face 
was clearly angry, and I could understand because as a minister and a senior army officer 
he was being publically abused. But I also approved of the students' actions. Ibnu 
Sutowo is not a clever minister and apparently he's also corrupt. As a graduation 
present, he bought his daughter a ticket to Hongkong. That's excessive. I asked the 
minister if he would come outside and address the students' demands but he refused. In a 
smooth fashion he said that this was a problem of prestige. I didn't want to force him. 
Outside the minister's office I conferred briefly with the other members of the 
delegation. I suggested that the minister's refusal not be publicised because it could 
create an explosive situation. Everyone agreed 46
The demonstration quickly moved on to the nearby Bank Indonesia headquarters to 
attempt to confront the Minister for Central Bank Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalam, who had 
acquired a reputation for corruption and high living and one of the ministers directly 
involved with the recent emergency measures. Allegations were rife that Jusuf Muda 
Dalam had been involved with the instigators of the failed coup and had been a supplier 
of funds to the PKI.46 The students clearly regarded him as one of the prime targets for 
their insults and slogans. Once again a small delegation was received in the minister's 
office. According to Soe's account, his companions became slightly hysterical when
4  ^ SHG Diary, 14 January 1966. Nining was one of the female students from the Faculty of Letters 
who played an active role in the demonstrations.
46 Soe noted these rumours in his diary. The source of his information was 'a friend in Koti', almost 
certainly Suripto. Although Jusuf Muda Dalam was subsequently convicted on a number of charges 
including subversion, these particular allegations were never proven. SHG Diary, 14 January 1966
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confronted by the minister but Soe was able to repeat the students' demands adding
...the existence of government regulations that are not based on any social reality 
proves that while many ministers shout out 'go down to the people' in fact they 
themselves have never faced the facts about society.47
Soe invited Jusuf Muda Dalam to address the demonstration waiting on the street outside, 
and unlike Ibnu Sutowo, the minister agreed. However, when he attempted to speak the 
students howled him down with chants of 'Crush the Gestapu Minister!'48
The demonstration then headed up the west side of Merdeka Square accompanied 
by soldiers from the Jakarta army command whom the students attempted to engage in 
good-humoured banter. At Harmoni, they were directed right by their leaders down 
Jalan Nusantara and away from the dangers of the Chinese business area near Kota. 
Later Soe learned that his friend Boelie Londa had prevailed upon Cosmas Batubara, the 
KAMI Pusat chairman, who was leading the main demonstration, to change their plans. 
Instead of targeting Surjadi's offices in Kota, the KAMI leadership decided instead to 
direct the demonstration to the State Oil Corporation (Pertamina) oil and natural gas 
installation facility and storage depot at the port area of Tanjung Priok to the north-west 
of the city.49 A large noisy and emotional crowd of demonstrators led by Cosmas 
Batubara confronted the head of Pertamina's regional sales division, and the startled 
official was intimidated into signing a piece of paper agreeing to the students' demands 
for a return to the old price of 250 rupiah per litre.50 The students immediately used this 
as a signal to enforce this price at the point of sale by occupying petrol pumps in various 
parts of the city.
47 SHG Diary, 14 January 1966. The acronym turba (turun ke bawah, 'go down to the people') was a 
typical leftist political slogan of the early 1960s.
48 'Ganyang Menteri GestapuY
49 See Wibisono 1970: 26-7 and Yozar Anwar 1980: 26-8.
50 A version of the wording of this statement is given in Wibisono 1980: 26.
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President Sukarno hits back
President Sukarno was well aware that these student demonstrations presented a 
serious challenge to his authority.51 During five days of noisy and widely reported 
activity in the heart of the nation's capital, some of his senior ministers and high-ranking 
government officials had been insulted and various policies of the government denounced 
in highly disrespectful language. The students' campaign for lower prices was obviously 
popular with much of Jakarta's population and the student protests were winning 
cautious approval in important sections of the press. Above all Sukarno was alarmed by 
the evidence that powerful elements within the army were supporting the student 
demonstrations.
Apparently determined to counter the student challenge directly, Sukarno requested 
the attendance of KAMI representatives at a cabinet meeting at the Bogor palace on 15 
January. Ten students, chosen to represent KAMI Pusat, KAMI Jaya and KAMI UI, 
took part in the cabinet meeting.52 However, if the president thought he would be able to 
isolate these leaders from their rank and file supporters by this tactic, he had not counted 
on the resourcefulness of the students.
Realising that Sukarno would go on the attack, the KAMI leaders arranged for as 
many students as possible to accompany them to Bogor. Messages were also sent to 
campuses at Bandung and at Bogor informing students of the planned rally. With the 
assistance of sympathetic senior military officers, a huge cavalcade of trucks and buses 
was organised to ferry thousands of Jakarta students to Bogor early on the Saturday 
morning.53 The students from the Faculties of Letters and Psychology again travelled
51 Apparently in response to the president's complaints, the Jakarta regional army commander, Major 
General Amir Machmud, had issued a statement criticising the demonstrations on 13 January. See 
Crouch 1978: 167; Wibisono 1970: 23\ Angkatan Bersenjata, 13 January 1966.
52 The following students attended: Cosmas Batubara, David Napitupulu, Zamroni, Elyas, Djoni 
Sunarja, Liem Bian Khoen, Firdaus Wadjdi, Suwarto, Abdul Gafur and Tommy Wangke.
53 According to Paget (1970: 340), around 130 army trucks were supplied to bring the students to 
Bogor.
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together as a single contingent, singing and chanting the anti-government slogans they 
had invented in the preceding week.54 At Bogor, Soe and his friends regrouped and then 
set off on the bicycles they had brought with them, shouting their Tritura slogans and 
making short speeches with megaphones to the startled Bogor populace.
Inside the palace, the president set about attempting to humiliate the KAMI leaders 
by making them feel as uncomfortable as possible.55 They were brought face to face not 
only with the cabinet ministers for whom they had expressed contempt, but also with six 
student leaders from organisations who had refused to join forces with KAMI and were 
attempting to resist the dissolution of PPMI.56
With over a hundred members, cabinet was not an effective executive decision­
making body. Its meetings had become occasions for rambling, self-indulgent addresses 
in which the president poured scorn on his enemies, real and imagined. This occasion 
was no exception. There was no discussion or dialogue with the KAMI leaders who 
were forced to sit silently while he spoke. Sukarno was obviously very angry and 
refused to give serious consideration to the students' resolutions. He ignored their 
proposal to ban the PKI. On the question of prices, he invited anyone who thought he 
could do better than his cabinet to step forward. He would appoint him minister, but if 
after three months prices were still rising, he would be shot. Sukarno rebuked the 
students for their bad manners and their un-Indonesian behaviour, exemplified by the 
rude insults they had levelled at his ministers and his government.57 Furthermore, he
54 SHG Diary, 15 January 1966. For other accounts of the events at Bogor, see Wibisono 1970: 27-30; 
and Yozar Anwar 1980: 29-37.
55 Sukarno's tactics would have made many Indonesians - especially Javanese - feel very awkward. Most 
of the KAMI group, however, were Outer Islanders. Ethnic Javanese were poorly represented in the 
KAMI leadership circle.
55 At a special PPMI plenary session in Jakarta on 29 December, the student organisations present had 
voted overwhelmingly to dissolve the federation. GMNI, GMKI and Germindo student leaders who had 
opposed PPMI's dissolution were present at Bogor. This was an obvious attempt to exacerbate the 
existing divisions within the student ranks. During his address Sukarno spoke about his intention to 
establish a national union of students that would incorporate all existing student organisations, including 
KAMI.
57 During the afternoon further abusive graffiti appeared, this time on the walls surrounding the Bogor 
home of the president's wife, Hartini: 'Syphilis Nest', 'The Great Whore', 'The Whore's Palace', 'Gerwani 
Leader'.
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suggested that the hand of Nekolim - his acronym for neo-colonialism, colonialism and 
imperialism - was behind these recent events. It was apparent that his ministers were not 
the only targets of these demonstrations but that ultimately his enemies were out to topple 
Sukarno himself. Consequently, he ended his speech with an impassioned call for his 
supporters to rally to his side:
Gather your forces, form your ranks, defend Sukarno... Wait for my command. Stand
behind Sukarno.58
Outside the palace gates the waiting students soon received reports of what was 
taking place inside.59 The president's verbal assault on the students and their motives 
and his refusal to consider their demands exacerbated the already defiant mood of the 
crowd. Some of the throng began to press forward threatening to push down the iron 
fence surrounding the palace grounds. The palace guard, who had been subjected to 
taunts and insults, fired warning shots into the air.60 It was only after Major General 
Soeharto, accompanied by the navy commander, Vice Admiral Martadinata, and the 
police commander, Major General Sutjipto, left the meeting and appealed for calm that the 
students finally agreed to disperse and return to Jakarta.61 As the cabinet ministers drove 
out through the palace gates and the streets of Bogor, the students cheered some and 
jeered others as they passed. Late in the afternoon the students - tired, frustrated but 
determined - returned in their trucks and buses to Jakarta.
58 President Sukarno's speech, 15 January 1966
59 At one point during the early afternoon, Cosmas Batubara and Zamroni left the meeting to report that 
the president had dismissed their demands. This provoked anger and dismay among the waiting crowd, 
and the KAMI leaders were forced to return inside. See Wibisono 1970: 29-30. Other students, including 
Soe Hok-gie and his friends, had listened in anger to Sukarno's address as it was being broadcast on the 
radio. SHG Diary, 15 January 1966
60 From the beginning of the Tritura demonstrations, the students and the palace guard regarded one 
another with mutual suspicion and hostility. The involvement of Lieutenant Colonel Untung and some 
of his fellow officers in the failed coup attempt was an obvious factor in the stance adopted by the 
students towards the Cakrabirawa regiment. Their suspicion of the palace guard grew as the 
demonstrations continued.
61 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. According to another eye-witness, 
Soeharto made two separate appearances to address the students during the course of the afternoon. See 
Yozar Anwar 1980: 32-34.
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The president's supporters respond
For the political forces threatened by the student demonstrations, Sukarno's defiant 
response at Bogor was the spark for a period of reassertion. In a radio address to the 
nation on Sunday evening, First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Subandrio 
made a bitter attack on those involved in the week-long demonstrations, accusing them of 
being exploited by foreign agents of subversion. Taking his cue from Sukarno's remarks 
the day before, Subandrio called for the immediate formation of a Sukarno Front (Barisan 
Sukarno) to defend the president from those who were attempting to undermine him. On 
the same day, the Jakarta army commander, Major General Amir Machmud, used his 
martial law powers to ban all demonstrations in the city.62 This action was an indication 
that the military were far from united in their response to the students' activities.
The student organisations supporting the president, especially GMNI, responded 
by trying to reclaim the leading roles they had played before 1 October. Late on the 
evening of 17 January and early the following morning, groups of pro-Sukarno students 
began to put up posters in various parts of the city, including some in the Menteng area 
and near the KAMI secretariat in Jalan Sam Ratulangi. This resulted in clashes with 
KAMI supporters who alleged that the pro-Sukarno students were tearing down or 
defacing their Tritura posters.63
On the day after the Bogor cabinet meeting, Soe was sought out by Suripto, his 
friend from Gemsos and Gerakan Pembaharuan circles. Late in 1965 Suripto had begun 
to work in the domestic intelligence section of Koti under the command of Brigadier
62 In September 1964, regional army commanders had been given sweeping martial law powers as 
Pepelrada (Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora) under the direction of the Supreme Operations 
Command (Koti). Although this was ostensibly part of the confrontation campaign against Malaysia, 
these powers were often used for domestic political purposes. See Crouch 1978: 76. Notices of the ban 
on further demonstrations were announced in the Jakarta press on 17 January, 1966. As far as the 
students were concerned, Amir Machmud remained a feared and hostile figure throughout the following 
months.
63 The incident is briefly noted in Wibisono 1970: 39. The GMNI version of events was set out in a 
press release, Tidak benar GMNI menyerang Sekretariat KAMI', dated 27 January 1966.
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General Yoga Sugama.64 Suripto was six years Soe Hok-gie's senior, but there was 
much mutual respect betwen them, each seeing the other as shrewd, tough and seriously 
committed to political action against Sukarno's regime. Since Suripto was also an 
operative in the shadowy realm of military intelligence, there was the added attraction for 
Soe of access to that conspiratorial world. During this period Suripto was an important 
source of much of Soe's information about the conflicts and manoeuvres within the 
regime and the military. Suripto had established connections with a number of senior and 
middle-level officers, especially of the Siliwangi Division of West Java, who were both 
strongly anti-communist and hostile to Sukarno. Apart from some of the KAMI Pusat 
leaders, few other students had access to such information or connections in early 1966.
At Suripto's invitation, Soe spent that evening at his house in Senayan, where until 
late into the night they discussed the latest political developments, in particular 
Subandrio's moves to establish the Barisan Sukarno. Suripto’s Senayan house was 
strategically located close to the headquarters of the Kostrad mobile brigade. In the 
following weeks and months, Senayan became an important centre for the most militant 
section of the student movement, and Suripto himself played a key role as a broker 
between the students and the military.
When Soe arrived at the University of Indonesia on Monday, 17 January, he found 
it relatively quiet in sharp contrast to the excitement of the previous week. Only a small 
number of students were on campus and no plans had been made for further 
demonstrations. However, around midday, Soe and his friends discovered several 
students whom they did not recognise in the act of putting up anti-KAMI posters on the 
Salemba campus. These four were taken upstairs to an empty room where they were 
stripped, searched and questioned by a larger group including Soe and Herman Lantang. 
They admitted they were from the Bung Karno University and working under the
64 SHG Diary, 16 January 1966; interview with Suripto, 2 and 19 March 1982
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direction of its assistant rector, and were handed over to the Jakarta military command.65 
It was apparent that pro-Sukarno students were beginning to respond to the president's 
call for support to combat the KAMI challenge.
In fact, the KAMI leaders, along with many of their supporters within the student 
community, had been thrown onto the defensive by the president's Bogor speech and 
subsequent developments. While the students were discussing what their next move 
should be, Sukarno elected to increase the political pressure by summoning the KAMI 
leaders to the Jakarta palace on the following Tuesday morning.
However, militant voices among the students urged that the Tritura campaign be 
continued whatever the consequences.66 As the KAMI leaders prepared to meet Sukarno 
for the second time in less than a week, a spontaneous meeting of student activists, 
including Soe, Boelie Londa, Ismid Hadad and Hakim Sorimuda, was held at the Faculty 
of Medicine at which it was decided to organise a demonstration to confront Subandrio 
over the allegations he had levelled at the students in his Sunday evening radio broadcast. 
With Hakim Sorimuda taking a leading role, this group quickly prepared a statement and 
announced their plans to the assembled students.67 Soe immediately sensed that they had 
taken an important step and the campaign against Sukarno and his supporters was 
escalating:
Strangely, there was an extraordinary response to this 'illegal' demonstration. About 
five thousand students took part and in a flash passing trucks in Salemba were stopped 
to take students to Pejambon (the Department of Foreign Affairs). At that moment, I 
grew tense because I knew that this demonstration was illegal and in a situation like 
that anything might happen.68
65 The Bung Karno University's rector was Major General Achmadi, Minister for Information in the 
Dwikora Cabinet and a staunch supporter of the president. Its student body was dominated by a pro- 
Sukarno organisation, Gema Bung Karno (Gerakan Mahasiswa Bung Karno, Bung Karno University 
Student Movement).
66 SHG Diary, 18 January 1966
67 Hakim Sorimuda was a medical student at the University of Indonesia and a HMI member; he was a 
prominent activist in KAMI'S UI branch, and throughout the demonstrations gained a reputation as an 
independently-minded militant student leader. In several sources, his name also appears as Hakim 
Sarimuda.
68 SHG Diary, 18 Januar}' 1966
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At the Foreign Affairs building in Jalan Pejambon, Soe joined a delegation of ten 
students led by Hakim Sorimuda who read out their demands to the Assistant Minister, 
Suwito Kusumowidagdo .69 Hearing that Subandrio himself was not there but in his 
nearby Jalan Merdeka Selatan office, the demonstrators marched to that location chanting 
'Subandrio - Running Dog of Peking!'
A delegation from this group eventually succeeded in seeing Subandrio and an 
angry confrontation occurred. The students challenged the First Minister's allegations 
that they were being exploited by Nekolim .70 Subandrio threatened to confront them 
with his own supporters,71 then curtly ordered them to leave when he received a message 
from Amir Machmud informing him that the demonstration was taking place without 
army authority and was therefore illegal. But the delegation insisted that the minister 
address the body of students gathered outside. Though aware of the hostile reception 
waiting, Subandrio finally accepted the challenge, attempting to placate the students with 
an assurance that he had not intended to imply that their actions were at the behest of 
Nekolim and its agents but only that there was a danger of such a situation occurring. As 
the students dispersed, an officer from the Jakarta military garrison instructed those 
responsible for organising the demonstration to present themselves for questioning.72
While the rank-and-file students were conducting this protest demonstration, ten 
KAMI student leaders visited the palace for an audience with President Sukarno .73 This 
had been arranged by ministers who hoped to reconcile the two parties but the attempt 
seems to have failed. The Minister of Education, Syarif Thayeb, and the Co-ordinating
^9 In addition to challenging Subandrio to retract the allegations he had made about the student 
demonstrations, the students demanded that he recall an official Indonesian delegation then visiting Cuba 
and arrange for its leader, Ibrahim Isa - a prominent left wing figure - to be executed.
70 On this occasion, Soe was not present and his account of the discussion was obtained from Boelie 
Londa. SHG Diary, 18 January 1966.
71 'Kalian puny a massa, sayapun punya massa.'
72 Subsequently, Hakim Sorimuda and Boelie Londa were both detained for 36 hours. SHG Diary, 18 
and 20 January 1966.
73 The ten students present again represented the leadership of KAMI Pusat, KAMI Jaya and KAMI UI. 
Soe probably received an account of the meeting from Suwarto. SHG Diary, 18 January 1966. See also 
Wibisono 1970: 33-4; and Yozar Anwar 1980: 44-6.
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Minister for Public Relations, Roeslan Abdulgani, were both present as Sukarno angrily 
repeated his criticism of the student's activities, referring in particular to the messages that 
had been scrawled on his wife Hartini's house in Bogor.74
Late on the evening of the same day, Soe was visited by one of the Bandung circle 
of militant anti-Sukarno activists, Rachman Tolleng, with news of important 
developments there.75 Extensive demonstrations had also been taking place in Bandung 
since 12 January and were still continuing. From Rachman, Soe learned that activists 
from the Bandung Institute of Technology had attempted to organise a 'long march' from 
Bandung to Jakarta but the Siliwangi divisional commander, Major General Ibrahim 
Adjie, who was unsympathetic to the students, had stopped them just outside Bandung at 
Padalarang. However, Adjie was also opposed to the Barisan Sukarno and had 
announced earlier that day that this organisation was banned throughout West Java.76 
Radically oppositionist student leaders from Bandung were now arriving in Jakarta to 
monitor developments and take an active part in the struggle. At the UI campus the 
following day, 19 January, Soe met with a group of Letters and Psychology students and 
read them a copy of the open petition to Sukarno that a group of Bandung students had 
prepared a week earlier.77 The petition was hard-hitting in its criticisms of the 
government and wras written in a style of exaggerated deference that was deliberately 
intended to be offensive. The mood in Bandung student circles was clearly in advance of 
that in Jakarta, and Soe tried to communicate the Bandung spirit to those present.
74 The students lamely attempted to blame this on agitators from the PKI youth organisation, Pemuda 
Rakyat. Paget (1970: 342-3) describes the meeting as 'relatively amicable'. Given the president's fury 
about the students' behaviour, this seems highly improbable.
75 Rachman Tolleng was a student at Padjadjaran University and a prominent Gemsos activist. He had 
been one of Suripto's circle in Bandung and in 1965 he had worked closely with him cultivating ties with 
sympathetic members of the armed forces under the guise of confrontation with Malaysia. He had known 
Soe Hok-gie since early 1964. Interviews with Rachman Tolleng, August 1978.
76 For a succinct account of the attempt by supporters of the president to establish a Barisan Sukarno 
and the army's efforts to block these moves, see Crouch 1978: 167-73. On Adjie's role in particular, see 
Crouch 1978: 168-70; also Sundhaussen 1982: 231-2.
77 The petition, prepared by Alex Rumondor, was reprinted in its entirety in the February edition of the 
Psychology students' stencilled broadsheet. See Gema Psychologi, February 1966: 4-10.
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Antipathy towards President Sukarno was widespread among militant students 
such as Soe, but none of them was yet prepared to voice those feelings directly in public 
situations. The president was still the object of powerful reverence - as the man who had 
proclaimed independence, who had put his country on the map of world affairs, the 
formally designated Great Leader of the Revolution - and he retained intensely loyal 
support among large sections of the student and youth movement. Outright public 
opposition to Sukarno would have been political suicide in January 1966.
The KAMI leaders who had yet again been confronted by an angry Sukarno and 
had been forced onto the defensive decided that they had to make some effort to show 
that they were still loyal to his wishes. The day after the palace meeting, the KAMI 
leaders met with the Minister of the Interior and Governor of Jakarta, Major General 
Sumamo Sosroatmodjo. As a result of their discussions KAMI Pusat chairman, Cosmas 
Batubara, announced that on the following day, 20 January, the students would 
whitewash the offending graffiti that had been plastered all over the city during the 
previous week.78 Before the students set about their work, KAMI leaders encouraged 
them to attend a 'Loyalty Rollcall' that was to take place outside the Jakarta palace and 
where the entire Dwikora Cabinet would swear an oath of allegiance to the president, as 
part of the preparations for the formation of the proposed Barisan Sukarno.
Soe was reluctant to participate in this, but felt a sense of obligation to his friend 
Herman Lantang, who had to be there as senate leader to coordinate the Letters 
students.79 Soe arrived late just as the speeches were ending. In fact, there was only a 
relatively small turn-out of several hundred KAMI supporters. They were outnumbered 
by a much larger crowd of students and workers who had come to demonstrate their 
loyalty to Sukarno. Many of the KAMI students were wearing the yellow jackets of the 
University of Indonesia, which had been prominent throughout the previous ten days'
78 Wibisono 1970: 41
79 SHG Diary, 20 January 1966. For other accounts see Wibisono 1970: 41-3; and Yozar Anwar 1980: 
50-2.
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demonstrations. As the students began to leave, taunts and abuse erupted from both 
sides and suddenly the KAMI students found themselves surrounded by hostile 
supporters of the president:
Suddenly the group of students and labourers in the lead circled around behind and led by 
one big tall fellow, attacked the KAMI line with sticks and stones. The students, 
unprepared for this, were startled. Several small groups of students outside the line 
were surrounded and beaten. Furthermore they didn't hesitate to hit the women. From 
Letters, Ibu Hendarmin (Archaeology IV) was surrounded and ordered to remove her 
yellow jacket. She refused and was kicked until her legs turned blue. Elvira Manopo 
(Elok) was stoned by Kosasih, a Letters student from GMNI-ASU. Judi was also 
stoned. His head was slightly wounded. From Psychology, Pudji, an ASU member, 
punched Kartini, a fellow first-year student. I could imagine what would have occurred 
if at that moment I had met one of the GMNI-ASU from Letters; I would have been 
beaten for sure, because they really hate me. The ASU supporters shouted out 'Crush 
KAMI', ’Crush the yellow jackets', 'KAMI - Kesatuan Aksi Maling Indonesia', KAMI - 
rightists' and so on.80
When Soe and his fellow students arrived back at Salemba, the leaders had an 
urgent meeting to discuss what had occurred and compile a report. Soe complained about 
the behaviour of one of the Letters GMNI-ASU activists he had identified in the melee. 
Other students claimed to have seen CGMI activists from the medical faculty.81
The incident was a sharp reminder to the KAMI activists at Salemba of the strength 
of the opposition they were facing within wider student circles. That evening Soe, 
Herman Lantang and others attended a meeting at Roeslan Abdulgani's residence where 
the KAMI leaders had gathered to discuss Sukarno's proposal to form a national union of 
students. The students took the opportunity to complain about the provocation from the 
Bung Karno University students and gave their account of the incident that had occurred 
earlier in the day outside the palace. That evening Soe joined his friends from the Letters- 
Psychology group at the Faculty of Psychology building. Rumours were rife that pro-
80 SHG Diary, 20 January 1966. GMNI, like its parent body the PNI, was split into rival left and right 
factions. The label ASU is an acronym derived from the names of the PNI's general chairman (Ali 
Sastroamidjojo) and general secretary (Surachman), and hence was used to signify the left wing of both 
the party and its student affiliate. Since 'asu' is also Javanese for 'dog', the label increasingly began to be 
used in a pejorative sense by GMNI's opponents. 'Kesatuan Aksi Maling Indonesia' (literally Indonesian 
Thieves Action Front) was a play on the initials of the acronym.
81 The KAMI Information Bureau immediately compiled a press release about the incident that was sent 
to the Jakarta press. A report subsequently appeared in Angkatan Bersendjata, 21 January 1966. GMNI 
activists from the Jakarta Raya branch immediately released t81heir own account of the incident, denying 
the presence of CGMI members and alleging provocation from the KAMI supporters. Their statement 
was in the form of a press release, 'Penjelasan Dewan Pimpinan Cabang GMNI Jakarta Raya tentang 
peristiwa pada rapat umum didepan Istana Merdeka pada 20 January 1966', dated 21 January 1966.
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Sukarno students were planning to launch an attack on the UI campus and so they spent a
nervous night fearing that this might occur:
From Roeslan's house we all returned to the Faculty of Psychology because in such a 
tense and critical situation, a physical clash was expected at any moment with UBK- 
ASU-Germindo and their hired lackeys. Late into the night I saw trucks loaded with the 
student masses coming from the direction of Cijantung.82
The following day, Amir Machmud as the Jakarta Martial Law Commander, 
organised a mass meeting at Lapangan Banteng to express loyalty to the president.83 In 
the light of the previous day's events, Soe and his friends were prepared for trouble. A 
late-night visitor had already warned him of the possibility of another clash occurring at 
this rally, but had also brought the good news that RPKAD troops in civilian clothes, 
would be there to protect them .84 In the event, since the KAMI students and their 
supporters arrived in numbers and well-prepared, another outbreak of violence failed to 
materialise:
During the public meeting, no attention was paid to the discussion but to the security 
situation. Up to the end of the meeting nothing happened. When the meeting ended, 
the KAMI group began to ridicule the ASU front to provoke them but received no 
response. Apparently they were scared because the large KAMI contingent was armed 
with iron bars and wearing military boots. In short, ready for combat. The ASU 
supporters were surrounded by Ansor, Pemuda Islam, Catholics and others who were 
also ready for a fight. Finally the meeting broke up.83
Soe and the Letters and Psychology students marched as a group back to Salemba 
chanting the Tritura slogans and singing the humorously offensive songs that they had 
perfected throughout the previous ten days. A strong bond was emerging among those 
who were taking part in the demonstrations. Now that the president's supporters were 
rallying behind him and a war of nerves between the two groups intensified, students 
started to sense that they were taking part in a major power struggle with potentially grave 
consequences.
82 SHG Diary, 20 January 1966
83 The meeting resulted in a statement of support that was signed by more than a hundred separate 
organisations representing the widest possible cross-section of Indonesian society. For the statement and 
a list of signatories, see Paget 1970: 366-9. For other accounts of the students' participation at this rally, 
see Wibisono 1970: 43; and Yozar Anwar 1980: 52-4.
84 Soe did not identify his visitor by name in his diary entry, merely describing him as 'an old fighter 
from the Japanese era'. SHG Diary, 20 January 1966
83 SHG Diary, 21 January 1966
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Back in the relative safety of the Salemba campus, Soe and the other students were 
obviously relieved that a major clash had not occurred.86 This rally and the KAMI show 
of force that accompanied it, marked the end of the first phase of the students' campaign. 
Lebaran, the end of the fasting period, arrived on 23 January and ushered in the 
traditional period of Islamic celebration widely observed throughout Indonesia. 
Consequently, for the next week or two the campus and the streets were quiet.
Strategies and structures
For the students who had taken part in the launching of the Tritura campaign, 
including those at the Faculty of Letters, the previous ten days had been an exciting and 
eventful period. The demonstrations had been noisy and boisterous, with a lot of 
exuberance and good humour, little violence and no destruction of property, private or 
public. For many of these students, this was their first experience of political activism. 
At Rawamangun where student political organisations did not have a strong following, 
most students had remained steadfastly non-political but silently cynical about the goals 
and direction of Guided Democracy. Suddenly they found themselves marching through 
the streets, chanting anti-government slogans, confronting senior ministers in their 
offices and shouting them down.
The broad direction of the campaign so far had been set by the KAMI Pusat 
leaders. Cosmas Batubara, Zamroni and the other members of the KAMI Presidium had 
decided upon the agenda, made many of the keynote speeches at the public rallies and 
assumed a high profile. However, Soe and his friends at the Faculty of Letters had held 
their own meetings before deciding to take part and had participated in the demonstrations 
as a group. Furthermore, they had been prepared to conduct their own small 
demonstrations even when this meant departing from KAMI'S announced program. 
There were other faculty groups of activists on the main campus of the University of
86 However, Kosasih, the GMNI student who had thrown a stone at a female student from his own 
faculty the day before, was cornered later that day by Boelie Londa and given a beating. Soe, who knew 
Kosasih well and regarded him as an opportunist, thoroughly approved. SHG Diary, 21 January 1966
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Indonesia. With a lecture strike in place and classes abandoned, the most militant 
students established separate headquarters in the Faculties of Medicine and Psychology, 
some of them sleeping on the campus. Very few of the KAMI leadership were 
University of Indonesia students and the KAMI Pusat headquarters was at the Catholic 
students' office in Jalan Sam Ratulangi in Menteng.
Soe and his closest allies saw the struggle to overthrow Sukarno and his 
government as one which had only just begun. GMNI, despite its own internal conflicts, 
remained the largest student political organisation in the country. Most of its membership 
remained loyal to the so-called ASU group led by its general chairman, Bambang 
Kusnohadi, and the Jakarta branch was still firmly under the control of Bambang's ally, 
Kartjono. These student leaders were staunch allies of Sukarno and were responding to 
his call for more active support. In addition, other centres of committed supporters of the 
president were evident at the Bung Kamo University.
The most serious question for the militant students opposed to Sukarno was how 
the military would react if the KAMI campaign continued or if a showdown with the
president eventually occurred. Soe had agonised over this issue earlier:
Of course with discipline we are ready to suffer, bu t... 'to the last point' will ABRI side 
with the people who are suffering and be prepared to point their bayonets at the 
corruptors and if necessary this corrupt government?^7
Nothing he had seen or heard since provided satisfactory answers to this problem. 
It was clear that the RPKAD under Sarwo Edhie supported the students and Soe knew 
from his contacts at Senayan that there were many Siliwangi officers who were opposed 
to the president, his policies and his style of government. But would they dare to move 
alone?
On the other hand, Sukarno had strong support from sections of the armed forces. 
The Cakrabirawa regiment, his palace guard, were intensely loyal and had already
87 SHG Diary, 7 January 1966
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clashed with students. In addition, the well-equipped police mobile brigade (Brimob), 
and in particular its Pioneers regiment (Pelopor) led by Anton Soedjarwo, were 
prominent in the capital whenever demonstrations and large public gatherings were held, 
and widely believed to be largely Sukarno supporters. In the Jakarta regional military 
command, senior officers like its chief of staff Colonel Witono and Lieutenant Colonel 
Urip Widodo were sympathetic to the new student movement, but several of the students 
had already been roughed up by their subordinates. The commander of the Jakarta 
region, Amir Machmud, had given no indication of supporting the KAMI students' 
cause: on the contrary, he had publicly criticised them early in the Tritura campaign and 
announced a ban on all demonstrations when he learned of the president's anger. At that 
point, Soe and the other student militants knew little about the likely reaction of Major 
General Soeharto, appointed army commander on 16 October, except that various people 
had different evaluations of where his sympathies lay as between the president and 
KAMI. Would he support the militant students in a political struggle against Sukarno? It 
was clear to Soe that in late January the struggle had reached a critical stage.
The pressure to return to class
It was almost two weeks before any further activity took place on the streets of 
Jakarta. That was partly because of the ban on demonstrations proclaimed by Amir 
Machmud and enforced by his Jakarta garrison command, and partly because the majority 
of the students had returned to their homes and their families for the Lebaran holiday.
Soe Hok-gie remained at Kebon Jeruk and spent time resting and writing. He 
included a vivid account of the previous three weeks extraordinary events in his diary,88
88 Until this was written Soe had made no entries in his diary for almost a year. However, he was 
clearly aware of the profound importance of the events in which he had just participated and took the 
opportunity afforded by Lebaran to make a permanent record while everything was fresh in his memory. 
Entitled 'The days of the approaching typhoon in the student world', the manuscript consists of sixteen 
closely-typed foolscap pages (it was the only section of his diary that was ever typewritten) and covers the 
period from just before 7 January until 21 January. It was dated 25 January 1966, almost certainly the 
day it was completed. Although written as a single continuous entry, the chronology of individual days 
and events is readily apparent.
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and drew on this for a special 'demonstration edition’ of the Psychology students' faculty 
broadsheet, Gema Psychologi (sic), which was distributed throughout the campus and 
elsewhere in late January and early February.89 This was a hastily written, stencilled 
account of the demonstrations, that set out to explain the aims and purpose of the 
students' actions. Intended principally to maintain the commitment of his own circle, it 
was also used to spread the message beyond the university.
When he returned to the campus, Soe discovered several worrying 
developments.90 Although the University of Indonesia remained quiet, there was a high 
degree of activity behind the scenes in certain student circles during the last ten days of 
January as President Sukarno began to increase the pressure on his student adversaries. 
Having tongue-lashed the KAMI student leaders himself on two occasions, he now 
issued instructions to his ministers, and especially to Syarif Thayeb whom he held 
responsible for KAMI'S emergence, to see that the striking students returned to classes.91 
In addition, in an attempt to out-manoeuvre those who were behind the recent 
demonstrations he pushed for steps to establish a new body to represent all Indonesian 
students.
Over the Lebaran period, the KAMI Pusat leaders held meetings with several 
cabinet ministers, including Roeslan Abdulgani, Achmadi and Syarif Thayeb.92 In the 
face of this sustained pressure, the KAMI Pusat leadership issued an instruction to all 
branches to return to classes on 1 February. This sparked an intense debate within 
student circles that raged for the next fortnight, especially on the campus of the
89 See his 'Demonstrasi mahasiswa', Gema Psychologi, January 1966.
90 From the end of January 1966, Soe became so thoroughly immersed in the political events occurring 
on and off the campus that there was little time for quiet reflection. Consequently, he recorded nothing 
further of these events in his diary. The following account of his role in the events of February and 
March is drawn largely from interviews with a number of other participants.
91 Throughout most of the first phase of the Tritura campaign, Syarif Thayeb had been overseas in 
Japan accompanying Sukarno's Japanese wife, Ratna Sari Dewi, in conjunction with a proposal to 
establish a new hospital in Jakarta. He returned on the day of the Bogor cabinet meeting and was shocked 
to discover what had been occurring in his absence. The following day, 16 January, the furious minister 
summoned the KAMI leaders for an official rebuke. Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 
1982
92 See Wibisono 1970: 44-5 and Yozar Anwar 1980: 58.
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University of Indonesia which had been the centre of the students' activities so far. 
KAMI Jaya leaders immediately opposed the move, and the militant student activists who 
had formed the KAMI Bandung branch sent representatives to Jakarta to urge that the 
lecture strike continue.93
At a student rally at Salemba on 1 February, to announce the end of the lecture 
strike, Zamroni presented the KAMI Pusat case. The issue, however, was hotly debated 
with several other speakers, including representatives from KAMI Jaya and KAMI UI. 
Militant student leaders, and in particular the small number of politically conscious 
individuals like Soe who hoped for a total transformation of the political system were 
totally opposed to abandoning the lecture strike, and determined to find ways to continue 
the confrontation with the government. The general reaction was disappointment with the 
KAMI Pusat recommendations. The majority of the students who had taken part in the 
January demonstrations considered this to be an unnecessary and unacceptable 
compromise. The students saw themselves as standing on a point of principle. Until 
there was some positive response from President Sukarno to their three basic demands, 
they saw no reason for the tactical retreat that KAMI Pusat was suggesting.
The position of the KAMI Pusat leaders was in one sense entirely understandable 
since they had been subjected to intense political pressure by some of the most 
experienced and senior political operators in the country. But they were also guilty of 
completely misreading the prevailing mood within the campus where many students, 
under the influence of the hard-liners, were determined to continue the struggle they had 
embarked upon in early January.94 This issue ultimately discredited the KAMI Pusat 
leaders in the eyes of many students, who regarded them as having 'sold out' to the
93 Wibisono 1970: 49; Yozar Anwar 1980: 83
94 These differences reflected the fact that the KAMI Pusat activists lacked close ties with the University 
of Indonesia campus. None of the four chairmen of the Presidium was a student there: Cosmas Batubara 
was a Catholic school teacher, currently studying at a Jakarta college of mass communications (Sekolah 
Tinggi Publisistik); David Napitupulu was a student of public administration (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu 
Administrasi Negara); Zamroni was studying education at the Jakarta IAIN; and Elyas was a student from 
IPB. Bogor.
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politicians. The lecture strike debate continued throughout the next three weeks as the 
KAMI Pusat leaders and Syarif Thayeb, supported in turn by the university rector, some 
sections of the Jakarta press, the pro-Sukarno student organisations and Amir Machmud, 
unsuccessfully attempted to cajole, threaten and force the students back to class.
As this debate continued in student circles throughout the first weeks of February, a 
struggle was also taking place in civilian and military circles over the notion of the 
Barisan Sukarno and what this might mean, with many groups looking for ways to carry 
out the president's commands in a way which did not mean letting down the KAMI 
cause. Sukarno, meanwhile, did what he could to stiffen the resolve of his most ardent 
supporters, particularly those in student and youth circles, as a counterweight to KAMI. 
A group of student leaders representing GMNI, the Indonesian Nationalist Secondary 
School Movement (Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, GSNI) and the PNI's youth 
affiliate Marhaen Youth (Pemuda Marhaenis), had visited the palace on 26 January and 
assured the president of their loyal support and their opposition to the KAMI-led 
demonstrations. Several days later, on 30 January, Achmadi, Sukarno's Minister for 
Information and the rector of the Bung Kamo University, hosted a meeting of student 
leaders from that campus (Gema Bung Kamo) and the leadership of GMNI. The two 
groups produced a joint statement supporting the president and calling for the immediate 
establishment of a new national union of students.95
On 2 February, when a ceremony was held at the Salemba campus to mark the 
sixteenth anniversary of the university, fighting broke out between GMNI students, who 
were attempting to pursue a 'business as usual' approach, and their opponents.96 A 
number of GMNI students, including Bambang Harianto, a recent chairman of the 
Student Council, were badly beaten. The university student regiment, Mahajaya, who 
seemed to be on the side of the KAMI students, vainly attempted to intervene. Finally,
95 'Pemyataan bersama pimpinan pusat Gema Bung Kamo dan presidium GMNI', 30 January 1966.
96 See Wibisono 1970: 51 and Yozar Anwar 1980: 83. The GMNI Jakarta Raya chairman, Kartjono, 
compiled a detailed report on these incidents, alleging deliberate harassment of his members. Interview 
with Kartjono, 22 February 1985
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police and troops - including members of the Cakrabirawa regiment - were called onto the 
campus to break up the brawling.
On 3 February KAMI Jaya, whose three chairmen were all University of Indonesia 
students, prepared a statement opposing the return to classes.97 To publicise this 
continuation of the lecture strike, a convoy of army trucks was again organised to ferry 
students to the Heroes' Ceremony at Kalibata. In a brief ceremony at the grave of the six 
generals murdered on 1 October, the students affirmed their determination to continue the 
Tritura struggle. On their way home they ventured into the field of foreign affairs, calling 
at the US Embassy to protest about the bombing of Vietnam, and the Chinese Embassy to 
complain about what they called Chinese interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs. At 
the US Embassy, Ambassador Marshall Green received a polite deputation, but at the 
Chinese Embassy the gates stayed firmly shut. The students then scrawled abusive 
messages on the surrounding high walls and levered the embassy's name plaque from the 
front gates before departing.98
Further fighting broke out that evening in and around the GMNI students' 
headquarters in Jalan Tegalan, where a member of the University of Indonesia's student 
regiment was caught throwing stones into the GMNI compound. On 7 February, the 
chairman of the Faculty of Medicine student senate, Abdul Razak, was stabbed by a 
GMNI student on the Salemba campus.99
On 8 February, the campus-based student activists released a strongly worded 
statement, expressing their determination to continue the lecture strike.100 On the same
97 Yozar Anwar 1980: 84. The students were Firdaus Wadjdi (Economics), Liem Bian Khoen 
(Economics) and Marsillam Simanjuntak (Medicine).
98 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. See also Wibisono 1970: 54-5; and 
Yozar Anwar 1980: 86-7. GMNI students and Pemuda Marhaenis replied with a noisy demonstration of 
their own to the US Embassy late on the same day.
99 Both sides blamed each other for these incidents. See Wibisono 1970: 55; and Yozar Anwar 1980: 88 
and 93. The GMNI version of these events was contained in a press release, 'Penjelasan dewan pimpinan 
cabang Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI) Jakarta-Raya tentang kejadian di Jalan Tegalan I 
dan di Fakultas Kedoktoran Universitas Indonesia', 8 February 1966.
100 'Pernyataan Universitas Indonesia', 8 February 1966.
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day Syarif Thayeb received a hostile reception from a group of militant students as he 
addressed a meeting on the campus of the Christian University of Indonesia (UKI) on 
Jalan Diponegoro.101 By chance, a group of Bandung activists had just arrived in 
Jakarta. One of their number, Robby Sutrisno, publicly attacked the minister for his 
attempt to persuade the students to return to their classes and, to the delight of those 
present, urged students to continue their support for the campaign. On 8 and 9 February, 
KAMI Jaya organised further activities on the streets outside the campus - a single file 
'picket line' on 8 February and a march arm-in-arm winding through the streets of central 
Jakarta on the following day with many students wearing placards publicising the Tritura 
demands.102 Although the offices of ministers or officials were not invaded on these 
occasions, the students involved were technically breaking the ban on demonstrations, 
and troops from the Jakarta army command were already breaking up meetings of student 
leaders and forcing them to disperse. Also on 9 February, a huge demonstration was 
held in Bandung (where no ban on student gatherings was in force) in the form of an 
'allegorical procession'. The Bandung students displayed considerable ingenuity at 
creating fanciful models and caricatures insulting to key personalities of the cabinet.103
Faced with this continued student protest, Sukarno and his supporters decided that 
a tougher response was required. On 9 February, troops acting on orders from Amir 
Machmud arrested some of the KAMI leaders and held them in detention for several 
days.104 Meanwhile Higher Education Minister Syarif Thayeb, his credibility with 
KAMI students now shaky, renewed his order for students to return to class, threatening 
to resign if they continued to disobey. The minister's order was repeated in the
101 Interview with Rachman Tolleng, 19 February 1982. See also Yozar Anwar 1980: 95-9.
102 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. Yozar Anwar 1980: 95-9
103 The procession included a donkey with the message 'I'm a stupid minister' and students paraded 
dressed as cabinet ministers and accompanied by a retinue of female students bearing signs identifying 
them as 'imported concubines'. Some of them were wearing Japanese kimonos.
104 Those arrested included Cosmas Batubara, David Napitupulu and Zamroni of KAMI Pusat, and 
Firdaus Wadjdi and Liem Bian Khoen of KAMI Jaya. Several other KAMI activists managed to evade the 
team sent to detain them. See Wibisono 1970: 78-9 and Yozar Anwar 1980: 100.
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newspapers and on the radio over several successive days from 10 February, and was 
strongly supported by GMNI students.105
On 13 February, the National Front organised a mass rally at Senayan stadium to 
promote the planned Conference of the New Emerging Forces (Conefo) and the 
continuing konfrontasi campaign against Malaysia.106 Sukarno seized the chance to 
attack the student demonstrations, to renew his call for his supporters to form the Barisan 
Sukarno, and expressed his defiance of the KAMI students by praising the PKI's 
contributions to Indonesia's national development. Sukarno's speech enraged his 
enemies and even those within the military who still retained great affection for the 
president were deeply disturbed by his pro-PKI remarks.
On 15 February, Sukarno summoned a group of student leaders from GMNI, 
Germindo, Gema Bung Kamo, PPMI and MMI to discuss the conflicts occurring within 
student circles. Subandrio joined in the discussions and the students present again 
expressed their eagerness to join the Barisan Sukarno and their willingness to confront 
the counter-revolutionary elements within student circles.107
By the middle of February students like Soe who were supporting the militant line 
found themselves under considerable pressure. The president and his supporters 
appeared to be gaining the upper hand in the war of nerves that was being played out on 
the campus, and it seemed to the students that most of the key commanders were 
supporting him. The KAMI leaders who had been in detention were obviously shaken 
by the experience and resumed their attempts to persuade students to abandon the lecture 
strike. In planning their next moves, they consulted the older generation action front 
leaders from Front Pancasila, Subchan and Harry Tjan, who were close to several 
members of the KAMI Presidium.108
105 'Memorandum presidium GMNI untuk menyelesaikan berbagai masalah kemahasiswaan Indonesia', 
10 February 1966.
106 See Crouch 1978: 173; Wibisono 1970: 57.
107 Wibisono 1970: 58; Yozar Anwar 1980: 115
108 Wibisono 1970: 58-9; Yozar Anwar 1980: 111-112
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The rector of the University of Indonesia, Professor Sumantri Brodjonegoro, also 
issued an instruction for students to return to classes on 17 February, while at a further 
meeting at the Salemba campus on 16 February, the KAMI leaders again announced that 
the lecture strike was to end.109 To placate the militant Bandung students who had made 
it clear that they would accept no compromise, the KAMI announcement was worded so 
as to allow branches in other cities and institutions to make their own decisions. Those 
students who were committed to continuing the lecture strike gathered at the Faculty of 
Psychology building nearby in Jalan Diponegoro and Soe took a lead in opposing any 
retreat from their declared position:
Soe Hok-gie declared that he would not accept any form of political compromise. 'As 
for me', said Hok-gie angrily, 'I'm going to continue the lecture strike. Every person 
who thinks plainly will surely agree with my view. We must continue to fight, the 
struggle is still long, the road is still far, sacrifice is still required of us. We cannot 
retreat because of political reasons, because of political calculations. I'm going to 
continue the lecture strike with all its risks and consequences'.11(1
Yet as the pressures mounted against them throughout February, Soe could see that 
the students on their own were incapable of enforcing the changes that were required to 
bring about the demise of Guided Democracy. To continue their campaign, the students 
would need the backing of those elements of the armed forces who were opposed to 
Sukarno's style of government and who also believed in fundamental reform. 
Consequently, Soe conferred more and more frequently during this time with his friend 
Suripto at Senayan.* 111 Suripto had good contacts with senior officers such as Kostrad 
chief of staff, Brigadier General Kemal Idris and Koti intelligence officer, Brigadier 
General Yoga Sugama, and also with sympathetic middle-ranking officers. Foremost
109 Yozar Anwar 1980: 117-118
1 1<9 Wibisono 1970: 63. Although the University of Indonesia rector had called on the students to return 
to classes, not all his staff agreed with him. Over a year later Soe recalled an occasion during that 
February period when he was approached unexpectedly on the campus by the dean of the Faculty of 
Psychology, Professor Slamet Imam Santoso, a senior and widely respected figure. Professor Slamet 
related to Soe some of his experiences as a young doctor during the worst excesses of the Japanese 
occupation and how these had led him to wrestle with his own conscience:
Pak Slamet then said we must always have the courage to be honest and faithful to the 
truth. Even though we are going to be abused, this abuse will only confirm us in our 
heart of hearts.'
See Soe Hok-gie, 'I remember Merapi', Mahasiswa Indonesia, No 58, Week 4, July 1967.
111 Interview with Suripto, 2 March 1982
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among this group was Lieutenant Colonel Muljono, the chief of staff of the Kostrad 
Cavalry Brigade, located strategically close by, and Lieutenant Colonel Andi Norman, a 
RPKAD officer who had been attached to the West Kalimantan Battle Command.112 
These officers and their subordinates assured Suripto and his student circle of material 
and physical support for their activities. Senayan became a focal point, not only for Soe 
and others in the Gerakan Pembaharuan - Jopie Lasut, Boelie Londa and Henk 
Tombokan - but also for a small group of militant Bandung student activists who made 
regular visits to Jakarta.113 Many of this group of student activists at Senayan were 
given military passes and access to military vehicles, enabling them to avoid curfews. A 
few were also provided with weapons.
With tension escalating and battle lines being drawn between the pro-Sukarno 
students and their militant opponents, the Jakarta army commander, Amir Machmud, 
announced another 'Loyalty Rally' for the president, to be held at Lapangan Banteng on 
23 February. However, two days before this, Sukarno dropped a political bombshell 
with the radio announcement of a cabinet reshuffle on the evening of 21 February.
Reform of the cabinet had been one of the three demands of the students since the 
beginning of January but there was little about this re-casting of the cabinet to suggest 
that Sukarno was responding to the Tritura. On the contrary, the changes he announced 
on 21 February seemed deliberately designed to antagonise his opponents and reassert his 
own authority.114 Major General Soeharto, as the recently appointed army commander, 
now retained cabinet rank; but none of those ministers who had been singled out for 
special criticism by the students were dropped, not those who had been attacked for their 
economic incompetence, nor those attacked as corruptors, nor the alleged sympathisers
112 See also Suripto's own article written on the anniversary of the student movement, 'Pelaku-pelaku di 
balik aksi Tritura' (The actors behind the Tritura campaign), Kompas, 11 January 1984, where these and 
other military supporters of the students are mentioned in some detail.
113 Interviews with Henk Tombokan and Jopie Lasut, August 1978. Around this time, the Gerakan 
Pembaharuan group had taken over an empty house in Jalan Setiabudi, allegedly belonging to Jusuf Muda 
Dalam, and had established it as their headquarters, using it for meetings and preparing pamphlets to 
distribute during demonstrations.
114 For a full account of the cabinet reshuffle and its political implications, see Crouch 1978: 174-7.
171
with the PKI. The most dramatic change was the dropping of General Nasution as 
Minister for Defence. Nasution was the only one of the seven generals targeted by the 
coup plotters of 1 October who had managed to escape, and was regarded as a leading 
counterweight to Sukarno. Not only were the positions of known supporters of the 
president strengthened, especially in the reshuffling of several significant military posts, 
but a number of new faces in his cabinet were widely regarded as close to the PKI, 
including the newly appointed Minister for Basic Education and Culture, Sumardjo. 
Syarif Thayeb, who had been involved in the establishment of KAMI in late October, but 
had proved unable to control the activities of students rallying under its banner, was 
demoted to a minor cabinet post.
Demonstrations resume: the violent phase
The announced cabinet changes galvanised the militant students into immediate 
action, ushering in what turned out to be the final phase in the mass movement to 
overthrow Sukarno, although this was not initially apparent. Before the cabinet reshuffle 
was announced, Sukarno and his supporters seemed gradually to be gaining the 
ascendancy over their opponents, but the anger and disappointment engendered by the 
announcement created a climate in which militant student leaders such as Soe Hok-gie 
were able to plan further demonstrations with ease.
In fact, shortly after the cabinet reshuffle was announced, Soe received some 
alarming news - almost certainly from his friends at Senayan - to the effect that Lieutenant 
Colonel Imam Sjafe'i, Sukarno's newly appointed Minister for Security Affairs, was 
intending to eliminate the KAMI student leaders. Although such a rumour seemed overly 
dramatic, Sjafe'i was best known not for his rather tenuous military connections but for 
his reputation as a Jakarta crime boss, and it was widely believed that he was appointed 
to cabinet solely to deal with the problem of the students. Consequently, Soe decided to 
approach those student leaders from within the KAMI circle whom he judged to be more 
independent-minded and militant and with whom effective political collaboration seemed 
possible. He immediately contacted Marsillam Simanjuntak of KAMI Jaya and Elyas of
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KAMI Pusat - both members of SOMAL - to warn them about Sjafe'i, persuading them 
both to accompany him to a safe house.115 Both students had spoken out against the 
proposal to abandon the lecture strike and were believed to share the same 
uncompromising outlook as the other militant students. Soe took both of them to 
Senayan where they were introduced to the Suripto circle and their military supporters.
Plans were immediately drawn up to resume demonstrations on a large scale. The 
Loyalty Rally for Sukarno called by Amir Machmud for 23 February presented an ideal 
opportunity. Through Suripto, the students' intentions were communicated to Yoga 
Sugama and Kemal Idris who gave their approval.116 The students were led to believe 
that if they were to cause a serious riot, this would give the armed forces under Soeharto 
sufficient reason to step in and take over. Consequently, Soe and the other militant 
students gathered at Senayan set out for Lapangan Banteng intending to cause as much 
trouble as possible. They knew that pro-Sukarno students would also be attending the 
rally in force and hoped to provoke a confrontation with those students when the 
speeches concluded. Soe and Marsillam Simanjuntak had a plan to direct the 
demonstrators to the Department of Foreign Affairs building in Jalan Pejambon - a route 
which would bring them into direct conflict with the pro-Sukarno students whom they 
expected would be gathered on the southern side of Lapangan Banteng. They told their 
army allies to expect the clash to occur at Pejambon.
However, it seems that other student leaders had different plans. When the rally 
concluded, whether by accident or design, large numbers of students headed north out of 
Lapangan Banteng along Jalan Kathedral and towards the State Secretariat building
115 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. Simanjuntak recalled the sense of 
urgency and the seriousness of purpose Soe conveyed when he arrived unexpectedly at his house. This 
occurred shortly after he had himself returned from Subandrio's residence where he had delivered a joint 
KAMI Pusat/KAMI Jaya statement rejecting the reshuffled cabinet.
116 Interviews with Suripto, 2 March 1982; and Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. Suripto 
recalls informing Yoga Sugama about the students' plans on the morning of 23 February. Yoga 
suggested that the demonstration should be as big as possible so that he could report to Soeharto who 
would then have an excuse for taking control.
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behind the presidential palace. 117 When the students reached the railway crossing at the 
entrance to Jalan Nusantara (now Jalan Ir H. Juanda), they found their way blocked by 
troops. When the student throng persisted, one soldier opened fire, seriously wounding 
at least one, possibly more. 118 The frightened but angry demonstrators ran along Jalan 
Nusantara and Jalan Veteran to the State Secretariat building where secondary school 
students mobilised by the Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi 
Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia, KAPPI), had already gathered in force.119 Eventually large 
numbers of students forced their way into the building to present their demands, 
occupying it for several hours and causing considerable damage to the contents. Outside 
the building, the milling students continued to hurl abuse at the Cakrabirawa palace guard 
who were gathered in some force protecting the adjacent presidential palace. The 
demonstrators were finally persuaded to leave the State Secretariat building later in the 
afternoon. As they attempted to retrace their steps along Jalan Nusantara and Jalan 
Veteran, they were fired on by the palace guard, and several more were wounded. This 
created further pandemonium as many students found themselves trapped.120 Sporadic 
shooting continued as the students made their way back to the Salemba campus just as 
dusk fell.
It had been a day full of emotion and confusion. Noone knew how many students 
had been wounded, but rumours quickly spread that at least one had been shot dead. It
117 Interviews with Firdaus Wadjdi, 25 February 1985; and Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. 
It appears likely that other student leaders had their own plan about where the demonstration should be 
directed. Just as possible, the student mass may have taken that direction as a spur of the moment and 
spontaneous decision. For brief published accounts of the demonstration, see Wibisono 1970: 65-6; and 
Yozar Anwar 1980: 129-34.
118 The identity of these troops or those who were commanding them is unknown, although it appears 
that they were not from the palace guard, the Cakrabirawa. Yozar Anwar (1980: 129) describes them as 
military police (Pomad); other students who were present suggest that the soldiers were without 
identifying insignia. Did the soldier shoot out of panic or ill-discipline, or was he acting under orders? 
Several former students, reflecting on the incident, suggested that the troops may have been ordered to 
shoot to ensure some bloodshed occurred, thus enraging the students and pushing the conflict to a new 
level of intensity.
119 KAPPI had been formed on 9 January by a group of Islamic activists. The chairman of its central 
presidium was Moh. Husnie Thamrin, a HMI activist from Yogyakarta who had become the general 
secretary of the Indonesian Islamic Students (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII) in Jakarta in 1962.
120 Some students remained inside the State Secretariat building throughout the night, too terrified to 
leave.
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was clear to the students that a new and dangerous stage of their campaign had been 
reached. 121 What was especially alarming to them was the absence of any backing from 
their military supporters. As soon as the shooting had begun that morning, Soe and 
others had prevailed upon Suripto to report this to Yoga Sugama and Kemal Idris. The 
two Kostrad officers did confer with Soeharto, but returned with the news that it was too 
soon for the army to move against the president. The students would have to face the 
palace guard on their own. 122
The following day the newly appointed cabinet was to be installed at the 
presidential palace and with the events of the previous day in mind, the militant students 
were determined to do all in their power to prevent the ceremony occurring. 123 From 
well before dawn, small bands of students set out from the university, stopping vehicles 
at strategic points all over central Jakarta, letting down their tyres and creating a huge 
traffic jam that brought large parts of the city to a standstill. 124 The installation of the 
new cabinet went ahead but only with great difficulty; many ministers were collected by 
helicopter, and some even arrived on foot or by bicycle.
While this was occurring, a large body of students approached the palace under 
close military escort. These students had gathered at Salemba during the morning, and 
had set off through the streets of Menteng, their passions stirred by militants brandishing 
the blood-soaked yellow jackets of victims of the previous day's encounter.125 As the
121 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak and Rachman Tolleng, 19 February 1982. One KAMI 
activist appears to have deliberately fuelled the rumours by rushing off to buy a wreath which was placed 
at the State Secretariat building during the afternoon. Bandung activists heard these rumours on the same 
day and immediately organised a demonstration. According to Crouch (1978: 182), Radio Australia, 
widely listened to in Indonesia, reported four students dead. Although these reports were incorrect, the 
total number of students shot or wounded appears to have been around nine, and several of the wounds 
were quite serious.
122 Interview with Suripto, 2 March 1982. The militant students made their displeasure known to the 
Kostrad officers. Suripto recalls thumping the table and cursing. Tensions between the military and the 
students who were appealing for their support increased from this point.
123 Interviews with several participants. For published accounts of the day's events, see Wibisono 
1970: 67-9; and Yozar Anwar 1980: 135-41.
124 Hakim Sorimuda played a central role in these events.
125 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. For greater effect some red paint had 
been smeared on one of the jackets and it was waved aloft on a bamboo pole like a battle ensign for the 
students to follow.
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students reached the south-eastern comer of Merdeka Square, they found large numbers 
of heavily armed troops from the Jakarta command barring their way. These were under 
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Urip Widodo who was broadly in sympathy with the 
anti-Sukarno students' cause.126 The students pressed forward, pleading with the 
soldiers to let them pass. Female students, many of them Soe's Letters-Psychology 
contingent, occupied the front line, taking advantage of the soldiers’ evident reluctance to 
manhandle them. Slowly but surely the excited and noisy mass of students edged its way 
north along Jalan Merdeka Timur, here and there pushing back armoured vehicles 
blocking their path.
Shortly after midday as the student throng reached the northern end of Merdeka 
Timur, large numbers of them managed to break through the protective cordon and ran 
wildly in various directions towards the presidential palace several hundred metres away 
along Jalan Merdeka Utara on the northern side of the square.127 As they approached, 
the palace guard opened fire, and two students were fatally wounded: Arief Rachman 
Hakim, a fourth-year medical student at the University of Indonesia, and Zubaedah, a 
young high school girl. In addition, a number of other students were also seriously 
wounded. On the following day, 25 February, Arief Rachman Hakim's funeral was the 
occasion for a massive procession from the University of Indonesia to Kebayoran with 
thousands lining the route as the motorcade passed by. Tributes were received from 
many senior military and civilian figures, including Soeharto and Nasution. The student 
movement had produced the first martyr for its cause.
126 It is impossible to know precisely what instructions, if any, these troops had been given and from 
which senior military commander. Although their immediate commander, Amir Machmud, had shown 
no sign of supporting the students, some at least of the senior officers had clearly indicated that they were 
in broad sympathy with their aims. It is possible that these troops were genuinely attempting to prevent 
a clash by restraining the students from approaching the palace. It is equally possible that they were 
under instructions to make it appear that this was the case, but to do nothing when this occurred.
127 Crouch (1978: 182) captures the situation aptly: 'The students had eventually pierced, or been 
permitted to pierce, the army buffer between the demonstrators and the Cakrabirawa'.
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Militant students take charge
The events of these three days, especially the deaths of the students, had an 
immediate impact upon the nature of the student movement. There had been a carnival­
like atmosphere about the January demonstrations, but now everyone - not just the small 
number of politically-conscious militants - realised that they were taking part in a deadly 
serious struggle involving confrontation with the president himself. The intransigence of 
Sukarno had created a situation where it was no longer his 'stupid ministers' who were 
the target of the students' anger (a fiction it had suited the militants to play along with) but 
Sukarno himself. As the rank-and-file students were rapidly politicised, the task of the 
militant students such as Soe and his circle became much easier and the claims of the 
moderate leaders - such as those in KAMI Pusat who had been preaching caution and 
tactical compromises - seemed increasingly untenable.
The gravity of the situation the students now faced was underlined on 25 February 
when, after a long meeting between Sukarno and his senior military commanders, it was 
announced that KAMI had been proscribed as an illegal organisation and demonstrations 
or public gatherings of more than five people were once more prohibited.128 The 
following day, Jakarta army commander, Amir Machmud, announced that an evening 
curfew would immediately be applied in the Jakarta area.129
Shortly after these events, Brigadier General Kemal Idris, the Kostrad chief of 
staff, contacted the KAMI leaders and urged them to move to the headquarters of 
Kostrad's 2nd Combat Command in Jalan Kebon Sirih, just south of Merdeka Square, 
where Lieutenant Colonel Ali Murtopo, another intelligence officer and a close associate 
of Soeharto, had established a Special Operations unit. This was partly to secure the
128 The announcement was made in a radio broadcast by Air Force Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang, as 
Kogam deputy chief of staff, on the evening of 25 February. (Koti had been transformed into Kogam 
following the cabinet reshuffle. See Crouch 1978: 175.)
129 At first this was from midnight until 3.00 am but it was soon extended from 9.00 pm till 6.00 am. 
See Wibisono 1970: 81.
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KAMI leaders' protection but probably also to give this group of army officers more 
control over the student movement.130 Although the moderate KAMI Pusat leaders who 
took refuge at Jalan Kebon Sirih tried to keep in touch with what was going on outside, 
their tenuous links with the campus were further strained by their isolation.
After their release from several days in detention in early February, many of the 
KAMI leaders had disappeared from public view, taking no further active part in the 
demonstrations, although they were to reappear and claim the spotlight after 11 March. 
Many of these leaders had been prominent in January, but their reputations among the 
rank-and-file students had been tarnished by their stand on the lecture strike issue. 
Among the campus-based student activists there was now a widespread feeling of 
resentment that when the shooting began and the demonstrations turned violent they were 
nowhere to be seen.131 It may be that these students had been advised to withdraw from 
the frontline by their older-generation political advisors, but this did little for their 
reputations among those who were facing the bullets of the palace guard.132 This was
certainly Soe Hok-gie's own perception of this phase of the students' struggle:
Throughout those difficult weeks student leaders rose from the ranks who were more 
capable of representing the moral force aspirations of the rank and file. These leaders 
did not speak as politicians but as ordinary students. During those days we saw the 
emergence of Fahmi Idris and Hakim Sorimuda who quickly rose to prominence. The 
killing of Arief Rachman Hakim was a point of no return for the students' struggle.
The formal presidium [ie KAMI Pusat] rarely appeared anymore in the field, possibly 
out of calculations of political opportunism - and leadership was in the hands of non­
political students. This was the situation until 12 March 1966.133
130 Crouch 1978: 183
131 On his own admission Cosmas Batubara, for example, spent some time in the St Carolus Catholic 
Hospital in late February where he was said to be recovering from an accident. See Ahmaddani G Martha 
1984: 331
132 These views were repeated by a remarkable number of those interviewed. As one Bandung student 
activist explained about the period from late February:
They [ie. the KAMI leaders] never had any control over the students... They were never, 
never involved in any of the demonstrations. You never saw them. They were always 
having dealings, meetings with the military... At that time, you know, if you really 
wanted to control the mob you had to be in the middle and they were certainly never in 
control.
133 'Moga-moga KAMI tidak mendjadi neo-PPMI - menjambut dua tahun KAMI' (Let's hope KAMI 
doesn't become a neo-PPMI - celebrating two years of KAMI), Kompas, 25 October 1967. Fahmi Idris 
(Economics) and Hakim Sorimuda (Medicine) were prominent University of Indonesia activists. Both 
were HMI members. Soe's use of the label 'non-political students' is misleading: a more accurate term 
would be 'campus-based activists'.
From this point on, effective decision-making about the course of the student 
movement was securely in the hands of several groups of militant campus-based student 
activists who were able to command the loyalty, support and commitment of their fellow 
students by their presence among them during the course of dangerous activities.
Despite the increasing control by the more militant students over the shape and 
direction of the student movement, a mood of growing gloom and pessimism prevailed 
on the campus at the University of Indonesia following the events of 21-25 February. 
For many of the students it was one thing to take part in noisy street demonstrations but it 
was quite another to find themselves in a situation where they had become shooting 
targets for hostile and heavily armed troops. There were rumours that their campus might 
be invaded at any moment by the pro-Sukarno GMNI students with whom they had 
already had numerous nasty clashes. The GMNI students were able to call on the 
support of large numbers of pro-Sukarno youth and workers from Marhaen Youth 
(.Pemuda Marhaenis) and Marhaen Workers (Buruh Marhaenis). In addition, thousands 
of high school students, many from Central and East Java, were arriving in Jakarta for a 
rally organised by the PNI-affiliated GSNI. Such rumours were given substance on 24 
February when GMNI students and their supporters launched a surprise attack on the 
Salemba campus at a time when a large number of students from that campus were 
confronting the Cakrabirawa outside the palace.134
On 28 February, the planned GSNI rally was held at Senayan, attended by 
thousands of loyal Sukarno supporters. There were fiery speeches from several cabinet 
members with Subandrio, in particular, attacking KAMI for its treachery and calling for
134 Yozar Anwar (1980: 145) mentions this incident. A day earlier, on 23 February, eleven members of 
the GMNI central presidium, led by its general chairman Bambang Kusnohadi, had been summoned to 
another meeting at the palace. The president, accompanied by his three deputy prime ministers, 
Subandrio, Leimena and Chaerul Saleh, told the students that the time had come to meet 'force with force' 
and urged them to confront his enemies who were attempting to derail the revolution. See Paget 1970: 
373-4; GMNI press release 23 February 1966. Later the same day, GMNI students demonstrated at the 
US Embassy. See Crouch 1978: 181.
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'meeting terror with counter-terror'.135 After the rally concluded, pro-Sukarno students 
headed towards the University of Indonesia and a clash occurred outside the headquarters 
of the university regiment in Jalan Matraman Raya when they attempted to raise a flag that 
had been hanging at half-mast in honour of the students who had been killed several days 
before.136
In those weeks it was widely believed that pro-Sukarno military forces might be 
ordered to clear the campus. As most of the moderate KAMI leaders withdrew to the 
safety of Ali Murtopo's headquarters at Kebon Sirih, the militant student leaders and their 
supporters, who were congregated in and around the Faculty of Medicine building 
situated near the corner of Jalan Salemba and Jalan Diponegoro, began to feel 
dangerously exposed. There was talk of abandoning the campus in compliance with the 
instructions they had received from Kemal Idris, and some students began to discuss the 
possibility of going underground.137
The arrival of Bandung radicals
Just as the position of the radical students was at its most critical, a new element 
appeared with the arrival of a contingent of about two hundred students from Bandung 
who established their headquarters on the University of Indonesia campus on or about 25 
February.138 Throughout the previous three weeks, couriers from Bandung had been 
making brief visits to Jakarta to keep the students on the Bandung campuses informed 
about what was occurring in the capital. By mid February the Bandung activists realised
135 See Crouch 1978: 184. Sukarno also spoke at the rally, repeating his belief in Marxism: '... 
Marhaenism is Marxism applied to Indonesia'.
136 See Wibisono 1970: 81 and Yozar Anwar 1980: 150-1. On this occasion, according to Suripto, 
Andi Norman and some of his men arrived in full RPKAD battledress to protect the university students. 
Interview, 2 March 1982
137 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982
138 Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982. In 1966 Hehuwat had recently concluded his studies 
in geology at ITB and was deputy chairman of the student council and a leading member of one of the 
local student organisations resisting moved by leftists to dominate student forums, the Bandung 
University Student Association (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Bandung, PMB). He had been one of the 
organisers of the attempted 'long march' from Bandung to Jakarta that had been prevented by Major 
General Adjie a month earlier. Hehuwat was the 'field commander' of the Bandung contingent in Jakarta 
and was responsible for organising the students' selection and departure.
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that the situation in Jakarta was deteriorating rapidly and the student movement there was 
in urgent need of additional support. Consequently, the decision was taken to recruit a 
special task force of militant students who arrived thoroughly prepared for confrontation 
with the pro-Sukarno forces. Around 25 February the Bandung students slipped into 
Jakarta by bus, train and truck, and eventually linked up at the Salemba campus.139
The Bandung contingent consisted mostly of ITB students with a small number 
from Padjadjaran and Parahiyangan Universities. In general terms these students fell into 
two categories. A small group of them were Gemsos activists and PSI sympathisers who 
had been working closely together in Bandung for some years. Many of this group were 
old associates of Suripto and several of them had been part of the 10 May affair in 
Bandung in 1963.140 The great majority, however, were members of intra-university 
oriented bodies such as the Bandung University Student Association (Perhimpunan 
Mahasiswa Bandung, PMB). Such organisations had for years been resisting attempts 
by the government and party-linked student organisations of the left to politicise their 
campuses.
The Bandung contingent arrived at the University of Indonesia just in time. It 
seemed to them that the remaining students had begun to lose heart, especially when it 
became known that Cakrabirawa troops had set up a post in one comer of the Salemba 
cam pus.141 Within a short space of time the Bandung students and the remaining 
University of Indonesia students turned the Faculty of Medicine building into a fortress 
by barricading themselves inside and stacking furniture soaked in kerosene into the
139 A somewhat larger number set out from Bandung but some students were turned back en route by 
the military who were attempting to prevent students from outside Jakarta entering the city. Some of the 
early arrivals took part in the funeral of Arief Rachman Hakim on 25 February. At first the Bandung 
students tried to occupy the unfinished Hotel Asoka building in Jalan Thamrin, immediately opposite 
Hotel Indonesia, but after threats of attacks from pro-Sukarno elements it was eventually decided to 
establish their headquarters at the University of Indonesia campus at Salemba.
149 Among the most prominent were Dedi Krisna and Muslimin Nasution, the chairman of the ITB 
student council.
141 Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982. A small Cakrabirawa force was occupying the old 
Faculty of Letters building immediately across from the Faculty of Medicine where the militants had 
established their headquarters.
entrances. Though Kostrad chief of staff, Kemal Idris, tried to persuade them to leave, 
the Bandung students made it clear they would resist any attempt to remove them and 
would set fire to the building if they were invaded.142
The arrival of the Bandung contingent revived the flagging spirits of the Jakarta 
students and many of those that had left returned and joined them in establishing their 
headquarters on the campus. Soe Hok-gie and his intra-university oriented group from 
the Letters and Psychology Faculties quickly found common ground with the Bandung 
students and the two groups became comfortable a llies . 143 In many of the 
demonstrations that occurred over the next two weeks, they worked together as a team.
One of the projects in which Soe and several Bandung activists participated almost 
as soon as the Bandung contingent arrived in Jakarta was the setting up of an illegal radio 
transmitter to publicise the students' views and broadcast their version of events. 144 Soe 
had had difficulty finding outlets for his news about the student campaign even in those 
Jakarta newspapers where he had friends, and the Indonesian government radio station 
(RRI) was firmly under the control of Sukarno supporters in the Ministry of Information. 
Consequently, several Bandung students with the appropriate technical know-how, set 
up a small transmitter that they had brought with them to Jakarta while other students 
prepared the material for its broadcasts, timed to compete with the official RRI news 
bulletins . 145 The equipment was initially hastily installed in one of the towers of the 
Faculty of Medicine building but was later moved to several other safer locations around 
Jakarta.
142 The Bandung students arrived on the campus about the same time that the KAMI leaders received 
their instructions to vacate the university and move to Kebon Sirih. There were arguments with some of 
the KAMI leaders, especially from HMI, who appeared annoyed to discover that the Bandung students 
were taking over their campus. Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982
143 Soe was already well known to some of the more politically active Bandung leaders who gravitated 
to Suripto's headquarters at Senayan.
144 Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982. See also 'Radio Ampera - suka duka perdjuangan 
mahasiswa' (Radio Ampera - the ups and downs of the students' struggle), Kompas, 14 and 15 April 
1966.
145 The first broadcast was made on 28 February 1966. However, the transmitter was not very powerful 
and the signal reached only a relatively small area of Jakarta. Unfortunately I have not managed to find 
any transcripts of these early transmissions. See Soe's article ’Salemba enam, gedung keramat bangsa 
Indonesia’ (Salemba six, sacred building of the Indonesian people), Alma Mater, 3, 1966.
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For Soe Hok-gie himself these were exhausting days with little opportunity for 
proper sleep or rest; yet he seemed able to draw upon hidden reserves of energy driven 
by the knowledge that no retreat was now possible. He rarely returned home to Kebon 
Jeruk spending his time rushing between the students' headquarters on the campus, his 
contacts at Senayan and the Gerakan Pembaharuan group at Jalan Setiabudi. He would 
frequently appear on the campus late at night and brief the students on the latest 
developments, impressing everyone with his knowledge of the wider political scene. His 
fellow students noted his seriousness of purpose and his intensity and many were 
inspired by his single-minded commitment to the struggle in which all were now 
engaged. Soe was clearly considered a leader by his fellow students at this time - not in 
the sense of conveying an impression of physical power like his friend Herman and 
others of their group - but as one who was respected for his knowledge, his ideas and his 
opinions.146
For the militant students crowded into the medical faculty building, by the end of 
February the days were filled with tension and danger, and there was a high degree of 
confusion about what was occurring in the world outside and where events were 
heading. Despite these doubts, the students were determined to maintain their role on the 
political stage by further provoking the president and his supporters and encouraging the 
military to seize power. Further direct confrontation with the Cakrabirawa at the palace 
was seen as too dangerous, especially since their erstwhile military allies had not 
supported them on 23 and 24 February. Instead, the students turned their attention again 
to Sukarno's subordinates, in particular, Subandrio, already their declared enemy, and 
several other ministers associated in the public mind with the PKI.
Further demonstrations: the role of KAPPI and a student militia
From the beginning of March student demonstrators were on the streets of Jakarta 
again almost every day. This time hundreds and sometimes thousands of high school
146 Interviews with several of his contemporaries who observed him closely during this period
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students, under the banner of KAPPI took part in many of the demonstrations that began 
from the University of Indonesia campus, or initiated many of their own protest marches.
One of the figures singled out for particular attention by the KAPPI students was 
the recently appointed Minister for Basic Education and Culture, Sumardjo, a supporter 
of the PKI-affiliated teachers' union (PGRI).147 On 1 March KAPPI students arrived in 
large numbers at the offices of the Department of Education and Culture in Jalan Cilacap 
where they demanded Sumardjo's sacking.148 The following day a large group of 
university students held a rally at Salemba, and then headed out into the nearby streets 
with a grotesque effigy of Subandrio hanging from a bamboo pole. They paraded this in 
a truck past Subandrio's house in Jalan Diponegoro with cries of 'Hang Subandrio' and 
'Subandrio - Running Dog of Peking'. When they arrived back at the campus, the effigy 
was ceremoniously set alight in one of the university courtyards.149 During the course of 
the day, another group of students organised a demonstration to the Kebayoran 
headquarters of the State Electricity Enterprise (PLN) where the minister, Ir. Setiadi 
Reksoprodjo, was also alleged to be close to the PKI.150
On 3 March, students again targeted Subandrio - this time massing outside the 
Department of Foreign Affairs building at Jalan Pejambon until Brimob troops arrived 
and dispersed the demonstration by firing into the air. The KAPPI students then headed 
to Jalan Merdeka Timur where they occupied another building of the Department of 
Education and Culture.151
These were flagrant breaches of the ban on demonstrations, so Sukarno instructed 
his Deputy Prime Minister and acting Minister of Higher Education and Science, 
Leimena, to close the University of Indonesia. The ministerial instruction was issued on 
3 March, but it was immediately evident that it could not be enforced. Since the arrival of
147 See Crouch 1978: 185.
148 Wibisono 1970: 82; Yozar Anwar 1980: 173-4
149 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. See also Yozar Anwar 1980: 176-7. 
1511 Yozar Anwar 1980: 176
151 Yozar Anwar 1980: 178; Wibisono 1970: 82
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the militant and grimly determined Bandung students, the university campus had become 
a fortress. Furthermore, the arrival of Kostrad troops very early on the morning of 4 
March, to occupy defensive positions at the entrance to the campus, thwarted any action 
pro-Sukarno military units may have been considering to clear the campus.152
Meanwhile other student leaders at the University of Indonesia had begun to initiate 
further offensive measures. On 4 March, students crowded into one of the university 
courtyards to witness the establishment of a student militia, named the Laskar Arief 
Rachman Hakim in memory of the student shot on 24 February. Its formation had been 
approved by Kostrad senior officers and uniforms and equipment were supplied by 
sympathetic businessmen. On paper at least, the Laskar had an elaborate organisational 
structure.153 In keeping with KAMI'S own origins, several leaders were appointed to 
represent the various constituent student organisations that had come together under the 
action front banner, and the militia was divided into seven 'battalions' (yon) with 
responsibility for patrolling particular parts of the city. These were named after each of 
the seven officers murdered on 1 October. One of the most prominent figures in this 
venture was Fahmi Idris, a HMI activist with a reputation as a campus tough guy.154 
Many, but not all, of the students who took part in the Laskar were from HMI 
backgrounds, and Hakim Sorimuda - a friend of Soe Hok-gie's and one of the most 
militant and uncompromising of the campus activists - had taken a leading role in its 
formation.155 Though apparently integrated into the KAMI structure, the militia was in 
reality a separate entity. It took an active part in several of the demonstrations over the
152 The students occupying the medical faculty building at Salemba were visited by RPKAD 
commander, Sarwo Edhie, late on the evening of 3 March. When it was apparent that, come what may, 
the students were determined to remain despite Leimena's announcement and the presence of Cakrabirawa 
troops in an adjacent building, Kemal Idris despatched three tanks and some troops from the Siliwangi 
elite Kujang brigade to protect the campus. By the following morning, the Cakrabirawa had departed. 
Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982
153 Interviews with Marsillam Simanjuntak 19 February 1982; and Firdaus Wadjdi 25 February 1985
154 Interview with Fahmi Idris, 28 February 1985. An economics student at the University of 
Indonesia, Fahmi Idris had been involved in the orientation incident with Drs. Basirun Nugroho the 
previous September. During February 1966 he had taken a leading role in the harassment of GMNI 
students whenever they appeared on the campus.
155 Later, a militant Catholic student, Louis Wangge, also rose to prominence as a Laskar leader. One 
other important element within the Laskar was Yon Yani, led by Albert Hasibuan, a prominent UKI law 
student. Many UKI students participated in Yon Yani which operated in the Menteng-Gambir area.
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next few days, its most important immediate role being to confront the organised bands 
of pro-Sukarno students, youth and labourers who had been a constant threat to the 
demonstrating students over recent weeks. The danger from this quarter was now 
effectively negated.
On 5 March another demonstration headed for Subandrio's office, on this occasion 
his headquarters in Jalan Merdeka Selatan, where the students, despite a large Brimob 
presence and repeated warning shots, invaded the ministrial compound.156 Another 
effigy of the minister, this time with the body of a dog but with Subandrio's bespectacled 
face - the 'Running Dog of Peking' - was burnt in one of the courtyards.
By this time a significant proportion of Jakarta's senior high school students were 
also on strike. The Minister of Education, Sumardjo, instructed teachers to stop their 
pupils from leaving classes to participate in demonstrations, but his instructions and 
theirs were widely defied. KAPPI students took over the Department of Education and 
Culture auditorium in Jalan Merdeka Timur and were using it as their headquarters. 
President Sukarno demanded that the ban on KAMI be properly implemented and vainly 
called for Amir Machmud to take tough action on the students but Amir was in fact no 
longer in operational control.157
The militants' dilemma and escalating chaos
From the vantage point of the campus-based militants and their Senayan 
counterparts the armed forces seemed extraordinarily slow to move against Sukarno. As 
they saw it, they were the ones risking their lives in confrontations with pro-Sukarno 
civilian and military forces. Had they been misled by the army officers who had
156 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. See also Yozar Anwar 1980: 182-3.
157 According to Crouch (1978: 181),
'...an informal agreement had been reached with the Jakarta commander, Amir 
Machmud, whereby operational command of all army troops in Jakarta was transferred 
to Kemal [Idris], while Amir Machmud remained responsible for administration and 
territorial matters.'
However, the students knew nothing of such an arrangement and Amir Machmud remained a feared 
figure.
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encouraged them to hope for decisive support from Soeharto? Were they being 
deliberately exploited by an army leadership which had its own agenda? This led to bitter 
arguments between the student leaders and those people in the military hierarchy like 
Kemal Idris, who tried to convince them to be patient: what was needed, they said, was 
a slow steady building up of the political pressure on Sukarno that would force him to 
concede to the demands for significant political change and avoid an outright use of 
military force. 158 A military putsch would only lead to a backlash in the regions, and 
especially in East and Central Java, where large reserves of popular support for the 
president could lead to a civil war.
That attitude by the KAMI sympathisers in the military heightened the tension 
between the militant students and the KAMI leaders who counselled moderation.159 The 
hardliners began to look for further ways to force a showdown - possibly encouraged by 
some of their army allies - by planning wilder and more outrageous demonstrations that 
would further enrage Sukarno and his supporters, provoking them into a response. At 
the same time, the students did what they could to involve the military directly in the 
conflict. At a time when Soeharto continued to play the role of loyal servant of the 
president, student activists angered senior military officers by arriving for a supposedly 
secret meeting at Kostrad headquarters in Jalan Merdeka Selatan wearing their distinctive 
yellow jackets identifying them as University of Indonesia students. 160 The wilder 
elements took to provoking the military more directly: on at least one occasion, students 
riding in a friendly military vehicle 'borrowed' an automatic rifle and fired off a few 
rounds at a passing Cakrabirawa jeep.
158 Kemal Idris visited the militant students at Salemba on more than one occasion to discuss the 
situation. The Bandung students had good relations with Kemal. In addition to his obvious sympathy 
for their anti-Sukarno views, Kemal's son had just enrolled as a student at ITB and lived in the same 
student dormitary as several of the Bandung contingent. Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982
159 KAMI leaders, probably under pressure from their military advisors to exert some influence over 
events, from time to time left the safety of the Kebon Sirih barracks and appeared at the campus 
headquarters, but were jeered and booed by the militants when they suggested adopting a softer approach. 
Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982
160 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982
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The frustrations and impatience of the students boiled over on 8 March when the 
most anarchic and destructive of student demonstrations took place, directed primarily 
against Foreign Minister Subandrio. In a surprise early morning raid, students invaded 
and occupied the Department of Foreign Affairs building in Jalan Pejambon. Soe Hok- 
gie, his Senayan accomplices and the Bandung militants were the principal initiators of 
this demonstration and thousands of students, including large numbers of KAPPI high 
school students, took part in it.161 Demonstrators occupied the building from 6.30 am 
until early in the afternoon. While bewildered bureaucrats tried to salvage papers and 
files, the students resisted all attempts by security to force them to leave and set about 
destroying the contents of the building. They defaced the office walls with their slogans, 
smashed furniture and fittings, emptied out the contents of filing cabinets and drawers, 
and shredded and destroyed papers. The police mobile brigade did what it could to force 
the students out by lobbing tear gas cannisters in through the windows, but its troops 
were totally outnumbered by the wild horde of angry students. The tear gas terrified the 
students trapped inside the building, but this evidently led them into committing wilder 
acts of vandalism. As the battle to eject the demonstrators continued throughout the 
course of the morning the students reduced the contents of the building to rubble.
While this anarchic demonstration was proceeding, President Sukarno was 
addressing a women's rally at Senayan where he complained about his authority being 
jacked up' and called on the armed forces to be loyal to him as their supreme 
commander.162 After further defiant speeches by Subandrio and his wife, Chaerul Saleh 
and J.S. Tumakaka, the newly appointed head of the National Front, several truck-loads 
of GMNI students and Pemuda Marhaenis headed for the US Embassy in Jalan Merdeka 
Selatan where they demonstrated against alleged US interference in Indonesia's domestic 
affairs. In the course of a wild demonstration two US diplomatic vehicles were torched. 
The pro-Sukarno demonstrators then moved across the square to Jalan Merdeka Timur to
161 Interviews with several participants, including Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982; and Marsillam 
Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982. See also the account in Yozar Anwar 1980: 185-7.
162 Crouch 1978: 186
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attack the KAPPI-occupied Department of Education and Culture building. Students 
returning from the Department of Foreign Affairs, led by the Laskar Arief Rachman 
Hakim, rushed to the scene and a nasty pitched battle involving fist fights and rock­
throwing erupted with injuries sustained on both sides.163
The following morning, 9 March, a furious Sukarno inspected the damage to the 
Foreign Affairs building before beginning a marathon meeting with party leaders at the 
palace, intended to brow-beat them into signing a public statement of support for him .164 
Further demonstrations occurred that day, and in fact, demonstrations by different groups 
of students were now taking place almost simultaneously in various parts of the city. 
KAPPI and the Laskar Arief Rachman Hakim protested at the parliament building at 
Senayan.165 Others returned to the Department of Education and Culture building in 
Jalan Cilacap which was seized and locked by KAPPI students.166
The most dramatic incidents to occur on 9 and 10 March followed initiatives by the 
Bandung activists and some of the Letters-Psychology students, including Soe Hok- 
gie.167 These militant students felt frustrated by the efforts of the military to supervise 
and control their activities. Consequently, their operations became more clandestine and 
more daring, concentrating on difficult and dangerous targets to achieve the maximum 
impact.168 Small groups of students took part in sudden and unexpected pseudo-military 
raids; the leaders became obsessed with the details of the planning and used scouts,
163 Wibisono 1970: 84; Yozar Anwar 1980: 187-9
164 See Crouch 1978: 187. The statement was finally extracted from the party leaders the following 
day.
163 Yozar Anwar 1980: 190
166 Yozar Anwar 1980: 190
167 Interviews with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982; and Herman Lantang, 10 February 1982. Many of 
the Jakarta students involved in these activities were members of Mapala, the mountaineering club led by 
Herman Lantang and Soe Hok-gie.
168 The ITB students had sent messages back to Bandung inquiring about how to make explosives. At 
one point it was rumoured that Sukarno was to make a televised address to appeal for support and the 
militants began to consider blowing up the Jakarta television transmitter tower. In some of their raids 
they brought Molotov cocktails but they were poorly made and were ineffective.
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diversionary manoeuvres and attempts to conceal their intentions from military officers, 
both friends as well as those they took to be their enemies.169
Among major targets of the militants at this stage were those buildings operated by 
agencies of the Peoples' Republic of China. The embassy building itself in Jalan Gajah 
Mada was too well-protected and too far from their base at Salemba, but several other 
locations were more exposed. The students wanted to highlight Sukarno and 
Subandrio's close ties with Peking, hoping to force angry reactions from those two and 
the Chinese government to add to the sense of crisis. On 9 March they attempted to bum 
down the Chinese press agency, Hsin Hua, which they claimed was spreading lies and 
propaganda about the student movement and continuing to support the PKI. However, 
the building was located in the Tanah Abang area not far from a large Marine Corps 
headquarters, so the invaders were only able to inflict minor damage on the building 
before they were beaten off by security forces. Determined to improve on this, that 
evening Soe and two Bandung students surveyed the Chinese consulate building in Jalan 
Kramat Raya and the Chinese trade consulate in Jalan Cilosari. As these buildings were 
close to the Salemba campus and there were no army barracks or police posts nearby, 
they were considered suitable targets.
Just before dawn on 10 March about forty students set out and launched a 
commando-style assault on both buildings. At the consulate in Kramat Raya, the gates 
were smashed through using a truck and the students set about wrecking the contents of 
the building. Then at Jalan Cilosari, the students scaled the high wall surrounding the 
trade building. Some of them fought with the Chinese staff inside while others destroyed
169 After the attack on the Foreign Affairs building, most of the Bandung students had left their crowded 
and cramped quarters in the medical faculty building and small groups of them were being billeted in 
various parts of the city. Although they continued to return to the campus each day, the irregular 
comings and goings made it easier to conceal their activities from outsiders. To avoid detection, groups 
of students began to use a side exit from the campus that required them to pass through a room where the 
Faculty of Medicine stored its cadavers for anatomy classes. Interview with Herman Lantang, 10 
February 1982
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motor vehicles and looted the offices, seizing bundles of documents at random.170 The 
students also seized a powerful radio transmitter which they hoped to use to improve the 
quality of the Radio Ampera broadcasts.
The denouement came on the following day, 11 March. On that day KAPPI and 
Laskar students again clashed with GMNI students and their supporters in Jalan 
Salemba. Other students wrecked the office of the PNI-leaning newspaper Warta 
Peladjar. Others again disrupted traffic by deflating tyres of vehicles in the vicinity of the 
presidential palace where a cabinet meeting was planned.171 The militant Bandung group 
and their Jakarta allies, buoyed by the success of the previous day's raids, decided to 
increase the pressure by launching an attack on a cabinet minister's house. There had 
already been many occasions where delegations had invaded ministers' offices and 
several noisy demonstrations had assembled outside Subandrio's house in Jalan 
Diponegoro, but there had been no previous attempt to force entry into a cabinet 
minister's private residence.
The chosen house was that of Oei Tjoe Tat, a member of the small leftist Indonesia 
Party (Partindo) and since December 1963 a minister without portfolio in the cabinet. Oei 
Tjoe Tat, along with other Partindo politicians, had been strong supporters of President 
Sukarno and was alleged to be close to the PKI. A lawyer, he was a prominent member 
of Indonesia's Chinese community and had been deputy chairman of Baperki, the largest 
of all Sino-Indonesian organisations, led by the communist-aligned former cabinet 
minister, Siauw Giok Tjhan. Since Oei represented much that Soe Hok-gie thoroughly 
opposed about Guided Democracy politics, he had many grounds for supporting the 
choice of his house for an attack. The assault on Oei's house in the centre of Menteng 
took place late in the afternoon. Windows were shattered by rocks and a few of the
170 According to Fred Hehuwat, the students were obsessed with the idea that they might discover 
documents that would implicate key government personnel in politically compromising activities. Soe 
had been asked to find some students from the Faculty of Letters who could read Chinese so these 
documents could be checked.
171 Yozar Anwar 1980: 196
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students managed to break in, but most of the demonstrators were soon driven off when 
the minister's security guards opened fire with automatic weapons.172
Soeharto finally moves
Meanwhile major developments had taken place at the presidential palace. After 
many days of persistent chaos on the streets of Jakarta, Soeharto had finally ordered a 
complex operation against the president. At around 11 am Sukarno was informed that 
unidentified troops had taken up offensive positions outside the palace. He immediately 
decided to flee Jakarta. Accompanied by Chaerul Saleh and Subandrio, he hurriedly left 
the cabinet meeting that was in progress and flew by helicopter to his Bogor palace.173
There, later in the day, Sukarno received three emissaries from Soeharto: Jakarta 
army commander Amir Machmud, and Major Generals Mohamad Jusuf and Basuki 
Rachmat, who both held cabinet portfolios.174 This was a shrewd move by Soeharto 
designed to minimise any affront to Sukarno. As army officers who had good personal 
relations with the president, they were able to conduct themselves as intermediaries who 
had come to persuade him of the seriousness of the situation in Jakarta and the need to 
give his support for emergency measures to restore order. Thus they were able to 
negotiate the drafting of a letter signed by the president by which Soeharto was instructed 
'... to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm and stability of 
the government and the revolution'.175
Soe and his friends heard of this only late in the evening. They were then informed 
by their military contacts that the army wanted the students to participate in a massive
172 Interviews with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982; and Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982. 
Two of those who broke in were apprehended by the guards, one managed to escape when darkness fell, 
while another spent the night trapped on the roof. The incident is referred to in Jopie Lasut's article, 
'Sekali lagi Soe Hok Gie', Sinar Harapan, 7 January 1970.
173 For a full account of these events and the background to them, see Crouch 1978: 185-92.
174 Mohamad Jusuf was Minister for Basic Industry and Basuki Rachmat was Minister for Veteran 
Affairs.
175 The letter became known as Super Semar.
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victory parade the following day.176 Soeharto and the armed forces had finally taken the 
initiative. The students who had rallied behind the Tritura, inspired by a handful of 
radical and politically skilled leaders who were prepared to stand among them in periods 
of great physical danger, had played an important part in that process. The student 
movement had not forced Sukarno to concede, but their determination to stand firm in the 
face of serious threats had finally pushed the Indonesian polity to a point of crisis, where 
it was possible for Soeharto to intervene as the responsible army commander and the only 
person capable of resolving the political impasse.
Soe and his friends were by no means convinced that the concessions Sukarno 
made to the military in his 11 March Letter of Authority were the beginning of the end for 
the president. They expected him to continue to resist the pressures for reform of the 
kind they wanted. And they were not sure that Major General Soeharto would implement 
their demands over prices, cabinet reforms and the banning of the PKI. They were 
relieved at what had happened, but expected to be involved in many more battles in the 
days that lay ahead.
176 Interview with Marsillam Simanjuntak, 19 February 1982
193
Chapter 5
CLEANING OUT THE OLD ORDER
The extraordinary events of 11 March marked a critical turning point in Indonesian 
politics. Faced with an increasingly chaotic situation in Jakarta and threatened by the 
hardline anti-communists within the army, President Sukarno had fled to Bogor where, 
by the end of the day, he had been forced to grant Major General Soeharto special 
emergency powers. The political initiative now lay firmly with Soeharto and his 
supporters within the army, and the army commander quickly seized the opportunity to 
demonstrate his new power.
On the following day, 12 March, Soeharto used the Letter of Authority given to 
him by Sukarno to issue an order in the name of the president banning the PKI and its 
affiliated organisations. In fact, by March 1966, the communist party was already in total 
disarray throughout the country: its national headquarters had been ransacked and 
destroyed in October 1965, most of its top leadership had already been hunted down or 
were in hiding, and thousands of party cadres and hundreds of thousands of PKI 
members and supporters had been massacred during the course of the army-initiated anti- 
PKI crackdown that had taken place several months earlier.
Yet Soeharto's first action was an important political step, for the banning of the 
PKI had been one of the central demands of the Tritura student campaign and a demand 
that Sukarno had repeatedly refused to countenance. Such action was also important 
symbolically because it meant that the government itself was now putting an end to the 
idea of Nasakom, the central ideological theme of Guided Democracy under which 
communism had had a high level of legitimacy. In fact, the announcement of the banning 
order marked the beginning of the formal dismantling of the Guided Democracy edifice 
which had already been dubbed the Old Order (Orde Lama) by those clamouring for 
fundamental political change. Such action was to bring an immediate and predictable
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response from President Sukarno who was not prepared to stand by idly while the 
political system he had presided over since mid 1959 was steadily destroyed.
Yet in moving against the president, Soeharto and his inner circle within the army 
continued to act with extreme caution. Although the destruction of the PKI had removed 
Sukarno's most powerful political ally, the president remained a potentially formidable 
opponent still in a position to impede political reforms. In March 1966 Sukarno still had 
many loyal supporters within the government and the bureaucracy, in the political parties, 
and even inside certain sections of the armed forces, particularly the police, navy, 
airforce, and in both the Central Java and East Java regional army commands. While 
many military officers supported the ban on the PKI, they still remained personally loyal 
to Sukarno. Furthermore, the president remained a revered and popular figure with 
ordinary Indonesians in many parts of the country.
Consequently, the banning of the PKI on 12 March was merely the beginning of a 
gradual and cautious series of moves designed to transform the political system and to 
whittle away the president's own personal authority by curbing his powers and 
undermining the strength of his supporters throughout the country.1
The students who had participated in the demonstrations on the streets of Jakarta 
during the previous two months were eager to continue to play an active part in this 
process of political reform. After the deadening restrictions and political conformity of 
the Guided Democracy years, the exhilaration experienced by large numbers of students, 
in particular the thousands of young high school students who had joined the 
demonstrations during late February and early March, had helped to create a mood of 
high expectation and a movement with a sense of a momentum that was difficult to 
contain. The most militant and politically conscious students were convinced that they 
had played a pivotal role throughout the January to March period. Many of them had 
risked their lives to stand up to Sukarno, thereby creating the conditions where seemingly
1 For a full account of this process, see Crouch 1978: 197-220.
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hesitant and reluctant senior military officers were finally able to force Sukarno to make 
significant concessions. Many students believed that their actions entitled them to claim a 
continuing role in national affairs and some began to speak of a student-ABRI 
partnership.
As far as Soe Hok-gie himself was concerned, the events of 11 and 12 March were 
grounds for cautious optimism. As one who had long been committed to the overthrow 
of Sukarno and the system of government he had created, Soe believed that not only was 
the demise of Guided Democracy imminent but that there was some chance that Indonesia 
might return to a free, open and more democratic system of government. Yet he knew 
that Sukarno and his supporters would not relinquish power without a fight. To that end, 
he was determined to do whatever he could to help undermine further the position of the 
president and his allies, and to encourage the Soeharto-led military to adopt tough, 
uncompromising measures against Sukarno and his key supporters, and to implement 
immediate structural reforms.
Radio Ampera on the offensive
When news of Sukarno's flight to Bogor and his surrender of the Letter of 
Authority to Soeharto became known in Jakarta late on the evening of 11 March, a 
combined student-army 'show of force' was quickly organised for the following day. 
Trucks, tanks and military vehicles carried thousands of excited students through the 
streets of the capital in an impressive 'victory parade'. In the days that followed, the 
leadership of KAMI, KAPPI and the Laskar Arief Rachman Hakim organised further 
rallies and demonstrations in support of Soeharto, endorsing the PKI ban and urging 
further immediate action against particular cabinet ministers.
It is not clear what role, if any, Soe Hok-gie played in these events. As a campus- 
based student leader, Soe had never been very close to the KAMI activists. Athough he 
had collaborated with a few individuals from this group, he had preferred to work
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independently with his own small student circle at Rawamangun and with the militant 
group of students who had gathered at Senayan throughout the previous two months.
According to one account, Soe heard rumours several days after 11 March that the 
pro-Sukarno Siliwangi divisional commander, Major General Ibrahim Adjie, would 
attempt to undermine Soeharto's newly-won authority.2 Soe and his friend Jopie Lasut 
made an urgent trip to Bandung, where they consulted the Army Staff and Command 
College (Seskoad) deputy commander, Brigadier General Suwarto, who was already 
well known to them through their Senayan circle, and the staunchly anti-Sukamoist 
Major General Hartono Rekso Dharsono, who had only recently returned to the Siliwangi 
division as its chief of staff. Both officers assured them that Adjie would not interfere 
with the course of political events underway in Jakarta.
Although Soe has left no diary account of his activities during this period of his 
life, it is almost certain that he was soon back in Jakarta.3 From early in March until 
about the middle of May, much of his time and energy was directed towards working 
with the small group of student activists who were operating the illegal radio transmitter 
that had been broadcasting since late February as Radio Ampera.
Fearing an assault on the Salemba campus after the closure of the university had 
been announced on 3 March, the students had decided to move their equipment away 
from the Medical Faculty building. By mid March it had been relocated to the relative 
safety of a private house in nearby Menteng. The house, in Jalan Haji Agus Salim, was 
owned by a prominent lawyer, Mashuri, who happened to be both a next-door neighbour 
and a close civilian advisor to Major General Soeharto.4
2 See Jopie Lasut's article 'Sekali lagi Soe Hok Gie' (Once again Soe Hok Gie), Sinar Harapan, 8 
January 1970. Two months later, as part of a series of moves designed to undermine President Sukarno's 
support within senior military circles, Soeharto instructed Adjie to undergo a special upgrading course at 
Seskoad, and appointed Dharsono to replace him as Siliwangi commander.
3 Soe’s habit of making occasional diary entries, abandoned during the turmoil of February 1966, was 
not resumed until the beginning of 1968.
4 During the anxious and uncertain days before 11 March, Soe had been one of a small group of 
students, eager for news and information, who had sought out Mashuri. Soe had made an immediate 
impression and the relocation of the radio transmitter had resulted. Like Soeharto, Mashuri and his friend
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With the scaling down of demonstrations after 11 March, the students involved 
with Radio Ampera were able to give more attention to its operation. In the beginning, 
they had made do with makeshift equipment and a small transmitter that was incapable of 
spreading their irregular broadcasts over any great distance. By mid March, however, a 
more powerful transmitter had been located and their regular evening broadcasts were 
able to reach a much wider audience throughout Jakarta.* 5
The Radio Ampera project involved only a small number of students. The technical 
equipment was installed and maintained by students from ITB, while the preparation and 
writing of the scripts for its broadcasts were mostly the work of Soe Hok-gie and his 
brother Hok-djin. In this respect, the work on Radio Ampera had an important private 
dimension for both brothers for, after years of avoiding each other's presence and 
refusing to speak to each other, Hok-gie and Hok-djin suddenly began to communicate 
with one another, working together harmoniously and effectively.6 It was as if the 
political upheaval that had overwhelmed Indonesia throughout the previous twelve 
months had also been the means of transforming their own personal relationship, pushing 
aside the bittemess and antagonisms of their immature teenage years. Although those 
years of simmering sibling rivalry and studied silence still cast something of a shadow 
and a certain reserve was maintained in their personal dealings with each other, a new 
maturity prevailed as both young men, now well into their twenties and fortified by their
Umar Kayam, who was also present during the discussions with the student activists, had strong Central 
Java connections. Both were graduates of Gajah Mada University, Mashuri in law and Kayam in 
education, and were influential with an important group of UGM graduates. When the cabinet and senior
levels of the bureaucracy were reshuffled later in March, Mashuri was appointed Director General of 
Higher Education and Umar Kayam, Director General of Radio, TV and Film. By then the Radio Ampera
group had been forced to move again, initially to a military base at Tebet and finally to the RPKAD
headquarters at Cijantung. Interviews with Umar Kayam, 8 October 1991; Arief Budiman, 8 March 
1982; and Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982
5 Throughout March and April, news of Radio Ampera spread rapidly by word of mouth. See also the 
articles publicising the station in Kompas on 7, 14 and 15 April 1966. These were almost certainly the 
work of Soe Hok-gie.
6 Interview with Arief Budiman, 8 March 1982. Towards the end of 1965, Soe Hok-djin had fallen 
seriously ill with tuberculosis and was unable to take an active part in the street marches and 
demonstrations. Behind the scenes, he had worked with a group of writers and artists preparing placards 
and posters that were used by the demonstrators.
shared moral and political outlook, set about working for the downfall of Sukarno and 
his supporters.
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The student activists involved with Radio Ampera believed that it was imperative to 
counteract the stranglehold Sukarno and his supporters continued to hold over the mass 
media in Indonesia. In mid March the government radio station, Radio Republik 
Indonesia (RRI), was still firmly under the control of the president's appointees, while 
none of the nation's newspaper editors - whatever their private opinions may have been - 
yet dared to challenge or criticise directly the president's words or actions. In these 
circumstances, Soe and his group contrived during the post 11 March period to provide 
the kind of forthright, hard-hitting commentary on the issues of the day of which the 
citizens of Jakarta had been starved:
Radio Ampera believes that during the era of the hundred ministers' regime, the 
Indonesian people have been systematically indoctrinated to the point where their 
critical capacity (with few exceptions) is absolutely minimal. They react like robots, 
like 'Pavlov's dog'. If the leadership clique shouts BPS, then publicly everyone is 
convinced that the CIA is behind it. If anyone dares to hold a different opinion from 
what has been outlined, publicly that person is accused of being against the revolution.
If anyone dares to suggest that what is important is Jatiluhur, not Conefo, then that 
person is branded a textbook thinker. It is precisely the duty of the mass media to 
expose that way of thinking. There is only one way, and that is to open the eyes of the 
people to the lies about what they had previously accepted as truth. From this starting 
point, Radio Ampera will always broadcast anything capable of demolishing the false 
myths that have been planted by the hundred ministers' regime.7
In the days immediately following 11 March and the announcement of the banning 
of the PKI throughout Indonesia, a tense struggle erupted as President Sukarno attempted 
to fend off Soeharto's demands for the reform of the Dwikora Cabinet.8 On 16 March 
Sukarno prepared a written statement claiming that under the 1945 Constitution he was 
responsible only to the MPRS which had appointed him president-for-life, and that he 
alone had the authority to decide who would hold cabinet posts. That evening Sukarno's
7 Radio Ampera Menggugat (Radio Ampera Accuses), Vol.I, 1966a: 3. In April and again in May 1966 
the Radio Ampera group gathered together a collection of their scripts in pamphlet form for general 
distribution. The pamphlet's title is a play on the title of Sukarno's famous defence speech 'Indonesia 
Menggugat', delivered in 1930 when on trial by the colonial government. This quotation is from the 
introduction to the first volume of Radio Ampera's scripts.
On the BPS (The Body to Support Sukarnoism) affair, see Chapter 2 p.73. Jatiluhur was a major hydro­
electricity construction project situated between Jakarta and Bandung. Conefo was the Indonesian 
acronym for the planned conference of the New Emerging Forces.
8 See Crouch 1978: 192-6.
Statement was read on state radio and television by Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh, 
followed by a detailed explanation delivered by Roeslan Abdulgani, Coordinating 
Minister for Public Relations.
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In several broadcasts later that evening and the next, Radio Ampera launched a 
bitter assault on both Sukarno and his ministerial messengers. Radio Ampera pointed out 
to its listeners that while it was correct that according to the 1945 Constitution the 
president was answerable only to the MPR, that body was intended to be chosen by the
Indonesian people in free and fair elections:
The present MPRS was created and formed by Bung Karno himself. Its members have 
been selected according to whim. So obviously it is only natural that those chosen are 
individuals favoured by Bung Karno. In this case the Indonesian people are totally 
excluded. Those who call themselves the representatives of the people are the faithful 
slaves of their master. What their master says they follow. So we should not be 
surprised if the MPRS issues decrees that make no sense. For example appointing 
President Sukarno as president-for-life. Only the insane and little children want to 
continue to be led by the elderly, the infirm or the feebleminded. In a democratic 
society a chairman, a leader or an administrator is chosen according to ability. If there 
is clearly someone who is more able than they are then obviously they will be replaced. 
Appointing someone just according to whim as leader for life is a crazy act. If 
President Sukarno because of his age becomes senile will we still want to be ruled by 
such a person? So it is apparent that the MPRS decisions are invalid because the 
MPRS does not represent the Indonesian people. They are all paid appointees who do 
not represent the people...
In his announcement the president declared that he has the right to be free to select his 
own assistants. If this principle is applied, it is apparent that the people are absolutely 
excluded from participating. The president of the Republic of Indonesia is not its 
owner. He must listen to the voice of the people because he has received his authority 
from them. So he is responsible to the people, not to appointed clowns who sit in 
what is called the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. The announcement 
also declares that in addition to the MPRS he is also accountable to Almighty God.
That statement is correct. As an individual he is of course accountable to God but as an 
official he is accountable to his superiors. And the superiors of the president are the 
Indonesian people. Is a robber able to say just as he pleases that he is only accountable 
to God and not to society
As for the two cabinet ministers who had appeared as the public defenders of the 
president, Radio Ampera was remorseless in its attack. Chaerul Saleh was depicted as a 
minister who had misused his position to amass a huge personal fortune. Reading from 
what was purported to be a statement from a Swiss bank account, details of a vast sum of
9 'Maklumat Presiden, MPRS dan tuntutan rakjat' (The presidential announcement, the MPRS and the 
people's demands), broadcast 15 March 1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 9-10
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US dollars were divulged to Radio Ampera's listeners.10 The attack on Roeslan
Abdulgani was even more devastating:
Hey, how hilarious is this Plampitan clown!
Listen, in his own party - either in the Osa-Usep or the ASU faction - this clown is no 
longer used. Because neither has any use for the opportunist attitude that he has 
practised for years to secure his own position.
And do you know what nickname Bung Karno has given to him? Heer Bommel! Do 
you know who this Heer Bommel is? Heer Bommel is a character created by Marten 
Toonden, a well-known Dutch cartoonist. This Heer Bommel is a pot-bellied bear who 
loves to put on airs pretending to know everything, pretending to be serious, but in 
reality he never knows anything and is never able to do anything, so that he ends up as 
the object of everyone's ridicule. How apt is Bung Karno's name for this cak Roeslan! 
Pot-bellied, pseudo serious, pseudo important, pseudo knowledgeable, pseudo scholarly, 
pseudo philosophical, pseudo 'clean', in short, listeners, pseudo everything!
Listen, student friends!
If we are talking about the matter of Roeslan Abdulgani's 'cleanness' and integrity, we 
should first recall the Lie Hok Thay scandal. During that era, when corruption was still 
carried out in secret and with a bit of decorum, and thus not yet out in the open and 
frenetic as it became in the Dwikora cabinet period, Roeslan Abdulgani, in his position 
as Foreign Minister, was dragged before a judge because of corruption and a foreign 
exchange conspiracy. His defence - declaring that he was 'already wealthy' - was so 
laughable that it still sends people into stitches. So listeners, if we are to sum up 
Roeslan Abdulgani as a leader it's roughly like this: a person who blows with the 
wind, an unprincipled and corrupt opportunist, and one who wishes to be the supreme 
ruler's court slave; but who wants to conceal all these unfortunate ingredients with a 
scholarly, philosophical, majestic and exalted demeanour.
But cak Roes, do you really think you can continue to deceive the people with your talk 
and your country-bumpkin political indoctrination? No way, cakl The people have 
been starving for too long! No more leaders talking nonsense and - it's crazy! Our 
revolutionary patience has been tested in recent days. Come on, let's remove the masks 
of these bogus leaders and get rid of them!* 11
Despite President Sukarno's desperate attempts to prevent a cabinet restructuring, 
the pressure for action was too great to withstand for long.12 Soeharto and his army 
advisors had drawn up a list of those ministers they wished to arrest and on 18 March
10 'Dengarlah kekajaan pemimpinan kita' (Listen to our leaders' wealth), Radio Ampera 1966a: 14. 
When Chaerul died while in custody in February of the following year, Soe wrote a detailed obituary 
outlining his achievements, but passing harsh judgement on his political opportunism. See 
'Kebangkitan & kedjatuhannja, In memorium Chaerul Saleh’ (Rise and fall, In memorium Chaerul 
Saleh), Sinar Harapan, 9 February 1967.
11 ’Badut Plampitan' (The Plampitan clown), Radio Ampera 1966a: 11. Plampitan was Roeslan 
Abdulgani's birthplace in Surabaya. Osa-Usep and ASU were rival right and left wing factions struggling 
for control of the PNI in early 1966, the party of which he was a member. Cak is a Javanese form of 
address for an older male, but it is also a common Surabaya term for low-class people such as trishaw 
drivers, roughly equivalent to 'mate' or 'buddy'. The Lie Hok Thay affair first erupted in August 1956 and 
received extensive coverage in the Jakarta press, especially in Indonesia Raya. Roeslan Abdulgani was 
finally convicted on relatively minor charges in April 1957. See Feith 1962: 503-4 and 509-10.
Some of the heavy sarcasm of the Radio Ampera piece is lost in translation, especially the repetition of 
the evocative Indonesian term sok (putting on airs, pretending), rendered here as 'pseudo'.
12 KAPPI and Laskar AR Hakim activists 'arrested' several ministers on 16 March.
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thirteen were taken into custody by RPKAD troops in Jakarta and Bogor, including 
Deputy Prime Ministers, Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh, and Minister for Central Bank 
Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalam .13 A new six-person interim cabinet presidium was 
announced consisting of Soeharto, Idham Chalid of the NU, Adam Malik, the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta, Leimena and Roeslan Abdulgani, although the real decision-making 
authority lay with Soeharto, Malik and the Sultan.
During the weeks that followed, Soeharto moved cautiously. Above all he was 
concerned to give the impression of legitimacy and of not acting with undue haste against 
the president and his supporters. Consequently, when a restructuring of the cabinet was 
announced by Sukarno on 27 March, there were relatively few changes apart from those 
ministers who had been arrested or had fled. Nevertheless, quietly and behind the 
scenes, steps were soon under way to begin the difficult task of rehabilitating the ailing 
Indonesian economy and reversing Sukarno's adventurist foreign policy by ending the 
konfrontasi campaign. At the same time, Soeharto quickly moved to shore up his 
support politically both inside and outside the military. Purges were instigated in those 
sections of the armed forces where support for the president was strongest - in particular, 
the air force, the navy and the police. A similar process was set in train within all levels 
of the government bureaucracy under the supervision of the political affairs section of the 
army.
Since many of these reforms and policy reversals were to take some time to have an 
effect, it was the announcement of the new cabinet that made the most immediate 
impression. For the militant anti-Sukarno students, the retention of so many individuals 
who were regarded either as opportunists or as sychophantic supporters of the president 
was a profound disappointment. Several ministers in particular had been personally 
responsible for political decisions for which they were held in complete contempt. Radio
13 For a full list of those arrested, see Crouch 1978: 195.
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Ampera forcefully expressed many of these concerns in several bluntly-worded 
broadcasts as soon as the new cabinet was announced.14
Why, Radio Ampera asked, had so many who had proved themselves to the 
Indonesian people as unworthy been reappointed? Some ministers, like Dr Soeharto 
(National Development Planning Affairs) and Pandelaki (Budgets) were well-known for 
their personal corruption; Sumarno (Finance) and J.B. Massie (Assistant to the Sultan) 
had both been the principal architects of the massive price rises that had aroused so much 
bitterness in late 1965; David Cheng (Housing, Planning and Urban Development), was 
described as a 'Kuomintang capitalist from Hong Kong' who, it was alleged, could not 
even speak Indonesian! Yet Radio Ampera's harshest criticisms were directed at Leimena 
and Roeslan Abdulgani, the former retained as a Deputy Prime Minister and the latter - to 
the consternation of Soe and his fellow students - elevated to that position. Leimena was 
denounced as the minister who had been responsible for closing the University of 
Indonesia at the height of the Tritura campaign in early March and for his role in brow­
beating party leaders into signing a statement on 10 March condemning the student 
demonstrations as the work of Nekolim and the CIA. The various personal and public 
failings of Roeslan Abdulgani were once more detailed, with the minister branded with 
the derogatory label, Jubir Usman.15
Just taking this pair, it's difficult for us to have any confidence in the present cabinet.
Can honest leaders of the people such as Sri Sultan, Adam Malik and Pak Harto work 
with people like this? Can such a cabinet become united? Without trust in the 
leadership, the people could lose their enthusiasm for reform.1^
Soe Hok-gie and his circle believed that these ministers should be replaced with 
people who had a genuine commitment to the pursuit of a complete overhaul of 
government policy. Such a point of view not only required fresh faces in the cabinet, it 
also struck at the very heart of Guided Democracy and its chief architect, the president
14 'Menilai kabinet jang baru' (Assessing the new cabinet), broadcast 29 and 30 March 1966, Radio 
Ampera 1966a: 13-14
15 Jubir Usman, a plausible Indonesian name, was in fact an acronym for juru bicara USDEK Manipol 
(spokesperson for Manipol USDEK)
16 'Menilai kabinet jang baru' (Assessing the new cabinet), broadcast 30 March 1966, Radio Ampera 
1966a: 14
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himself. Hence Radio Ampera, while continuing to call for further cabinet reform, began
directly to attack Sukarno's ideological formulations and his political slogans:
That's our type of Great Leader of the Revolution. So clever at juggling words, while 
the people grow hungrier and a great monument tipped with gold soars high. When 
this was criticised he declared 'Monuments are trousers’. The contents of a poster 
scrawled on the wall of a building in Bandung was thoroughly apt: 'Basically already 
senile, a monument is said to be trousers'. Yes, listeners, do we still want to be led by 
someone already senile, who [refuses] to ban the PKI and praises them after their murder 
of the generals who were trying to defend Pancasila? Do we still want to retain a leader 
who refuses to answer to the people, but only to the MPRS (who, nota bene, are 
people he himself appointed) and to God, while he himself continues to flirt with the 
communists? And one more question: do we still want to support him without 
qualification?
Listeners, we are sick of empty slogans. We are heartily sick of them. We don't want 
lofty speeches thoroughly devoid of content. We want modest leaders, who look at the 
real facts and who then work hard to correct existing shortcomings.
Listeners, our struggle now is a struggle to uphold the critical capacity of the 
Indonesian people, because only with a critical capacity can we see problems as they 
really are, and so be able precisely to overcome our difficulties. This is the road that 
leads to prosperity for the Indonesian people. We will no longer say that Indonesia is a 
wealthy nation because a few ordinary people can be seen buying gladioli for Lebaran at 
the Roxy market. We will no longer say that the Indonesian nation is prosperous 
because people don't roast stones. But we will look at the actual situation and work to 
overcome actual difficulties.
Listeners, our real enemies are the lies within the slogans. Subandrio, Ali 
[Sastroamidjojo] and Chaerul Saleh were only the instruments, they became the 
trumpets of these lies, and because of that we must eliminate them. But our prime 
enemies are all those people who spread these slogans, and who want to eliminate our 
critical capacity. Our enemies are people who proclaim themselves infallible in word 
and deed; our enemies are people who do not want to be criticised.17
From the end of March until well into May, Radio Ampera continued to unleash a 
steady barrage of invective against Sukarno, his political allies and his policies during its 
regular evening broadcasts. The president himself was repeatedly condemned for his 
dictatorial tendencies: his penchant for collecting grandiose titles, his flouting of the 
provisions of the 1945 Constitution with his acquisition of the president-for-life status, 
his stacking of the MPRS with his own sycophantic supporters, and his suppression of 
any domestic political opposition by the use of arbitrary arrests and detention without 
trial.18
17 'Bangkitlah daja kritik melawan slogan-slogan' (Raising the critical capacity to oppose slogans), 
broadcast 24 March 1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 15-16. The design and construction of the National 
Monument in central Jakarta had been a project which President Sukarno had personally initiated and 
supervised. See McIntyre 1993: 182-90.
18 One broadcast aired on 23 April drew a comparison between Sukarno and Ghana's former president,
Nkrumah, who had been overthrown by a military coup in February 1966: 'Setiap diktator akan
diganjang rakjat' (Every dictator will be crushed by the people), Radio Ampera 1966b: 10.
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In early April reports of the grave condition and then the death of the PSI leader, 
Sutan Sjahrir, in Switzerland prompted several bitter attacks on the tactics Sukarno had 
employed to silence his critics, and a call for the release of others who had been 
imprisoned without trial. 19 Also under attack was the profligate personal lifestyle of the 
president, his excessive number of wives and the steady stream of mistresses, and the 
instances of high-level corruption associated with the palace circle, allegedly involving 
deferred payment schemes and smuggling rackets coordinated by the wives of senior 
palace officials and their followers.20
In addition, Radio Ampera called for decisive action to be taken both against those 
senior government officials who had misused their positions to enrich themselves, and 
against those entrepreneurs and businessmen who had advanced their business empires 
by ingratiating themselves with Sukarno and his circle through a deliberate policy of 
bribes and flattery.21 Ibnu Sutowo, the minister who controlled Indonesia's oil and 
natural gas operations, was singled out on several occasions as a prime example of the 
corrupt official.22 Among the most prominent of the Old Order business figures 
condemned for their cultivation of palace patronage was Tengku Markam, the director of 
P.T. Markam, one of the largest trading corporations in Indonesia.
While it continued to attack the president, Radio Ampera also called on both the 
Indonesian press and the nation's political parties to cast off the blinkered outlook 
imposed by the Guided Democracy era that had required them to display total loyalty to
19 'Nasib seorang pedjuang kemerdekaan' (The fate of an independence fighter), broadcast 6 April 1966, 
Radio Ampera 1966a: 18-19; 'Peladjaran daripada peristiwa Sjahrir' (Lessons from the Sjahrir affair), 
broadcast 14 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966b: 4
20 'Revolusi Perantjis dan Tanah Air Kita sekarang' (The French Revolution and our fatherland at the 
present), broadcast 2 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 6
21 See 'Operasi Budhi' (The Budhi Operation), broadcast 7 and 8 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 10; 
and 'Kaum vested interest harus di singkirkan' (Vested interests must be eliminated), broadcast 25 April 
1966, Radio Ampera 1966b: 17. Radio Ampera called for the reintroduction of 'Operasi Budhi', a plan 
originally proposed some years earlier by General Nasution to examine the wealth and business interests 
of all senior government officials including cabinet ministers.
22 See, for example, Radio Ampera 1966b: 16. Shortly after Ibnu Sutowo was attacked in several 
broadcasts, the Radio Ampera students were raided by troops from the Jakarta garrison. Subsequently the 
radio transmitter was relocated to the RPKAD headquarters at Cijantung where it was well protected. 
Interview with Fred Hehuwat, 2 February 1982
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those in authority and the president in particular. The Old Order political slogan 
mendukung tanpa reserve was repeatedly condemned as totally inappropriate for the 
changing political and social conditions.23 Journalists were challenged to show courage 
by returning to their roles as 'instruments of control', and exposing corruption wherever 
it occurred.24 Political party members, especially those who sat in the MPRS which 
would soon be meeting in special session to hear the president report on the events of the 
previous October, were called upon to become once more 'guardians of democracy'.25
It is not clear how long Radio Ampera broadcasts continued after the middle of 
May. By June 1966 the group's original criticism of the Indonesian mass media for its 
cowardice and timidity and its domination by the supporters of the president no longer 
carried as much force as it had in the early months of the year.26 By mid 1966, a new 
critical spirit was steadily beginning to emerge within the Jakarta press as independent- 
minded editors and journalists sensed that Sukarno's grip on power was rapidly eroding 
and that other sources of protection were now available if they found themselves in 
trouble.
As far as the most militant anti-Sukarno activists were concerned, the appearance in 
June of two newspapers controlled and operated by students, the Jakarta daily Harian 
KAMI and the Bandung weekly Mahasiswa Indonesia, was a positive development.27 
During the month that followed, both newspapers quickly established a reputation for 
their hard-hitting attack upon all aspects of the Old Order and its leadership. In contrast 
to the oblique and cautious style most other newspapers continued to adopt in dealing
2“ Mendukung tanpa reserve may be literally translated as 'support without qualification’ but in practice 
meant something like 'unquestioning obedience'. See 'Djaman mendukung tanpa reserve telah selesai' 
(The era of unqualified support has ended), broadcast 8 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 17-18.
24 'Fungsi pers Indonesia dimasa depan' (The function of the Indonesian press in the future), broadcast 16 
April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966b: 7-8; 'Jang kita tjari adalah orang2 jang berani' (What we are looking 
for are people with courage), broadcast 25 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966b: 16
25 'Parpol2 bangkitlah!' (Political parties wake up!), broadcast 8 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 20- 
1; 'Harapan rakjat' (The people's hope), stencilled pamphlet, 28 April 1966
26 For an overview of the Jakarta press during this period, see Paget 1967a and 1967b.
27 The first weekly edition of Mahasiswa Indonesia appeared on 19 June. Harian KAMI published an 
introductory edition at the end of the month and began as a daily on 2 July.
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with the president, the editorials and feature articles of both these papers were marked by 
a bluntness and directness that quickly attracted readers from Indonesia's political and 
educated elite.
Harian KAMI was established under the editorship of Nono Anwar Makarim, an 
ambitious and enterprising University of Indonesia law student who had operated on the 
fringes of student and intellectual activist circles in the early 1960s. During that period 
Makarim had been one of the founders of a hitherto inconsequential body, the Indonesian 
Student Press League (Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, IPMI). Although he seems to 
have played no direct part in the student demonstrations in early 1966, by June he had 
used his IPMI position to establish Harian KAMI,28 Despite the names of several KAMI 
Pusat activists appearing on its masthead as members of its editorial board, the 
newspaper had no formal connection with that body. Yet the appropriation of the KAMI 
label was a clever device, for Harian KAMI was soon accepted as the Jakarta daily 
representing the interests and opinions of the student movement that had challenged the 
government in the first three months of the year. Makarim quickly gathered around him a 
group of committed student activists as writers, reporters and journalists, including Soe 
Hok-gie's old friend from Gemsos and the Faculty of Letters, Zainal Zakse. Makarim 
applied his own literary talent to the newspaper's sharply worded editorials which made 
effective use of biting sarcasm. In addition to frequent articles by various student 
activists from the KAMI Pusat circle, the paper published occasional feature articles and 
columns by a number of prominent intellectuals known for their implacable opposition to 
the PKI and Sukarno, including Rosihan Anwar, Mochtar Lubis and Emil Salim. 
Although Soe Hok-gie himself wrote an occasional piece for Harian KAMI, he was a 
much more frequent contributor to Mahasiwa Indonesia.
28 Harian KAMI'S general manager (pemimpin umum) was Anis Ibrahim, a close associate of Makarim 
and a co-founder of IPMI. Anis Ibrahim was also well known to Soe Hok-gie as one of the most active 
pribumi supporters of the assimilationist movement. In addition to editing the LB KB's monthly journal, 
Bara Eka, for a short period, Ibrahim had played a prominent role in negotiating the deferred payment 
facility which had led Soe Hok-gie to withdraw from the LPKB in early 1966.
207
Bandung student activists had been among the most militant and determined 
opponents of the Sukarno regime during the January to March period and had played a 
critical role in the demonstrations after their arrival in Jakarta. The weekly Mahasiswa 
Indonesia, established by a group of student activists under the leadership of Rachman 
Tolleng, quickly achieved a national reputation for its uncompromising critique of all 
aspects of the politics of the Old Order.29 The newspaper made an immediate and 
striking impression through the high quality of its layout, printing and artwork, which 
put it well in advance of all other Indonesian newspapers at that time. It was, however, 
the aggressive posture of its lead articles, the tough-minded and penetrating quality of its 
editorials and the biting humour of its cartoons that placed the Bandung weekly at the 
forefront of the burgeoning critique of the president and the political system he had 
established. Soe Hok-gie, who for some time had known Rachman Tolleng as a 
committed opponent of Sukarno and Guided Democracy politics, immediately lent his 
name to the newspaper's masthead as an editorial assistant.
A defiant president
Despite the dramatically changed political circumstances prevailing in Indonesia 
after 11 March, President Sukarno showed no sign that he was prepared to make any 
further concessions to his opponents or to accept any significant diminution of his 
presidential power and authority. On the contrary, in his speeches and public 
appearances throughout the months that followed, Sukarno gave every indication that he 
was intent on resuming his position at the apex of government and reasserting those 
ideological symbols and political slogans that had been the hall-mark of the Guided 
Democracy era.
29 For a detailed study of the Mahasiswa Indonesia circle and an examination of its foundation, its ideas 
and its development throughout the course of the New Order, see Raillon 1984 and 1985. There were 
also Jakarta (edisi Pusat) and Yogyakarta (edisi Jateng) 'editions’ of Mahasiswa Indonesia. Though all 
three publications shared the same masthead and operated under the same publication permit, they were in 
reality quite separate operations. In Bandung, Mahasiswa Indonesia had the backing of the Siliwangi 
division’s commander, Major General Dharsono. The Jakarta publication, edited by Louis Taolin, 
appeared infrequently and never achieved the quality or reputation of the Bandung paper.
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Such a prospect posed a serious threat to the political ambitions of Soeharto and his 
circle within the army. In the short term it also put at risk the delicate and largely secret 
negotiations with Malaysia that had begun in April under Adam Malik's direction.30 
Healing the rift between the two countries by putting an end to konfrontasi was 
considered to be essential if Indonesia was to secure the large sums of Western aid 
money required to restore the fortunes of the ailing Indonesian economy and rebuild the 
country's basic infrastructure.
Fearing that Sukarno might revoke the emergency powers that had been used to 
legitimize the political reforms and restructuring that were already well underway, 
Soeharto and his supporters made arrangements for the MPRS to be called into special 
session to gain constitutional sanction for their actions. The two student newspapers, 
Harian KAMI and the Bandung edition of Mahasiswa Indonesia, both made their initial 
appearance on the newstands around the time of the MPRS session. Both papers quickly 
became the vehicles for opinions and points of view hostile to the president.
When the MPRS finally assembled in Jakarta on 20 June, its membership had been 
changed in a number of important respects. Not only was it now purged of its PKI 
members, but there were some significant changes both within the armed forces faction 
and in the composition of those members who represented the PNI.31 Consequently, 
with many of the staunchest supporters of the president no longer present, there was a 
new critical element in the assembly, now under the chairmanship of General Nasution 
who had not been returned to the cabinet when it was reshuffled during March.32 The 11 
March Letter of Authority was immediately reinforced by its adoption as a decree of the 
MPRS. President Sukarno, invited to address the session in his capacity as mandatory of 
the MPRS, was listened to politely during his speech entitled 'Nawaksara', which he
30 On the ending of konfrontasi, see Mackie 1974: 318-22; and Weinstein 1969.
31 For details of these changes, see Crouch 1975: 387-8. At a special PNI party congress, held in 
Bandung in late April under the tight supervision of the Siliwangi chief of staff, Dharsono, the right 
wing Osa-Usep faction had swept to power at the expense of the ASU faction. See McIntyre 1972.
32 On Nasution's sidelining see Crouch 1978: 231-2.
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delivered on 22 June. During the subsequent debates, however, the perceived 
shortcomings of his report were subjected to mounting criticism. In particular, Sukarno 
was openly attacked for his failure to address adequately the disastrous economic 
situation into which the country had degenerated, and his complete omission of any 
reference to the events of the attempted coup of the previous October.
Consequently, the MPRS passed a number of decrees aimed at reasserting its 
constitutional authority and curtailing many of the specific powers and much of the 
arbitrary authority that the president had managed to accumulate throughout the Guided 
Democracy era. Sukarno's president-for-life status was revoked, his responsibility under 
the constitution to give a thorough account of his term of office was reiterated, and he 
was called on to address the shortcomings that had been identified in his recent report. In 
addition, the MPRS called for the formation of a new cabinet, identified as the 'Ampera' 
cabinet, in which Soeharto was accorded a key decision-making role as to its ultimate 
composition.33
Yet in spite of these evident setbacks and the accompanying blow to his prestige, 
Sukarno maintained a defiant attitude, refusing to countenance the possibility of holding 
on to the presidency with reduced powers. To the chagrin of those who hoped for such 
an outcome as a compromise solution, Sukarno continued to do what he could to obstruct 
the reform process that the MPRS had sanctioned. During July he made plain his 
opposition to Soeharto's proposed new cabinet by delaying his approval for as long as 
possible.34 At the subsequent installation ceremony on 28 July, Sukarno delivered an 
especially aggressive speech, including remarks intended to disrupt the peace negotiations 
with Malaysia that had already reached a decisive stage. Despite the president's 
opposition, a settlement of the long-running dispute with Malaysia was finalised early in
33 For a fuller account of the MPRS session and its outcome, see Crouch 1975: 387-94.
34 The new 'Ampera' cabinet did not include either Leimena or Roeslan Abdulgani. See Crouch 1975:
407-8.
August. Soon after, on 11 August, Malaysia's Foreign Minister Tun Razak paid an 
official visit to Jakarta.
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As far as the wider Indonesian public was concerned, the president's position 
became abundantly clear on 17 August during his Independence Day speech, entitled 
'Never Leave History'. The speech was a direct challenge to his enemies and an implicit 
appeal to his supporters to rally behind him. Not only was the president's reference to 
the attempted coup once again cursory and ambiguous, but he managed to lay the blame 
for the country's serious economic difficulties on the very high level of expenditure by 
the armed forces. All the familiar ideological constructs were reasserted, including those 
political slogans like Nasakom, Manipol-USDEK, the New Emerging Forces and 
Berdikari that to all practical purpose had already been rendered inoperable by the 
destruction of the PKI and recent political reforms.35 Yet Sukarno, believing implicitly 
that as Great Leader of the Revolution he still commanded the loyal support of the 
majority of the Indonesian people, challenged his opponents to hold an election to test 
their own political support.
The Independence Day speech, broadcast on radio throughout the country, was a 
critical turning point in the process of transition that had begun on 11 March. Sukarno's 
blatant defiance was undoubtedly deeply disturbing to those who believed that he would 
recognise the changed political circumstances and accept a figurehead role, for it was now 
clear that Soeharto would have to find a way to remove him in order to pursue those 
political and economic reforms that the incumbent president continued to regard with 
disdain. As for those who were implacably opposed to the president and his policies, 
especially those in student circles, the speech was considered to be an outright 
provocation, hardening their resolve to campaign for his removal from office as swiftly 
as possible. It immediately precipitated a new outburst of student activity, with the
35 Exploiting the Indonesian-language title (’Jangan sekali-kali meninggalkan sejarah'), the student press 
quickly coined the clever acronym Jas Merah ('The Red Jacket') for the president's address. See the 
editorial in Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 10, 21 August 1966.
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KAMI action front in both Jakarta and Bandung releasing statements rejecting the 
contents of the speech, and students once more taking to the streets. However, in sharp 
contrast to the demonstrations of January to March, this time Sukarno himself was the 
specific target of their protests.
Militant anti-Sukamo students were especially active in Bandung. Two days after 
the Independence Day speech, on 19 August, anti-Sukarno activists clashed with 
supporters of the president on the campus of the Catholic Parahyangan University, 
resulting in the death of one KAMI activist and the wounding of several others. 
However the Bandung KAMI activists had the strong support of both the Siliwangi 
commander Dharsono and Kostrad chief of staff Kemal Idris.36 Mahasiswa Indonesia 
immediately embarked upon a virulent campaign against the president with a stream of 
hard-hitting editorials, hostile feature articles and bitingly sarcastic cartoons.
Throughout September, outspoken opposition to Sukarno gathered momentum, 
fuelled both by further defiant speeches from the president,37 and also by the sensational 
accounts of high level corruption and yet more immorality involving the palace circle 
revealed during the trial of the former Minister for Central Bank Affairs, Jusuf Muda 
Dalam.38 As the first anniversary of the attempted coup approached, the anti-Sukamo 
campaign became more and more intense. On 28 September students held an all-night 
vigil at the graves of the murdered generals followed by a march through Jakarta carrying 
anti-Sukarno placards. October 1 was a day of high political drama in the Indonesian 
capital. The military authorities, aiming for the maximum political impact, had chosen 
that day to open the Mahmillub trial proceedings against the former First Deputy Prime
36 Following the clash at Parahyangan University, Dharsono moved swiftly to purge pro-Sukarnoists 
within the Bandung military command who were implicated in the incident. Kemal Idris visited Bandung 
shortly after, to give his support to the militant anti-Sukarnoists and their demands for reforms.
37 On 6 September Sukarno proclaimed his life-long allegiance to Marxism. For a discussion of the 
political reverberations caused by this speech and several others made during early September, see Crouch 
1975: 423-5.
38 The Jusuf Muda Dalam trial, the first in a series of carefully timed 'show trials' in the Special 
Military Court (Mahakamar Militer Luar Biasa, Mahmillub) designed to apply the maximum political 
pressure on the president and his wavering supporters, began in Jakarta on 30 August. A guilty verdict 
on all charges was announced on 7 September.
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Minister and Foreign Minister Subandrio.39 On the same day, thousands of students 
gathered outside the gates of the presidential palace in Jakarta. Some of them brought 
large photographs of the victims of the attempted coup which they placed in full view of 
the palace; others carried placards demanding that the president be immediately removed 
from office and brought before the special military tribunal to answer for his own alleged 
crimes, in particular his role in the failed coup.40 Some of the student demonstrators 
remained outside the palace in an all-night vigil, but by early the following afternoon, a 
Sunday, all had agreed to disperse after the intervention of Kemal Idris. Later that 
afternoon, student leaders met with Kemal Idris at his Kostrad headquarters and were 
warned that further demonstrations of this nature would not be tolerated by the army 
leadership.
This renewed outburst of student activity had caught the army leadership by 
surprise. Since it remained committed to the pursuit of a cautious and constitutional 
approach towards the president, it was not prepared to move directly against him nor 
attempt to remove him from office by force. The warning given by Kemal Idris was 
reinforced later that evening when the Jakarta regional military commander, Amir 
Machmud, announced a ban on all further demonstrations.
Some student leaders - principally those who were KAMI Pusat activists - were 
prepared to accept the army leadership's direction; but other sections of the student 
movement - especially the militant Laskar Arief Rachman Hakim, the leaders of the 
KAPPI high school student and some of the more independent-minded KAMI activists - 
were unwilling to abandon what they had begun to call 'the parliament of the streets' 
(MPR jalanari) and were determined to maintain the pressure on Sukarno.41
39 Subandrio was on trial for participating in the attempted coup. Like Jusuf Muda Dalam he has found 
guilty and sentenced to death. Both trials were front page stories in the Jakarta press throughout their 
duration.
40 See the editorial in Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 16, Week 1, October 1966: 'Minggir, Bung Karno. 
Silahkan minggir! (Stand aside, Bung Karno. Please stand aside!).
41 Confidential interviews. The students regarded the army as their'partners'. Some student leaders had 
learned that the soldiers guarding the palace would not be issued with live ammunition. They calculated
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When students again assembled in the vicinity of the palace on the following 
morning, 3 October, the troops guarding the palace were under strict orders to clear them 
from the area. Although these troops were under Kostrad command, they had mostly 
been drawn from the Brawijaya East Java division where support for the president 
remained high among senior and middle ranking officers.42 When these troops moved to 
disperse the demonstration, soldiers reacted angrily to taunts and abuse from some of the 
students. An ugly melee followed in the vicinity of the National Monument when 
soldiers charged the demonstrators and used their rifle butts and bayonets. More than 
sixty students were injured, some of them seriously.43 One of those in the latter category 
was Soe Hok-gie's friend from the Faculty of Letters and Gemsos, Zainal Zakse, who 
was present at the demonstration in his capacity as a reporter with the student daily 
Harian KAMIA*
The incident was a blunt but effective reminder to the students of where real power 
and authority now lay. In the aftermath, senior military officers like Kemal Idris and 
Sarwo Edhie did their best to placate the angry and confused students with assurances 
that the so-called New Order 'partnership' between the students and the military remained 
intact45 However, they also made it clear that the army leadership would not tolerate the 
students' attempts to dictate the course of events by taking the law into their own hands.
that, in such circumstances, it was safe to go ahead with another demonstration despite the warnings they 
had received.
42 On the strong pro-Sukarno stance adopted by the Brawijaya division throughout 1966, see Crouch 
1978: 208-10.
43 For an account of the incident from the perspective of the students, see Harian KAMI, 4 October
1966.
44 Zainal Zakse received serious bayonet wounds during the 3 October incident. He lingered in a critical 
condition in a Jakarta hospital for several months, before his friends finally arranged for belated 
emergency treatment in the Netherlands. He died there on 8 May 1967. A number of obituaries and 
notices appeared in the Jakarta press, including a bitter article by Soe Hok-djin (written under his newly- 
acquired name, Anef Budiman), attacking the hypocrisy of those in the action fronts and the mass media 
who had quickly abandoned Zakse six months earlier. See 'Pesan Zakse, Apakah pahlawan mati jang 
dihargai?' (Zakse's message, must it be dead heroes who are appreciated?), Sinar Harapan, 16 and 17 May
1967. Soe Hok-gie prepared his own reflective tribute to his friend Zakse, which appeared soon after: 
'Kenang2an untuk seorang kawan: Zainal Abidin' (Reminiscences for a friend: Zainal Abidin), 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.49, Week 4, May 1967.
43 For the student movement's reaction, see the editorial in the subsequent edition of Mahasiswa 
Indonesia, 'Hadiah ulang tahun kepada partner' (Birthday present to a partner), No. 17, Week 2, October
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The end of Sukarno
After Radio Ampera disappeared from the Jakarta air waves around the time of the 
MPRS special session in June, knowledge of Soe Hok-gie's exact movements remains 
somewhat limited. Yet as far as family and friends can recall, Soe was not an active 
participant in the renewed outburst of student demonstrations that occurred in late 
September, culminating in the mortal wounding of his friend Zakse in Merdeka Square 
on 3 October.
The University of Indonesia campus had been officially reopened in early April, 
and although it was to be many months before academic life returned to normal, it is 
certain that Soe was one of those eager to resume interrupted studies as soon as it was 
possible to do so and determined to participate in the process of institutional rebuilding 
that had then to occur. Although the exact timing of his withdrawal from the activist 
phase of the student movement remains uncertain, one point is beyond doubt. Soe 
regarded his own and his fellow students' direct intervention in national politics on the 
streets of Jakarta as a temporary phenomenon, an emergency measure arising out of the 
extraordinary events set in train by the attempted coup of the previous year. Unlike some 
who had assumed leadership positions within the student movement since late 1965 - 
especially those at the head of the student action front KAMI - Soe did not consider 
students per se as a permanent political force at the highest levels of politics in 
Indonesia.46 Nor did he regard the student movement as a vehicle for securing for 
himself a position on the national political stage.
1966. Privately, Kemal Idris was extremely disturbed by the 3 October clash between students and the 
troops under his command. The Kostrad chief of staff, who had established very good relations with the 
anti-Sukarno student movement, knew Zainal Zakse personally and had a high regard for the young 
Gemsos activist. Confidential interviews, March 1982.
46 Soe’s trenchant criticisms of KAMI and its leadership and his own views about the place of students 
in political life are taken up in the following chapter.
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Throughout the second half of 1966, however, many of his fellow students 
remained swept up by the emotion-charged atmosphere that had developed over previous 
months. Some had begun to believe their own rhetoric about an armed forces-student 
'partnership' and to claim special rights and privileges based upon the heroic role they 
believed they had played. Soe, however, was one of the first to attack student excesses, 
arguing that it was time to abandon the streets and return as quickly as possible to schools 
and university campuses.47
It seems probable that by the middle of 1966 - especially after the MPRS special 
session had given legal backing to the 11 March Letter of Authority - Soe considered that 
the major crisis had passed. Despite the many serious problems that remained to be 
solved, not the least of which was the question of the position of the president himself, 
he believed that it was essentially the task of the adult world political actors - those who 
sat in the DPR-GR and MPRS, party leaders and senior military officers - to give shape 
and meaning to the new order of Indonesian politics that was beginning to emerge from 
the wreck of the old.
Despite this, Soe remained a keen and close observer of the latest political 
developments. Furthermore, the transformation of the Indonesian press provided him 
with an outlet for his views. This became increasingly evident after the MPRS session as 
editors and journalists cast off the stultifying conformity of the Guided Democracy years 
and began to display a renewed vigour and boldness. Eager to contribute to the public 
debate about the pace and direction of political reform, Soe began to contribute occasional 
articles to several newspapers throughout the second half of 1966, thus laying the 
foundation for his emergence over the next three years as one of Indonesia's most 
outspoken and independent-minded intellectuals. His part-time career in journalism
47 Radio Ampera devoted a number of broadcasts to these issues on several occasions during April. See 
'Awas penjakit pahlawan gadungan' (Watch out for the bogus heroes' disease), broadcast 5 and 6 April 
1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 16-17; 'Pesan pada KAPPl-KAMI-KASI dan kesatuan2 aksi lainnja' 
(Message to KAPPI-KAMI-KASI and other action fronts), broadcast end of April 1966, Radio Ampera 
1966b: 3; 'Terbitkan sekarang djuga tindakan2 liar dari siapapun djuga' (Control immediately any 
unauthorised actions), broadcast 26 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966b: 19-20.
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began with a portrait of the journalist Mochtar Lubis whom he had admired for his 
principled opposition to Sukarno, written shortly after Lubis' release from detention.48 It 
was followed a few weeks later by an article (probably the first to appear on the issue) 
calling for the release of other opponents of the Old Order still being held in prison, 
including those who had participated in the PRRI-Pemesta regional rebellions from the 
late 1950s.49
In addition, in August Soe wrote a two-part article on the tensions inside the 
Peoples' Republic of China between intellectuals and the Chinese Communist Party, 
based in part on discussions with Indonesian students at the Faculty of Letters who had 
recently returned from China.50 At around the same time, he also wrote a piece for the 
Jakarta weekly Djaja on the 1956-57 student movement at Beijing University, which had 
arisen out of the 'Hundred Flowers' reform movement in China, describing the 
crackdown on dissident students and intellectuals that had resulted and suggesting that a 
similar fate would have befallen Indonesian students if their movement had not been 
successful.51
As the first anniversary of the failed 1965 coup approached, Soe wrote a brief 
account of the earlier incident of alleged communist treachery that had occurred at Madiun 
during the independence struggle. The title of his article mocked the title of Sukarno's
48 See 'Mengapa saja memilih pendjara - Mochtar Lubis dan politik’ (Why I chose gaol - Mochtar Lubis 
and politics), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.7, 31 July 1966. Towards the end of March 1966, Soe Hok-gie 
and his brother Hok-djin had managed to gain access to the detention centre at Jalan Keagungan in Glodok 
where Mochtar Lubis and a group of other high profile Guided Democracy political detaineees had recently 
been relocated. Since the gaol was only a short distance from their home in Kebon Jeruk, they paid a 
number of visits during the following month exchanging views and passing on information about the 
students' activities. Interview with Arief Budiman, 9 March 1982; and Mochtar Lubis, 17 March 1982. 
See also Mochtar Lubis, 1980: 477.
49 See 'Sebuah penilaian baru terhadap kaum anti Kamunis [sic]' (A re-evaluation of the anti­
communists), Harian KAMI, 20 August 1966. Several months later, when nothing had been done, Soe 
prepared a more detailed appeal on their behalf: see 'Bagaimana dengan nasib-nasib tawanan politik resim 
j.l.' (What about the fate of the political prisoners of the previous regime?), Sinar Harapan, 25 and 26 
November 1966.
50 See 'Antara kemerdekaan intelektuil dan instruksi partai' (Between intellectual freedom and party 
directives), Kompas, 20 and 22 August 1966.
51 The exact publication details of this article are unknown since copies of Djaja have been unavailable. 
It has beeen reprinted in a recent compilation of some of Soe Hok-gie's journalism. See 'Sembilan tahun 
yang lalu mahasiswa-mahasiswa Universitas Peking mengamuk' (Nine years ago Beijing University 
students ran riot) in Soe 1995: 107-17.
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Independence Day speech that had provoked his enemies a month earlier.52 As public 
debate intensified among the supporters of the New Order about the future direction of 
the political reform process, Soe quickly identified himself as an advocate of militant and 
far-reaching measures. Just after the clash between students and Kostrad troops on 3 
October, he prepared a forceful article for the Bandung weekly Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
comparing the arguments of those advocating a cautious and gradual approach to further 
political change - what he termed 'the middle group' - with the arguments of those like 
himself who were pressing for the immediate implementation of a more drastic reform 
agenda:
.... the only proper way to put our country's affairs in order is with resolute action. 
Whoever has been at fault must be brought to justice without taking into consideration 
their position or their service. Every corruptor must be arrested without taking into 
account whether they have a green shirt, a white shirt or a red shirt. Only with such 
tough measures will the people's faith be restored and within a short period of time 
(because we are racing against time), the economy will begin to improve. The 
consequences of these tough measures have been considered, that is, the distinct 
possibility that physical conflict will occur between several social forces. But this is 
the only course that is visible.
Opposed to such a course of action, according to Soe, were the advocates of what he
termed 'the middle group' who took the view that
.... we have to be realistic about the existing conditions in our country. They refuse to 
resort to drastic methods because they believe such methods will lead to civil war.
Their argument is 'to put in place the executive, legislative and judicial forces and the 
laws in accordance with their functions'. They believe that if 'the rules of the game' 
operate properly our objectives of fulfilling AMPERA will finally be achieved.
Yet Soe doubted whether such a gradual path to reform was possible in the present
circumstances:
The economic situation continues to deteriorate, and prices continue to rise although 
not as crazily as in the past. Economic aid from the IMF and the World Bank remains 
uncertain as long as Sukarno is allowed to pursue his guerilla politics.... Corruptors 
are also still out of control because they have the backing of such and such a party or 
such and such a military officer who misuse their authority. Each and every attempt to 
take action against them is prevented with the excuse that the time is not ripe, we must 
be tactical etc.
Also efforts to put in place the functions of the legislative, executive and judicial bodies 
have not been completely successful. The Attorney General still treats Mochtar Lubis 
et al as under house arrest, for reasons that are incomprehensible to any sane person.
The DPR-GR and the MPRS as legislative bodies remain powerless when Sukarno 
stubbornly refuses to heed MPRS decrees. He still persistently refuses to condemn 
Gestapu-PKI and ignores the MPRS decree requesting him to provide an explanation for 
the occurrence of Gestapu as a supplement to his Nawaksara speech. It seems very
52 '18 September 1948 - djangan sekali-kali tinggalkan sedjarah ... Madiun' (18 September 1948 - Never 
leave history ... Madiun), Kompas, 20 and 21 September 1966
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likely that the legislative agencies that have been empowered by Pak Harto are actually 
frightened to use their authority. The problem is that the personnel in the MPRS and 
DPR-GR for the most part are Old Order men.
If such a situation continues, it is possible that the political strategy of the 'middle 
group' will ultimately run into a dead end.^
During the final months of 1966 as the militant anti-Sukarnoists voiced their 
demand for such thorough-going reforms, attention began to centre on the question of 
what should be done about President Sukarno himself. While the army leadership 
continued to act with supreme caution, pressure began to mount for Soeharto to take 
decisive action. On 22 October, General Nasution, in his capacity as chairman of the 
MPRS, formally requested Sukarno to address the perceived shortcomings and 
omissions of his Nawaksara speech delivered to the parliament on 22 June. By early 
November, the militants' campaign against the president continued to escalate, with 
Mahasiswa Indonesia demanding his immediate dismissal and trial. Soe Hok-gie was 
part of this process, writing another hard-hitting article in which he elaborated on the
reasons for acting swiftly and decisively to remove Sukarno from the presidency:
If we want to talk about Sukarno, we must consider him in the widest possible way.
We must not adopt a narrow point of view by talking of Sukarno as such. With 
'Sukarno' all the problems of the present struggle are involved. When university 
students and the people initiated the demand to uphold justice and truth, they had 
immediately declared war against vested interests, those who blow with the wind, 
political adventurers etc. From January to March the students' target was the PKI, 
Subandrio et al (including Jusuf Muda Dalam, Chaerul Saleh etc.). This doesn't mean 
that justice and truth had been established in our country after they had been dragged in 
front of a court, because they were only the first target of the movement for justice and 
truth. After that there was a second stage, a third and so forth. The problem of 
upholding what is just and what is honest is a never-ending struggle.
After the PKI and Subandrio et al were 'brought under control', a further problem arose.
After them, who else had to be brought under control? And the people's choice was 
Sukarno, because (with good reason) he is held responsible for the corruption, the moral 
decadence and the disappearance of democracy in Indonesia. After Sukarno, the next 
targets are those groups who assisted him, the corruptors and others. So in upholding 
the students' and the people's demands Sukarno is the second target. The groups who 
have become the third target, the fourth, the fifth and so forth are aware that their turn is 
only a matter of time. And because of that, they are now uniting to defend Sukarno.
They are defending Sukarno, not because they love him, but because by defending him 
they are defending themselves. Sukarno is a battlefield now. He is a fortress, he is the 
second line. Without the collapse of this fortress, it will be very difficult to widen the 
struggle. In other words, until Sukarno falls the struggle cannot progress any further.
With this problem, Sukarno becomes a political factor.
'Kehantjuran politik gol. tengah?' (The destruction of the middle group's policy?), Mahasiswa 
Indonesia, No. 17, 9 October 1966
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In addition there are other problems that we must also consider. In an invisible way, 
Sukarno's power remains great. As long as the structure of Indonesian society remains 
influenced by the feudal realm, Sukarno possesses the opportunity to make a comeback. 
He is a leader in a psychological sense. He is a person who has done wrong (breaking 
Islamic law about having too many wives, corruption, his political errors etc.) And for 
the sake of implanting a good democratic tradition, a guilty person must be punished 
and must be replaced. This is the first lesson in a course on democratic education. It is 
very difficult to implant the traditions of democracy, justice, honesty and a mature 
psychological outlook in the Indonesian people, if at the centre of their history they 
have allowed themselves to be ruled by a person like President Sukarno. And if we 
replace Sukarno, every Indonesian boy and girl for centuries will learn - 'The people 
will take action against anyone who tries to become a tyrant'. This is democracy. And 
here lies the place of Sukarno as a political factor. In the short term and in the long 
term.54
When this article appeared in Mahasiswa Indonesia, that newspaper's campaign 
against Sukarno was in full flight. Each edition carried hostile front-page news stories, 
cleverly written feature articles, and sharply-worded editorials attacking the president's 
politics and demanding immediate action to be taken against him. In addition, 
compromising photographs and bitingly sarcastic cartoons combined to personalize the 
attack on Sukarno by portraying him as a corrupt, lascivious megalomaniac who had 
brought the country to the brink of political and economic min. Soe, having observed at 
first hand the palace lifestyle on a number of occasions, was an active participant in this 
very public campaign to undermine further Sukarno's declining prestige.55
In the face of such sustained pressure, the position of the president was steadily 
eroded to the point where it appeared inevitable that a seemingly reluctant General 
Soeharto would be forced to move against him. The trial of the airforce commander, Air 
Marshal Omar Dhani, in early December 1966 was a crucial step in this process. Omar 
Dhani's testimony was manipulated by the army leadership to create the strong 
impression in the public mind that Sukarno knew about and approved of the plans of the
54 'Bung Karno, faktor politik atau bukan' (Bung Karno, political factor or not), Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
No.21, 6 November 1966
55 See Soe's article 'Tjerita^ konjol dari negeri kita' (Foolish tales from our country), M ahasiswa 
Indonesia, No.22, 13 November 1966. Several weeks earlier, the Bandung weekly had published a front­
page story based upon an article that had appeared in the foreign press back in February. It described an 
incident where President Sukarno was alleged to have drugged and raped the fourteen-year-old daughter of a 
Chinese restaurant owner in Vienna during a visit there in 1961. See 'Roti, gadis dan Bung. Hampir 
sadja diseret ke muka pengadilan' (Bread, a girl and Bung. Almost dragged in front of the court), 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.20, 20 October 1966.
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coup's perpetrators.56 Subsequently, the student action fronts issued statements 
declaring that they believed that the president was 'involved' in the attempted coup, with 
the most militant students calling for the reconvening of the MPRS and for Sukarno 
himself to be put on trial.57
By the end of the year, many of Sukarno's most ardent supporters were urging him 
to complete his report to the MPRS as requested, for they argued that this was now the 
only way to answer his critics and save his presidency. Despite his obvious reluctance to 
cooperate with his detractors, by early January 1967 Sukarno finally agreed. But when 
the president's written response, the Nawaksara Supplement (Pelengkap Nawaksara), 
was delivered on 10 January, neither its contents nor its tone went nearly far enough to 
mollify those who were now demanding his dismissal.58
Consequently, the clamour to remove him from the presidency increased rather than 
abated.59 Towards the end of January, as students held further noisy demonstrations, 
the hardline anti-Sukamoists among the senior military echelon held a series of high- 
profile meetings at a mountain retreat outside Jakarta and announced that they were ready 
for the final showdown.60 Meanwhile, the MPRS leadership, after consideration of 
Sukarno's Pelengkap Nawaksara, declared the president negligent and began to deliberate 
about what further action to take. Ominously for Sukarno, some of his erstwhile 
supporters now began to desert him. Towards the end of January, senior NU political
56 See Crouch 1978: 212-13.
57 See, for example, Soe Hok-djin's article, 'Pidato Presiden Sukarno pada tanggal 30 September 1965' 
(President Sukarno's speech on 30 September 1965), Kompas, 19 December 1966.
58 Although Sukarno did blame the PKI leadership for the coup, he also extended responsibility to 
include others such as the agents of Nekolim, while refusing to offer any explanation concerning his own 
alleged involvement in those events. The president once again failed to render a full account of his period 
of office or provide an adequate explanation for the nation's disastrous economic decline during the 
previous five years.
59 A further article by Soe Hok-djin was typical of the militant student response. See 'Pengadilan Pres. 
Sukarno sebagai monumen sedjarah' (The trial of Pres. Sukarno as an historical monument), Kompas, 30 
January 1967.
60 Crouch 1978: 213
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figures signalled a shift in that party's position, and by February, NU representatives in 
the DPR-GR were leading the attack upon him with hostile resolutions.61
Although the president's remaining military and civilian supporters did what they 
could to protect him, his position now began to look increasingly untenable. By mid- 
February, the MPRS leadership announced its total rejection of the Pelengkap Nawaksara 
and the convening of a special session of the assembly in early March to resolve the 
problem of the presidency. Throughout February and early March there was a series of 
urgent meetings at the highest level involving senior military officers, civilian politicians 
and party leaders.62
As those most strongly opposed to Sukarno pressed home their advantage, the 
president and his supporters struggled desperately to find a compromise that would avoid 
the final ignominy of a public dismissal at the MPRS session. Throughout these weeks, 
Soeharto, though clearly determined to secure Sukarno's removal, continued to act with 
studied caution, endeavouring to negotiate a formula that would allow the president to 
vacate the office voluntarily and with dignity, thereby avoiding a public humiliation.
Yet such a solution proved impossible in the face of Sukarno's dogged refusal to 
cooperate with Soeharto's emissaries and the determination of the hardliners to pursue the 
MPRS path to removal. With the trial under way in late February of yet another of the 
leading coup plotters, Brigadier General Supardjo, and with reports of an uprising by 
supporters of the president in a remote rural enclave in East Java, the MPRS session 
opened on 7 March against a background of considerable tension.63
On the very morning that the members of the assembly began their deliberations, an 
article written by Soe Hok-gie appeared in the Jakarta daily Kompas. Entitled 'Politicians
61 Crouch 1975: 450-1, and 1978: 217
62 For a full account of the complex manoeuvring within the political elite that occurred before the 
opening of the MPRS session on 7 March, see Crouch 1975: 452-60, and 1978: 215-17.
63 Elite RPKAD units destroyed the Mbah Suro movement's stronghold in East Java in early March. 
For an account of the movement and its millenarian dimensions, see Mitchell 1968.
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and Manliness', it briefly recounted the rise to power during World War II of French 
Vichy leader, Marshal Petain, and his subsequent trial and conviction for collaboration 
with the Nazis. Soe sought to draw out some similarities between the Petain affair in 
France and Indonesia's present predicament as the nation wrestled with the issue of what 
to do about Sukarno. As a final opportunity to press the case for the president's 
dismissal and trial, the comparison between Petain and Sukarno was highly unfavourable 
to the latter:
Like Petain, President Sukarno has made many blunders in the field of politics 
(Nasakom, Nefos, his economic policy etc). Like Petain, Sukarno has also rendered 
great service to the people's struggle for independence. And like Petain, President 
Sukarno is also now old.
But besides that there are also huge differences between Petain and President Sukarno.
Petain was a 'clean' individual whereas the private life of President Sukarno is 
thoroughly sordid (keeping mistresses inside and outside the country, corruption etc).
But the greatest difference is the attitude of Petain and President Sukarno towards 
accepting responsibility for all of their actions. Unlike Petain, President Sukarno has 
not acted like a man. We do not think it is necessary to analyse further the issue of the 
Nawaksara and its Supplement.
Now the Indonesian people still face a difficult problem. There are elements within 
society that have declared their opposition to President Sukarno being put on trial.
They have all kinds of reasons. There are those who assert that if President Sukarno is 
put on trial, there is a strong possibility of it leading to civil war. There are those who 
explain that President Sukarno is old and his services in the past were great . . .  so 
okay, let's just forgive him.
The issue in fact is not one of civil war, of pity or of anything else. The issue is one 
of principle. The principle that we are always proclaiming, that the law makes no 
distinctions, that under the law all people are equal.
If we do not put President Sukarno on trial (his involvement in G30S is no longer in 
doubt), we will have broken the above principle.
The second issue is one of education. What a poor education in public affairs it would 
be for the Indonesian people if President Sukarno is not brought to justice, for they will 
discover that when it is anyone of high rank or service, they can expect to evade the 
web of justice. On the contrary, if President Sukarno had the same great spirit as 
Petain, he would actually ask to be put on trial to decide the real truth of whether he is 
guilty or not.
And the Indonesian people must also display great spirit like the French people did in 
1945. Only a people with the courage to uphold the law deserves to become great.64
Throughout most of 1966, Kompas had remained cautious and measured in its 
criticism of the president. The publication of such a remarkably hostile article was a clear 
sign that Sukarno's grip on the presidency was close to its end.
64 'Politikus dan kedjantanan' (Politics and manliness), Kompas, 7 March 1967
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After several days of intense and often heated debate, the MPRS finally resolved on 
12 March to dismiss Sukarno from the presidency and appoint General Soeharto as acting 
president in his place until the holding of general elections. The exact wording of the 
MPRS decision was confusing and clouded in ambiguity, for it reflected the struggle that 
had taken place inside the assembly between those members who supported the call for 
extreme measures to be taken against Sukarno and those who sought his dismissal but 
did not wish to antagonize further his most ardent supporters, out of fear that they might 
risk provoking them into armed conflict.65 Although the final result was essentially a 
compromise - there was to be no public trial and Sukarno was to disappear quietly from 
public view - the Sukarno era was finally at an end. The building of a new political order 
could now proceed without further obstruction by him or his supporters.
The post-Sukarno era: aspirations and forebodings
The thousands of young students from schools and universities who had rallied 
around the Tritura cause on the streets of Jakarta in early 1966, many of whom had 
continued throughout the rest of that year to press for Sukarno's removal, had by and 
large defined themselves politically through their increasingly open and vociferous 
opposition to all aspects of Guided Democracy political life. Yet while it is perfectly clear 
what they wished to see destroyed, it is by no means easy to explain what sort of political 
system this generation of young Indonesians wished to see rise up out of the ashes of the 
Sukarno era. In all probability, this was a question that most of the students who made 
up the rank and file of the movement had never seriously considered.
Since the formal organisational basis of the student movement was centred on a 
loose coalition of student organisations representing a number of different political, social 
and religious perspectives, achieving a consensus on the nature of politics or the type of 
political system to be established in the post-Sukarno era was never going to be easy, 
even among those who had risen to prominence as student leaders. In fact the differences
65 For a full account of the MPRS session and an analysis of its outcome, see Crouch 1978: 217-20.
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and rivalries between the component elements of the 1966 student movement quickly 
resurfaced as soon as the Old Order had been eliminated, especially when HMI, as the 
largest and most powerful student organisation, began to exert its authority over student 
affairs.
In sharp contrast, however, Soe Hok-gie was one of those student activists who 
had thought a great deal about the sort of society and government he wanted to see 
emerge in his country. As the account of his early life reveals, from at least his middle 
teenage years he had developed a keen interest in Indonesia's political history since 
independence had been won and he had become firmly opposed to the direction national 
politics had taken since the late 1950s. It is also apparent that he was committed to the 
view that the restitution of some form of open and responsible democratic system was 
ultimately the most desirable goal.
During the political upheaval immediately before and after October 1965 Soe had 
become preoccupied with attacking the ills of the existing political order, but he never lost 
sight of these wider perspectives. As the possibility of a post-Sukarno political era 
emerged into a reality after 11 March 1966, Soe expressed himself forcefully on a 
number of occasions about his hopes for the longer term. These were general 
pronouncements, never intended to be anything more than a declaration of a set of ideals. 
Yet Soe made it quite clear that he regarded the downfall of Sukarno and his allies as 
merely the first step in a complex task of social, economic and political reform that, if 
successful, would lead eventually to a more just, equitable and democratic society.
Among the earliest examples of this advocacy was a script that Soe had prepared as 
a Radio Ampera broadcast towards the end of April 1966. The title of his text, The 
Reform Movement', was no doubt inspired by his participation in the clandestine 
movement of the same name:
Beginning right now, we must guard against a repetition of the bitter experiences of the 
period leading up to Gestapu, and for this it is absolutely essential that radical reform be 
effected within society.
What has been done up till now merely constitutes a small part of the reforms that have 
to be carried out. We must bring about reforms in ways of thinking, in social and legal
225
standards, and in systems of leadership and government. At the moment it is essential 
to develop critical and sound thinking. We must not return to that era when a voice 
that was not in tune was immediately branded as counter-revolutionary, exploited by 
outsiders and so forth. Let us give every person the opportunity to be able to express 
an opinion freely and securely, without any kind of pressure from anyone. Let us guard 
against any one group or individual feeling so powerful that they refuse to accept 
criticism or points of view that differ from what they believe to be correct. We must 
learn from our previous bitter experiences. Only with the existence of the guarantee of 
academic freedom and the freedom to express an opinion, can we guard against a 
repetition of the period of party dictators, press dictators, group dictators, or the 
dictatorship of bureaus and agencies. At this phase of the younger generation's 
struggle, the freedom to express an opinion still has to be implemented more 
effectively, and in this case it is quite appropriate that university and school students 
provide an example to society. Let us show that in student and youth circles, there are 
no dictators - KAMI dictators or KAPPI dictators - there are no warlords in the student 
regiments and battalions. So this can be an example to other circles of society, from 
academics, labourers, farmers, and entrepreneurs to pedicab drivers. Hasn't all our 
struggle been directed at upholding truth and justice?
We have already touched on the need for the reforms of social and legal standards. 
Recently, it is true, criticism has begun of the 'yes-man' mentality, bebekisme, ABS- 
isme and so forth, which previously were infectious diseases spreading everywhere. But 
to this moment, there are still those who continue to become contaminated with 
diseases of that type, people who now persist in joining in the attack on the PKI and 
Subandrio, but who, in fact, in the past always agreed with the words and deeds of the 
aforementioned PKI and Subandrio. There are still groups or individuals at the present 
time who still want to talk nonsense by declaring themselves to be 'the most 
meritorious', 'pillars of the revolution', 'standing right behind the leader', 'obedient 
without reservation’, 'caretakers of the people's suffering' and so on. Apparently there 
are still many who haven't yet realized that it is no longer the era of ranting and raving. 
As General Nasution said in front of students in Bandung, if we want to become a 
nation that acts as a beacon in this world, we don't need those who keep shouting 
everywhere to assert that to be the case, but just allow the other nations of the world to 
judge us properly. The community must now learn to recognise good and bad, right 
and wrong, not from what is constantly shouted, broadcast or put about in press 
releases, but from the real facts. In this case, the mass media - whether newspapers and 
magazines or radio and TV - has a very important role in the elimination of all the 
hypocrisy by the brave course of releasing genuine news and analysis.
Concerning legal standards, it is unnecesssary to explain here how in the past, facilities, 
control and authority, power and weapons that should have been used to uphold the law 
and protect the people, were used instead to oppress them and trample on justice. 
Whether we must experience tyranny of this sort again in the future, largely depends on 
the willingness of those officials who are entrusted with the task of upholding the law 
to change their attitudes. Remember that many sacrifices have already been made, and 
the younger generation especially will not hesitate to continue the struggle to uphold 
justice.
The reform of .the system of leadership and government has already begun with the 
removal of those ministers and senior officials who lacked discretion and who had 
damaged the national struggle and supported those entrepreneurs and millionaires who 
were parasites on society. This reform must be continued of all incompetent personnel: 
those who in the past acted as dictators and warlords over those they led, those who 
have damaged the state, those who were involved in mismanagement, those who have 
low morals, those who have the mentality of yes-men, those who sway with the wind, 
and so on. Radio Ampera as an exponent and an instrument of the students' struggle, 
will continue to carry out its task, consistent with the aims of the reform movement 
required by society at the present time.66
66 'Gerakan pembaharuan' (The reform movement), broadcast 28 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966b: 27-8. 
The terms bebekisme and ABS-isme are two colloquial Indonesian expressions that defy simple 
translation into English. Bebekisme means the practice of following along blindly, like ducks (bebek)
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The theme of reform was one to which Soe was to return in subsequent articles. 
An essential component of his vision of thorough-going reform was his belief that those 
individuals who had gained a reputation for personal corruption or those individuals who 
had actively supported the policies and ideology of Sukarno during the Guided 
Democracy era should not be allowed to reassert themselves in public life. For Soe, the 
time had arrived for a complete revitalisation of the personnel in positions of power and 
influence inside the government, the bureaucracy and the judiciary. Towards the end of 
1966 he was becoming concerned that among those who were rallying behind the New 
Order were too many individuals whose credentials he judged to be suspect. Borrowing 
a phrase from the Spanish social theorist, Ortega y Gasset, Soe warned that it was 
imperative to search out those within society who were 'in form' as the spearhead of the 
New Order's reform efforts:
Before we can carry out this restructuring, we had better ask, are they clean and immune 
from the diseases that they wish to destroy? Are they 'in form'?
To be honest, in my opinion they are NOT. On the whole neither the armed forces, the 
political parties, the action fronts, nor the mass organisations etc are free of the diseases 
of the old order. We know that certain of their people are corrupt, are disposed to 
swindling and bootlicking, and are obsessed with status and promotion - in short every 
infection of the old order is also present within their bodies. Even KAMI-KAPPI- 
KAPI, who are considered to be the cleanest and most idealistic, are also not free of the 
sores of the old order.
From this perspective, there is really no use preparing a strategy merely on the basis of 
formal organisations. The most that will result will only be resolutions that will never 
be put into effect. Especially in the case of the political parties that changed their 
colours three times in the space of three days (9, 10 & 11 March). Perhaps there are 
some individuals who are honest and respectable among them, but it is clear that as 
long as their leaders are not 'in form' the social reform that has been entrusted to them 
will run into a dead end.
The problem now is to seek more efficient cooperation between those new order 
elements who really are 'in form' to carry out the tasks of reform. We are formulating 
strategy and tactics on the basis that those who really are 'in form' are comrades while 
those who are inflicted with the diseases of the old order are to be excluded from 
participation in this process of social reconstruction. Because if not, ultimately we will 
arrive at that vicious circle that we have experienced under Sukarno in the past.^7
that follow one behind the other in a long line. ABS-isme derives from the abbreviation ABS (asal bapak 
senang, 'as long as the boss is happy').
'Orde baru dan pembaruan masjarakat' (The new order and social reform), Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
No.23, 20 November 1966
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For several months towards the end of 1966 and in early 1967, Soe's thinking 
about future political directions was clearly affected by rumours that were surfacing in 
Jakarta of attempts by surviving PKI activists to reorganise their shattered movement. 
Armed forces intelligence reports appeared to confirm that some of the PKI leadership 
had regrouped and were establishing base areas in remote parts of Central and East Java. 
As the possibility of a PKI comeback became a keen topic of discussion in Jakarta 
circles, Soe was prompted to consider what positive measures should be taken to ensure 
that this did not occur.
Historical experience in Indonesia and in other parts of the world suggested to him 
that repression and formal banning edicts alone would never prevent communism from 
regenerating. It was imperative, he contended, that a number of important reforms be put
into effect to undermine communism's attraction:
According to us, all bans against the PKI will just be in vain if drastic improvements 
are not introduced in our country. If there is no legal justice, if there is no social and 
economic justice, we will experience the same fate as Iraq, South Vietnam and 
Kuomintang China.
First of all, the sources of poverty themselves must be eradicated, in this instance 
corruption. The government must be firm. Pull in the corruptors no matter who they 
are. Whether they are soldiers or civilians. Bring them to justice properly....
If we want to destroy communism effectively, we ought not use narrow-minded logic.
We must consciously separate those things that are really essential and those that will 
be made into an instrument of communism. Lately there have been obvious attempts 
to reject everything put about in slogans by the PKI, on the grounds of the stench of 
communism. Yet a lot of this is actually valid, such as land reform, the elimination of 
the ijon (rice purchasing) system, mismanagement etc. The use of this narrow-minded 
logic will, on the contrary, become a boomerang.^
Despite the arrest of a number of leading PKI activists in late 1966 (including its 
senior surviving politburo member and secretary-general, Sudisman) and the crushing of 
the Mbah Suro movement in East Java in March 1967, Soe remained concerned about the 
possibility of a communist resurgence over the longer term. In a commentary that drew 
upon his reading of some of the captured PKI documents, in particular Sudisman's own
68 This article first appeared as 'Pelarangan komunisme what next?' (Banning communism what next?), 
Alma Mater, 5/6 August 1966. (This was the University of Indonesia semi-monthly student magazine.) 
It also appeared as 'Pelarangan komunis what next' in Sinar Harapan, 9 December 1966. The ijon system 
was the practice of selling a crop to a middleman while it was still green (ijo).
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detailed critique of recent PKI policies and his analysis of the party's future directions, 
Soe repeated his warning:
The only way to prevent the revival of the PKI is to foster the existence of democracy 
in Indonesia and at the same time to eliminate corruption and restore economic life and 
justice. Without these things, it is CERTAIN that Sudisman's plan will succeed 
within five years.
A year ago the PKI was dissolved by General Soeharto. This was only the dissolution 
of the formal organisation. Following this, several things had to be done immediately.
Firstly, the elimination of corruption efficiently and effectively. This has not yet been 
carried out. To this moment, there are still many corruptors from the armed forces, the 
political parties, individuals who are free and in fact keep shouting ORBA and other 
nonsense. The second step is the development of a society that is democratic. This is 
apparently in the process of being carried out. Without such far-reaching measures, we 
are indirectly nurturing the return of the PKI. Moreover, by permitting and tolerating 
corruption (for whatever reason), in truth we are helping the PKI to revive. A year after 
the PKI was dissolved, the situation remains dangerous.^
The uncompromising nature of Soe's vision of what the New Order should be almost
guaranteed that he would soon begin to feel frustrated when the political reality fell far
short of his own idealism.
We know very little about Soe's exact movements or his political involvements 
throughout much of 1967. Nor is there a diary account that might have provided an 
insight into his private thought-world during these months. Nevertheless, his public 
writings offer the clearest indication that in the period immediately after the MPRS 
session of March 1967 he was observing the progress of the New Order very closely.
During 1967 Soe became a fairly frequent contributor to the Jakarta press.70 Out of 
nearly thirty articles on a range of topics appearing under his name during that period, 
several of the pieces written in the second half of the year stand out as superb examples
69 'Situasi tetap berbahaja - sesudah PKI dibubarkan setahun jang lalu' (The situation remains dangerous 
- a year after the PKI was dissolved), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.39, Week 2, March 1967
70 As well as continuing to write for the student press, especially Mahasiswa Indonesia, in the second 
half of 1966 Soe began to earn himself a little money by sending articles to both Kompas and Sinar 
Harapan. He had first met Kompas' founding editor. P.K. Ojong (Auwjong Peng Koen), several years 
previously when both were actively involved in the assimilation movement. Ojong, impressed by the 
young man's youthful idealism, had encouraged him to submit occasional articles and had introduced him 
to his subordinates, including Jakob Oetama.
The afternoon Protestant daily, Sinar Harapan, had been the slower of these two newspapers to adjust to 
the changing political landscape. But by 1967, strong support for the New Order had emerged among its 
editors and senior journalists. During 1966 a mutual interest in mountain climbing had brought Soe into 
contact with the brothers Aristides and Josi Katoppo, both Sinar Harapan journalists. By the end of 
1967, Aristides Katoppo had become the newspaper's managing editor, while Soe's close friend from the 
Reform Movement circle, Jopie Lasut, began to work as a Sinar Harapan reporter.
229
of his capacity to raise difficult and potentially awkward questions about the political 
direction of the New Order and the failure of its leadership to put into effect the sort of 
fundamental political and social reforms he believed were essential.71 Each of these 
articles was written with a bluntness and a refreshing candour that became the hallmarks 
of Soe Hok-gie's style of journalism.
In many respects, his two-part article entitled 'The future social consequences of 
the "Gestapu" affair' that appeared in Kompas in early July was an important landmark, 
for this was almost certainly the first occasion that the issues of human suffering and 
massive injustice that followed in the aftermath of the attempted coup had been raised in 
the Indonesian press.72 The fact that one of those who had worked actively to bring 
about the downfall of the Old Order and the defeat of the PKI was speaking out in 
defence of the victims gave his article an added significance.
Soe, who had become a fan of sixties Western folk music, established the theme of 
his article at the outset by quoting several memorable lines from the Bob Dylan ballad 
'Blowing in the Wind':
How many times must a man turn his head and pretend that he just doesn’t see
How many ears must one man have before he can hear people cry
How many deaths will it take till he knows that too many people have died?* 7^
After reminding his readers of the horrendous scale of the post-coup massacres, with
various estimates ranging from the Sumamo Report's 85,000 to as many as one million -
'there isn't a person who knows the actual number of victims of these mass killings' -
Soe chose to concentrate on detailing the terrible injustices that continued to haunt the
lives of those who had survived the massacres but who had been caught up in the wave
of anti-communist persecution and retribution that had swept the country throughout the
71 In addition to those discussed below, a complete list of all Soe's articles is included in the
bibliography.
72 'Akibat2 sosial dari peristiwa "Gestapu" di masa depan’ (The future social consequences of the
'Gestapu' affair), Kompas, 7 and 8 July 1967
73 As they appeared in the Kompas article, the second line of these lyrics was slightly garbled. This 
may have been Soe's error or it may have been a mistake during typesetting.
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previous eighteen months:
But for those who were PKI followers out of economic considerations the situation is 
extremely difficult. Many former SOBSI members knew nothing about communism.
They joined SOBSI because if they didn't the foreman (who was a communist) would 
have made matters difficult for them. It was the same with BTI. One farmer who was 
almost killed in Bali begged for mercy and swore that he was not PKI. 'My 
organisation's the BTI,’ he said in tears.
They do not understand why they are suddenly dismissed, killed, isolated by the 
community and expelled from society. And hardly anyone wants to give them new jobs 
because they are ex-SOBSI. The positions available to them (that do not require a 
statement of non-involvement in Gestapu) are as trishaw drivers, day labourers and junk 
sellers in the back alleys; and for women as servants or prostitutes (for those who are 
still young and attractive).
In villages where employment opportunities are more difficult they usually become 
petty traders or flee to the towns. In one village in Central Java, I met a 'Gestapu' wife 
who had opened a coffee stall starting at 3 am to feed her nine children. Their life was 
extremely tough. Her children also had developed an inferiority complex because their 
father was in gaol. These nine children didn't dare play in the paddy-fields or in the 
street because they were afraid of being abused by their peers. They just played together 
inside their own house. These small children had learnt about the bitterness of politics.
For the families of those who have been killed the situation is even more desperate.
They are silent and do not say much. But deep down hatred and revenge is growing 
towards those groups that killed their relatives. And at some point this hatred will take 
shape. We do not know how many of these people there are. But if we take the figure 
of 300,000 killed during the period mentioned, and these killings have left behind 3 or 4 
close relatives (wives, children, siblings, fathers) then at present there are about a 
million people who live bearing a grudge into the future.
In Soe's opinion, this was a state of affairs with disastrous consequences for the nation.
If nothing was done to address these problems, it would certainly mean the existence for
many years to come of large numbers of hostile and disturbed individuals, alienated from
mainstream society. It also raised the possibility of increasing anti-social and criminal
behaviour and the threat of a potentially large pool of supporters for any future
communist movement to draw upon. Soe concluded by confronting his readers with two
conflicting courses of action:
The first alternative is the Russian alternative (now also being put into effect in China), 
with its system of concentration camps. Millions of former members of the PKI and 
its mass organisations (without distinguishing whether they were just followers or not) 
would be sent to a Neo Digul. And gradually they would be ordered to die there. (If we 
choose this alternative we will be cursed by the whole civilised world and we will be 
trampling on our Principle of Humanitarianism and Belief in God.)
The second alternative is to accept them back into society as quickly as possible. If 
they are perceived to be a threat in certain specified occupations, such as the armed 
forces, teaching, journalism and other important posts, then a number of new fields of 
work must be created for them. For example, work as ordinary typists, middle and 
lower-level workers, drivers and other positions that are not considered sensitive. One 
consequence of such measures would be that the PKI would obtain a wide area to 
operate for their 'guerilla politics'....
However, one thing is certain. Attitudes like those at present are very dangerous for the 
future. Society (government) has rejected millions of ex-members of the PKI and its 
mass organisations without providing them with a proper outlet. The frustration that
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exists in their circles now will eventually become a time-bomb for our nation in ten or 
twenty years time.74
It is not clear what had prompted Soe to take a public stand on these issues at this 
particular time. Nor is it apparent at what point he became fully aware of the terrible scale 
of the massacres and the tragic suffering that followed in their wake. The killings that 
had begun in late October 1995 were, in the main, centred on small towns and villages in 
Central Java, East Java and Bali.75 These events were never properly reported by the 
national press, which in the late Guided Democracy era was in no condition to investigate 
such highly charged political events with either accuracy or objectivity. Consequently, 
accurate information about the massacres was completely unavailable in Jakarta in late 
1965 and early 1966, and the stories that had surfaced there were largely the product of 
rumour and anti-communist hysteria. The emotional response these engendered played 
into the hands of the army as it set about the destruction of its major political opponent.
Most of the killings were actually taking place during that period when Soe Hok-gie 
and his fellow students were thoroughly absorbed with their own agenda within the 
context of Jakarta national capital politics: the formulation of their own response to the 
attempted coup; the establishment of the student action front; the enunciation of the 
Tritura challenge; and the pursuit of the campaign of protests and street demonstrations 
that took place between January and March 1966.
However as more precise information emerged during the following year about 
what had really occurred, Soe was fully conscious of the enormity of the human tragedy. 
Nevertheless, his article reveals a distinct lack of sympathy for the fate of the PKI 
leadership:
We do not need to worry too much about them. They are the enemy who wish to 
destroy us and it's only natural that we are going to [have to] face up to them again.
74 'Neo Digul' is a reference to the infamous Dutch colonial prison camp at Boven Digul in Irian Jaya 
where many Indonesian activists were incarcerated during the 1930s. Humanitarianism and Belief in God 
are two of the five fundamental principles of Indonesia's state philosophy, Panca Sila.
75 For the fullest survey of the massacres to date, see Cribb 1990.
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In fact, in his Kompas articles he was at great pains to stress that he held the PKI leaders 
and senior cadres directly responsible for 'sowing the seeds of hate' within Indonesian 
society during the 1958 to 1965 period, and in particular for the dramatically heightened 
tensions that occurred after 1963. In his view, these actions had contributed directly to 
the explosion of violence that erupted immediately after the attempted coup.
On the other hand, Soe drew a very sharp distinction between the elimination of 
PKI leadership and the fate of the millions of the party's followers - those ordinary party 
members and those who had rallied behind its various affiliated bodies, such as the 
Indonesian Peasant Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI), the All-Indonesia Federation of 
Labour Organizations (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, SOBSI), the 
Peoples' Cultural Institute (.Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Lekra) and the Indonesian 
Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Gerwani). It was these individuals 
and their families who had borne the brunt of the killings and who continued to be 
subjected to persecution and retribution. During 1967 Soe had almost certainly had the 
opportunity to see at first hand the personal misery of some of the victims during Mapala 
excursions into the Javanese countryside.76 He was also becoming concerned about the 
increasing level of intolerance that was sweeping the country - the screenings and 
witchhunts being conducted at all levels of society to root out those who were former 
members of the PKI and its affiliated organisations. His plea for a more humane 
approach to the surviving victims of these tragic events was bolstered by his own 
credentials as a well-known student activist and the reminder to his readers of his own 
tough-minded anti-communism.
In addition, Soe was of the opinion that the massacres and the continuing human 
rights abuses were playing into the hands of both domestic enemies and foreign critics of 
the New Order who were intent on using this issue to undermine the government's
76 There were Mapala expeditions to climb Mt Ceramai in West Java in March and Mt Slamet in 
Central Java in August 1967. See Soe's four-part report 'Menaklukkan Gunung Slamet' (Conquering Mt 
Slamet), Kompas, 14, 15, 16, and 18 September 1967.
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credibility. A week later, Soe took up this particular theme in a separate article, in which 
he defended the New Order but at the same time issued an implicit challenge to its 
leadership to institute the sort of reform measures that would reduce the effectiveness of 
such criticism.77 In December 1967, on the eve of Soeharto's first official visit to Bali as 
acting President, Soe wrote a lengthy two-part account of the massacres that had taken 
place there. The articles appeared under the pseudonym 'Dewa'.78
Important though it was, the issue of human rights was not the only area of 
government policy to draw a sharp response from Soe's pen in the second half of 1967. 
He was also angered by the continuing tendency of the New Order leadership to draw 
upon the services of certain individuals who had been significant supporters of the Old 
Order, for it was totally at odds with his own firm belief that such tainted political figures 
could never be trusted to participate in the building of a new society.
This issue came to a head in July 1967 when Acting President Soeharto announced 
the appointment of Roeslan Abdulgani as Indonesia's Ambassador to the United Nations 
in New York.79 As noted earlier, Soe had singled out Roeslan Abdulgani for adverse 
comment in the previous year.80 This time his response was an even more public and 
highly personal attack that began with an anecdote deliberately intended to shock his 
readers:
During World War 2, a Russian crossed to the German side and leaked Russian defence 
secrets to the commander of the German army. And as a reward for this treason, he 
requested various facilities for his own pleasure. After the German commander had 
extracted all the secret information from this Russian fugitive, he gave instructions that 
the man was to be shot. 'Why?' asked his comrades. 'A dog who changes his master 
just for a bone is not much of a dog. If he is prepared to betray his own country, he
77 See 'Kampanje anti pemerintah Indonesia diluar negeri' (The anti-Indonesian campaign overseas), 
Sinar Harapan, 15 July 1967
78 I do not know why Soe chose not to use his own name on this occasion. Nor do I know anything 
about the source of his information. So far as I am aware he did not visit Bali himself during this period. 
See 'Disekitar peristiwa pembunuhan besar7an di Pulau Bali' (On the mass killings in Bali) Parts I and II, 
Mahasisxva Indonesia, Weeks 2 and 3, December 1967. Soe's articles have been translated into English 
by Anton Lucas and appear in Cribb 1990: 252-8.
79 Roeslan Abdulgani's appointment was criticised in many quarters. See 'Roeslan Abdulgani dan Ibnu 
Soetowo banjak disorot' (Roeslan Abdulgani and Ibnu Soetowo under the spotlight), Sinar Harapan, 21 
July 1967
80 See earlier this chapter, p.200.
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certainly won't hesitate to change again. And the appropriate reward for someone like 
that is a bullet, in keeping with the laws of war.'
In Indonesia at the present time one finds many people with the mentality of that 
Russian traitor. Those who once fawned over Sukarno have suddenly become the most 
fanatical Soeharto supporters. And many of them are prominent Indonesian political 
identities. On this matter, I recall a work of Russian literature that angered Khrushchev 
several years ago. A Russian writer related that at the time when Stalin had just died, 
his closest comrades held a party beside his coffin. They abused Stalin while they 
danced. Suddenly, Stalin's eyes opened again (and he seemed to smile). The comrades 
who were insulting him were startled because they thought Stalin had come back to life 
again. So they begged for mercy, afraid of the 'ire' of the dictator. After that he died 
once again. Khrushchev was very offended by this satirical work because he felt stung 
by it.
And in my imagination, I see Sukarno lying in his coffin. Former loyal friends from 
the old order are dancing and cursing the old order that they had previously established 
together. And they are praising the new order to the sky. And one of those who is 
dancing and praising the new order is Roeslan Abdulgani. What's more he is being sent 
to an international forum to praise the struggle of the 'new order' and curse the 'old 
order'.
After tersely outlining his objections to Roeslan Abdulgani's appointment, Soe concluded
by condemning it as a thoroughly unacceptable betrayal of principle:
We know well enough who Roeslan Abdulgani is. During the Japanese Occupation he 
joined the underground movement with Sjahrir's group. What's more then he became 
an admirer of Sjahrir. But when he saw Sjahrir's star begin to wane in Indonesia's 
political realm, he became such a staunch supporter of Sukarno that he succeeded in 
becoming the Goebbels of Sukarno's Guided Democracy. And after Sukarno fell, not a 
word has fallen from his mouth to explain his intellectual position in the past. He is 
too much of a coward to talk. Far better are the PKI people who openly and 
courageously defend their views in the courts.
I respect General Soeharto because, despite all the problems, he has succeeded in 
guiding the Indonesian nation to overcome the difficult years. But I am certain that 
General Soeharto has made a mistake over the issue of Roeslan Abdulgani. A dog that 
changes its master twice because of a bone is not a good dog. And Roeslan Abdulgani 
is the type of opportunist who is not ashamed to praise the new order that has toppled 
the old order. Even though he himself was one of the architects of the old order. 
Yesterday Suwito Kusumowidagdo, now Roeslan, tomorrow perhaps Mualif Nasution 
and again the day after maybe Ali Sastroamidjojo. And General Soeharto apparently has 
taken this decision for tactical reasons, forgetting matters of principle. Perhaps this 
will please the PNI, the Sukarnoists of whom there are, it is true, still large numbers.
But it is certain that this action will offend those honest students, academics, officers, 
journalists, and politicians who are diligently in the process of establishing a new 
society. Their representative in an international forum has changed masters three times 
over the issue of bones.82
Throughout the following months Soe remained troubled by his growing doubts 
about the sincerity and integrity of some of those who were claiming to be among the
81 'Ruslan Abdulgani dan pengchianatan intelektuil' (Ruslan Abdulgani and intellectual treason), 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.59, Week 5, July 1967
82 Suwito Kusumowidagdo was a senior official of the Department of Foreign Affairs during the 
Sukarno era who had been appointed as Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States. Mualif Nasution 
was one of Sukarno's personal private assistants and a leading member of the palace circle. Ali 
Sastroamidjojo was a senior PNI figure.
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staunchest supporters of the New Order. In mid October he prepared another article that
opened in the following astonishing manner:
Several weeks ago I visited the house of an old friend and was gossiping about the state 
of the nation. Our conversation turned to the problem of Sudisman, the prominent PKI 
leader who 'doesn't regret the actions of the PKI and wishes to take responsibility for all 
its deeds'. Like it or not, one thing is clear. Many people admire Sudisman's attitude.
I am also one of those who 'respect' his attitude, because Sudisman is a man who hasn't 
tried to evade responsibility. Although personally I am one of those who reject 
communism because to my mind its ideology will bring misery to mankind.
My friend then said, 'If I was ordered to choose between Sudisman and Mr So and So 
(better that I don't mention his name) I would choose Sudisman as my representative in 
the DPR'.
'Why?' I asked.
'Because Sudisman is a person who is consistent. He was a communist when Sukarno 
was triumphant. And when Sukarno fell, he remained a communist. Previously he 
was a Sukarno supporter, and even now he dares to defend Sukarno and not look for 
other people's mistakes. Different from Mr So and So. He used to be a Sukarno 
supporter. In fact, he went along with the bestowing of titles like 'Great Leader of the 
Revolution’, 'Hero of Islam', 'President-For-Life' and so forth. And when Sukarno was 
about to fall, he suddenly does a 180° about-turn. Mr So and So becomes a person 
who is completely anti-Sukarno. And he now appears as a hero of the New Order (oh, 
my poor new order), dancing on the 'corpse' of the PKI and Sukarno. People like that 
cannot be trusted. And the fate of the Indonesian people is greatly endangered, because 
there are now many leaders of this type lodged within the state apparatus of the 
Republic of Indonesia.'
I was silent. Later on several things came to mind. The first was that society loathes 
and detests opportunists. The second was the conclusion that an opportunist is more 
dangerous than a communist. The purge of the communists must coincide with a purge 
of the opportunists, because, if not, all efforts to eliminate communism from society 
will just be in vain. In fact it will encourage communism to spread again.83
The contrast between Soe's grudging admiration for Sudisman's courage in 
standing up for his convictions and his withering contempt for those Old Order 
opportunists now flocking to the cause of the New Order made for an extraordinarily 
provocative passage - especially since Sudisman had been found guilty and sentenced to 
death by the Mahmillub only two and a half months earlier. Like many of those who 
witnessed Sudisman's trial, Soe appears to have been profoundly impressed by the
83 'Kedjantanan seorang wartawan' (The manliness of a reporter), Mahasiswa Indonesia (edisi Pusat), 
No.3/2, Week 2, October 1967. I am indebted to Herbert Feith for a typescript copy of Soe's article. 
Since I have been unable to locate a complete collection of the Jakarta edition of Mahasiswa Indonesia, it 
is unclear if his essay had been prompted by material in an earlier number of this irregular weekly student 
newspaper. His own article drew at least one angry response from A.M. Chandra, a regular columnist and 
contributor to a number of Jakarta newspapers. See 'Djalan keluar dari lingkungan tak berudjung 
pangkal. Menggapi tulisan Soe Hok Gie.' (The way out of a vicious circle. A response to Soe Hok 
Gie's article), Mahasiswa Indonesia, 4/2, Week 3, October 1967. Soe penned a brief sarcastic reply in the 
following issue: 'Pendjelasan atas tanggapan A.M. Chandra' (A clarification of A.M. Chandra's response) 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, 5/2, Week 4, October 1967.
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defendant's courageous and dignified demeanour and his eloquent defence of his own 
and his party's political actions.84
The principal target of Soe's considerable invective on this occasion was a certain 
section of the Jakarta press corps whom he castigated for their blatant hypocrisy. In his 
view, this had been exemplified both by the alacrity with which so many journalists had 
leapt onto the New Order band wagon following Sukarno's demise and by their tendency 
to indulge in the practice of what he contemptuously termed 'dancing on the carcass' of 
the Old Order:
Journalists who in the past praised The Great Leader of the Revolution, Dr Ir Haji 
Sukarno every day in a sloganeering fashion have now changed direction. Now it's 
Acting President General Soeharto who is worshipped. The methods haven't changed 
much. Whereas previously reporters on an inspection tour received bribes to praise a 
certain project, the situation is still much the same... But saddest of all is the issue of 
'the destruction of the carcass'. There are still far too many newspapers and magazines 
whose task now is just to destroy the carcass. The carcass of the PKI, the carcass of 
Sukarno, the carcass of ASU et al. They dance and sing victory songs on the corpses of 
their opponents (who are actually their own former bosses) as if they are the heroes who 
killed these gangsters. And then they stick out their tongues to lick and fawn so that a 
leader (in this case General Soeharto) will confer his 'holy blessing' to make use of 
these servants as new kinds of simple slaves. And to indicate that they really are loyal 
to their prospective employer, they brutally carve up the corpse of their former 
employer (Sukarno et al) while singing hymns of praise to General Soeharto. It's 
thoroughly sickening...
Sukarno was only one link in Indonesia's rottenness. That link is now broken. But 
there are still many other links in the chain. Ibnu Sutowo, Suhardiman, Mas Agung, 
Roeslan Abdulgani, big-time corruptors, New Order elements who are now dividing the 
'loot' of the Old Order. If journalists were really honest and courageous enough to carry 
out their role as instruments of social control, they should attack the gangsters who are 
still alive, who are armed and have plenty of followers. Leave the gangsters who are 
already dead to the undertakers to be properly buried. The struggle in the future will 
still be very hard, possibly harder. Some of us will be slain by the gangsters' shots.
What a pity if at this moment there are still journalist colleagues who are dancing on 
the carcasses of their opponents (read their former bosses) and shooting these corpses
84 Sudisman had been arrested in Jakarta in December 1966. His trial took place in July and he was 
convicted and sentenced to death on 27th. I do not know if Soe was actually present on any occasion 
during Sudisman's trial. However, he undoubtedly heard about it directly from some who were, including 
his friend Benedict Anderson, the Cornell political scientist. (Anderson was one of a number of foreign 
observers who attended the Tribunal's hearings, and subsequently translated Sudisman's moving defence 
plea. See Sudisman 1975.)
According to Anderson (personal communication), during the course of the trial, the defence counsel 
quoted from Soe's articles on the plight of the victims of the Gestapu affair, which had appeared just after 
the tribunal hearings began. Anderson believes that the 'show-trial' character of these hearings contributed 
directly to Soe's growing doubts about the New Order. If this is true, the Sudisman trial marked a 
significant shift in Soe's thinking. Although he had called publicly for the immediate release of the 
thousands of innocent victims swept up in the mass arrests that had followed the Gestapu affair, on 
several occasions he had also argued that those directly responsible for the coup attempt should be put on 
trial and the full force of the law be applied to those who were found to be guilty. See for example the 
final paragraph of Soe's article 'Kampanje anti pemerintah Indonesia di luar-negeri' (The anti-Indonesian 
campaign overseas), Sinar Harapan, 15 July 1967.
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with their pistols. Ahead there are gangsters who are even more vicious - corruptors, 
communist remnants, sloganeers, and our own former friends who are in the process of 
enjoying the spoils of the Old Order. Are we brave enough to confront them?85
In the closing months of 1967 Soe was entertaining serious doubts about the 
direction in which the New Order was headed. There was abundant evidence of 
widespread and continuing abuses of human rights throughout the country, affecting the 
lives of a significant group of its citizens. Meanwhile, the New Order leadership under 
Acting President Soeharto seemed to be intent on forging alliances with a number of 
prominent political figures and economic power brokers associated with the Sukarno era, 
while within public life generally there was a growing tendency to resort to mindless 
political slogans as a substitute for national debate.
It was within this context that Soe's sharp critique of the local press took on a 
special urgency. As one who had always been a passionate supporter of a free, open and 
critical press during the difficult years of Guided Democracy, he believed that it was 
essential for these liberal qualities to reassert themselves if arbitrary authority and the 
abuse of power were to be held in check. During the following two years, Soe's own 
frequent contributions to public debate on a broad range of social and political issues 
were to be directed towards these ends.
85 Brigadier General Suhardiman was the head of PT Berdikari, an army-backed trading company that had 
assumed control of several Old Order trading corporations. Suhardiman's business operations were an 
early target for critics of New Order corruption. See Crouch 1978: 281-2. Mas Agung was a prominent 
Sino-Indonesian businessman and publisher who was close to Sukarno's palace circle.
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Chapter 6
GRAPPLING WITH THE EMERGING NEW ORDER
The political upheavals that turned Indonesia upside down throughout 1966 
profoundly disrupted the country's education system. In Jakarta, many schools and 
tertiary institutions were in turmoil for several months as students flocked onto the 
streets, either to take an active part in the demonstrations or merely to observe the political 
theatre. Some students became so thoroughly involved in politics that they did not return 
to the classroom for many months.
As the University of Indonesia had been one of the principal centres of student 
activism in Jakarta in early 1966, and a rallying point for those students who had initiated 
the Tritura campaign, its academic program that year was severely disrupted. Several 
buildings on its main Salemba campus were eventually occupied by some of the most 
militant students, and in early March the entire campus was officially closed on the orders 
of the Minister of Education, Leimena. Although the university's rector, Professor 
Sumantri Brodjonegoro, announced its reopening in late April, many months elapsed 
before classes were fully operative once more. In fact courses did not recommence 
properly in many faculties until early 1967.
Resuming the life of a student
As noted already, we do not know precisely when Soe Hok-gie decided to return to 
the campus and resume his studies, although it seems most likely that this occurred 
during the second half of 1966. When the attempted coup and the subsequent political 
upheaval brought the academic program of the university to a temporary halt, Soe had 
just completed the fourth year in the History Department, and was regarded by his 
teachers as one of the most accomplished young scholars in the Faculty of Letters. The
major task that remained for the completion of his sarjana degree was the successful 
submission of a thesis in his chosen discipline.
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In addition to pursuing his own personal academic goals, there was another 
important dimension to his desire to see the normal operations of the campus resume as 
quickly as possible. Throughout the early 1960s, Soe had observed the rapid 
politicisation of all aspects of life under Guided Democracy. The impact of politics upon 
the academic world had been especially disturbing to him. Although he knew that many 
of his fellow students at the University of Indonesia remained quietly cynical about what 
they saw as the empty political rhetoric of the Sukarno era, he had nevertheless been 
alarmed by the increasing numbers of students and university teachers who had been 
pulled into the political maelstrom of late Guided Democracy. Even though the 
Rawamangun campus had been spared the worst of these tensions, during 1965 serious 
conflicts had also broken out there as rival student organisations affiliated with political 
forces outside the campus sought to exert their dominance over the student world.1 With 
the dramatic events of late 1965 and early 1966, campus internal affairs were totally 
overwhelmed by the national political crisis.
During this period, Soe had played a decisive role at Rawamangun by encouraging 
and directing the participation of his fellow students. Yet in spite of his own activism, 
Soe regarded the direct involvement of students in national politics as a temporary 
phenomenon: this was a spontaneous reaction to a political crisis that was threatening to 
engulf the entire country. Although this was both necessary and unavoidable, by about 
the middle of 1966 Soe had come to the view that this active participation of students in 
national politics should be firmly reversed. Teachers and students, he believed, should 
now return to their primary tasks of teaching and study.
At the same time, Soe wished to see the elimination of what he regarded as the 
corrosive impact of external political forces upon the campus and the restoration of
l See Chapter 3, pp. 124-5.
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complete academic independence, for he believed that such conditions were essential if 
students and intellectuals were to express their opinions openly and without fear of 
recrimination. Soe's views about the need to build and preserve campus independence 
were grounded in his direct experience of the Guided Democracy years. In addition, 
there was also his own inner ambivalence towards the world of politics; for despite his 
own political activism there remained deep within him a sense of revulsion against what 
he regarded as the rottenness and corruption that pervaded much of political life. For all 
these reasons he was committed to doing all he could to preserve the Faculty of Letters as 
a part of the university that should be free of political interference and domination by any 
outside forces.
Consequently, when the University of Indonesia's academic program 
recommenced in earnest in early 1967, Soe was an active and enthusiastic senior student, 
eager to contribute to the process of returning campus life to normal inside and outside 
formal classes. During the official February orientation program for new students 
(Mapram), he was a prominent spokesperson for campus independence. To the 
annoyance of those activists who were touting for new members, Soe publicly advised 
new students not to join any of the student political and religious organisations until they 
had had time to consider the matter very carefully. He also did his best to persuade 
students at the Faculty of Letters to remain with the Mapram program and not to go 
rushing off to participate in the anti-Orde Lama political demonstrations that were still 
occurring in Jakarta in the lead-up to the March MPRS session.2
By 1967 Soe was regarded as a prominent and popular senior student at 
Rawamangun. His role as a campus leader in the events of early 1966 had undoubtedly 
enhanced his reputation in the eyes of many of his fellow students. When elections were 
held in September 1967 to choose a new student senate, he decided to stand for the 
leadership position (ketua senat) and was elected by a comfortable majority of nearly two
2 The information in this and the following paragraph draws upon notes compiled by Herbert Feith from 
discussions with Soe Hok-gie in September 1967.
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to one over his GMKI opponent, who had stood on a joint GMKI-HMI ticket.3 In 
addition to the support he received from his own immediate circle of friends - what he 
liked to call the 'Alma Mater' group - Soe's candidacy won the backing of all those 
students who were antagonistic towards the intrusion of external student organisations 
onto the Rawamangun campus.4
The position of ketua senat was potentially a significant one since, as well as the 
organisation of a wide range of extra-curricular activities at the faculty level with the 
support of his chosen student team, the chairperson was also expected to liaise closely 
with faculty staff in the dean's office, especially with the assistant dean responsible for 
student affairs. During his period as ketua senat Soe worked enthusiastically with his 
senate team to put in place a range of extra-curricular activities: there were sporting 
competitions, visits to and from sister faculties in other Indonesian universities and 
regular film nights with screenings of quality films followed by discussions.
Soe also took a close interest in the academic progress of his fellow students, 
advising those who sought his counsel, discussing their results and, if he thought it 
justified, negotiating with lecturers or heads of departments for special concessions or 
repeat examinations for those students who were borderline cases. These were 
responsibilities that Soe took very seriously, and he quickly demonstrated an ability to 
listen carefully to his fellow students' problems and when he thought it necessary a 
willingness to take up any issues on their behalf directly with faculty staff and 
administration.
3 The composition of Soe's senate team was announced on 28 September. A complete list appears in 
Sastranesia, October 1967: 7.
4 There was an additional significance to Soe's victory. Although there had always been a sizeable 
number of Sino-Indonesian students within the faculty, this was the first occasion that one of their 
number had been elected to this position. In fact, some pribum i students told Soe that they were 
supporting him precisely because he was Chinese. The issue of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority had 
been thrown into sharp focus earlier in the year when anti-Chinese rioting erupted in Jakarta in April. 
See Mackie 1976: 123.
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As was the case in other Indonesian tertiary institutions during the 1960s, the 
standard of teaching and general education that students received at Rawamangun was 
notoriously uneven. Poor facilities, inadequate resources and low salaries were facts of 
life. All university lecturers were forced to supplement their meagre incomes with other 
employment, and some used this as an excuse for poor attendance and inadequate 
preparation. Early in 1968, in an attempt to improve the quality of the teaching within the 
faculty and to put pressure on those lecturers who were widely regarded as lazy or 
incompetent, Soe organised his senate team to conduct a faculty-wide survey of student 
opinion. Those who took part were guaranteed anonymity: Soe himself took full 
responsibility for the compilation of the final report containing the names of those 
lecturers about whom there had been widespread complaints. There was considerable 
uproar when it was forwarded to the dean's office, for such blunt and open criticism 
from students was regarded as impertinent and highly irregular by many senior staff.5
With his election as ketua senat, Soe was primarily intent on ensuring that the 
Faculty of Letters developed in accordance with his conception of the university as a 
place free from the negative influences and corrupting elements of society at large.6 
Although he worked hard trying to persuade his fellow students to share his ideals of the 
university as a forum for free and open debate and rigorous intellectual enquiry, it proved 
impossible for him to escape entirely from the problems of the recent past. During his 
period as Senate leader several troubling issues arose that were to cause him considerable 
personal anguish.
5 Soe subsequently wrote a lively account of the affair: see 'Kenang^an bekas mahasiswa: Dosen^ 
djuga perlu dikontrol!' (Reminiscences of a former student: Lecturers must also be supervised!), 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 168, 31 August 1969. His penchant for direct dealing and plain speaking when 
following up student complaints about perceived shortcomings of teaching staff (for example allegations 
of dictatorial behaviour, incompetence or laziness) made him a difficult opponent in some quarters. As 
one senior Faculty of Letters academic put it: 'What you have to realise about Soe Hok-gie is that he 
was a very stubborn young man.' See also Soe's cryptic diary notes on these matters in SHG Diary, 25 
February and 6 March 1968.
6 Inside and outside his own campus Soe remained a powerful advocate for campus independence and 
freedom of expression. For a cogent statement of his views, written towards the end of his term as ketua 
senat, see his two-part article 'Mimpi- terachir seorang mahasiswa tua' (Final dreams of a senior student), 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, Nos. 106 and 107, 23 and 30 June 1968.
243
Foremost among them was the problem of what the faculty should do about those 
members of the university community who had supported the left in Indonesian politics 
before the attempted coup.7 In the early months of 1966 about twenty university 
lecturers and teaching assistants had been temporarily suspended from duty by the 
Faculty of Letters pending further investigation. In a small faculty this was a significant 
number. Most of them were members of the Indonesian Scholars' Association (HSI). A 
few belonged to other leftist bodies. Although none was known to have been an actual 
member of the Communist Party, one or two had very close ties to PKI forums and front 
organisations, and all were well known for their leftist sympathies.8
As for students in the faculty, a screening committee had been established at 
Rawamungan in the latter half of 1966 to vet the backgrounds and political affiliations of 
all returning students.9 The screening committee, chaired by a PMKRI student, Paulus 
Mitung, was firmly under the control of right-wing students closely aligned to KAMI.
The relatively small number of students in the faculty who were members of 
organisations such as GMNI, CGMI and Perhimi were in a highly vulnerable position in 
late 1966 with several types of allegations against them. The parent bodies to which 
these organisations were directly or indirectly linked had been either banned or purged in 
the aftermath of the failed coup. In addition, throughout 1965 these students had formed 
an active and vocal minority at Rawamangun, and the wider student community was still 
very conscious of the fact that the 1965 Mapram program had ended in a shambles when 
conflicts erupted between left-wing activists and the independent 'Alma Mater' group.10 
But most seriously of all, there had been a number of violent clashes during the January 
to March demonstrations involving fighting and rock-throwing between rival groups of
7 This was an issue that educational institutions all over Indonesia had to come to grips with during 
1966-7.
8 See McVey 1990: 20 and 23. A small number of faculty staff had been arrested in the general 
crackdown on the left following the coup: these included Dra Ina Slamet, Drs Jan Ave, and Drs Kamil.
9 Screening committees were established in work-places and in government departments throughout the 
country as part of the drive to eradicate communists and leftists.
10 See Chapter 3, p.125.
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students. Several of these incidents had occurred on the University of Indonesia campus 
at Salemba while it was occupied by militant students supporting the Tritura cause.11 
Subsequently it was alleged that pro-Sukarno and left-wing students had treacherously 
participated in attacks on their own campus. Following the political eclipse of Sukarno 
and the organised left in Indonesia and the atmosphere of recrimination and revenge 
prevailing in many quarters by early 1967, such allegations were sufficient to ensure that 
any students who had been prominent members of one of the left-wing student 
organisations were blocked by the screening committees from resuming their university 
studies.12
Soe Hok-gie's own attitude towards these developments was not entirely 
consistent. Given his views about the university as a preserve of free and frank debate 
without the threat of physical intimidation, it was not surprising that he would react 
angrily when he discovered that some of his fellow students had been involved in attacks 
on their own university. In April 1966 Radio Ampera had broadcast an emotional 
onslaught against left-wing student groups, calling for the expulsion of those who had 
tried to invade the University of Indonesia campus.13 Early the following year, in an 
article directed at new students taking part in the orientation program, Soe reminded his 
readers of those who had 'betrayed' the university a year earlier.14
11 See Chapter 4, pp. 165-6, 179 and 188.
12 For an impassioned defence of the work of the screening committees at the University of Indonesia, 
see the editorial by KAMI activist Khoe Hok Kie in the special edition of the university magazine Alma 
Mater, No.5/6, August 1966. Though it is impossible to determine precisely how many students were 
affected, anecdotal evidence from confidential interviews with former GMNI and CGMI activists suggests 
that a large number of students who had been members of those organisations were dismissed from the 
university and were never able to complete their degrees or graduate. Exact details of the number of 
students adversely affected at the Faculty of Letters are also unknown. It seems that some students who 
had not been particularly active managed to hide their previous membership of left-wing organisations. 
Those who had been prominent activists, however, quietly disappeared, although a small number were 
caught up in the anti-communist wave of arrests, including the younger sister of PKI politburo member 
and Harlan Rakjat editor, Nyoto. According to reports, at least one female student was raped by her 
captors, a not uncommon fate for many female PKI activists and the wives and daughters of party 
members.
13 See 'Mengapa ASU dkk harus dikeluarkan dari universitas?' (Why must ASU and their associates be 
expelled from the university?), broadcast 24 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966b: 15.
14 See Alma Mater sebagai sumber inspirasi' (The Alma Mater as a source of inspiration), Alma Mater, 
(Mapram issue), February-March, 1967.
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Yet by the time he took over as senate leader some months later, it seems that his 
views had to some extent shifted. In a similar vein to some of the developments in his 
thinking about the wider political world, Soe appears to have decided that the witch- 
hunting and persecution that was occurring within the academic community was far in 
excess of natural justice.
Towards the end of 1967 the sociologist Harsja Bachtiar returned from post­
graduate studies in the United States and was appointed as assistant dean at 
Rawamangun. Despite strong objections from both staff and students - including some 
of his own friends - Soe gave his support to Harsja Bachtiar's decision to readmit a 
number of staff and students who had been suspended. Some of these individuals had 
been mere followers and had played no political role of any consequence, while others 
were the unfortunate victims of blind prejudice and guilt by association. On the other 
hand, it was decided that those lecturers who were regarded as 'communists' were to be 
dismissed.
In a series of letters to his friend Herman Lantang, Soe described in some detail
these developments and the hostile reaction that followed:
Harsja is also a decisive person. He has decided to reinstate A ---- as a teacher and
activist at FSUI. The head of department has contacted the senate (myself) to ask our 
opinion. I said that I was in agreement and was prepared to face up to anyone who tries 
to stir up trouble. I merely emphasised the principle that we want to rid the university
of political influences. Harsja is also solving the problem of B ----who will probably
be reinstated. The extremists will probably cause uproar and produce anti-communist 
slogans but I'm certain that with decisiveness on the part of the assistant dean and the 
senate, this issue can be settled. On the other hand, those lecturers who are clearly
communists like C ---- , D -----, E -----, F -----etc will be dismissed. But not those
who were just followers. ^
But a few days later he wrote again describing in some detail the howls of protest that had 
erupted from staff and students. Most disappointing was the reaction of some of his 
closest friends:
What distresses me is not that the students aren't supporting me. I'm always alone and 
gambling with fate. Most distressing is that the group that calls itself the alma mater 
and Sastra's finest still has such a short-sighted view. I just told them that the issue I 
was facing was one of principle. I'm going to press on even though I'm alone. And if
1  ^ Letter to Herman Lantang, 26 November 1967. Soe's friend was in Irian Jaya conducting 
anthropological fieldwork. The actual names have been deleted from this extract.
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a majority of the senate and our inner group do not accept my policy, I will hand in my 
resignation. I have nothing to lose but my job. In fact so-called freedom of speech is 
non-existent. Only Dahana and Janti understand my position. Most just abstain and 
obey because I'm ketua senat. ^
It was at such moments when life in Jakarta became intolerable that Soe turned with 
relief to his beloved mountains.17 In the closing months of 1967 he took every 
opportunity he could to escape from these problems into the solitude of the high 
mountains. There were climbing trips to Gede and Pangrango, to Salak, and on his 
twenty-fifth birthday, to Telaga Bodas near Garut in West Java with a small group of 
Mapala friends including the Sinar Harapan editor, Aristides Katoppo.
But on his return, he wrote again to his friend, still depressed by the growing gulf
that appeared to separate him from his fellow students:
Other factors that make me feel 'alone' at present is that I'm increasingly misunderstood 
by friends. They complain that I'm pig-headed. Maybe they are right. But I can't 
change my personality. I don't want to change my convictions as long as I believe I'm 
right. And I don't want to become one of the mob whose private opinions are decided 
by placards, slogans and intimidation. Because the PKI was in error, then everything 
connected with the PKI must be avoided. Perhaps people like me can only emerge in a 
moment of crisis. After that, society needs leaders who are more moderate. And they 
don't think creatively, they are too pragmatic. Sometimes I'm frightened to think about 
the future.
This week I've been doing a lot of thinking. Especially since I returned from the 
mountains. Maybe because I've had less work to do and I've been preoccupied with my 
own thoughts. No sadness, no regrets, nothing at all really. It's as if everything is like 
a cold wind that makes you shiver, but I have no choice but to accept it. I just don't 
have the enthusiasm of last year. Maybe I'm too worn out and just want to finish my 
thesis. Maybe all of this is some sort of sign that my world is different from that of 
my younger friends. It seems that quiet voices are knocking on the door inviting me to 
leave this world that I've been a part of for so long. With its laughter, its quarrels, its 
gossip etc. I'll have to face up to it all.
Maybe this is a rather strange letter to you. And maybe a letter like this is not what 
you expected. If so, I'm sorry, I'm only complaining just to you.18
1(1 Letter to Herman Lantang, 3 December 1967. Dahana and Janti were fellow students.
17 In December 1966 Soe had taken over as chairperson of Mapala. Throughout the following year he 
organised a number of major ventures, including trips to Mt. Ceramai in West Java in March and to Mt. 
Slamet in Central Java in August. He wrote a lively and lengthy account of the latter expedition for 
Kompas: see 'Menaklukkan Gunung Slamet' (Conquering Mt. Slamet), Kompas, 14, 15, 16 and 18 
September 1967.
18 Letter to Herman Lantang, 25 December 1967
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Student politics: KAMI under the New Order
It was not only the internal affairs of his own campus that was the cause of Soe's 
low spirits in the final months of 1967. As noted already, he was also deeply troubled by 
the direction that national politics appeared to be taking under the New Order led by 
General Soeharto: the absence of any serious attempts at systematic democratic reform, 
the survival of too many political figures tainted by their association with the Guided 
Democracy period, and signs of growing repression and intolerance in public life. One 
additional aspect of national politics about which he had grave misgivings - and one 
which touched directly on campus affairs - was his increasing concern about the place of 
KAMI as an organisation claiming to represent the interests and aspirations of all 
Indonesian university students. In a structural sense, KAMI was nothing more than a 
loose coalition of a number of externally-based student organisations. It had been hastily 
formed in October 1965 when PPMI - the existing peak body of Indonesian student clubs 
and societies - had been unable to respond effectively to the rapidly changing political 
circumstances that prevailed after the failed coup attempt.
Although Soe had regarded KAMI’S emergence and the role it had played in 
initiating the student demonstrations in January of 1966 as a positive development, as a 
campus-based activist he soon began to entertain doubts about KAMI'S viability over the 
longer term. He had noted that most of the foremost KAMI Pusat identities had failed the 
test of leadership by their absence from the streets during February and early March when 
the student demonstrations were at their most intense and dangerous. Some had further 
angered him by publicly advocating compliance with the government's demands that 
students abandon their lecture strike and return to classes.
After March 11, the KAMI leaders had nevertheless reemerged into public 
prominence. Ironically, by the middle of 1966 when Soe was actively persuading 
students to return to their schools and campuses and suggesting that it was time for
KAMI to dissolve itself, KAMI Pusat activists began manoeuvring to create a permanent 
place for themselves within the political forums of the New Order.
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In the final months of 1966 - and especially after the disastrous clash between 
student demonstrators and Kostrad troops in Jakarta on 3 October - the idea took shape to 
appoint a group of student representatives to sit in the MPRS and DPR-GR.19 The 
KAMI activists argued that since students had played such a key role in the January to 
March period in support of the Tritura, they had earned the right to have their voices 
heard in these forums. Moreover, they held the view that the battle against Sukarno and 
his supporters was far from over and that student representatives could play a vital role in 
helping to defeat the Old Order elements remaining in the MPRS. The issue took on a 
renewed urgency in the leadup to the all-important March 1967 session of the MPRS. 
Though some sections of the student movement, notably the independent-minded 
Bandung branch of KAMI, rejected the idea as 'not yet necessary', KAMI Pusat activists 
were strongly in favour, negotiating with Soeharto and his advisors over the compilation 
of a list of possible candidates.20
When Soeharto authorised the release of the list of new members of the restructured 
MPRS and DPG-GR at the end of January 1967 fourteen student activists were included 
among them.21 As one of those who had argued from m id-1966 that students should 
abandon political activism and resume their studies, Soe Hok-gie was fundamentally 
opposed to these appointments. Throughout the following year he watched subsequent
19 The issue of student appointees to the parliament and the national assembly had actually been 
canvassed some months earlier prior to the June MPRS session. See the articles for and against the 
proposal in Sinar Harapan on 7, 12 and 14 May. On this occasion HMI activist Mar'ie Muhammad 
argued in favour of student representation.
20 For KAMI Bandung's statement rejecting the idea of student representation, see the front page of 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.25, Week 1, December 1966. A few days later the views of KAMI Pusat 
chairman, Cosmas Batubara, were also widely reported: see 'Orba wadjar dapat kursi' (The New Order 
should obtain seats), Sinar Harapan, 7 December 1966.
21 The following thirteen individuals were listed as representing university students: Slamet
Sukirnanto, T. Zulfadli, Fahmi Idris, Mar'ie Muhammad, Firdaus Wadjdi, Soegeng Sarjadi, Cosmas 
Batubara, Liem Bian Khoen, Djoni Simanjuntak, David Napitupulu, Zamroni, Yozar Anwar, and Salam 
Sumangat. In addition, Harian KAMI editor Nono Anwar Makarim was appointed as a representative of 
IPMI. With the exception of Soegeng Sarjadi, who was from Bandung, all were KAMI Pusat or KAMI 
Jaya activists.
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developments closely. During this period both he and his brother Hok-djin contributed a 
series of articles to the Indonesian press that constituted a powerful critique of those who 
sat as student representatives in the legislative chambers and also of KAMI as an 
organisation claiming to represent the interests of the entire student community.22
The basic principle underpinning all their arguments was their belief that students 
should act as a 'moral force' in the political life of the nation, rather than as a 'political 
force'.23 By this they meant that students should only emerge as political actors at 
moments of extreme crisis, as indeed they had in early 1966. When that crisis was over 
they believed that students should return to their campuses and their vocation. 
Furthermore, they should not expect rewards for their intervention and it was 
inappropriate for them to seek to hold positions in government office as officials or as 
legislators.
During the latter half of 1966, Soe considered that the real nature of KAMI as a 
loose coalition of competing sectional interests was rapidly reemerging. On several 
occasions he drew a telling comparison between KAMI and the discredited former PPMI, 
stressing that despite the quite different political circumstances in which each operated, 
both bodies shared similar structural flaws which KAMI needed to address urgently if it 
was ever to function effectively as Indonesia's peak student forum.24 As it was 
constituted, Soe believed that it was impossible for KAMI to act as an independent voice
22 For the first of these articles, see Soe Hok-djin's 'Tjatatan singkat tentang masuknja wakil2 
mahasiswa kedlm lembaga^ konstitutionil' (Brief notes on the entry of student representatives into the 
constitutional forums), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.35, 12 February 1967, and Soe Hok-gie's 'Beladjar dari 
kesalahan^ PPMI’ (Learn from PPMI's mistakes), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.44, Week 3, April 1967.
23 The idea of students as a 'moral force' had its origins in the text of a Radio Ampera broadcast prepared 
by Soe Hok-djin in April 1966. See 'Awas penjakit pahlawan gadungan' (Watch out for the bogus 
heroes' disease), broadcast 5 and 6 April 1966, Radio Ampera 1966a: 16-7. In response to widespread 
reports of student excesses - demands for money, 'borrowing' of vehicles and so on - Radio Ampera drew 
upon an example from popular Western movie culture, that of Shane the lone cowboy who arrives to 
defend the townspeople against the bandits who have been robbing, raping and pillaging the district. 
After the bandits have been challenged and eliminated and while the townspeople are discussing the 
rewards they intend to shower on their benefactor, Shane quietly rides out of town into the hills. Though 
seemingly corny and superficial, the example was one that everyone was familiar with and was intended 
to impress upon students that their political role was limited and temporary.
24 See 'Beladjar dari kesalahan2 PPMI' (Learn from PPMI's mistakes), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.44, 
Week 3, April 1967.
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speaking on behalf of Indonesian tertiary students since, like PPMI, almost all of the 
member organisations represented on KAMI'S central presidium had close ties to adult- 
world political parties or religious groupings. It was inevitable that as soon as the issue 
of Sukarno and his followers was finally put to rest, these differences would reassert 
themselves. Thus KAMI'S supposed unity he considered to be a fragile commodity.
In fact, as soon as news of the plan to appoint a group of students to the 
MPRS/DPR-GR became public knowledge, bickering between KAMI'S member bodies 
began in earnest. These conflicting interests became even more obvious after the student 
representatives took their places in the legislature, for not only were they unable to act as 
a united bloc but several of the most prominent individuals openly aligned themselves 
with the political parties or groupings with which their own particular organisations were 
closely linked. As time passed it became increasingly difficult to find any major issue on 
which KAMI activists could speak with one voice.25
In Soe's opinion KAMI was therefore incapable of nurturing campus 
independence. On the contrary, the competition and rivalries existing between KAMI'S 
constituent elements threatened to involve students in the political and sectarian divisions 
of the outside world more than ever. As Soe emphasised in his public critique, KAMI 
itself was a quite undemocratic entity: neither those who sat on its central presidium or 
the student representatives in the legislature had been chosen directly by the wider student 
body, nor was there any mechanism for rank and file students to exercise control over 
their actions. The absence of any checks and balances resulted in a complete lack of 
accountability. Soe summed up the position of the KAMI activists with characteristic 
bluntness:
KAMI Pusat has finally become nothing more than a student clique of vested interests.
Most KAMI activists are just big shots who exist by exploiting their status as
25 KAMI'S inability to surmount the divided loyalties and conflicting interests of its member 
organisations was clearly demonstrated by its failure to produce a satisfactory response to an outbreak of 
anti-Christian violence in Makassar (Ujung Pandang) in October 1967. See the report in Sinar Harapan, 
3 October 1967. Islamic activists on KAMI'S central presidium refused to agree to a joint statement 
condemning attacks on churches. At the local level PMKRI withdrew from KAMI in South Sulawesi in 
protest.
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university students. On average they are around thirty and have repeatedly failed to 
graduate to the next class because they rarely attend lectures. They are no longer 
university students involved in politics but politicians with student cards.26
Not surprisingly there was an ever-widening gulf between these erstwhile student 
politicians and the ordinary students whom in theory they were supposed to represent. It 
soon became apparent that the leading KAMI activists were neither interested in nor 
competent to deal with those day-to-day issues which were of most significance to 
ordinary students, such as the quality of the education they were receiving, the condition 
of university resources such as libraries and laboratories, and the provision of better 
sporting facilities. Although initially, as Soe himself was prepared to admit, KAMI had 
been a popular body and news of the appointment of student representatives to the 
MPRS/DPR-GR had been broadly supported by the bulk of the students who had been 
part of the Tritura campaign, by late 1967 there had been a dramatic shift in campus 
opinion with signs of growing anger and cynicism.27
An important factor in this process was the issue of corruption within KAMI 
itself.28 In addition to various complaints about petty corruption, photographs and 
reports appearing in the Indonesian press of KAMI leaders in suits and ties hobnobbing 
with officials while on overseas 'study-tours' and 'fact-finding missions' did nothing for 
their reputations on campus. What possible justification could there be for these foreign 
trips, students wondered? Who selected the individuals concerned and how were these 
trips financed? Most damaging of all, however, were the revelations surfacing in the
26 ’Moga-moga KAMI tidak mendjadi neo PPMI - menjambut dua tahun KAMI' (Let's hope KAMI 
doesn't become a neo PPMI - celebrating two years of KAMI), Kompas, 25 and 26 October 1967. For a 
thoughtful critical commentary on Soe's article see Goenawan Mohamad's Apa jang sebaiknja diperbaiki 
dalam KAMI' (What should be reformed within KAMI), Kompas, 28 and 30 October 1967.
27 The sharply worded critiques appearing in the Jakarta press written by Soe and his brother played an 
important part in this change in public opinion. In addition to the articles already mentioned, see Arief 
Budiman's 'Mahasiswa seharusnja djadi pedjuang moral, sebuah pendapat ttg. organisasi KAMI' (Students 
should be a moral force, one opinion about KAMI), Sinar Harapan, 23, 26 and 27 September 1967. Soe 
Hok-djin had changed his name to Arief Budiman in May 1967.
28 In September 1967 Soe had angered KAMI Pusat leaders by his references to corruption in his report 
of a conversation with a young village official during a Mapala climbing trip:
Some of the KAMI leaders are also thieves. They're corrupt, they're in uproar over 
seats, over the gifts of cars, and are always talking nonsense.
See 'Menaklukkan Gunung Slamet' (Conquering Mt Slamet), Kompas, 14 September 1967. Soe was 
called to confront the fifteen-member presidium to justify his remarks but refused.
Jakarta press in the latter half of 1967 that some of the KAMI leaders who had been 
appointed to the legislative bodies were involved in the racket over the acquisition of 
motor vehicles by members of parliament.29
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Soe's prediction that the acceptance of seats in the legislature was 'poison wrapped 
in honey' was confirned by these developments. It was impossible, in his opinion, for 
KAMI Pusat activists to talk seriously about eradicating corruption in public life when 
KAMI itself was incapable of putting its own house in order. In fact, when it came to the 
issue of corruption most of the KAMI leaders were at best reduced to dealing in platitudes 
and generalities. How could those activists who had close ties to certain senior political 
figures or parties, themselves allegedly involved in shady business dealings or serious 
high-level corruption, publicly attack their own benefactors?30
Soe's early warnings about KAMI'S shortcomings fell on deaf ears. By late 1967
he decided that KAMI'S position was almost irretrievable:
On 25 October KAMI will celebrate its second anniversary. KAMI'S third year is going 
to be even more difficult. Within the student world itself frustration and apathy are on 
the increase. Students are in panic and are repeatedly asking about their leaders who are 
back and forth overseas, about stories of student leaders' moral decadence, about violent 
arguments higher up, about letting down the tyres of the car owned by the KAMI 
presidium leaders at the Arief Rachman Hakim regiment's headquarters, and a thousand 
and one other questions. On the other hand there is an atmosphere of mutual suspicion 
within KAMI'S presidium. If we regard KAMI as a ship the prevailing atmosphere is as 
follows. The ship's officers are quarrelling about the direction of its course, although a 
hurricane has started to blow. The sailors are already fed up and are considering mutiny. 
KAMI'S third year is a year full of question marks. Quo vadis KAMI?31
29 Members of Indonesia's legislative bodies were allocated Holden Special motor cars under privileged 
financing arrangements that reduced the price of these vehicles to a level far below their prevailing market 
value. The Jakarta press was full of reports of the scandal during late 1967. See, for example, Sinar 
Harapan, 12 October 1967, and the critical reaction from Bandung student activists in Mahasiswa 
Indonesia, No.71, 22 October 1967.
30 The most blatant example of this was the case of the seemingly inconsequential Pelmasi, a student 
organisation with a small membership but one which was closely linked to the army-backed trade union 
body SOKSI. SOKSI was headed by Brigadier General Suhardiman who had been widely criticised over 
the PT Berdikari affair. Soe also suggested that the PMKRI-Partai Katolik and PMII-NU connections 
were other examples of the same problem.
31 'Moga-moga KAMI tidak mendjadi neo PPMI' (Let's hope KAMI doesn't become a neo PPMI), 
Kompas, 25 and 26 October 1967. (It had been reported that some of those who had missed out on the 
opportunity for perks of office were so enraged that the tyres of a KAMI leader's vehicle were deflated on 
at least one such occasion.)
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Student politics: 'intra-extra' conflict increases
In addition to his pessimistic assessment of KAMI as a flawed and floundering 
body, by late 1967 Soe was also seriously concerned about the increasing level of 
involvement in campus affairs being displayed by some of those student organisations 
that sat on KAMI'S central presidium.
The various student clubs and societies that had their headquarters and secretariats 
outside the university campus were known as the 'extra' element (ormas extra) in 
Indonesian student affairs, to distinguish them from those 'intra' level bodies, the 
university student councils and faculty senates. These ormas extra, some of them based 
on political affiliations, others with a religious focus, had always been a prominent 
feature of Indonesian student politics. Yet Soe had always been suspicious of them, 
regarding them as too narrowly-based, too divisive and essentially only concerned with 
looking after the interests of their own constituency rather than those of the wider student 
community. Since many of these organisations had close links to the political world 
beyond the campus, he believed that there was a real danger of repeating the mistakes of 
the Guided Democracy era. During that period GMNI and its political allies CGMI and 
Perhimi had dominated 'extra' university forums such as PPMI, and had steadily 
managed to wrest control of the 'intra' student bodies - the student councils and senates - 
at many tertiary institutions throughout the country. With these left-wing student 
organisations effectively eliminated, the path was now clear for HMI, as the largest and 
most powerful student organisation in the country, to exert its authority over its rivals in 
both 'extra' and 'intra' student affairs.
While the position of independently-minded anti-ormas students at the Faculty of 
Letters was never seriously threatened, during 1967 the University of Indonesia Student 
Council and most of the other faculty senates came under the control of students who 
were members of these student organisations, with HMI activists holding the most 
prominent positions.
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As usual the university's official orientation program (Mapram) became an occasion 
for particular activity since the various ormas used this as an opportunity to sign up new 
members. Consequently, even at Rawamangun there were several angry confrontations 
during the 1968 Mapram, held at the beginning of February, as both HMI and PMKRI 
activists demanded access to the names and addresses of new students and tried to 
enforce compulsory attendance at lectures and religious observances for students of their 
own religious persuasion. Soe as ketua senat and the group of anti-ormas students who 
were responsible for the Mapram program at the Rawamangun campus were implacably 
opposed to the idea of compulsion. Despite considerable pressure from the university's 
Mapram central organising committee, and from senior HMI and PMKRI activists, the 
independent group managed to resist their demands, although Soe found the experience
both exhausting and emotionally draining, as he related to his friend Herman:
The Centre [the University of Indonesia's Mapram body] decided that its Spiritual 
Affairs section was going to give a 2-3 hour lecture every day between 6 pm and about 
8 pm. The Faculty of Letters refused and so the UI Mapram general chairman (from 
HMI) arrived. There was an intense all-night debate between Dahana/Tabrani and Akbar 
Tanjung (HMI's chairman) and his friends from the IAIN. In addition Jones, Maman,
Tenan and Purba were up against the HMI students who wanted to enforce their 
demands. Thank heavens it didn't come to a fight. The Letters students were united in 
their refusal, better to withdraw from the Centre if continuing to be compelled. We 
stressed that religion should not be trivialised and politicised. Eventually the Centre 
gave in and there was no further insistence. Letters was the only faculty that was able 
to hold out.
At Letters prayers were voluntary and not compulsory. Nominal Muslims did not have 
to pray (like last year). At the Law Faculty the students assembled at 5am and were 
compelled to perform dawn prayers. Those who could not pray were given instructions.
The HMI students were quite excessive in their offensive....
In the past we fought against 'revolution' and now we are opposed to 'God'. It's far 
tougher now, and only people with courage are able to unmask the hypocrites. It's as if 
they alone are the owners of God, and all of us know nothing.32
After instancing a similar battle with PMKRI activists Soe concluded:
This Mapram made me thoroughly exhausted, especially mentally. On the one hand 
opposing the sabotage of HMI and PMKRI and on the other hand preventing the over­
reaction of Udin and Judi. Udin openly accused the ormas of being Nekolim and if a 
HMI activist appeared he would shout: 'the owner of God has come'. I was horrified to 
see him. But I was also proud that the Faculty of Letters is now one of the last 
bastions of the 'alma mater' group that is still on the attack. The Faculty of Letters 
senate is the only one that has dared to discuss the issue of dancing with the rector, that
32 Letter to Herman Lantang, 18 February 1968. Soe's letter was written just as the Mapram ended. A 
number of his 'alma mater' group friends are mentioned, including Dahana who was appointed by the 
senate to organise the orientation program at Rawamangun.
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has rejected the corrupt UI Student Representative Council, that defends freedom of 
expression and opposes the nonsense of the New O rd e rt
In addition to the particular problems associated with the February 1968 Mapram, 
Soe's letter makes plain his growing frustration with many other aspects of the 
University of Indonesia's internal affairs. In fact, he had already begun to share these 
concerns with others. From at least early February he had initiated a series of private 
meetings with a small group of fellow students drawn from across the various faculties of 
the university at which a wide range of issues of mutual concern were analysed and 
discussed.34 Despite their different backgrounds the group shared a common view that 
the university's reputation was being put at risk by the activities of those student leaders 
who placed narrow sectional interests ahead of the welfare of the wider student 
community, and who, it was alleged, had frequently misused their positions of leadership 
for their own private gain. The group also shared Soe's views about the importance of 
protecting and enhancing the place of the university as a bastion of vigorous and 
independent intellectual endeavour. Like Soe, they were also committed to resisting any 
attempts by outside elements to interfere in student and university affairs.
After several months of deliberations the group decided to announce their existence 
to the rest of the university community. Calling themselves the University of Indonesia 
Discussion Group (Group Diskusi Universitas Indonesia), seventeen students released a 
joint statement in early July setting out their views on a range of issues.35 Though 
clearly the expression of a minority view, the declaration was a direct challenge to those
33 Letter to Herman Lantang, 18 February 1968
34 SHG Diary, 2 and 4 February 1968. Although Soe's earlier custom of jotting down his thoughts was 
not resumed until the middle of that year, some of his appointments and activities during the early 
months of 1968 are recorded in his 1968 diary.
35 See 'Pernjataan 2 Djuli 1968' (Declaration of 2 July 1968), stencilled pamphlet, Group Diskusi UI. 
The full text of the statement also appeared in Mahasiswa Indonesia, N o .Ill, 28 July 1968. The 
following were the signatories: Antonius Wijana (Letters), Aulia Rachman (Law), Benny Mamoto 
(Psychology), Dahana (Letters), Djoko Martanto (Engineering), Fauri Ch. Munir (Economics), Gulardi 
Hanifa (Medicine), Harry Victor (Psychology), Marully (Law), Rudy Hutapea (Economics), Sarsanto 
(Medicine), Sjahrir (Economics), Soe Hok-gie (Letters), Susanto (Engineering), Uno Bintang Sudibjo 
(Engineering), Vidiapaty (Medicine), Heru Baskoro (Economics). The text of the declaration was written 
by Soe and his friend Sjahrir from the Economics Faculty, who was the other prime mover in the 
formation of the Discussion Group. Interviews with Sjahrir, July 1978
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students who controlled the existing University of Indonesia Student Council (DMUI) 
and marked the beginning of a campaign to reform the prevailing system of student
governance at the University of Indonesia:
Based on our experiences and our lengthy and deep discussions we have observed that 
there are a great many aspects of university life that do not conform with the purposes 
of higher education. We are aware that within the University of Indonesia student 
community a great many irregularities remain. The structure of student life is still 
determined by divisiveness, ideology and narrow sectional interests. Of the student 
leadership at the University of Indonesia at present, there are many who are involved in 
dishonest activities, including manipulation, corruption and other kinds of amoral 
behaviour.
Academic freedom and academic responsibility are still frequently ignored and replaced 
by attitudes of intolerance and dogmatism, resulting in the thinking of UI people 
becoming limited and narrowminded. Meanwhile the health of the student community, 
its character as youth, is interfered with and even terrorised by the slogans of Panca 
Sila, religion, national identity and so forth. We consider that attitudes such as these 
threaten the fundamental significance of the University as a centre for research, 
education and public service.36
Some months prior to the release of their public manifesto the Discussion Group 
students held talks with the university's rector, Professor Sumantri Brodjonegoro, to 
inform him of their existence and to outline their concerns.37 The announcement of their 
existence to the wider public and the elaboration of their views were merely the opening 
shots in a protracted and increasingly bitter debate about the nature of student affairs 
inside the University of Indonesia in which Soe was to be a central figure.
National affairs: the rising tide of authoritarian politics
During 1967 Soe had begun to immerse himself once again in day-to-day student 
affairs at the Faculty of Letters' Rawamangun campus. Yet although this world was of 
immense importance to him, it was never totally exclusive, for he continued to cast a 
sharply critical eye on political developments occurring outside the campus as the 
Soeharto-led New Order continued to take shape.
36 This passage is from the preamble to the 2 July Declaration. The document went on to outline the 
group's views on three specific matters: the present parlous state of student affairs at the University of 
Indonesia and, in particular, the failings of the present crop of student leaders; the fundamental importance 
of protecting and enhancing academic independence and freedom of expression; and a commitment to the 
notion of ’modernisation' and 'secularisation' within contemporary national and social development. See 
'Pernjatataan 2 July 1868'.
37 SHG Diary, 12 April 1968
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In mid December 1967, the prominent afternoon Jakarta daily, Sinar Harapan, 
carried a feature article on its front page under the following bold headline: 'General Ne 
Win's Political Detainees - Democracy Crushed Under the Boot of the Burmese Army'. 
A few days later, a second article appeared, this time entitled rather less dramatically, 
'Ghana Under Military Rule'.38
Soe Hok-gie was the author of both articles, which briefly recounted the overthrow 
of ineffectual and corrupt civilian rule in both Burma and Ghana, after coups by senior 
military officers. Drawing on reports by the widely-respected human rights organisation, 
Amnesty International, Soe's articles described how the consolidation of power by a 
highly authoritarian military junta in both countries had led to a significant diminution in 
the freedoms of the press, speech and association, and had given rise to a wide range of 
civil rights abuses, in particular the incarceration of thousands of political opponents of 
the military rulers under harsh conditions and without recourse to a fair trial.
Although Indonesia was scarcely mentioned in either article, it would have been 
perfectly plain to Soe's readers that he was sounding a grim warning about the growing 
threat posed by the excessive concentration of political power in the hands of the circle of 
senior army officers led by Acting President Soeharto, and the emerging trend to 
emasculate further those elements within Indonesian civil society who wished to see the 
nation directed towards some form of responsible democratic government.
The implicit message in Soe's articles soon proved to be almost prophetic when on 
New Year's Day 1968 the Jakarta political elite was rocked by the news of the arrest of 
the prominent lawyer and public defender, Yap Thiam Hien. Yap had first risen to public 
prominence during 1966 for his robust and conscientious defence of the ex-Foreign 
Minister, Dr Subandrio, at the Special Military Court following the abortive coup. 
Subsequently, Yap - a devout Christian and a staunch advocate of the restoration of 'the
38 See ’Tawanan2 politik Djend. Ne Win’ (Gen. Ne Win's political detainees), Sinar Harapan, 18 
December 1967; and 'Ghana, dibawah pemerintahan militer' (Ghana, under military rule), Sinar Harapan, 
22 December 1967.
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rule of law' in Indonesia - had gained a reputation as a lawyer who was prepared to take 
on difficult cases in the courts, especially when it involved defending the poor and under­
privileged against arbitrary or corrupt use of power by civilian or military officials. 
Towards the end of 1967, in the course of defending a client facing criminal charges, Yap 
had made a number of serious allegations in open court, accusing a senior police 
commander and a prominent public prosecutor of corruption. His arrest on what were 
widely believed to be tmmped-up charges, was a blatant attempt to intimidate him and to 
undermine his public credibility.39
News of the arrest spread quickly throughout Jakarta, provoking immediate outrage 
from a wide cross-section of prominent public figures, including fellow lawyers, 
intellectuals, newspaper editors and columnists. In the days that followed there was a 
steady stream of editorials, feature articles and letters in the Jakarta press calling for 
Yap's release. Soe Hok-gie was therefore not the only individual to spring to Yap's 
defence, but his own spirited appeal was one of the most powerful.40 Significantly, the 
three words he chose to use to describe Yap encapsulated those qualities he most admired 
in a public figure: honest, courageous and consistent (jujur, berani dan konsekwen). In a 
deliberate attempt to counter the smear currently being put about that Yap had been a 
prominent member of the proscribed Chinese peranakan organisation, Baperki, and 
therefore a closet leftist, Soe by-lined his article 'Soe Hok-gie - Ex-member of the 
Kodam V/Jaya team to investigate Baperki documents'.41
Soe was deeply disturbed by the Yap affair, for it seemed to be symptomatic of 
those trends at work within society that had troubled him throughout the previous twelve 
months. Above all, it set him thinking again about the threat posed by the arbitrary use of
39 The PT Quick affair was widely reported in the Indonesian press in early 1968. See also Lev 1972: 
278-8.
40 'Yap Thiam jang saja kenal' (Yap Thiam whom I know), Harian KAMI, 6 January 1968
41 During December 1965 Soe was part of a group of LPKB activists who had been appointed by the 
army to examine Baperki affairs. See Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1965b: 53.
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power against those who were weak and defenceless, and the grave danger that arose 
when political smear and innuendo were substituted for open and honest public debate.
Over the following week, Soe prepared a second article for the Jakarta press that 
sought to address some of these fundamental concerns. He took as the focus for his 
essay The Crucible, the powerful 1953 drama by the American playwright, Arthur Miller, 
which had used the narrative of the Salem witch-hunts of 1692 as a political allegory to 
highlight the anti-communist hysteria that had swept the United States during the early 
1950s. In his published article, Soe reviewed the broad outlines of the play in some 
detail for his Indonesian readers, quoting some of the memorable dialogue and explaining 
the contemporary political parallels Miller intended his audiences to draw. But Soe urged
his readers to consider The Crucible as a work with a message of much wider relevance:
This drama is applicable anywhere. In America those people who do not believe in 
'communist witches' are Proctor. In Russia those people who do not believe in 
'capitalist witches' are Proctor. The tendency within a society to look for scapegoats is 
a powerful one and the wider society will follow along with this. Anything that is 
regarded as unpalatable is linked to this fundamental cause....
In Indonesia nowadays the Salem drama is still taking place. Society has problems that 
cannot be explained (because people lack the courage to think). And so they search out 
scapegoats - Sukarno, the Old Order, subversive foreign Chinese, PKI remnants, 
political guerillas etc. It is not my intention to declare that these have become victims 
of slander. They really are guilty (and this has been proven). But they are not the cause 
of every problem. Our economy is in a mess not merely because of Sukarno, the PKI 
and the Old Order. The fundamental reason is because we are lazy, corrupt and lack the 
ability to think for ourselves. If the Pancasila Front, KAMI and KAPPI have grown 
weak, it is not because of PKI infiltration. The prime reason is because, since the 
defeat of the PKI-PNI, the political parties and student organisations have been fighting 
among themselves over official positions and opportunities.
Through his play Arthur Miller actually said NO to McCarthyism in his country. At 
that point communists were being pursued like witches, and the victims included those 
who had supported left-wing movements like Paul Robeson, Berthold Brecht (who 
wrote film scripts for Hollywood after fleeing from the Nazis) and Charlie Chaplin. 
Oppenheimer (the first head of the Congress for Cultural Freedom), the famous US 
atomic scientist, also became a victim because he and several other scientists refused to 
go along with nuclear research activities for military purposes.
I have also been greatly concerned to observe McCarthyism occurring on a limited scale 
in Indonesia at the present time. Pak Kasur, the former head of the Indonesian Teachers'
Union (that was affiliated with the PKI) has been completely destroyed as if he was a 
sorcerer. Yet the issue should be put in proportion. He was accused of teaching little 
children the song Nasakom, whereas those who developed Nasakom policies themselves 
(all parties were involved) have not been criticised any further.
Liem Tjeng Hoat has been singled out for having connections with a subversive 
network from China, because communist books were found in his former warehouse.
In every society in chaos there is always a tendency to look for scapegoats and follow 
mass hysteria. Those who display common sense will become the victims. But if we
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follow the mainstream we will be destroyed. At times like this, people of integrity are 
called upon to rescue society.42
Soe's concern over the rising level of intolerance and the implicit dangers of 
military authoritarian rule merely compounded his growing doubts about the nature of the 
Indonesian polity that was beginning to emerge under Soeharto's leadership. While it 
appeared to him that the New Order government's efforts to reform and rebuild the 
Indonesian economy and its rapid abandonment of Sukarno's brinksmanship foreign 
policy were measures to be applauded, serious questions remained about its domestic 
political agenda. There were no indications that Soeharto had any real commitment to 
building effective representative political institutions. The existing DPR-GR was in 
Soe's view a degenerate legislative body that no longer conformed to political realities. 
The entry of the thirteen student representatives into that body was nothing more than 
window-dressing. In any case, Soe was scornful of their performance and he had 
nothing but contempt for most of the older generation political party figures who 
remained: in his view these were the 'yes men' who had sold out to Sukarno in the past 
and who were now only intent on political survival. But there was nothing to suggest 
that Soeharto was prepared to countenance a serious restructuring that would permit the 
entry of fresh faces, for example the so-called 'independent group' forces or some of the 
younger Islamic political activists.43
One issue of profound importance to him was the quality of some of the key 
personnel that had attained positions of power and authority in the New Order regime. 
Jakarta gossip circles were alive with stories of the blatant corruption and high living of a 
number of senior military officers who had been appointed to key positions. During 
1967 there had been frequent references to the most glaring cases, especially in the two
42 'Arthur Miller dan intoleransi’ (Arthur Miller and intolerance), Kompas, 16 January 1968. Liem 
Tjeng Hoat may have been one of the many Sino-Indonesians who were arrested in a general crack-down 
on the Indonesian Chinese community during 1967.
43 On the attempt throughout 1967 by a number of prominent intellectuals to establish a new political 
body, the ’independent group’, see Crouch 1978: 265.
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student newspapers Harian KAMI and Mahasiswa Indonesia. On this matter Soe was 
candid in his criticism:
At the present time Acting President Soeharto is still a popular leader on the campuses, 
in both student and graduate circles.
But frustration is becoming apparent on the campus. Especially concerning his 
advisors and the ministers of the Ampera Cabinet.
Stories are beginning to emerge of Ampera Cabinet ministers adding to their collections 
of wives. And of big shots like Ibnu Sutowo, Alamsjah (who is at present under attack 
from the student magazine Mimbar Demokrasi that is being posted up around the UI 
campus), Suhardiman, B.M. Diah, Achmad Tirtosudiro and his National Logistics 
Board, and other lesser figures all adding to the existing level of frustration. 'Doesn't 
Pak Harto know? And if he does know why does he allow this to continue?'44
In the light of these serious problems Soe suggested that students on the campuses 
were entitled to consider whether they should continue to support Soeharto 
wholeheartedly. There were some who out of fear of the military were prepared to throw 
their support behind the existing political parties, but the path that seemed to him to be 
attracting support in student circles - and which appeared to represent his own position - 
was as follows:
.... to remain critical concerning Soeharto but to refrain from joining forces with the 
parties that had sold democracy to Sukarno and Nasakom.... This group of students is 
prepared to continue to cooperate with the military because they believe that there are 
still many ABRI officers who are respectable, courageous and honest. They firmly 
believe that Indonesia's future will be in ABRI's hands for another decade. But this 
group are becoming increasingly frustrated by the behaviour and the corruption of some 
of those around Soeharto.45
For the time being Soe tried to put these concerns to one side. For several months 
in the first half of 1968 he reduced his commitments in faculty and university affairs in
44 'Di balik krisis kemahasiswaan Indonesia' (Behind the Indonesian student crisis), Sinar Harapan, 1 
February 1968. In fact, Soe's article began with an account of the conflicts emerging in student circles, 
especially the growing antagonism being directed towards the student representatives in the DPR-GR as 
campus opinion across the country turned against them. Major General Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara had 
been appointed head of Soeharto's personal staff (Staf Pribadi, Spri) in August 1966 (see Crouch 1978: 
243). B.M. Diah, long-time owner of the Jakarta daily Merdeka, was appointed Minister for Information 
in 1968. Brigadier General Achmad Tirtosudiro had been appointed in 1966 to head the National 
Logistics Board (Badan Urusan Logistik Nasional, Bulog), the body formed to oversee trading in essential 
food commodities, especially rice. Bulog quickly gained an alarming reputation for internal corruption 
and speculative trading. See Crouch 1978: 278-9.
45 'Di balik krisis kemahasiswaan Indonesia' (Behind the Indonesian student crisis), Sinar Harapan, 1 
February 1968. Soe's article appeared little more than a month before the special MPRS session which 
was to confirm Soeharto in the presidency. Shortly before the session opened, his brother, Arief 
Budiman, contributed an article of his own on the same issue that reached similar conclusions. See 
'Djendral Soeharto dan mandat pemerintahan' (General Soeharto and the mandate of government), 
Kompas, 11 March 1968.
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order to concentrate on completing a draft of his sarjana thesis.46 However, in early July 
news of the death in custody of a former senior University of Indonesia academic 
persuaded Soe to return to the issue of the thousands of political prisoners still awaiting 
resolution.
Until early 1966 Professor Sukimo had been a distinguished senior professor in the 
Faculty of Medicine at UI. However, since he had also been the general chairman of the 
leftist scholars' body, HSI, he had been one of those swept up in the post-coup wave of 
arrests and was subsequently held without trial in a Jakarta detention centre. When he 
fell seriously ill early in 1968 his captors refused his request for medical attention, 
forcing him to endure the misery of his cramped prison cell. When finally and 
ignominiously delivered in a truck to the Armed Forces Hospital it was too late and he 
died there shortly after. Soe had personally never met Sukimo, though his brother Arief 
had spoken favourably of him as a teacher. However, he sensed that this was an 
opportunity to bring to the public's attention yet again the plight of the thousands of other 
political prisoners whose cases remained in limbo. He compared the shameful treatment 
of Professor Sukimo with the circumstances surrounding the death of former Prime 
Minister Sutan Sjahrir after his imprisonment by Sukarno. Such appalling treatment of 
its people was quite out of place in a country claiming to be based on Humanitarianism 
and Belief in Almighty God.
What happened to Sjahrir has now been repeated to Professor Sukirno. Sjahrir was 
detained in the name of 'revolution', Sukirno was detained in the name of 'anti­
communism'. But the pattern is the same - even though the political stuation is totally 
different. And because of this Prof Sukirno's death (like Sjahrir's) is a clear indication 
of the inability of the Indonesian people to uphold the principles of justice concerning 
detainees....
Prof Sukirno's death has already happened and nothing can be done about it. What we 
can do is to think about improving the treatment of those 80,000 New Order political 
prisoners who are at present in jails and concentration camps all over Indonesia so that 
for them at least principles of justice can be put into effect. So that there will be no
46 Letter to Herman Lantang, 18 February 1968. Despite his studies, he still found time to write the 
occasional newspaper article. See in particular his biting attack on the hypocrisy surrounding the annual 
celebration of Kartini Day: Tjita2 Kartini dim pengalaman seorang mahasiswa Indonesia' (Kartini's 
ideals in the experience of an Indonesian university student), Kompas, 20 April 1968. For a complete 
list of Soe's writing during this period, see the attached bibliography.
263
further repetitions of new Sjahrirs, new Sukirnos, dying in detention because of years 
and years without ever being brought to trial.47
Privately he conceded that there was really little prospect in the short term of the 
military releasing those innocent of any wrong-doing.48 The Indonesian press continued 
to be full of articles raising the spectre of communism, and Soe knew from his own 
contacts that the army leaders remained seriously concerned about the possibility of a PKI 
resurgence based on the Yenan-style resistance underway in remote parts of East Java 
under the leadership of a new central committee 49 Nevertheless, his own commitment to 
tmth and justice compelled him to speak out on this occasion.
Considering the options
By the middle of 1968 Soe began to realise that his time as a student was quickly 
coming to an end and that a new and more uncertain phase of his life was about to begin. 
This awareness was accompanied by a renewed burst of introspection as he began to 
consider the possibilities that lay ahead.50 Despite the important place Rawamangun held 
for him, there was a growing sense of distance and isolation from many of his campus 
friends.51 No doubt the trials and tribulations of the previous twelve months as ketua 
senat had contributed to his sombre mood. But there were also periods of restlessness, 
even depression:
Spent the whole day typing an article.... Feeling depressed because of friends' attitudes.
These weeks have been a tough time for me because I've decided to stick to my 
principles. Better to be isolated than to give in to hypocrisy.
I asked Josi last night whether I've changed or not. I think I have changed.
47 'Sebuah prinsip dan kematian seorang professor tua' (A principle and the death of an old professor), 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.l 11, 28 July 1968
48 Soe's realistic and sober assessment is conveyed in a letter to the Australian political scientist Herbert 
Feith, 11 July 1968. Feith had come to know Soe while teaching at UI in 1967.
49 The army did not succeed in crushing this PKI resistance until the middle months of 1968. See 
Crouch 1978: 226-7.
50 Soe also took the opportunity to draft a strong reassertion of his own views about the fundamental 
importance of a truly liberal education where campus independence and freedom of expression inside and 
outside the classroom were guaranteed, and to launch a stinging attack upon the growing signs of 
hypocrisy, stultifying conformity and rigidity on the campus. See his two-part article 'Mimpi2 terachir 
seorang mahasiswa tua' (Final dreams of an old student), Mahasiswa Indonesia, Nos. 106 and 107, 23 and 
30 June 1968.
51 SHG Diary, 12, 16 and 19 August 1968
Read some of the poems of Ho Chi Minh and feel refreshed. What a lot of problems 
there are in the world. I don't want to be like a bamboo tree, I want to be like an oak 
tree, brave in the face of the wind.52
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There were also moments of anxiety and self-doubt about the path he had chosen 
for himself as an uncommitted critical intellectual. A visit to Yap Thian Hien elicited the 
following diary response:
Talking with Yap makes us optimistic about the future even though the road ahead is 
very hard. In Indonesia there are only two choices. Become an idealist or become 
apathetic. I decided long ago that I must become an idealist as far as it is possible to do 
so. Sometimes I'm frightened about what will happen to me if I'm broken. Apathy or 
anarchy. Let's hope not both.53
Soe was well aware that his candid and sharply-worded articles in the Indonesian 
press attracted considerable attention. For him it was both a calculated risk and an 
essential act. Yet a number of his friends and acquaintances, no doubt solicitous of his 
welfare, suggested that he be more circumspect in his criticism of the military and of 
government policy; above all, they urged him to refrain from mentioning the names of 
powerful and potentially vindictive public figures.54 He also heard second-hand about 
the comments of others who did not know him personally, but regarded him as an 
opportunist who was trying to establish a public reputation for his own ends.55
52 SHG Diary, 30 July 1968. The reasons for Soe's depression on this occasion are not entirely clear, 
though it was almost certainly compounded by his discovery the previous day that Sinar Harapan had 
quoted a supposedly 'off-the-record' conversation with his friend Benedict Anderson in a front page article 
on the PKI's attempted revival in rural Java. The journalist who wrote the article was Soe's own friend 
Jopie Lasut. See 'Yenan di lautnja Loro Kidul?' (Yenan in Loro Kidul's sea?), Sinar Harapan, 27 July 
1968. Since Anderson had already been publicly attacked in the Indonesian press on several occasions 
over his joint authorship of the so-called 'Cornell Paper' - the controversial interpretation of the attempted 
1965 coup - Soe was concerned for his friend's position. Upon learning of the indiscretion, he 
immediately confronted Aristides Katoppo and attempted to hand back his Sinar Harapan press card. 
Katoppo refused to accept it and the matter was quickly settled.
Josi was the younger brother of Aristides Katoppo and a close friend who often accompanied Soe on 
mountain climbing ventures. He also worked at Sinar Harapan as a journalist.
53 SHG Diary, 20 August 1968. Soe and the Kompas publisher P.K. Ojong visited Yap the day after 
the prosecutor had demanded a sentence of three years imprisonment and the cancellation of his licence to 
practise as a public defender, at the culmination of Yap's trial over the charges arising out of the PT 
Quick affair. (See the page 1 report in Kompas, 20 August 1968.) The visitors found Yap optimistic 
that the case would eventually succeed in his favour and the 'rule of law' upheld. In mid October Yap was 
convicted and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. However this was later quashed on appeal to the 
High Court.
54 Letters to Herbert Feith, 1 and 28 August 1968; SHG Diary, 26 August 1968
55 Some of these remarks were relayed to him after he had organised and led a student demonstration to 
the Soviet Embassy on 23 August to protest about Moscow's brutal crushing of the Dubcek Government 
in Czechoslovakia. Despite his attempts to involve them, both KAMI Pusat activists and the UI Student 
Council refused to participate on the grounds that this was an 'internal communist affair'. Both bodies 
issued statements disclaiming any responsibility for the demonstration. SHG Diary, 22 and 23 August
265
Whenever the issue of his public outspokeness had been raised in the past Soe had 
always been quite clear about his position.56 But the frequency of the comments he was 
receiving and perhaps his own inner anxieties encouraged him to prepare a more 
considered response to the problems of defining where he as an individual stood in 
relation to the world around him.
He used as his point of departure an account of the Czech film 'And the Fifth Rider 
is Fear' which had recently been screened at Rawamangun by the faculty's film group. 
Soe believed that the film raised a number of fundamental existential questions for the 
individual when confronted by awkward or uncomfortable moral, social or political 
choices. His article was the clearest possible statement of his own personal moral code; it 
was also an implicit challenge to others in his own society to search for their own 
solutions:
The issue posed by this film is a human problem. And as human beings we are faced 
by confusing choices. Before we do anything we must answer for ourselves, 'Who am 
I?' And our answer will determine our choices....
Sometimes we ask ourselves: 'Who am I?'
Am I a party functionary who by chance has become a university student so that I must 
obey the instructions of my masters in the party? Am I a politician who must always 
be realistic and ready to accept compromises of principle and not possess high-sounding 
idealism? Am I just a little person who must always obey every decision of the central 
committee of my organisation, or my faculty leadership, or my superiors? Or am I a 
person who is still learning about life and continually trying to develop and critically 
evaluate every situation? Even though my experience and knowledge are limited.
Every day this question presents itself. I say to myself: 'I'm a university student. As a 
student I cannot deny my own reality. As a young person still studying and with lots 
of ideals I must act in accordance with this reality.
1968. See also his report on the demonstration 'Mahasiswa2 Indonesia protes imperialis Rusia' 
(Indonesian students protest against Russian imperialism), Kompas, 24 August 1968, and a later article 
'Soal Tjekoslawakia soal kemanusiaan atau soal komunisme' (The Czechoslovakia problem, an issue of 
humanity or communism), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.l 16, 1 September 1968.
56 'I remember Merapi’, Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.58, Week 4, July 1967:
People who used to knock about with me suddenly want to give me lectures about the 
tactics of the struggle. 'Soe, what you say is true, but we have to be realistic. Don't 
go to extremes. It's dangerous.' But to this point I don't feel that I am an extremist. If 
I see corruption, manipulation, moral decadence and then I say so, they say that I'm an 
extremist.
But for me one thing is certain. We must always be honest to our own conscience, 
however high the price. Racialism, mass-killings in Central Java, East Java and Bali, 
civil and military corruption or even corruption in the action fronts - these are all 
crimes. And it's also a crime if we are not brave enough to say so and just pretend we 
don't know.
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Because of this I will always have the courage to be candid, despite the possibility that I 
might be wrong. Better to act in error than to refrain from acting out of fear of being 
wrong. If I'm honest to myself, I'm sure that eventually I will discover the right path.
I'm a human being, not just anyone's tool. Truth doesn't come in the form of 
somebody's instructions, but must be creatively inspired'. A man is as he 
thinks. 5^
Yet with his student days about to end Soe realised that he had to think seriously 
about his immediate future. At the urging of a foreign acquaintance who felt that he 
would benefit from the broadening experience of overseas study and a lengthy period 
away from Indonesia, Soe wrote to his friend Herbert Feith to enquire about the 
possibilities of post-graduate study in Australia.58 He was surprised to receive an 
immediate and enthusiastic reply. In the midst of considering his response and his 
immediate responsibilities at the Faculty of Letters where he was already a part-time 
teaching assistant, he received another foreign invitation of a different kind.
During August he was approached by the US Embassy with an invitation to be 
Indonesia's representative in a State Department-sponsored three-month study tour of the 
United States for a group of university students from the Asia-Pacific region. Soe found 
the invitation immediately appealing. In addition to the attractions of the official program, 
there would also be the opportunity to visit old academic friends at Cornell and Berkeley.
During the two months before his departure Soe was busy with the supervision of 
elections for the new faculty senate at Rawamangun and the official handover to the 
incoming senate team, led by his friend Dahana. With the help of close friends he 
completed all the necessary bureaucratic arrangements for overseas travel. In the process 
he was stunned - and angered - to discover that as an Indonesian of Chinese descent he 
was required to provide proof of his citizenship, and, in addition, to furnish statements of 
his non-involvement in the 1965 attempted coup.59
'Siapakah saja?' (Who am I?), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No.l 17, 8 September 1968. Bold type as in the 
original published essay.
58 Letters to Herbert Feith, 1 August 1968; SHG Diary, 28 August 1968
59 See Soe's comments on these issues in one of the first of his articles describing his travels: 
'Kelujuran di campus- Amerika Serikat: Saja bukan wakil KAMI' (Roaming around US campuses: I'm 
not KAMI'S representative), Sinar Harapan, 1 February 1969.
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Despite these distractions and the round of farewells from close friends, Soe still 
found time to write a provocative article for Mahasiswa Indonesia which appeared on the 
eve of his departure. In a way, it summed up his sense of all that was going wrong with 
the society around him: his fears about where Soeharto's New Order regime was leading 
Indonesia, his sense of frustration with the failings of the legislative chamber that he had 
hoped might develop into a meaningful representative body and, above all, his sense of 
disillusionment with those of his own generation whom he believed had betrayed the 
ideals that had been at the heart of the struggle to overthrow Sukarno and the Old Order. 
He introduced his article with his own bitter interpretation of a poem by the well-known
Russian 'protest poet' Yevgeny Yevtushenko:
Yevtushenko's psychological condition is reflected in a recently published poem. The 
poem, 'Monologue of the Arctic Fox', is in the form of a monologue by a person who 
has long experienced slavery and is afraid of freedom.
I am the blue fox on the gray animal farm 
But since I am destined for death by the color of my coat 
Behind the impenetrable iron fence 
I take no consolation in the beauty o f my fur  
(The blue fox escaped but overawed by freedom, returned to captivity of his own accord)
But I was tired and snowstorms overcame me 
I could not extricate my frozen paws 
And /  had no friend or sweetheart there:
The children o f captivity are too weak for freedom 
He who was bom in a kennel bemoans best in the kennel.
With horror 1 understood that /  loved the chain that binds me
The animal farm is my beloved native land
/  wanted to be innocent like my fathers
But unlike them I was born into slavery
Whoever feeds me, by him shall I be given over
And he who strokes me, flays me to my fur.
The Blue Fox that loves its binding chains is Yevtushenko and thousands of other 
leaders who have sold themselves for comfort.
There is nothing new in the tale of the Blue Fox above. It is a classic story of millions 
of people from olden times and on into the future. It has appeared in Russia, in 
America, in China, in Bandung and in Sukarnapura. But stories like this will always 
attract our attention. Tales about the rise of idealists and their fall. History documents 
it and we hope we become wiser through reading as many tales of blue foxes as 
possible.
I then recalled similar stories that are happening around me. My friends who have now 
become members of the DPR-GR (whether from KAMI, the KASI Functional Group or 
from the political parties). Formerly they talked of legal controls and of honesty and 
justice and who knows what else. But to this moment I have never heard their critical 
questions (like Bujung Nasution’s) about the tens of thousands of people imprisoned 
without process (whether as political PKI detainees or out of simple extortion), about 
the corruption of the generals (that is talked about behind the scenes), and the 
manipulation of prominent civilians.
'What is your opinion on the problems of education and Mashuri?' they ask me. Then I 
talk, in the cafeteria or the coffee stall. 'What can we do to solve the problem of PKI 
prisoners so that they will not become a danger in the future?' Then I talk again for 
hours about sociological and political matters. And I talk on until finally I realise that
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they are blue foxes. Realise . . . .  with horror that I love the chain that binds me'. . . .  
That they are the window-dressing for Indonesia's democracy, just as Yevtushenko 
became the window-dressing for the democracy and freedom of the USSR.
This morning I dreamed that I had entered the DPR-GR building. And I saw the colour 
blue everywhere, on moustached snouts, and the colour was beautiful. Everywhere I 
saw blue foxes. Leaders (from the Head to his deputies) and members. Sometimes I 
saw a blue fox with a yellow jacket (the jacket of my own alma mater of which I am 
very proud), sometimes a jacket of another campus. Then I prayed with great 
uncertainty . . . .  'Please Father don't let it all be coloured blue as I see now. Let there 
be other colours amongst the blue multitudes'. And I am still waiting for the 
protestations of my friends about the arbitrary imprisonments occurring in the 
provinces, the women prisoners who are being prostituted by their own guards, the 
business touts who have the rank of admiral or general, and bandits who use the identity 
of KAMI, KAPPI and KAPI. 'Father, let the colour blue that I see be only a false Fata 
Morgana'.611
An overseas interlude
On 8 October Soe flew out of Jakarta bound for Hawaii where he was to link up 
with the other ten invitees to the oddly-named 'Experiment in International Living' 
program.61 This was the first stage in a 75-day study tour sponsored by the US State 
Department, with visits to more than fifteen major locations across the United States. 
Soe and the other students arrived to find the 1968 US presidential election campaign in 
full swing, but also to discover a nation racked by racial conflict and deeply divided by 
the Vietnam quagmire, and where university campuses had become centres of both 
organised opposition to the war through the activities of groups such as 'Students for a 
Democratic Society' and 'Resistance', and the Black Panther movement.
In fact, beginning with the University of Hawaii and the East-West Centre in 
Honolulu, American university campuses were a central focus of the students' tour. As 
well as visits to prestige institutions such as Berkeley, the University of Chicago, Cornell
611 'Srigala biru' (The blue fox), Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 121, 6 October 1968. Adnan Buyung 
Nasution had been a KASI representative in the DPR-GR until the 1968 re-shuffle.
61 The other student participants were from Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Soe quickly discovered that his political 
perspective and general outlook on the world was closer to that of the two Australian and New Zealand 
students; most of the Asian students in the party he found to be not especially interested in political 
issues or simply far too bourgeois.
Throughout the course of the study tour, Soe turned to his diary to record his immediate thoughts and 
impressions. In addition, he contributed a lively series of twelve articles for Sinar Harapan on selected 
aspects of his travels and another single article for Kompas. Two of his personal letters to friends were 
also passed on to Indonesia Raya for publication. See the bibliography for complete details. The 
following account of his American visit draws on all these sources.
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and Yale, there were also visits to smaller regional universities in Oregon and New York 
State and to almost exclusively black campuses in San Francisco and Houston. On these 
occasions, there were welcoming receptions hosted by university administrators, formal 
and informal meetings with groups of student leaders and a wide variety of individual 
activists, from Nixonite Republicans to radicals and Black Power advocates. The visiting 
party also had the opportunity to attend specially arranged lectures or sit in on classes and 
seminars on a range of contemporary issues: aspects of US domestic politics, foreign 
policy, the Vietnam War, social and religious change and black history.
In addition, there were numerous semi-official briefings from State Department 
officials in Washington, from politicians during visits to both Congress and state 
legislatures, from the US military in Colorado, and from newspaper editors in New York 
and elsewhere. The program included tours to farms, factories, schools, art galleries and 
museums, to the White House and FBI headquarters in Washington, and to the UN 
complex in New York. There were also visits to Niagara Falls, Harper's Ferry, NASA 
in Houston, and of course, Hollywood and Disneyland.
The visiting students' schedule was arranged to include several homestays with 
American families. Soe especially enjoyed one lengthy billet with the family of a former 
US airforce pilot in Salem, Oregon. On such occasions there were opportunities for trips 
with new friends into the outdoors, and to Soe's delight, he was able to spend several 
days in the Rocky Mountains under snow. Whenever there was free time in the cities he 
enjoyed browsing in record stores and bookshops - especially those radical bookshops he 
found on the fringes of the university campuses - and also taking in as many films as 
possible, from Ingmar Bergmann to pornography.
During the course of his American visit Soe was also able to renew his 
acquaintance with academic friends at Berkeley, Cornell and Yale who shared his 
interests in Indonesian affairs. He was pleased to be invited on several occasions to give 
a lecture to students on Indonesian politics, especially the role played by students over 
recent years. While at Ithaca he used the resources of the Cornell Modem Indonesia
Project and the university's library to gather some additional materials for his still 
unfinished sarjana thesis on the Madiun rebellion.
Soe found it all to be a positive and valuable set of experiences. He welcomed the 
opportunity it gave to observe American society at first hand and to learn something of its 
peculiar strengths and weaknesses.62 More importantly, he drew much from the 
experience to reinforce his own determination to chart a course as an independent public 
intellectual in his own country. He was surprised, by and large, with the vigour and 
determination of the radical student movement that he found throughout America. He 
shared their uncompromising rejection of US policy in Vietnam, but when discussion 
turned to Indonesia he was frequently disappointed by the lack of knowledge and 
superficial judgements many of the student radicals displayed.63
His response to the issues of race that continued to plague American society and to 
the challenge of black militants was a somewhat ambiguous one. He acknowledged the 
long history of brutal exploitation, discrimination and blind prejudice that black America 
had experienced and he could understand how this had fuelled the sense of frustration, 
resentment and anger that was driving the Black Power movement. However, he could 
not bring himself to accept the politics of black separation that was being advocated by 
the most militant activists he encountered on the campuses across America, except as a 
regrettable although perhaps inevitable first stage in the struggle for black self-respect and 
identity.64
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62 See his thoughtful article on the choices facing voters in the US presidential election: 'Perang 
Vietnam dan tjalon3 presiden jang tidak mejakinkan' (The Vietnam war and the unconvincing candidates 
for the presidency), Sinar Harapan, 30 October 1968. See also his account of contemporary religious and 
social alienation: 'Agama dim tantangan' (Religion under challenge), Sinar Harapan, 12 February 1969; 
and 'Klujuran di campus3 AS: Sebuah generasi jang ketjewa' (Roaming around US campuses: A 
disappointed generation), Sinar Harapan, 5 March 1969.
63 SHG Diary, 15 October 1968; Generasi jang marah' (The angry generation), Sinar Harapan, 2 
November 1968.
64 Soe rejected the extreme position of black militants as a form of black apartheid. See especially 
'Surat dari Amerika: Masaalah identitas negro di Amerika' (Letter from America: The problem of black 
identity in America), Indonesia Raya, 15 December 1968; 'Klujuran di campus3 AS: Perkenalan pertama 
dengan nasionalisme hitam' (Roaming around US campuses: An introduction to black nationalism), 
Sinar Harapan, 5 February 1969; 'Kelujuran di campus3 Amerika Serikat (3): "Kekuatan hitam" dan 
"bahaja kuning"' (Roaming around US campuses (3): 'Black power' and 'yellow peril'), Sinar Harapan, 8 
February 1969.
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There were, however, other independent voices arising out of Soe's American 
experiences that he found especially challenging and inspiring. There was the example 
provided by a Catholic priest who described his efforts to establish basic education and 
health facilities for poor peasants in Guatamala and his eventual expulsion for 
collaboration with the underground guerilla movement.65 And there were several lengthy 
encounters with former Peace Corps workers who had been radicalised by their 
experiences in the Third World and who were now trying to find a niche for themselves 
back in their own country.66
On such occasions Indonesia and the question marks over his own future were 
never far from his mind:
Father Art Melville mentioned a total of 400 peasants who had been murdered. I was 
reminded of the 300,000 who died without protest of any kind. For many people this is 
just a number. For me too. I don't know the face of one of those victims. But I will 
always endeavour not to depersonalise this 'number'. I will always imagine them 
coming to me. Speaking to me like the soldiers slain in the Civil War spoke to Walt 
Whitman....
What a lot of injustice there is in this world. Not just in Indonesia but everywhere. In 
Guatamala, in Vietnam, in the United States, in the Soviet Union, in Czechoslovakia, 
in Africa and elsewhere. It's as if the world is a rubbish heap of the lust and greed of 
mankind. Sometimes I wonder whether it wouldn't be better to blow the world up so 
that it all comes to an end.
But as well as all this we also find people struggling for ideals. Some succeed and 
become widely respected - Gandhi, Kennedy - but millions sink in the rubbish and are 
swallowed by time. But more distressing are those who experience disappointment and 
become consumed by hatred of their opponents. Determined to destroy their enemy's 
world and brutal towards all of them. I think the great idealists whether communists, 
fascists, Black Power activists, or any others are fired by the same ideals. Revulsion 
against the world's obscenity and devotion to those who are oppressed. How many are 
able to survive in defeat? I don't know about my own future. A successful person? A 
person who fails in his idealism? And who sinks with time and old age? A 
disillusioned person who then attempts to terrorise the world? Or a person who fails 
but who gazes at the setting sun full of pride. I want to try to love it all. And hold 
firm in this life.67
From his own perspective one of the most powerful impressions that he had 
gathered from his observations of the United States concerned the role intellectuals could 
play in public life.
65 'Seorang pastor, pemberontakan petani dan keketjewaan' (A priest, peasant rebellion and 
disappointment), Kompas, 20 November 1968
66 'Klujuran di campus7 AS: Sukarelawan perdamaian jang kembali' (Roaming around US campuses: 
The returning peace volunteers), Sinar Harapart, 18 March 1969
67 SHG Diary, 26 October 1968
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But there is one thing we can see from the attitude of American intellectuals. And that 
is the courage to look at problems clearly. Without being confused by accusations of 
'guerilla politics', 'old order', superhumanism' and so on.
I was thinking about this problem while flying from Fiji to Sydney on Christmas Day 
1968. I remembered the deaths in Indonesian concentration camps. I remembered the 
murders of communists that are still continuing here and there. I remembered our 
Attorney General who goes on and on at random with empty slogans. I remembered 
our generals, who knows how many hundred of them, talking about the rule of law. I 
remembered our religious leaders from the political parties. Pretending to be pure and 
honest but full of hypocrisy. Then I remembered the faces of my friends on the 
campus. As cowardly as rabbits but with loud voices. Corrupt and exploiting their 
name as students.^
After a brief Australian stopover to visit friends in Melbourne, Soe arrived back in 
Indonesia early in January 1969.69 The months ahead were to be full of growing doubts 
about national politics and intense personal anguish.
Returning to old problems
When Soe Hok-gie returned to Jakarta in January he was intent on bringing his 
student days to a close as quickly as possible. Drawing on the additional material he had 
gathered during his visit to Cornell University, he planned to spend much of his time at 
Kebon Jeruk completing the final revisions to his thesis so that it could be submitted for 
examination and a date arranged for the formal oral defence.
But Soe soon became aware of several significant political developments occurring 
in the immediate world around him that made single-minded concentration on academic 
matters difficult to sustain. As far as student affairs were concerned, two separate yet 
related issues soon attracted his attention. During the first six weeks of 1969 a very 
public and bitter debate erupted inside and outside student circles over the question of 
whether KAMI should continue to have a central role as an organisation representing the 
interests of university students throughout the country. The renewed debate about KAMI 
was sparked off by some harsh criticism of the organisation from within. In late
68 'Klujuran di campus2 AS [Penutup]: Awal dan achir ' (Roaming around US campuses [Conclusion]: 
Beginning and end), Sinar Harapan, 7 April 1968
69 Upon arriving in Sydney on 25 December, Australian customs seized his Joan Baez records and the 
literature recently acquired in US radical bookshops. He was then questioned about his attitude to the 
Vietnam war and asked whether he was a communist. SHG Diary, 25 December 1968
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December 1968 IMADA leader and KAMI Jaya activist, Marsillam Simanjuntak, who 
had recently been elected as Secretary General of SOMAL - the peak umbrella body of 
Indonesian locally-based student organisations - launched a stinging attack on KAMI, 
describing it as a body without a future.70
During January debate intensified with a flood of articles in the Indonesian press by 
KAMI'S supporters and detractors.71 When debate over the organisation's future 
reached an impasse at KAMI Pusat's 11-13 February plenary session, SOMAL and its 
six constituent member bodies finally declared their withdrawal.72 Against a background 
of growing cynicism on the part of rank and file students on the campus, the departure of 
the SOMAL group, which had played such a pivotal role in the action front's formation in 
late 1966, marked the beginning of the end for KAMI. Though the rump of the 
organisation lingered on for some time, its viability as a national student forum was all 
but over.
Although not directly involved in these events, as one of those who had fuelled the 
debate over the previous two years with his trenchant criticisms of KAMI, Soe watched 
these developments closely as they seemed to confirm his publicly expressed doubts 
about the capacity of KAMI to transform itself into an effective representative body. But 
the signs of KAMI'S ultimate demise were not matched by any evidence that the struggle 
between extra and intra-oriented student leaders for control of student affairs on the 
campus was any closer to resolution. On the contrary, the start of a new academic year 
and the opening of the University of Indonesia's official Mapram signalled a renewed 
round of tension, especially between the central UI Student Council (DMUI), dominated
70 See 'KAMI sudah sukar dipertahankan, kata Marsillam Simanjuntak' (KAMI'S hard to defend, says 
Marsillam Simanjuntak), Pedoman, 27 December 1968.
71 See, for example, the editorials and feature articles in Mahasiswa Indonesia during January and 
February 1968.
72 See 'Enam organisasi mahasiswa keluar dari KAMI Pusat' (Six student organisations leave KAMI 
Pusat), Kompas, 15 February 1969; and 'Pidato perpisahan Marsillam Simanjuntak' (Marsillam 
Simanjuntak's parting speech), Kompas, 17 February 1969.
by HMI and PMKRI activists, and those faculties such as Letters where anti-ormas 
independents still retained control.
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On this aspect of student affairs, Soe was not content to remain a mere observer, 
making time to fire off two public broadsides at HMI and PMKRI respectively over two 
separate instances of what he regarded as improper interference in the independence and 
integrity of the campus and its student community.73 Trivial as these events may have 
seemed, they were an early indication of a rapidly escalating power struggle between two 
opposing groups within UI student politics, a struggle in which Soe was himself to 
emerge as a central protagonist.
Beyond student and campus affairs, Soe was also distracted by what he saw as 
certain worrying developments within the wider body politic of the New Order, in 
particular some alarming signs that the relative press freedom that he and others had 
enjoyed since mid 1966 might soon be curtailed. When Harian KAMI ran several articles 
on the unresolved issue of the thousands of political prisoners being held in detention 
centres throughout the country, its editor Nono Anwar Makarim received a blunt warning 
from the military. Soe heard other reports of threats and intimidation being used against 
independent-minded journalists and editors and discovered that he himself was under 
scrutiny:
Nono says that he's scared (and so am I) but we can't continue to keep quiet on this. 
Apparently AB has attacked me not just once but on three separate occasions. 
According to insiders I've qualified as an anti-army figure because of my excessive 
criticisms. I'm frightened that the relative press freedom that exists in Jakarta will be 
lost in a fairly short time.... Several generals consider that if press criticism like this 
continues the armed forces will split. Certain matters that were previously only clique 
secrets are now being broached in the press. And demands from inside to clean out 
corrupt officers are increasingly strong. I'm not yet able to predict Pak Harto's attitude,
73 During the 1969 UI Mapram, as part of the official program HMI activists distributed a questionaire 
to all new students whom they were able to identify as Muslims. It contained a number of detailed and 
highly personal questions about the religious life and practice of both the students and their immediate 
families. Soe attacked the questionaire as a gross invasion of privacy. See 'Hak untuk tidak mendjawab' 
(The right not to reply), Kompas, 8 February 1969. For a HMI activist's response to his criticism, see 
Azrul Azwar's 'Sebuah angket telah dipersoalkan' (A questionaire has been criticised), Kompas, 11 
February 1969.
Soe's second article criticised the way in which Catholic students who had been accepted into Catholic 
student hostels in Jakarta were pressured into joining PMKRI. See 'Hak untuk tidak berormas' (The right 
not to belong to a mass organisation), Harian KAMI, 11 March 1969.
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but if the vested interest group is strong enough it will be able to convince the 
leadership to stop criticism from the press or dissension.74
Despite these threats, in late February it was Harian KAMI that broke the 
sensational story alleging that a wave of army-organised killings of several thousand PKI 
suspects had been taking place since November 1968 in the Purwodadi region of Central 
Java.75 The report drew on information collected by human rights activist Haji J.C. 
Princen during a recent visit to the area. It was quickly followed by a series of official 
denials and clumsy attempts to brand Princen as a former Dutch communist.76 Several 
Jakarta newspapers despatched reporters to the area in an attempt to investigate the 
allegations, though not all their reports were published.77 Soe's friend Jopie Lasut wrote 
a report for Sinar Harapan after an attempted incognito visit to Central Java in an effort to 
avoid military surveillance of his investigations. In addition, Soe also read a detailed 
account prepared by a Kompas reporter which that newspaper's editor, Jakob Oetama, 
decided to suppress following pressure from senior military officers. Soe believed that 
both reports provided prima-facie evidence that a series of army-sponsored killings had in 
fact occurred, although a proper investigation of the Purwodadi affair was thwarted by 
the release of official denials by senior government ministers that anything untoward had 
taken place.78 For Soe, the probability that serious army-initiated human rights abuses 
had occurred was compounded by the signs of growing intolerance of press criticism, 
especially in senior military circles. Consequently, he regarded the Purwodadi affair as 
an indication that the democratic aspirations of some of the New Order's supporters were
74 Letter to Herbert Feith, 14 January 1969. 'AB' is a shorthand reference to Angkatan Bersenjata, the 
Jakarta daily newspaper reflecting the interests and views of the armed forces.
75 See 'Pembunuhan bergelombang dalam 3 bulan di Purwodadi' (A wave of killings over 3 months in 
Purwodadi), Harian KAMI, 26 February 1969.
76 The smear was soon exposed as nonsense. Princen, vice-chairman of the recently formed Human 
Rights Institute (Lembaga Hakr Azasi Manusia), had deserted from the Dutch army during the revolution 
in favour of the Republican cause. With strong Siliwangi connections, he had represented IPKI in the 
DPR following the 1955 elections but had been imprisoned by Sukarno from 1962 to 1966 for his 
participation in the anti-communist 'Liga Demokrasi affair'.
77 For an overview of the Purwodadi affair and a translation of two of the published reports, including 
that of Jopie Lasut, see Cribb 1990: 195-226.
78 Letters to Herbert Feith, 21 March and 1 April 1969. For Harian KAMTs response to these official 
denials, see Nono Anwar Makarim's hilariously sarcastic editorial 'De teerling is geworpen ... "peristiwa 
Purwodadi tidak ada'" (The die is cast... "The Purwodadi affair did not exist"), 21 March 1969.
running counter to a rising tide of authoritarianism from within the armed forces 
leadership.
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Such fears were underscored by a series of transfers of senior military officers 
announced in the first months of 1969.79 Among those moved sideways were Major 
Generals Kemal Idris and Dharsono, both held in high regard on the campus, especially 
by those who had been part of the 1966 student movement, as army officers untainted by 
allegations of corruption and who were intent on finding ways to reform the political 
system without compromising with the political parties or surviving old order elements. 
Soe was quite aware that this series of transfers had serious implications for the nature of 
the New Order:
The present situation is more and more appalling. My friends and I regard the 
reshuffling of the army leadership as extremely worrying. Kartakusumah, Dharsono,
Kemal Idris and Askari have been transferred. They are all from Siliwangi. Most of us 
regard them positively because despite all their military-mindedness they are senior 
officers who are still able to communicate with the intellectual and university circle.
Among officers at army headquarters they are regarded as strict officers who wish to 
extend intellectual freedom as far as possible (except for the PKI) - a free press and 
university autonomy.
The Siliwangi who have been retained are hopeless individuals like Sugiarto and Amir 
Machmud. In internal army circles the totalitarian Brawijaya and Sriwijaya group 
(Soemitro, Alamsyah, Ibnu Sutowo and their associates) have apparently become more 
powerful. We are worried that the militaristic Brawijaya group will eventually become 
more influential in the determination of Indonesian politics.^
The private realm
For all the concern and distraction these various issues created, none of them 
matched the emotional turmoil that began to cloud Soe's thoughts in early April. 
Towards the latter half of the previous year he had formed a close friendship with a 
young woman who was also a student at Rawamangun. Several years his junior, G ----
79 For a full account of the changes taking place within the army's command structure and the 
consolidation of Soeharto's control, see Crouch 1978: 228-41.
Letter to Herbert Feith, 1 April 1969. Dharsono was appointed as ambassador to Thailand, while 
Kemal Idris was transferred to the East Indonesia interregional command in Ujung Pandang, technically a 
promotion. Kartakusumah and Askari were both senior Siliwangi officers. Sugiarto had been appointed 
as Attorney General in 1966, while Amir Machmud became Minister for Internal Affairs in 1969. 
Soemitro, who had been acting as commander of the Brawijaya Division in 1966, was appointed chief of 
staff within the Department of Defence and Security and deputy commander of the army's security and 
intelligence command, Kopkamtib.
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was a student in the French Department at the Faculty of Letters.81 Like Soe, she was 
from a Sino-Indonesian family, though of more substantial means than his own. This 
was not Soe's first girlfriend but it was obvious to all who observed them that this was 
more than a mere casual relationship. Within the small world at Rawamangun where he 
was such a high profile figure, the friendship was quickly noted and widely commented 
upon. Following his return from the United States visit, friendship had clearly developed 
into love, though this may not have been declared. In early April, however, Soe learned
from G ---- that her parents were strongly opposed to their deepening relationship.82
For Soe this was a painful blow. It was a reminder of events of the previous year when 
the family of another girl objected to him on the grounds of ethnic and religious 
differences.83 History now seemed to be repeating itself although this time the grounds 
for objection were rather different:
I'm also beginning to understand G ---- 's mother's reaction. These Chinese like me
because I'm courageous. I'm honest and I have personality. But no more than that.
The moment they sense that I want to join their group they refuse. ’Soe’s fine but not 
for our family.' I recall the fate of soldiers who many people were prejudiced against.
They were worshipped and kissed on the road as liberators. But if a daughter wanted to 
marry one - wait on! This is how I feel at the moment.
I've been aware of this problem for some time. But when it becomes reality, it's a very 
painful feeling. However, I won't become emotional. I think I'm far too calm and 
mature.84
Despite his attempt to put on a brave face, it is evident from his subsequent diary 
entries that Soe found the news extremely distressing. Throughout the following weeks 
an air of uncertainty prevailed as they discussed ways to resolve the problem. However,
when it became clear that G ----was not able or inclined to battle with her family, the
relationship was doomed. The end came one evening at the end of April: despite tears 
and an admission of love on G -----'s part they would return to being just friends.85
81 Actual names have been replaced by initials on these pages.
82 SHG Diary, 4 April 1969. Soe's account of this development was the first entry in his diary since 
his return from the United States. This was obviously no mere coincidence. From this point entries 
appear almost every day, many of them quite lengthy. A large proportion of his journal concerns his 
private anguish over his relationships with friends, and his confused and emotional response to the 
complexities of his private world.
83 SHG Diary, 4 April 1969. Soe and H ---- remained close friends but both knew that anything further
was out of the question.
84 SHG Diary, 5-6 April 1969
85 SHG Diary, 28 April 1969
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Though they continued to see each other frequently, Soe tried hard to adopt an 
unconcerned public attitude for the sake of his pride and self-respect; in fact he had been 
deeply wounded by the affair:
Since the night she asked to break it off, I've paid her a lot of attention. But then I felt 
she was scared and trying to avoid it all out of fear of public opinion. I think I also 
have to learn to prepare myself to live once more as intensely as in the past. Since 
returning from Ciremai I feel it's starting to succeed. Unless there's some big changes 
I'll start again exploring this life without borders. And I'm beginning once more to feel 
absorbed in my own solitude.
At 9 pm I went home without feeling anything. Let her go back to ---- although I pity
her life that will be monotonous and hypocritical. And I with my usual feelings will 
endure the night again. Alone.8^
This unfortunate series of events coincided with the final preparation of his sarjana 
thesis. His completed study, Simpang kiri dari sebuah djalan (The left fork in the road), 
was a detailed analysis of the revolutionary strand in Indonesian politics during the years 
1945 to 1948, culminating in the 1948 rebellion at Madiun.87 As well as an account of 
the circumstances and impact of the rebellion itself, Soe's thesis also included material on 
the organisational development of Indonesian radicalism and its leading identities, and the 
social and political context within which the movement had emerged.
Soe had worked hard to prepare a balanced account of this controversial period of 
Indonesian history.88 His sense of fairness to those whom many had branded as the 
nation's traitors can be judged from the comment he included on the facing page to his 
thesis:
My sympathy is for those who have sacrified everything for the nation, the state and the 
people of Indonesia,
those on the left as well as those on the right...89
Despite all the additional difficulties the thesis was submitted in mid April. At the 
oral examination on 13 May, after some perfunctory questions from the panel of
86 SHG Diary, 5 June 1969
87 Soe 1969
88 Soe’s requests to interview surviving PKI leaders from the late 1940s who were being held in 
detention (principally Tan Ling-djie) were refused by the military, while copies of certain PKI 
publications held in the Central Museum Library remained sealed.
89 His friend Benedict Anderson quotes Soe's comment in his own study of the revolution. See 
Anderson 1972: vi.
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examiners, it was accepted as satisfactory.90 After the traditional dunking in a nearby 
muddy pond by his fellow student friends, Drs Soe Hok-gie now began to turn his 
attention to his immediate future.91
Prostitutes or partners: the place of intellectuals in public life
Despite the invitations he had received from Monash and Berkeley, Soe had already 
made up his mind to remain in Indonesia for at least another year. Although he found 
many of the routine duties he had been assigned rather boring, he felt both a moral 
obligation to stay on for a while teaching at the Faculty of Letters, and a personal debt to 
Harsja Bachtiar who was soon to be appointed acting dean.
The passing of his student days was accompanied by a period of subdued 
reflection. In a personal sense Soe was conscious of a growing distance between himself 
and many of his younger friends, although this had already been evident for some time. 
In addition, he began to give serious consideration to the question of his own future 
directions. Beyond his formal university commitments, he was determined to find some 
other outlet for his time and energy. As one of that generation of young Indonesians who 
had been swept up in the dramatic events that had marked Indonesia's recent history, it 
was only natural that he would maintain a strong interest in the most central political and 
social issues of the day. Yet Soe was not a joiner. As one who eschewed membership 
of any political parties of groupings, and who held no official government positions or 
appointments, he remained firmly on the outside. Nevertheless, he was determined at the 
very least to find some way to contribute to public debate about the problems arising 
within Indonesian society and, in particular, the nature of the emerging New Order 
regime which was controlling the country's immediate future. From such a perspective, 
he decided that the one task he could usefully perform was to continue to write regular
90 SHG Diary, 13 May and 17 June 1969
91 SHG Diary, 13 May 1969. The student high jinks were filmed by an Australian film crew that was 
shooting material for a documentary. See 'A House in the Jungle', 1969 Australian Broadcasting 
Commission Film directed by John Powers.
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articles for the Indonesian press on those social, moral or political questions that he 
identified as of particular importance.
In one sense this was quite consistent with his own personal history of active 
involvement from the early days of the New Order in early 1966, and in finding an outlet 
for his views he was after all able to draw on the close connections he had established 
during that period with many of Indonesia's leading newspapers. Yet it was also a role 
that appealed to Soe's perception of himself as an independent critical free spirit, with a 
strong sense of responsibility to put out his opinions for public scrutiny irrespective of 
the consequences.
He was also driven by a fear that the time for free, open and vigorous public 
discussion of many issues inside Indonesia was almost certainly limited. In addition to 
the numerous indications of rising intolerance within public life that had already become 
evident during the previous year, he knew that there were many senior officers in the 
armed forces who were impatient with any criticism of them or the government. As a 
consequence, he sensed that it was important to take advantage of whatever opportunities 
remained available for freedom of speech and the press.
It was in this vein that he returned in early April to a consideration of the 
unresolved fate of Indonesia's 80,000 political prisoners. For Soe this was a profoundly 
important moral problem, which he regarded, along with the 1965 massacres, as a dark 
stain on the New Order's origins. By early 1969 other voices were being heard in the 
Indonesian press calling for the government to respond.92 Yet he knew that this was a 
sensitive issue with the most authoritarian elements inside the armed forces, especially 
with the Purwodadi affair so fresh in everyone's mind. Consequently, he deliberately set 
out to write about the problem in a way that would avoid antagonising this group. 
Nevertheless, his candid description of the plight of the political prisoners was
92 Among the most prominent were the series of articles by M.A.W. Brouwer in Kompas, 2 and 9 May, 
11 and 28 June 1968, and 21 February 1969. See also Yap Thiam Hien's 'Masalah tahanan' (The 
problem of detainees), Kompas, 13 December 1968.
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confronting: the arbitrary nature of the arrests based simply on the claim of 'indications 
of involvement in G30S'; the lack of any time limit to the period of detention; the 
growing evidence of inadequate and deteriorating physical conditions in many of the 
detention centres with overcrowding, insufficient food and medical attention, 
accompanied by rumours of an unknown number of deaths in custody; and the reports of 
widespread intimidation and exploitation of prisoners and their families by those in 
authority. After reviewing the arguments, both humanitarian and political, in favour of
resolving the problem, Soe issued the following challenge:
On this matter the Government must have the courage to take a position. Does the 
government have the courage to be consistent by releasing these political prisoners 
within a specified period if it does not succeed in proving any wrong doing? For 
instance, by the end of 1969 if guilt is not established then they have to be released 
(meaning they have already been detained for four years). If not then we will be forced 
to admit that we are no better than the Netherlands Indies Government or the infamous 
Tsarist Russia with their prison camps at Digul and Siberia.93
In this and a subsequent article Soe also took up the vexed issue of the 'Letter of 
Non-involvement in G30S' (Surat Tidak Terlibat G30S) which all citizens were now 
required to produce for all manner of official purposes: seeking employment, moving 
one's place of residence, applying for government licences and permits, enrolling at 
educational institutions - even in some places registering a marriage. The procedures that 
had to be undertaken to obtain this official document were both inefficient and time- 
consuming, and were frequently used as a means of petty extortion by local officials.94 
Soe noted the ineffectiveness of a system which could easily be circumvented by bribery 
and pointed out some of the more farcical aspects, for children not even in their teens in 
1965 were still required to apply for this official statement. Essentially, however, he 
regarded this process as an inappropriate way of dealing with the millions of Indonesians 
who could be discriminated against because of their membership of one of the many PKI- 
affiliated front organisations.95
93 'Persoalan tawanan politik’ (The political prisoner problem), Harian KAMI, 4 April 1969
94 'Surat Tidak Terlibat G.30.S' (The Letter of Non-involvement in G.30.S), Kompas, 29 April 1969
95 Some months later Soe attacked a plan to apply a special mark to the citizenship identity cards of 
those living in the Greater Jakarta region who were former PKI members, comparing it to the Nazi policy 
requiring Jews to wear the yellow Star of David in Germany and occupied Europe during World War Two.
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For Soe, as for many others, the question of the role of intellectuals within the 
wider society, and in particular the relationship between intellectuals and government, 
was brought into sharper focus through a series of articles written by 'Wira' that 
appeared in Indonesia Raya during mid April, under the provocative title 'Examples of 
intellectual prostitution during the Sukarno regime'.96 The five principal targets of the 
articles (Mohammad Sadli, Ismail Suny, Sutjipto Wirjosuparto, Barli Halim and Emil 
Salim), all senior University of Indonesia academics, were each accused of committing 
serious compromises with the truth and with scientific objectivity during the Sukarno era 
by their public acceptance of many of Sukarno's ideological formulations.97 The series, 
written in a deliberately confronting style, created something of a sensation in Indonesian 
intellectual and elite circles. Many of the leading Jakarta dailies ran editorials on the 
issue, most of them criticising 'Wira' for excessive self-righteousness and hypocrisy.98 
There was also a number of articles by prominent figures, including a robust defence of 
the University of Indonesia's economists by their mentor and current Minister for Trade, 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, while two of those accused prepared their own detailed 
rejoinders.99
Soe's response to this issue was an interesting one in view of his own 
uncompromising approach when faced with matters of principle. Choosing to avoid the 
polemics about those particular individuals who had been targeted by 'Wira', he tried to 
present a measured and balanced approach to the difficult problem of making judgements
See his letter to Kompas, Tanda chusus bagi jang terlibat G.30.S' (A special sign for those involved in 
G.30.S), 29 July 1969.
96 The series appeared under the pseudonym of 'Wira' but it was soon common knowledge that the 
articles were the work of a senior Indonesia Raya journalist D.H. Assegaff. See 'Tjontoh7 pelatjuran 
intelektuil dizaman resim Sukarno', Indonesia Raya, 14-18 and 21-3 April 1969.
97 Professor Sadli, who was currently chairman of the Foreign Investment Committee trying to attract 
foreign capital into the country, was alleged publicly to have opposed foreign investment before 1966. 
Both Sadli and Emil Salim had recently been appointed to the Spri group of presidential advisors.
98 See, for example, Harian KAMTs editorial on 18 April 1969: 'Tentang pelatjuran intelektuil’ (On 
intellectual prostitution).
99 See Kompas, 19, 22 and 30 April 1969.
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about any individual's conduct in such circumstances.100 There were two quite different 
ways to tackle the problem he concluded, depending upon whether one applied a system 
of 'absolute values' - implying black and white or right and wrong choices - or a system 
of 'relative values'. According to the latter, although right and wrong may exist in 
theory, within the real world it was possible for certain compromises to be made with 
principles for the sake of future perceived advantages. Soe argued that there was in fact a 
place for both responses although the application of relative values as a guide to action 
was potentially more problematic:
Both these value systems are needed in society. In theory these perspectives are in 
conflict, but the boundary is rather vague. We can only say 'intuitively' that every 
situation and every position must be judged in a balanced manner.... Even though the 
boundaries are unclear, the basis of every action should always be supported by the 
motives that lie behind them. Precise boundaries do not exist, and a final judgement 
will be given by our own conscience. However, everyone who applies relative values 
should have a limit. And if that limit is crossed, they must be courageous enough to 
act differently, because they will be swept away by the current if they are too flexible.
When Sukarno began to bare his teeth after 1958 Indonesian intellectuals were faced 
with a difficult problem: what attitude should they adopt in the face of this increasingly 
deteriorating situation? A small group of them (for example, Mochtar Lubis) took the 
view that the existing regime could no longer be relied upon. The only way to improve 
the situation was to expose Sukarno's mistakes constantly and through public opinion 
press for a change of government. He was consistent and prepared to go to jail for nine 
years. Irrespective of whether we agree with him or not, Mochtar Lubis' attitude is one 
that must be respected and admired.
However, there were also those who believed that if they abandoned the government 
administration in its entirety, then Sukarno, the communists, and the boot-lickers 
would reign supreme. The situation would be even worse and because of that they had 
to participate within the government administration and maintain the situation as best 
as they could, and if possible improve matters. A lot of opinions had to be sacrificed 
and many convincing compromises had to be taken. Without believing in Manipol, 
Nasakom, Nefos and so on they had to participate in the use of these slogans. They had 
to speak about politics in the style of Sukarno.... I also have a lot of sympathy for 
those who assigned themselves this difficult task.101
Yet Soe did not wish to dwell exclusively on the past as the Indonesia Raya series 
had done. He was determined to take the opportunity presented by the controversy to 
direct public attention to the role intellectuals were playing under the emerging New 
Order: since a number of senior academics had accepted government posts during the
100 In the case of Professor Sutjipto, Soe almost certainly was in agreement with the assessment of 
'Wira'. See Chapter 3, pp.84-5.
101 '"Pelatjuran" intelektuil' (Intellectual 'prostitution'), Sinar Harapan, 21 April 1969
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previous year, this was a highly relevant issue.102 Consequently, Soe began his article
on 'intellectual prostitution' in the following manner:
When the University of Indonesia Rector, Professor Dr Sumantri Brodjonegoro was 
appointed Minister for Mining I went to see him. I asked why he wanted to become a 
minister and work with oil gangsters, foreign capital touts, and corrupt and sloganeering 
officials. The Rector replied that he was also aware of those problems. 'But we have 
two choices if we see something rotten occurring in government circles. Leap in and 
try to improve matters (without being sure of success) or remain outside and wait for 
the institution to collapse. I've chosen the first with all its consequences.’
I received the same answer when I questioned my friends who have also joined the 
government administration and who are now occupying senior positions around the 
country. I know that several of them have made compromises, have given out ’special 
licences', and sometimes have not taken any action against the corruption going on 
around them. But despite this, I still respect them, because they are working in a 
difficult situation and they are trying to achieve maximum results.105
This controversy over alleged 'intellectual prostitution' provoked Soe to reflect 
further on the nature of the relationship that had emerged between certain civilian 
intellectuals and the armed forces under the New Order.104 In a subsequent essay, he 
traced the origins of this relationship back to the Guided Democracy era, stressing the 
important pioneering role played by Brigadier General Suwarto in attracting a number of 
university academics and prominent intellectuals to teach at Seskoad in Bandung during 
the early 1960s.105 With the collapse of Sukarno's Old Order, Soeharto and the armed 
forces had been able to draw on the knowledge and technical expertise of this group in 
the urgent tasks of reconstruction, especially the rebuilding of the shattered Indonesian 
economy. The participation of these academics in the New Order government had also 
enhanced Indonesia's reputation abroad and had facilitated the task of attracting badly 
needed foreign aid and investment. However, as Soe emphasised, control over domestic
102 By 1968 the following academics had been appointed to cabinet posts: Professor Sumantri 
Brodjonegoro (Rector University of Indonesia, Mining), Professor Tojib Hadiwidjaja (Rector IPB, 
Agriculture), Professor Ali Wardhana (Dean of the Economics Faculty UI, Finance), Professor Oemar 
Senoadji (Senior Professor Law Faculty UI, Justice), and Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (Trade). 
In addition, a number of senior UI economists had joined the president's inner group of advisors, the Spri: 
Professors Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto.
103 '"Pelatjuran" intelektuil' (Intellectual 'prostitution'), Sinar Harapan, 21 April 1969; 'friends who 
have also joined the government administration' is almost certainly a reference to Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo.
104 Letter to Herbert Feith, 1 May 1969
105 'Kuli penguasa atau pemegang saham’ (Ruler's slaves or shareholders), Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
No.153, 18 May 1969
politics remained firmly in the hands of the military who knew that their civilian 
'partners' could never become rivals for power.
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Soe noted some of the arguments used to justify cooperation between university 
intellectuals and the military in developing countries like Indonesia, where the civilians 
were regarded as the agents of social change imparting essential ideas, knowledge and 
skills, and where, with increasing development and modernisation, the position of 
technocratic specialists would be strengthened as society's problems and the tasks of 
government grew more complex. But for all these noble arguments, Soe and many of his 
student friends remained uneasy about the so-called ABRI-civilian 'partnership' in the 
face of growing signs of authoritarian political control and increasing corruption on the 
part of some of the most powerful army officers. Consequently, Soe believed that a 
serious doubt remained over the position of those intellectuals who had decided to serve 
in the New Order government:
During discussions a student asked what guarantee was there that we would not be 
deceived by the military. 'In the present situation the armed forces as the largest and 
strongest party has no other choice but to use the technocrats. But if by some chance 
the economy is put in order and the armed forces get the bright idea to dismiss Emil 
Salim, Sumitro, Sumantri and the others, what bargaining position do we have?'.... I 
can't answer this question. I’m unable to convince myself that all the ABRI leaders are 
individuals with good intentions towards the Indonesian people. There have been too 
many irregularities and violations of the law. Ultimately I ask myself the question:
'Are they the ruler's slaves or are they shareholders who are also genuinely able to share
in decision-making?'106
A downward spiral
Throughout the second half of 1969 little occurred within the various strands of 
Soe's public and private life to allay a growing sense of personal restlessness. On the 
one hand, there was his increasing pessimism about the direction in which Indonesia 
appeared to be moving under Soeharto's leadership and his awareness that the emerging 
political order was falling far short of the ideals and aspirations that had inspired his own 
activism and involvement throughout the previous decade. On the other, there were the
'Kuli penguasa atau pemegang saham' (Ruler's slaves or shareholders), Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
No. 153, 18 May 1969
gnawing bouts of inner loneliness and isolation that he continued to experience within the 
seemingly familiar fabric of his everyday circle of friends and acquaintances.
As far as politics and national affairs were concerned, Soe continued to write 
regular essays and commentaries on a range of issues for the Jakarta press. Of the 
twenty or so articles he contributed between May and December, several stand out for 
their thoughtful and challenging perspective to national issues; but there is a sharp edge to 
much of his writing that is indicative of growing frustration and scepticism .107
Since he was well aware that open criticism of government personnel and politics in 
the national press was viewed with immense hostility by many senior officers in the 
armed forces he realised that it was crucial to use the existing opportunities to maximum 
effect. At the same time he believed that it was timely to express the frustration that many 
felt about the lack of any official action or investigation over those instances of corruption
and mismanagement that had been already revealed by the revitalised Indonesian press:
Some time ago Indonesia Raya reported the corruption surrounding the purchase of 
tankers involving millions of US dollars. In an honest fashion this newspaper 
mentioned the name of Major General Surjo as the individual involved. The armed 
forces promised to provide an explanation but to date the outcome has been zero.
Problems like this have frequently occurred throughout the last three years. I recall 
Sinar Harapan engaging in a holy war against Major General Ibnu Sutowo, exposing 
irregularities in the oil sector. There was uproar and disputation backwards and 
forwards. Society wondered whether the government was prepared to take action.
Punish whoever was guilty or prosecute the newspaper involved in the courts for 
publishing lies. The outcome was also zero.10**
Soe believed that lack of any proper action or investigation by the government over what 
were very serious allegations involving senior government officials was not only 
frustrating, it was also potentially very revealing about the real nature of the political
regime. He expressed his fears in the same essay in the following blunt fashion:
Press freedom should be followed up quickly by the legal apparatus. Otherwise there 
will only be disillusionment that will ultimately become a destructive force within 
society. If the government (the President and his assistants) really wish to build a new 
order, not just some sort of window dressing, then as a consequence there must also be 
some rapid changes to accommodate society's expectations. Development followed up
107 In addition to the articles discussed here there are also several film reviews and a number of articles 
on student affairs and the university world. For a complete listing, see the attached bibliography.
10** 'Kebebasan pers dan keketjewaan masjarakat' (Press freedom and society's disillusionment), Indonesia 
Raya, 12 May 1969
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by improvements in the apparatus of government, press freedom followed up by 
efficient legal institutions (police, prosecutors, judiciary etc).
On the other hand, if the government doesn't honestly have any intention in that 
direction (just overthrowing Sukarno and replacing all his lackeys), then don't change 
any of the existing fundamentals. Don't extend press freedom, don't give academic 
freedom etc. And wipe out any opposition voices, no matter how small. Because 
changes that are confusing will ultimately only destroy all that society and government 
hinges upon.
In mid July Soe reflected on what he believed to be the New Order government's 
failure to communicate its development message to the various layers of Indonesian 
society. In this regard he believed that it compared unfavourably with former President 
Sukarno who had been so successful in inspiring the nation and attracting support for his 
own programs and policies. Despite his own admitted lack of expertise in economic 
matters, Soe was quite aware of the critical importance of the economic reform program 
that was being implemented by the technocrats who were occupying the key economic 
posts in the New Order government. Yet it disappointed him that not enough was being 
done by Soeharto and his senior ministers to communicate the importance of the
government's program in a manner that was both comprehensible and inspiring:
It is precisely in the context of social mobilisation that groups are needed who are able 
to talk with all levels of society. To the university, to village society, as well as army 
circles. In this respect the Soeharto government has not yet been successful.... This 
year is the first year of the Five Year Plan. But until now my impression is that the 
Indonesian people are singularly indifferent about this important plan. There is hardly 
any communication that is comprehensible by the general public and this overly 
pragmatic government has ultimately failed to attract the enthusiasm and working 
support of the people.109
Towards the end of the year Soe used several of his essays to reflect more generally 
on some of the wider dimensions of national politics. On the anniversary of Indonesia's 
independence in August he wrote with feeling about the hopes and ideals of his own 
generation of young Indonesians who had no direct experience of the revolution and the 
struggle for independence but had grown up full of optimism only to experience the 
frustrations and failures of the decades that followed. 110 Then in October on the
109 'Betapa tak menariknja pemerintah sekarang?’ (How unattractive is the government at present?), 
Kompas, 16 July 1969
110 'Generasi jang lahir setelah tahun empat lima' (The post '45 generation), Kompas, 16 August 1969. 
Another version of the same essay was translated into English for a special issue of Quadrant: see 
'Children of independence: the post-war generation in Indonesia’, Quadrant, September-October 1969, pp.
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occasion of the celebration of the historic 1928 Youth Pledge - a significant milestone in 
the development of the nationalist movement - he described some of the regional, ethnic 
and religious divisions which had from time to time threatened to destroy the spirit of 
national unity that had inspired the struggle for independence and the creation of the 
Indonesian state. * 111
In addition to the public voice Soe revealed in his journalism there was also a 
personal dimension to his deepening disappointment with the direction of national 
politics. By late 1969 he was beginning to have serious doubts about some of those 
individuals in whom he had previously invested great hope for the future. Two of the 
most significant figures in this regard were Mochtar Lubis and Professor Sumitro, both 
men he had personally admired for their principled rejection of Sukarno and Guided 
Democracy politics.
When Indonesia Raya reappeared on the streets in October 1968, Soe was pleased 
to contribute occasional articles and believed that Mochtar Lubis' voice would strengthen 
the standing of the independent critical free press that had reemerged during the previous 
three years. Yet during the following year Soe was disappointed to discover that Lubis 
did not share his own views about a number of issues. In April there were sharp 
disagreements between, on the one hand Soe and his brother Arief, and on the other 
Mochtar and several supporters, over plans to organise a festival of Russian films in 
Jakarta.112 Mochtar Lubis' more thorough-going commitment to the cause of 
international anti-communism also led to differences over the Vietnam war where he
78-81. The same essay was also published in Indonesia Raya as 'Putera2 kemerdekaan, generasi sesudah 
perang di Indonesia', 5 January 1970. There are several references to army corruption that were deleted
from this version while Soe's estimate of 300,000 victims of the 1965 massacres was changed to 3000.
111 'Tantangan kepada semangat ke-Indonesia-an' (Challenge to the Indonesian spirit), Kompas, 29 
October 1969
112 SHG Diary, 21 and 23 April 1969. Mochtar Lubis, Jakob Oetama and others were opposed to the 
screening of any Soviet films in Indonesia on the grounds that these might be used as a propanganda tool 
in any attempt by the PKI to launch a comeback. See the Kompas editorial on this issue, 15 April 1969.
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remained implacably opposed to the withdrawal of US ground forces.113 But for Soe 
the most distressing news of all was the discovery that Mochtar did not share his views 
about the release of those political prisoners on whom the government had no evidence of 
wrong-doing.114
Until the middle of 1969 Soe continued to regard Sumitro's return to public life and 
his appointment to cabinet as one of the more positive aspects of the New Order.115 He 
had written a laudatory article about him for the Jakarta press when Sumitro first returned 
to Indonesia in May 1967.116 On a personal level his contacts with the Sumitro camp 
remained as close as ever. In fact, in the middle of the year he was invited by Sumitro's 
son, Prabowo, to participate in a project to establish a volunteer development worker 
scheme drawing on the skills of young Indonesian university graduates in rural 
development projects throughout the country.117 During the second half of 1969, 
however, Soe's attitude towards Sumitro and some of his closest supporters appears to 
have hardened. The reasons for this are not fully apparent from Soe's diary entries, but it 
undoubtedly grew in part out of the expectations that he and others had placed on Sumitro 
after his return from political exile.
113 SHG Diary, 30 July 1969
114 SHG Diary, 3 August 1969. The differences emerged during a visit to Indonesia by an Amnesty 
International delegation during July:
Mochtar Lubis doesn't agree with my suggestion that Pak Harto put out a statement 
about accepting them back into society. I don't understand Mochtar Lubis’ anti­
intellectual attitude. Whereas he was defended by Pramoedya when he was arrested back 
in 1958.
Mochtar Lubis (interview, 17 March 1982) claimed that he believed that at the time the army was so 
antagonistic to the idea that it was pointless to pursue it.
115 In mid May Soe's diary records a lively meeting at which Sumitro detailed his attempts to create 
opportunities for indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs to participate in economic development projects. 
Soe and his friend Sjahrir, who accompanied him on the visit to Sumitro's house, seemed to be impressed 
with the minister's plans. Sjahrir, who had not met Sumitro before, thought him 'a man of action’, in 
comparison to the 'generalist' Soedjatmoko. SHG Diary, 15 May 1969
116 See 'Siapakah Sumitro jang dihebohkan itu' (Who is this Sumitro who's causing a stir), Kompas, 
19 May 1967.
117 SHG Diary, 1 May 1969. Prabowo, who had only recently returned to Indonesia, drew upon some 
of the young activists in the Gerakan Pembaharuan circle to assist him with his plan. During May and 
June Soe participated in a series of informal meetings in Jakarta and Bandung with university staff and 
senior bureaucrats in various government departments and agencies. SHG Diary, 7, 11, 18 and 19 May 
1969. However, as the meetings progressed Soe began to have doubts about the feasibility of such a 
scheme and to question Prabowo's capacity to implement it effectively. SHG Diary, 22 and 25 May 
1969. From early July Soe seems to have played no further part in the project.
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Idealistic young men like Soe and his close friends in the Gerakan Pembaharuan 
circle had been committed and loyal supporters of Sumitro's movement inside Indonesia 
during the difficult years before 1966. They had taken heart from Sumitro's public 
critique of Guided Democracy and regarded him as a man of determination and principle. 
Following his return to Indonesia in mid 1967, many within the group entertained hopes 
that their hitherto clandestine movement might be the basis for a new democratic political 
force inside the New Order.118
Although Sumitro's elevation to cabinet in 1968 had at first been regarded with 
great optimism, by 1969 any hopes of launching a new political organisation based on 
Gerakan Pembaharuan had evaporated with the Soeharto government's plans for reform 
of the existing party system and its promotion of Golkar.119 The only course open to 
Sumitro, like the other technocrat ministers, was to work on the 'inside' to implement 
essential reforms, in spite of the compromises that such a path might entail.
By late 1969 Soe Hok-gie's own very public criticisms of the New Order had 
increased to the point where a certain distance may have been expected; but Soe's attitude 
towards Sumitro seems to have been coloured by a number of disturbing reports he had 
received about various instances of corruption involving some of the minister's closest 
supporters.120 On several occasions Soe took up the issue directly with members of
118 Interviews with Henk Tombokan, 24 February 1982; Jopie Lasut, 2 March 1982; and Suripto, 19 
March 1982
119 Crouch 1978: 247-66
120 During July Soe learned of corruption with the Jakarta office of the Ministry of Trade (SHG Diary, 
24 July 1969); but more serious were the allegations that certain key members of the Sumitro inner circle 
- including his own father Margono - had been receiving kickbacks from private companies (SHG Diary, 
8 August and 15 November 1969). The truth of the allegations is impossible to judge, but there is no 
doubting the anger and frustration Soe felt. It may explain the following curious comment in his 
Independence Day essay, 'Generasi jang lahir setelah tahun empat lima':
... what is most distressing is that money for the PRRI-Permesta struggle was frittered 
away in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Soe may have been unaware of it, but Sumitro himself had been accused of corruption in the 1950s. 
Prior to linking up with the 1958 regional rebellions he had fled Jakarta in May of the previous year to 
avoid a corruption investigation into the misuse of state funds for the PSI election campaign. See van 
der Kroef 1957b: 120; Feith 1962: 585; and Sundhaussen 1982: 118.
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Sumitro's inner circle:
I said that I was disappointed precisely because the GP people who had actually fought 
in the past and had now 'retreated', had expected and put their trust in friends in the field 
to realise their shared ideals, had now been misused.121
Soe's anger and sense of betrayal finally erupted at a meeting of Gerakan 
Pembaharuan supporters in early December at which he criticised the behaviour of certain 
individuals and challenged the older generation to stand aside if they were no longer able 
or inclined to provide proper leadership.122 His perception that those whom he had 
considered to be political allies had failed him was particularly distressing, since it came 
at a time when he was also beginning to hear reports that serious corruption under the 
New Order reached up to the highest levels, including President Soeharto's own 
family . 123
Soe's obvious disenchantment with the wider world of politics was matched by a 
deepening personal malaise. Despite his prominence and considerable popularity within 
university student circles, as the months passed he began to feel increasingly isolated and 
alone. Although his day to day contact with a wide circle of friends and acquaintances 
continued undiminished, he sensed a growing gulf with many of his campus friends and 
a feeling that he no longer shared their outlook, their values or their interests. Yet this 
was at best a partial explanation for the melancholy and loneliness that he kept largely 
hidden from public view.
The bitter disappointment over the break with G ----- was never far from the
surface, and meetings with either G ---- o r H ----- were a constant and painful reminder
of the emptiness he felt, and the longing for love and companionship that remained 
unfulfilled.124 In early June following a Mapala trip to climb Mt. Ciremai, Soe began a 
new friendship with I ---- , a young anthropology student at Rawamangun; but although
121 SHG Diary, 15 November 1969
122 SHG Diary, 2 December 1969
123 SHG Diary, 28 October, 4 and 20 November 1969. Friends with 'inside' contacts claimed to have 
documentary proof of corruption involving the president's wife, Tien Soeharto.
124 SHG Diary, 6 July, 9, 10, 16 and 20 August, 18 and 29 October, 8 December 1969
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the pair spent a great deal of time together during the following months, the real nature of 
their friendship remained enigmatic. They assured one another on more than one 
occasion that this was not a serious affair, but merely a platonic friendship to fill the void 
until someone else appeared.125 Yet when her strict and conservative family learned of 
the friendship, an angry confrontation ensued with wild and humiliating allegations.126 
Soe was once more branded as a thoroughly unacceptable person: it was another painful
reminder of the barriers imposed by ethnic chauvinism:
H ---- who understands the problem just remarked: 'That issue again.' I just thought
to myself, am I really that bad to be always distrusted? Am I wrong to associate with
I ----as a fellow human being? What's more, I’ve no special feelings towards her at all
except an honest sense of friendship.122
What Soe really felt about the nature of his friendship with I -----is difficult to assess,
although his subsequent diary entries lay bare the knife-edge on which his emotions and 
desires were so frequently and precariously balanced.128
For one who displayed remarkable confidence and maturity in dealing with so 
many aspects of the external world, Soe's inner emotional state was marked by ambiguity 
and confusion during these months as he struggled to come to terms with his feelings 
towards each of the three young women who had become such an important part of his 
life.129 Now in his twenty-sixth year, he could only look with envy upon those of his 
friends who were married or secure in established relationships. His own personal moral 
code prevented him from plunging headlong into casual sexual encounters;130 but many 
of his diary entries during the final months of 1969 reveal a tortured fascination with the 
exploits of some of his wilder acquaintances and an almost obsessive interest in the love 
affairs of others, highly suggestive of his own sexual tension.131 Soe's teenage 
reflections on the nature of love and desire were once more powerfully revisited; but his
125 SHG Diary, 20 June, 20 and 24 September, 1 November 1969
126 SHG Diary, 27 June and 5 July 1969
127 SHG Diary, 27 June 1969
128 SHG Diary, 18 July, 24 September, 17 and 31 October, 1, 10 and 11 November 1969
129 There are numerous anguished passages in his diary following encounters with each of them during 
these months: 6, 9, 11, 16 and 29 August and 6 September, and especially a long entry on 8 December 
1969.
130 SHG Diary, 30 April 1969
131 SHG Diary, 21 and 28 August 1969
anguished quest for someone to share his deepest thoughts, his hopes, his fears, for 
someone to share his love and satisfy his own desire remained as hopelessly out of reach
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as ever.
Conflict on the campus
Towards the end of October Soe found himself at the centre of a bitter and 
protracted public row over the nature of student government within the university.132 
Since he believed that the issues at stake threatened the integrity of the institution that had 
been such a central part of his intellectual and emotional life throughout the previous eight 
years, he could not avoid becoming involved. Yet his participation in the affair added 
considerably to the burden of stress and unhappiness that was pressing in upon him in 
late 1969.
The conflict that finally erupted was not entirely unexpected. From at least the 
beginning of the 1969 academic year there had been serious disagreements within student 
circles over the formation and composition of the incoming University of Indonesia 
Student Council (DM UI).133 It was readily apparent to Soe and other non-ormas 
students that HMI activists were intent on dominating the new council and that if this 
occurred 'intra'-oriented independent students would be effectively sidelined.
As a result, the Student Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratari 
Mahasiswa, MPM) reached a state of deadlock over the appointment of formateurs 
despite pressure from the university’s rector, Professor Sumantri.134 Opposition to HMI 
principally came from independent-minded students throughout the university but was
132 In addition to the sources listed below, the following account also draws on interviews with the 
following student leaders: Harry Victor (1969 Senate chairman, Faculty of Psychology), 7 February 
1985; Hendro Budidharmono (1969 Senate chairman, Faculty of Letters), 20 March 1982; and Sjahrir, 
July 1978.
133 SHG Diary, 11 and 29 April 1969
134 SHG Diary, 1 May 1969. The MPM was a 48 member body elected by the entire student 
community. In theory it was the student 'legislative' body but its major function appears to have been 
the appointment of the formateurs who decided upon the composition of the DMUI and the ratification of 
their deliberations.
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centred in three of the smallest faculties - Letters, Psychology and Dentistry - where anti- 
ormas feeling was particularly strong. In early June the three student senates in these 
faculties formed an alliance to resist HMI moves.135 Among those who were most active 
in the anti-HMI campaign were several students who had also been members of Group 
Diskusi UI formed a year earlier: in particular, IMADA leader and economics student 
Sjahrir v/as one of the most prominent.
Negotiations between the two parties proceeded during the following months but 
by mid August were no closer to resolution.136 When the demands of the rebel faculties 
for increased representation were rejected, seventeen members of the MPM withdrew 
from that body, and announced that they were severing relations with the DMUI to form 
what was, in effect, a rival organisation, the UI Student Coordinating Body (.Koordinasi 
Kegiatan Kemahasisxvaan-UI, KKK-UI).137 A meeting between the three rebel senate 
leaders and Rector Sumantri failed to provide any solution.138
By this stage Soe was technically no longer a student and had already become a 
junior university staff member. However, because of his reputation as a leading advocate 
for campus independence and his well-known hostility towards the political activities of 
externally-based student organisations, it was inevitable that he would continue to be a 
central figure in subsequent attempts to resolve this conflict. In addition to further 
discussions with the incoming DMUI leadership under Hariadi Darmawan,139 Soe met 
directly with the rector, Professor Sumantri, on several occasions to discuss the impasse 
within student affairs. At the first of these meetings on 8 September, Soe made plain his 
own belief that the issues at stake were far more serious and pervasive than the vexed
135 SHG Diary, 26 May and 3 June 1969
136 Soe was himself directly involved in many of these negotiations: SHG Diary, 12 June, 12, 13 and 
17 July, 13 and 18 August 1969.
137 See 'Krisis lembaga mahasiswa UI, kenapa Rektor diam?' (Crisis in UI student institution, why is 
the Rector silent?), Pedoman, 23 August 1969; 'Rektor UI tentang keritjuhan di universitasnja' (UI 
Rector on the chaos in his university), Kompas, 23 1969; SHG Diary, 20 and 23 August 1969.
138 SHG Diary, 28 August 1969; '3 Senat keluar dari DMUI' (3 Senates withdraw from DMUI), Sinar 
Harapan, 29 August 1969
139 SHG Diary, 20 September 1969. Hariadi Darmawan was a senior HMI activist. He had also been 
appointed to the DPR-GR as one of the student representatives in the 1968 reshuffle.
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question of the composition of the new DMUI and the various personality conflicts that 
had emerged within student circles. 140 He stressed that there were serious question- 
marks over the entire system of student government at the university. The nature of the 
relationship between the DMUI and the various faculty-level student senates remained 
confused, and the institutional procedures - 'the rules of the game' - to elect these various 
bodies were neither consistent nor properly implemented. In addition, Soe raised the 
problem of serious financial mismanagement and corruption within student affairs, 
instancing to Sumantri some of the most blatant examples. According to Soe's diary 
account of the meeting, Sumantri's response was indecisive but the rector stressed the 
importance of keeping these problems out of the press on the grounds that there were 
those who would use it to damage the university's reputation within the community. 141
By the end of the month the university administration's attitude had hardened 
towards the dissident faculties grouped under the KKK-UI. When the rector issued a 
statement declaring his opposition to the existence of such a body, Soe sensed that a 
decisive stage had been reached:
I'm beginning to see that the DMUI and Sumantri share the same interests on this 
issue. I imagine the rector is not pleased by these problems being discussed outside 
(especially in the newspapers) because its effect is likely to snowball. People will 
begin to ask about the chaos within the UI student world and will see how weak and 
rotten it is. Ultimately this rottenness will be evident and for certain it will give rise to 
the same question for the organisation at UI. UI is certainly damaged but succeeds in 
covering it up. I'm sure that the UI establishment will ultimately support the DMUI.
I have to be prepared for a clash with the UI leadership including Sumantri.142
Soe and others attended another inconclusive meeting with the rector in early 
October at which Sumantri, while requesting that the dissident faculties return to the 
DMUI fold, could give no more that a vague assurance that corruption would be dealt 
with in the future.143 A week later the DMUI issued a formal ban on the KKK-UI and
140 SHG Diary, 8 September 1969
141 A few days before their meeting, a lengthy article had appeared in the Jakarta press written by Sjahrir 
with Soe's assistance attacking the incoming DMUI and outlining the conflict within the MPM. See 
'Konflik dalam tubuh mahasiswa Indonesia’ (Conflict within the Indonesian student body), Kompas, 5 
September 1969.
142 SHG Diary, 27 September 1969
143 SHG Diary, 6 October 1969
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its program of activities within the university.144 On 17 October the Faculty of Letters 
senate leaders were called in by the rector and attacked as trouble-makers for continuing 
to operate under the KKK-UI banner.145 That afternoon Soe read an article in Harian 
KAMI which he regarded as a completely one-sided account of the conflict and a snide 
misrepresentation of the motives of the independent anti-ormas students.146 His patience 
at an end, he immediately drafted a detailed rejoinder which he read out that evening over 
Radio U I.147
Soe's article was written in anger and it showed. He put the blame for the present 
impasse within student affairs at UI squarely at the feet of the ormas-extra, especially 
HMI and its central leadership, which he claimed had deliberately set out on a mission to 
dominate student forums throughout the university, refusing to cooperate with 'intra'-
oriented students in either faculty or university-wide forums.
I don’t know how many ormas have put UI down as their major project.... 'to work on 
UI'. Or how many prominent student figures have been entrusted with the task of 
carrying out their 'organisation's mission'. Or how many secret agreements between 
ormas have been arranged.
I recall how in mid 1968 the UI student leadership and the UI administration were in 
uproar because they received a HMI document concerning the takeover of the DMUI by 
the HMI Executive Board, and its caretakers, the putting into position of prominent UI 
student figures who really shocked many people. The issue was taken up directly with 
them but their answer went round in circles, although it was never denied.
The ormas often have pretentions that they are 'the owners' of UI. This really offends 
those who do not belong to an ormas. At the time of the formation of the last DMUI 
the senates were not approached or asked for their opinion. Those approached were the 
ormas headquarters (PMKRI, PMII, GMKI etc). This really irritated those who do not 
belong to an ormas. One reason for the withdrawal of the Letters and Psychology 
student senates (their leadership are non-ormas people) was because they felt that they 
were regarded as of no consequence by the Student Council. When they pulled out 
because of the manipulations of the ormas, they (Letters and Psychology) were 
immediately branded as troublemakers, rebels, separatists and so on.
144 SHG Diary, 15 October 1969
145 SHG Diary, 17 October 1969
146 See'Djurnal kemahasiswaan: asjik ... asjik' (Student journal: infatuation ... infatuation) by AC. 
Zen Umar Purba in Harian KAMI, 17 October 1969.
147 SHG Diary, 17-22 October 1969. Soe's article did not actually appear in print for several days. He 
offered it at first to Kompas, but Jakob Oetama declined to publish it on the grounds that it was too harsh 
in its criticism. The Kompas editor admitted to him that Professor Sumantri had contacted him with a 
request that Soe be 'controlled'. The article was subsequently accepted by D.H. Assegaff at Indonesia 
Raya: see 'Wadjah mahasiswa UI jang bopeng sebelah' (The pock-marked side of the UI student face), 
Indonesia Raya, 22 October 1969.
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He also trenchantly criticised the UI administration for failing to ensure that fair and 
consistent university-wide procedures were in place to guarantee that those representative 
bodies accurately and fairly reflected the wishes of the student community. Yet probably 
the most inflamatory and controversial aspect of the article was his direct attack on the
issue of corruption within student affairs at UI:
As a student activist I have had a gutful of this experience. In my 'small republic' (UI)
I have been 'governor' (senate leader) and think I know quite well how unhealthy student 
life is at my place. In this 'small republic' called the University of Indonesia we can 
encounter all the kinds of dirtiness that we usually come upon in the larger republic - in 
the Republic of Indonesia.
If you meet an UI student activist (especially from the Central level) try asking whether 
he knows about corruption occurring within his circle. Both out in the open and in 
secret. If he's honest he will know and be able to tell you about the financial confusion 
occurring there. If he says he doesn't know, there are two possibilities. He's either so 
stupid that he can't smell the stench of corruption or he's pretending and doesn't want to 
speak out because he doesn't want outsiders to know about corruption and UI internal 
matters.
Soe backed up his allegations by giving numerous instances of some of the most blatant 
examples of financial mismanagement and lack of accountability which he claimed ran 
into millions of rupiah each year.
He had been involved in a number of political upheavals during the 1960s but he 
found this conflict on his own campus a particularly distressing experience. Not only 
was he challenging his opponents within the student body, but he also had placed himself 
at odds with the university's senior administrators. His diary entries during these weeks 
record the stress and anxiety the affair was causing him.148 Yet he felt that he had no 
choice but to take a very public stand over these issues.
The provocative nature of his article immediately attracted the attention of friends 
and enemies alike, and a number of rejoinders appeared in the days that followed.149 In
148 SHG Diary, 22 October 1969. Fearing he may have caused trouble for his own faculty, Soe offered 
his resignation to Harsja Bachtiar at Rawamangun.
149 See in particular the following: 'Hariadi Darmawan [Ketua DMUI]: Tundjuk hidung siapa2 jang 
lakukan korupsi' (Hariadi Darmawan [DMUI chairman]: Accuse anyone who has committed corruption), 
Indonesia Raya, 22 October 1969; 'Bekas tjatjar air pada sebahagian wadjah mahasiswa Universitas 
Indonesia' (Traces of chicken pox on a section of the UI student face), Drs. Med Biran Affandi, Indonesia 
Raya, 24 October 1969; 'Benarkah UI sudah sedemikian bopengnja?' (Is UI really that pockmarked?), 
Bustanil Arifin, Indonesia Raya, 25 October 1969; 'Sebuah lokasi film di UI. Titik ke-3 polemik Drs 
Soe Hok-gie versus Drs Biran Affandi' (A film location at UI. Third period of the polemic between Drs 
Soe Hok-gie and Drs Biran Affandi), Sinansari Etjip, Indonesia Raya, 27 October 1969.
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addition to the public comments, Soe also heard reports from friends of several instances 
of personal abuse, some of it tinged with racism.150 Perhaps most wounding of all was 
the discovery that several of his own 'Alma Mater' group at Rawamangun had 
approached the DMUI leadership with their support.151 Stung by the various reactions to 
his article, Soe prepared a tersely-worded reply.152 From this point his personal role in 
the conflict seemed to be at an end.
In the weeks that followed he began to turn his attention to other matters, in 
particular the planning of a Mapala trip to climb Mt. Semeru in East Java with his old 
friend Herman Lantang who had recently returned to Jakarta from Irian Jaya. Climbing 
Semeru was something he had talked about with Herman on several occasions over the 
previous two years. With the bitter conflict at UI so fresh in his mind, in addition to his 
growing disquiet over so many aspects of politics under the New Order and his own 
private melancholy, Soe looked forward with special enthusiasm to the solitude of the 
mountain peaks as a place of retreat from so much personal torment and restlessness.
Yet in the midst of preparations for his departure he could not resist the opportunity 
to leave behind two additional small pieces of political provocation. On 22 November the 
much-debated General Elections Law and associated legislation were finally passed by 
the DPR-GR, clearing the way for the holding of national elections which the Soeharto 
government announced would take place in July 1971.153 Several days after this 
announcement, Soe interviewed a group of students, including his brother Arief
150 Soe was told that the Rawamangun campus had been described as a 'PKI-G30S centre' by a senior 
professor in the Medical Faculty; he also heard that he had been attacked as 'that little chink Soe Hok-gie 
who is only now brave enough to talk’ and even more ludicrously as 'PKI-Baperki'. SHG Diary, 22 
September, 22 and 24 October 1969
151 SHG Diary, 23 and 24 October 1969; 3 and 4 November 1969. See also the letters by Hidayat 
Sutarnadi and Attabrani Kasuma Tabri in Harian KAMI, 24 October 1969. Soe regarded this as an act of 
treachery arising from personal rivalry and petty jealousy.
152 See 'Sikap dewasa thd. kritik' (A mature attitude to criticism), Indonesia Raya, 5 November 1969. 
During the following month negotiations between the DMUI and the rebel faculties continued. By early 
December the conflict appears to have been resolved, though the terms of the settlement were never made 
clear. See ’Senat mahasiswa FSUI dan F.Psy.UI pulihkan hubungan dgn DMUI’ (FSUI and F.Psy.UI 
senate resume relations with DMUI), Kompas, 16 December 1969.
153 For the background to these developments and the Soeharto government's efforts to reform the 
existing party system, see Crouch 1978: 247-53.
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Budiman, on the issue of the elections for Radio UI's regular evening program. 154 
During the course of the discussion Arief floated the idea of boycotting the forthcoming 
elections on the grounds that none of the existing parties were worth supporting. Soe 
reported Arief s remarks in a satirical piece that appeared in Sinar Harapan several days 
later, also detailing another friend's facetious and tongue-in-cheek proposal to compile a 
register of all those students who could not decide on a choice and to auction off all their 
votes as a bloc to the highest bidder:
Now, whoever dares to pay the most, we'll support them. It doesn't matter - PNI, NU
or MKGR. As far as we're concerned there's no difference.155
At the same time Soe was also involved in another political prank. In collaboration
with several friends, he hatched a plan to deliver a 'Christmas-Lebaran' gift to each of the
thirteen student representatives in the DPR-GR. 156 Packets of lipstick, a mirror, needles
and thread were prepared, and signatures collected for the attached letter:
Dear Sir,
We, university students in Jakarta, herewith respectfully send you, the 'representatives 
of the students' in the DPR-GR. Lebaran and Christmas packages. In this Lebaran and 
Christmas atmosphere, we salute the struggle you have made over the years in this 
institute of people's 'representatives'.
The democratic conditions in Indonesia and the present Rule of Law surely constitute 
the results of the struggle of you all, students who are relentless and unbeatable, who 
never give in, and who know no compromise with what is right!
With this letter, we are sending you a small gift of cosmetics and a little mirror so that 
you, our honoured brothers, can make yourselves more attractive in the eyes of the 
authorities and your colleagues in the DPR-GR.
Work well, long live the New Order! Enjoy your sittings - sleep well!
Your fellow students in Jakarta and former '66 demonstrators.157
154 SHG Diary, 27-29 November 1969
155 See 'Siapa mau beli suara mahasiswa untuk PEMILU?' (Who wants to buy the students' vote for the 
elections?), Sinar Harapan, 1 December 1969. The idea of the 'vote auction' came from a journalist 
friend, Fikri Djufri. MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong) was one of the numerous 
organisations grouped under the banner of Sekber-Golkar, the army-backed Joint Secretariat of Functional 
Groups.
15  ^ Soe had initially suggested to his friend Jopie Lasut sending a kain kebaya to the chairman of the 
DPR-GR 'in recognition of his cowardice'. SHG Diary, 26 November 1969. The idea of sending 
cosmetics as a calculated insult was not a new one. During the revolution East Java pemuda had sent 
lipstick to a Bandung pemuda leader who had been forced by the Japanese into a humiliating backdown. 
See Anderson 1972: 142. Soe may have been aware of this incident from his own study of the period.
157 The text of the letter appeared in Nusantara, 15 December 1969. Soe had some misgivings about 
sending the package to those student representatives in the DPR-GR whom he regarded as friends 
(Rachman Tolleng and Nono Anwar Makarim) but he felt he could not make any exceptions.
The parcels were delivered on 12 December. Meanwhile a lively debate had already 
erupted within student circles over the idea of an election boycott, with a stream of 
articles appearing on the subject in the Jakarta press.158 But by this time Soe was already 
heading for the slopes of Java's highest mountain.
Semeru
Only a few days before his departure for East Java Soe learned of the sudden death 
of an old school friend from his teenage years. The unwelcome news seemed to elicit a 
disturbing reaction:
I don't know what's the matter with me. Since I heard about the death of Kian Fong 
from Arief last Sunday I have the feeling of being constantly aware of death. I want to
say goodbye before leaving for Semeru. With G ---- and H ------, and I also want to
spend some time alone with I -----. I suppose this is the influence of Kian Fong's
strange and sudden death.159
As a consequence, in between a steady stream of other visitors, the final arrangements for 
the despatch of the parcels to the student-politicians and last-minute packing, Soe made a 
special effort to farewell in turn each of the three young women to whom he felt so close.
The Mapala circle had never paid much attention to the technical aspects of their 
outdoor activities. In fact, they seemed to enjoy the challenge of travelling light and 
pitting themselves against the elements. Their equipment and provisions were invariably 
rudimentary at best, although on this occasion Soe and Herman had taken the trouble to 
consult some old maps and the memoirs of the one of first vulcanologists to visit the 
region. Mt. Semeru was, after all, a highly active volcano and at 3676m it was the 
highest mountain in Java. Although the surrounding villages were easily accessible from 
nearby Malang, the peak itself was in remote and isolated terrain.
158 See in particular the various articles for and against the boycott proposal in Sinar Harapan, 4, 8, 10, 
15 and 16 December 1969. For a clear restatement of Arief Budiman's views, see his rejoinder to 
criticism: 'Hak untuk memboikot pd Pemilu 1971 - djawaban terhadap Sdr Zaenul Arifin' (The right to 
boycott the 1971 elections - a reply to Zaenul Arifin), Sinar Harapan, 8 December 1969.
159 SHG Diary, 8 December 1969
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Soe, Herman and six other friends set off from Jakarta on 12 December, travelling 
via Surabaya and Malang.160 The actual climb began on 14 December from the village of 
Gubukklakah, the highest settlement on the mountain's north-eastern approaches. It was 
a long and difficult two-day trek to the summit. The party had to negotiate thick forest on 
the lower slopes and recent rains had made the ground very heavy. After leaving the tree­
line it was still a gruelling slog through the loose ash and scoria that covered the sixty- 
degree incline of the mountain's upper slopes. After making a base-camp 500 metres 
from the summit the party pushed on, reaching the rim of the crater late on the afternoon 
of 16 December.161
When the climbers finally arrived at the top of the smouldering active volcano they 
were all thoroughly exhausted. One by one they began the descent to seek shelter from 
the bitter evening chill and the clouds of thick smoke billowing up from within the crater.
Despite his slight frame Soe was a tough and resilient climber but he too was 
feeling the effects of the last two days. While waiting for his friend Herman to follow 
him down from the summit he sought somewhere to shelter from the freezing wind. As 
Herman approached he noticed that something was seriously amiss. Soe had begun to 
tremble and to babble incoherently, and had to be restrained from rushing wildly about. 
His body was suddenly racked with violent convulsions and then became dreadfully still.
Soe had died in his friend's arms a day short of his twenty-seventh birthday.162
160 The other members of the party were Aristides Katoppo, Abdurrachman (Maman), Antonius Wijana, 
Freddy Lasut, Rudy Badil and Idan Lubis (a nephew of Mochtar Lubis).
161 This account draws on the numerous press reports that appeared in late December 1969. See in 
particular 'Soe Hok Gie tewas dipuntjak G. Semeru' (Soe Hok Gie dies at top of Mt. Semeru), Harian 
KAMI, 22 December 1969; and Rafik Pontoh, 'Semeru minta korban’ (Semeru demands a victim), 
Mingguan Chas, Week 1, January 1970. I am also indebted to Herman Lantang for his recollections of 
the trip to Semeru. Interview 10 and 12 February 1982
162 Minutes later Idan Lubis was also struck down in exactly the same manner, while their friend 
Abdurrachman had staggered into the arms of those waiting below where he too collapsed gravely ill. 
(Fortunately Abdurrachman was eventually able to make a full recovery after receiving medical attention 
in Malang.) All three were evidently the victims of asphixiation by a deadly poisonous gas - odourless, 
colourless and heavier than the surrounding air - seeping from the volcano's surface. The 20 year old Idan 
Lubis was a student at Tarumanegara University, one of Jakarta's many private or non-government 
institutions. He had also been a prominent KAPPI activist in early 1966.
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EPILOGUE
It was several days before news of the Semem tragedy reached Jakarta and almost a 
week before the bodies of the two young men were able to be removed from the place 
where they had met their death.1 Even after the alarm had been raised the task of 
retrieving their bodies from such a remote and inaccessible location proved extremely 
difficult. Bad weather and the rugged terrain thwarted initial attempts by a navy 
helicopter to reach the site and it was not until late on the afternoon of 22 December that a 
rescue team arrived at the place near the summit where Herman Lantang had maintained a 
lonely vigil for many days. The bodies were carried down the mountain the following 
day to the village where Soe's brother Arief Budiman was now waiting, and then 
transported by road to Malang.
On 24 December an airforce Hercules was used to bring the coffins containing the 
bodies of Soe and Idan Lubis to Jakarta. A large crowd of grief-stricken friends and 
fellow students were waiting when the aircraft landed early in the afternoon at 
Kemayoran. One busload of students had travelled down from Bandung in a vehicle 
provided by the Siliwangi Division and adorned by a large banner bearing the words 
'Gerakan Pembaharuan'. Minister of Trade Sumitro Djojohadikusumo was one of the 
few prominent public figures among the mourners.
From Kemayoran arrangements had been made for the young men's bodies to be 
first taken separately to the houses of their respective parents before a joint ceremony at 
Rawamangun later in the day. The narrow streets around Soe's home in Kebon Jeruk 
became choked with traffic as a large cavalcade escorted the hearse bearing his coffin to 
the simple house where his grieving parents waited. Later in the afternoon, Soe's body 
left Kebon Jeruk for the last time, bound for the place that his own mother admitted to his
1 This account of subsequent events in East Java and the Jakarta funeral that followed draws on the 
extensive coverage given to these matters in the Jakarta press.
friends had become his emotional second home, the Faculty of Letters campus at 
Rawamangun.
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Soe's coffin was placed beside that of Idan Lubis on the stage of the faculty 
auditorium filled to overflowing with students, friends and family members of both 
young men. During the simple ceremony that followed Soe's friend and fellow student 
Dahana, who had led the ad hoc committee formed to take charge of the funeral 
arrangements, spoke on behalf of the Faculty of Letters' senate and student body. 
Hariadi Darmawan, chairman of the UI Student Council - and one of those student 
leaders with whom Soe had been in bitter conflict during 1969 - represented the 
university's rector, Professor Sumantri, who was unable to attend.
The principal tributes on behalf of the mourners were delivered by the Dean of the 
Faculty of Letters, Harsja Bachtiar, and Professor Sumitro. Harsja Bachtiar spoke with 
feeling of Soe's courageous pursuit of those things in which he believed, his struggle to 
uphold the ideals of justice and progress, often in the face of harsh criticism from those 
around him who felt that their own position was threatened by his outspokenness. 
Sumitro described Soe as a young man who was 'a true patriot whom he had known 
personally'.2
There was almost no reference to religion throughout the ceremony, although 
Mochtar Lubis, speaking on behalf on Idan's family, used a few appropriate Arabic 
phrases. Arief Budiman, responding very briefly on behalf of his own family, was 
overcome by emotion and struggled to thank everyone who had rendered assistance to his 
younger brother. As dusk was settling over Jakarta and the monsoon rains that had 
soaked the city throughout much of the day continue to fall, the sombre procession 
headed off for the Menteng Pulo Cemetery where the two friends were laid to rest side by 
side.
2 A report of the ceremony and the speeches appears in Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 185, 28 December 
1969.
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A short time afterwards, however, when the Soe family were troubled by petty 
extortion at Menteng Pulo, Arief Budiman arranged for his brother's remains to be 
transferred to the former colonial cemetery in Tanah Abang which was also much closer 
to his parents' home. There Soe's grave was marked with a simple white marble plaque 
on which was inscribed a quotation paraphrased from one of his favourite folk spirituals: 
'Nobody knows the troubles I see, nobody knows my sorrow'. Four years later, in 
December 1973, a small group of Mapala members made the difficult trek to Mt Semeru, 
constructing a memorial near the summit with a marble marker post as a tribute to their 
lost friends. In 1975 when the Jakarta government announced that it intended to 
demolish the old Tanah Abang cemetery for a new development, Soe's family arranged 
for his remains to be cremated and his ashes scattered by his friends on the anniversary of 
his birthday at one of his favourite places when he was in search of tranquillity and 
solitude, the valley at Mandalawangi near Mt. Pangrango around 90 kilometres south of 
Jakarta.
Reactions, responses and the legacy
Soe's sudden death in such dramatic circumstances was guaranteed to receive a 
high level of publicity and the Jakarta press carried reports of the Semeru tragedy and its 
aftermath for many days. His own standing within student and intellectual circles and his 
close association with many of the leading independent newspapers ensured that his life 
and his activities would also be commented upon in feature articles.
On 23 December Indonesia Raya, which had been conducting a searching exposure 
of corruption within Ibnu Sutowo's Pertamina empire in a series of special investigative 
articles, announced a three-day 'moratorium' in its campaign as a mark of respect for the 
young men who had died on Semeru, promising to fill its pages instead with material by 
and about Soe Hok-gie.3 His friends at Kompas described him in the following terms:
3 See also its obituary column 'Dalam kenangan: Soe Hok Gie, patriot tulen' (In memory: Soe Hok 
Gie, genuine patriot), Indonesia Raya, 23 December 1969.
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An extraordinary young man .... extraordinary in many respects. Intellectual, brilliant.
Honest and open. A pure idealist with a keen sense of justice. A human being with a 
free spirit. And all of this adorned with extraordinary courage.4 *
The Bandung weekly Mahasiswa Indonesia devoted a special editorial to his death,
stressing his contribution to the overthrow of Sukarno but also emphasising his
commitment to the notion of uncompromising moral force in politics:
Perhaps the undeviating path followed by Hok-gie is not easy to put into practice in a 
political struggle. But without demanding that everyone become a Soe Hok-gie we 
merely wish to reveal this young man as a model of purity in a struggle. Not everyone 
can or should become Soe Hok-gie but in this life we need people like him to become 
an alarm bell to remind us every time we make mistakes.6
Several personal tributes also appeared in the Jakarta press.6 His old friend Jopie Lasut
used his position as a Sinar Harapan reporter to write his own rambling and discursive
recollections of Soe's political activism from the time that he had come to know him in
the early 1960s. The five articles were timed to appear just prior to the fourth anniversary
of the 1966 student movement.7
Soe's death did not pass unnoticed outside Indonesia. In mid January in the course 
of an address to the Asia Society in New York on the role of the intellectual in developing
countries, Indonesia's ambassador Soedjatmoko made the following remarks:
... I would like to pay tribute to the memory of Soe Hok-gie, one of the most dynamic 
and promising intellectuals of the young post-independence generation who recently died 
as the result of an accident while climbing Mt. Semeru. His total commitment to 
modernisation and democracy, his reckless honesty, and his complete lack of self- 
consciousness in waging his fights made it possible for him to overcome the traditional 
reservations towards him that many held because of his Chinese origin. To me he
4 'In memorium Soe Hok-gie: mahasisw'a idealis meninggal digunung Semeru’ (In memorium Soe Hok-
gie: idealistic student dies on Mt. Semeru), Kompas, 22 December 1969
6 'Editorial: In memorium Soe Hok-gie’, Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 185, 28 December 1969
6 See 'Soe Hok Gie, kenangan duka seorang sahabaf (Soe Hok Gie, sad memories of a close friend) by 
Benjamin, Indonesia Raya, 24 December 1969; 'In memorium: Soe Hok Gie, dalam mono-dialog "G"', 
by Gerson Poyk, Indonesia Raya, 26 December 1969; 'Soe Hok Gie dan Idhan (sic) Lubis jang mati 
muda' (Soe Hok-gie and Idan Lubis who died young) by Zainal Arifin, Sinar Harapan, 27 December 1969.
7 The articles appeared in Sinar Harapan between 6 and 10 January 1970 under the series title 
'Menjongsong "Hari Kebangkitan Mahasiswa" 10 Djanuari' (Commemorating 'The Day of Student 
Resurgence' 10 January). In the second article of the series, Lasut recounted the incident when Soe had 
led a student deputation to Ibnu Sutowo's office in January 1966 to protest about the petrol price rise. He 
reminded his readers that unlike Jusuf Muda Dalam, Ibnu Sutowo had been too frightened to leave his 
office and face the demonstrators outside, adding the colourful but dubious detail that the minister had 
become an object of student ridicule because he had been so scared 'he had pissed himself. Interestingly, 
Ibnu Sutowo who was already under attack from the Jakarta press at this time for corruption, felt 
sufficiently stung by the article to order one of his subordinates to write a reply, denying that the former 
minister had ever received such a student delegation and alleging that he had been a staunch opponent of 
the Old Order and the PKI long before that time. See the letters to the editor column, Sinar Harapan, 16 
January 1970.
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exemplified the possibility of a new type of Indonesian, of a truly Indonesian 
Indonesian. It is this message I think that his brief life contains for us. 8
In April Benedict Anderson published his own moving personal tribute to his friend 
in Cornell University's Indonesia, quoting from Soe's recent letters including some of
his characteristic remarks about his own journalism:
I feel that all there is in my articles is a few firecrackers. And I'd like to fill them with 
bombs.9
In addition to the various published responses to Soe's death there is an entirely different 
sense in which his passing may be seen to have had an immediate important effect. In 
January 1970 his brother Arief Budiman emerged into public prominence as one of the 
leaders of a series of student demonstrations against corruption. Calling their movement 
The Students' Demand (Mahasiswa Menggugat), the group targeted high-level corruption 
by senior members of the government, the bureaucracy and the armed forces. The spate 
of demonstrations seemed to have had some impact when, at the end of January, 
President Soeharto appointed a Commission of Four to conduct an inquiry into the 
problem and write an official report.
When the government appeared to delay releasing the report or acting upon its 
recommendations, Soe's friend and Sinar Harapan editor Aristides Katoppo embarrassed 
the government by publishing in full a leaked copy of the entire report.10 After further 
student demonstrations in July and August, Arief Budiman was one of a small group of 
students who had two inconclusive meetings with Soeharto to discuss the corruption 
issue.* 11
How much Hok-gie's death contributed to Ariefs decision to take an active 
leadership role in these demonstrations is difficult to say. Certainly, the two brothers had
8 This was one of the very few references to Indonesia in the ambassador's address. See Soedjatmoko 
1970: 4. His speech was subsequently translated into Indonesian and published in a number of edited 
collections.
9 See Anderson 1970. The essay was translated and published in Kompas the following month. See 'In 
memorium: Soe Hok Gie', Kompas, 4 May 1970.
10 See Crouch 1978: 296-8.
11 Budiman 1974
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put the emotional conflict of their teens well behind them. Though a degree of reticence 
may have remained, the brothers had grown closer in the previous two or three years and 
shared much the same views on a range of matters, especially on political questions. 
Arief was deeply distressed by his younger brother's death, and proud of his 
determination to speak out on awkward or politically sensitive issues. Above all, the two 
brothers placed the same emphasis on the notions of moral force in politics and Arief s 
activism in early 1970 was firmly in that mould.
In July of 1971 Arief took up the idea that he and Hok-gie had first discussed 
shortly before his brother's death. With other student activists he formed the White 
Group (Golongan Putih) to campaign for a protest boycott against the 1971 elections. 
Then in the following December, he was again a prominent figure in the demonstrations 
that occurred against the construction of the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah theme park, a 
project sponsored by Tien Suharto, the president's wife.12 In addition to his brother 
Arief, most of those who played a prominent part in these demonstrations between 1970 
and 1972 were students and activists of Soe Hok-gie's own generation. Some of them 
had known him personally and shared many of his own values and perceptions about 
politics.
For the Soeharto government these opposition movements were little more than 
minor irritations. But the demonstrations that erupted in late 1973 and early 1974 were to 
cause the government much more serious concern.13 Student protests directed against 
the government's economic policies and the nature of foreign investment in Indonesia 
culminated in mass demonstrations in Jakarta in January 1974 that coincided with an 
official visit by the Japanese prime minister Tanaka. However, these demonstrations 
degenerated into widespread anarchic rioting that raged throughout Jakarta for several 
days. The Malari Affair as it became known (Malapetaka Januari, January Disaster),
12 Arief Budiman was arrested in December and detained by the military for a month. Shortly after his 
release he left Indonesia for post-graduate studies in the United States.
13 See Crouch 1978: 310-16.
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shook the government into a stem response as it sought to pin the blame on disaffected 
PSI and Masjumi elements for instigating the demonstrations and riots. In the crackdown 
on students, activists and intellectuals that followed, many of Soe's former friends and 
acquaintances were arrested and several of them were detained for lengthy periods.14
Although the government moved to tighten its control over the campuses following 
the Malari Affair, student and intellectual dissent continued to be heard from time to time. 
However, those who were involved in student activism in the late 1970s and 1980s were 
by and large students of a younger generation who had not been directly involved in the 
1966 student movement, who had no personal connections with Soe Hok-gie, and 
probably knew little or nothing about him.
Yet from time to time there have been indications of renewed interest in Soe from 
younger generations of student activists. Perhaps some were curious to find out more 
about one of the '66 generation student leaders who had not become a government 
minister, a Golkar functionary or a successful businessman like those who received such 
frequent publicity and media-attention as heroes of the New Order in January each year. 
Perhaps a few even saw him as a possible role model. There were occasional articles in 
the Jakarta press by some who knew him, usually on the anniversary of the Semeru 
tragedy.15 However wider public interest in Soe was awakened by the publication of an 
edited version of his diary in 1983.16 As a published volume, his diary presented a
14 These included Jopie Lasut, Henk Tombokan, Sjahrir, Marsillam Simanjuntak, Rachman Tolleng, 
Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, Haji Princen, Yap Thiam Hien, Adnan Buyung Nasution and Mochtar Lubis. 
The student newspapers Mahasiswa Indonesia and Harian KAMI, along with Indonesia Raya, were banned 
and did not appear again. Soe's name was mentioned at the trial of Hariman Siregar (the young 
University of Indonesia medical student accused by the government of being one of the ringleaders of the 
movement) in connection with Grup Diskusi, the body he and Sjahrir had formed in July 1968 and which 
had continued after Soe's death to be a forum for independent campus debate. Sjahrir was also one of 
those put on trial after Malari. See van Dijk 1975: 6.
15 See for example the following: 'Mengenang sejenak Soe Hok-gie, perjuang besar Orde Baru yang 
kerempeng' (Recalling for a moment Soe Hok-gie, great if skinny fighter for the New Order) by 
Satygraha Hoerip, Sinar Harapan, 16 December 1975; 'Soe Hok Gie' by Haifa Shahab, Mutiara, No.206, 
26 December 1975; 'Soe Hok Gie dan Idhan (sic) Lubis dalam ingatan rekan seperjalanan' (Soe Hok Gie 
and Idan Lubis as remembered by their fellow travellers), by Rudy Badil, Kompas, 16 December 1984.
*6 Soe 1983. The diary had been prepared to galley proof stage as early as 1972 but its publication was 
postponed when objections were raised in some quarters. For further commentary on Soe's diary in both 
its original manuscript and published form, see Maxwell 1987 and the relevant section of the 
bibliography of this thesis.
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number of problems. It was not very literary and many of the entries were obviously 
written in haste. It was also quite fragmentary in its coverage of his life, leaving many 
large gaps in his experiences unaccounted for. Moreover, in the later years it was 
especially preoccupied with the small world of the Rawamangun campus that must have 
been almost incomprehensible for many outsiders. Yet in spite of these drawbacks many 
readers would have been attracted by the diary's frankness and authenticity: it was 
clearly a highly personal record that had obviously not been written with an eye to future 
publication. Fortunately, the published version was enhanced by a thoughtful and lucid 
introduction by Daniel Dhakidae.17 In fact the diary proved so popular that a second 
printing was issued at the end of 1983 with an additional appendix containing a selection 
of the numerous reviews that had appeared in the Indonesian print media in the previous 
few months.
A number of commentators, including many readers of the diary, frequently 
expressed the view that a volume of Soe's collected journalism would make an even more 
useful and accessible introduction to his life and his thinking. In 1995 such a volume 
finally appeared, containing thirty-six of his essays arranged thematically.18 Although 
this is less than a third of his complete journalistic output and some of his finest essays 
were not included, it nevertheless gave many Indonesian readers an opportunity to 
sample the range of Soe's interests and the hard-hitting and confronting style of his 
newspaper writing.
Final reflections
The question of an author's judgements about another human being's life is 
invariably a difficult and demanding responsibility for any biographer. In reflecting upon 
the totality of Soe's experiences I am very conscious that I have been writing about a 
young man whose life ended suddenly and quite prematurely, and with the future still full
17 See his essay 'Soe Hok Gie Sang Demonstran' (Soe Hok Gie the Demonstrator) in Soe 1983: 6-76.
18 Soe 1995
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of immense possibilities. In such circumstances it seems to me that any attempt to pass 
judgement or present a set of tightly drawn conclusions would be inappropriate, even 
unfair.
Nevertheless, I would like to conclude this study by touching on what I see as 
some important features of Soe's approach to politics. We have noted how the young 
Hok-gie became absorbed by politics and national affairs from at least his early teens. It 
is apparent that at some point during this period of his life he had already reached the 
conclusion that his own generation would be called upon in the future to intervene in the 
political life of the nation. As his knowledge and understanding about national politics 
continued to deepen during his university years, there was a powerful urge to move 
beyond observation and to become in some way directly involved in practical politics. 
This desire to participate at some level as a political actor strengthened with his perception 
that Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime was leading Indonesia to disaster.
Yet this urge to political action was tempered by his own judgement that the world 
of politics was essentially rotten, in his own words 'filthy mud'. Everything that he 
observed about politics seemed to point in that direction: his early harsh perceptions of 
the qualities of the country's leaders were confirmed during his own chance meetings 
with President Sukarno; those around Sukarno he judged to be corrupt and venal, while 
party leaders and prominent politicians were either sycophants and 'yes men' or had 
given up altogether. Despite his deep suspicion of totalitarian systems, he grudgingly 
admired many of the PKI leaders for their advocacy of social justice for the poor and the 
oppressed. Yet the PKI had seemed to him to have abandoned principle for the sake of 
political expediency as it moved into closer alignment with Sukarno and his policies.
Consequently he sensed that the world of politics was essentially rotten and 
corrupt. These same perceptions seemed to lie behind Soe's advocacy of the notion of a 
'moral force' in politics in early 1966. His own intervention in national politics, he 
declared, was temporary - an inevitable and unavoidable response to a national crisis. By 
the middle of that year he was arguing that it was time for students to step back, to
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withdraw from the field of politics and to allow the full-time professional politicians to 
get on with the task of rebuilding the nation's political institutions. Hence his scorn and 
condemnation of those student leaders whom he judged to have exploited their position 
by remaining full-time politicians.
The same antipathy towards the malign and destructive aspects of politics lay 
behind his efforts to keep the external world of political parties and mass organisations 
from intruding into the life of the university. Many of his fellow students disagreed, 
others regarded his views as hopelessly impractical, but Soe wanted the university to be a 
safe haven, a fortress free from all that he regarded as repellent about the political world 
beyond.
By the late 1960s, despite the sense of loneliness and isolation he increasingly felt, 
Soe seemed to have found his metier standing on the outside of politics as a free, 
independent and critical spirit. He expressed his admiration for some of the technocrats 
who had joined the government, recognising that their work was important, even 
essential. Nevertheless, he still feared the corrosive influence of politics whenever it was 
necessary to make compromises on matters of principle and to turn a blind eye to 
entrenched corruption or the arbitrary use of authority. It was something he could never 
have done himself.
During those periods of his life when he did become actively engaged in politics at 
some level, Soe was never really comfortable with large organisations. He never joined a 
political party or mass organisation. He fell out with the LPKB assimilationists over 
matters of principle in 1965, he was never part of the KAMI organisational structure and 
by late 1969 it seemed he was becoming disenchanted with the Gerakan Pembaharuan 
circle. Essentially, Soe was most at ease working with small groups of people where 
there was a clear sense of common purpose based on close bonds of trust and personal
commitment.
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Despite his fears about the rottenness of politics, when the critical moment 
suddenly came in October 1965, he had decided to plunge headlong into that arena. This 
was a momentous decision for he knew that in reality it meant taking the side of the army 
in a struggle against the PKI that was bound to be violent, although he could not have 
foreseen the terrible consequences and the massive scale of human suffering that was to 
result.
The events of 1 October 1965 brought all anti-communist liberal intellectuals in 
Indonesia who were desperate to see the end of Sukarno and everything he stood for face 
to face with difficult choices. It is to Soe's credit that when he did become aware of the 
scale of the massacres and the plight of the innocent victims of the anti-PKI vendetta he 
became one of the government's most determined critics in his pursuit of fair treatment 
for them. Yet there is a sense in which Soe may not have completely come to terms with 
his participation in the events of late 1965 and 1966 either emotionally or intellectually. 
We do not know what, as a student of history, he made of the various conflicting 
interpretations of the events of 1 October, especially since two of the most incompatible 
accounts were those of his teacher and mentor Nugroho Notosusanto and his friend 
Benedict Anderson.
Although Soe continued during the late 1960s to support publicly those senior army 
officers he had hoped would steer Indonesia on a path to a more equitable and just 
society, it must have been increasingly apparent to him by late 1969 that his faith had 
been misplaced. A growing sense of personal isolation and despondency and a renewed 
disenchantment with the pervasive political world of Jakarta compelled him to make the 
journeys to the mountain peaks of Java where he could for a time feel at one with nature 
and, above all, clean.
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M o v em en t)
G e s ta p u G era ka n  S e p te m b e r  T ig a p u lu h  (T h ir tie th  o f  S e p te m b e r  
M o v em en t)
G M K I G era ka n  M a h a s isw a  K ris ten  In d o n e s ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  
C h ris tian  U n iv e rs ity  S tu d en t M o v e m e n t)
G M N I G era ka n  M a h a s isw a  N a s io n a l In d o n e s ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  
N a tio n a lis t U n iv e rs ity  S tu d en t M o v e m e n t )
G M N I-A S U G era ka n  M a h a s isw a  N a s io n a l In d o n e s ia  - A l i  
S a s tro a m id jo jo -S u ra c h m a n  ( le ft w in g  fac tio n  o f  th e  
In d o n es ia n  N a tio n a lis t  U n iv e rs ity  S tu d e n t M o v e m e n t )
G M S G era ka n  M a h a s isw a  S u ra b a ya  (S u ra b a y a  U n iv e rs ity  
S tu d en t M o v e m e n t)
G o lk a r G o lo n g a n  K a ry a  (F u n c tio n a l G ro u p s)
G o lo n g a n  P u tih W h ite  G ro u p , rad ic a l g ro u p  a d v o c a tin g  th e  b o y c o tt in g  o f  
th e  1971 G e n e ra l E lec tio n s
g o to n g  ro y o n g m u tu a l a ss is ta n c e
G S N I G era ka n  S isw a  N a s io n a l In d o n es ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  N a tio n a l 
S e co n d a ry  S c h o o l S tu d e n t M o v e m e n t)
H C S H o lla n d sc h -C h in e e  se h e  S c h o o l , D u tc h -M e d iu m  p rim a ry  
sch o o l fo r  C h in e se
H I H o te l In d o n e s ia
H M I H im p u n a n  M a h a s isw a  Is la m  (Is lam ic  U n iv e rs ity  
S tu d e n ts ' A s s o c ia t io n )
H S I H im p u n a n  S a r ja n a  In d o n e s ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  S c h o la rs ' 
A sso c ia tio n )
IA IN In s titu t A g a m a  Is la m  N e g e r i  (S ta te  In s ti tu te  fo r  Is la m ic  
S tu d ie s)
IM A B A Ika ta n  M a h a s isw a  B a n d u n g  (B a n d u n g  U n iv e rs ity  
S tu d en t L e a g u e )
IM A D A Ika ta n  M a h a s isw a  D ja ka rta  (Ja k a rta  U n iv e rs ity  S tu d e n t 
L eag u e)
IM F In te rn a tio n a l M o n e ta ry  F u n d
IP B In s titu t P er ta n ia n  B o g o r  (B o g o r In s titu te  o f  A g r ic u ltu re )
IP K I Ika ta n  P e n d u k u n g  K e m erd e k a a n  In d o n e s ia  (L e a g u e  o f  
the  U p h o ld e rs  o f  In d o n es ia n  In d e p e n d e n c e )
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DPMI Ika ta n  P e r s  M a h a sisw a  In d o n es ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  
U n iv e rs ity  S tu d e n t P re ss  L e a g u e )
IT B In s ti tu t  T e k n o lo g i B a n d u n g  (B a n d u n g  In s ti tu te  o f  
T e c h n o lo g y )
K a b in e t K a ry a 'W o rk in g ' C a b in e t
k a in  k e b a y a a  b lo u se  a n d  a w ra p -a ro u n d  b a tik  sk irt.
K A M I K e sa tu a n  A k s i  M a h a s isw a  In d o n e s ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  
U n iv e rs ity  S tu d e n t A c tio n  F ro n t)
K A M I J a y a K A M I J a k a rta  R a ya  (T he  G rea te r  Ja k a r ta  b ra n c h  o f  
K A M I)
K A M I P u sa t T h e  n a tio n a l lead e rsh ip  b o d y  o f  K A M I
K A M I U I U n iv e rs ity  o f  In d o n e s ia  b ran ch  o f  K A M I
K A P -G e s ta p u K e sa tu a n  A k s i  P e n g g a n y a n g a n  G e s ta p u  (A c tio n  F ro n t 
fo r th e  C ru sh in g  o f  th e  T h irtie th  o f  S e p te m b e r  
M o v em en t)
K Ä P P I K e sa tu a n  A k s i  P e la ja r  P e m u d a  In d o n es ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  
S tu d e n t an d  Y o u th  A c tio n  F ro n t)
K A S I K e sa tu a n  A k s i  S a r ja n a  In d o n es ia  ( In d o n e s ia n  
G ra d u a te s ' A c tio n  F ro n t)
k e tu a ch a irm an
K e tu a  P re s id iu m C h a irm a n  o f  the  P re s id iu m
K e tu a  S en a t C h a irm a n  o f  th e  (S tu d en t) S en a te
K K K - U I K o o rd in a s i K e g ia ta n  K e m a h a s isw a a n -U l  (U I S tu d e n t 
C o o rd in a tin g  B o d y )
K K O K o rp s  K o m a n d o  (M a r in e s  C o m m a n d o  C o rp s )
K o g a m K o m a n d o  G a n ya n g  M a la y s ia  (C ru sh  M a la y s ia  
C o m m an d )
K o la g a K o m a n d o  M a n d a la  S ia g a  (M an d a la  V ig ila n c e  C o m m an d )
k o n fro n ta s i co n fro n ta tio n  (w ith  M a lay s ia )
k o n tra - re v o lu s i co u n te r-re v o lu tio n a ry
K o p k a m tib K o m a n d o  O p era si P e m u lih a n  K ea m a n a n  d a n  K e te r tib a n  
(O p e ra tio n a l C o m m a n d  fo r  th e  R e s to ra tio n  o f  S e c u rity  
and  O rd e r)
K o s tra d K o m a n d o  C a d a n g a n  S  trä te  g is  A n g k a ta n  D a r  a t  (A rm y  
S tra teg ic  R e se rv e  C o m m an d )
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K oti K om ando  O perasi Tertinggi (Suprem e O perations 
C om m and)
laskar militia
L ask a r A .R . H ak im Student M ilitia  nam ed  after A rief R achm an H akim , a 
student k illed  during  a dem onstra tion  on 24  F eb ru ary  
1966
Lebaran holiday period  fo llow ing  the Islam ic fasting  m on th  o f 
R am adan
Lekra L em baga  K ebudayaan  R a kya t  (Peoples ' C ultural 
Institute)
L em b ag a  H ak2 A zasi M anusia H um an R ights Institu te
L em hanas Lem baga P ertahanan N asional (N ational D efence 
Institute)
L iga D em okrasi D em ocratic League
L P K B L em baga P em bina  K esatuan B angsa  (Institu te o f  
P rom oters o f N ational U nity) later know n as L em b a g a  
P em binaan K esatuan B angsa  (Institu te  fo r the 
P rom otion  o f N ational U nity)
lurah village or sub-subd istric t head
M ahm illub M ahakam ar M iliter L u a r B iasa  (Special M ilitary C ourt)
M alari M alapetaka  Januari (January D isaster), 1973 Jakarta  
dem onstra tions and  riots
M anikebu M anifes K ebudayaan  (C ultural M anifesto)
M anipol M anifesto  P olitik  (Political M anifesto)
M an ipo l-U S D E K P residen t Sukarno 's  1959 politica l m an ifesto  b ased  on 
five gu iding principles
M apala M ahasisw a  P encita  A la m  (U niversity  S tudent N a tu re  
L overs)
M apancas M ahasisw a P ancasila  (Pancasila  U niversity  S tudents)
M apram M asa P rabakti M ahasisw a  (U niversity  S tudent 
O rientation P rogram )
M asyum i M ajelis  Syuro  M u slim in  Indonesia  (C ouncil o f  
Indonesian  Islam ic A ssocia tions)
M K G R M usyaw arah  K ekeluargaan  G otong  R oyong  (a 
functional group  body)
M M B M asyaraka t M ahasisw a  B o g o r  (B ogor U niversity  
S tuden ts ' S ociety )
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M M I M ajelis  M ahasisw a  Indonesia  (Indonesian  U n iv ersity  
S tudent A ssem bly)
M P P R M usjaxvarah pem b a n tu  p im pinan  revolusi (C o nsu lta tive  
C ouncil o f  the L eadersh ip  o f the R evo lu tion)
M PM M ajelis P erm usyaw aratan  M ahasisw a  (U niversity  
S tudent C onsu lta tive  A ssem bly)
M P R M ajelis  P erm usyaw ara tan  R a kya t (People 's 
C onsultative A ssem bly)
M P R S M ajelis P erm usyaw aratan R akya t Sem entara  
(P rovisional P eop le 's  C onsu lta tive  A ssem b ly )
m ufakat consensus
m usyaw arah consultation
N asakom N ationa lism e, A gam a, K o m u n ism e  (N a tio n a lism , 
R elig ion , C om m unism )
N ekolim N eo-kolonia lism e, K o lon ia lism e dan  Im p eria lism e  (N eo­
colonialism , C olon ialism  and Im peria lism )
N U N ahda tu l U lam a  (Islam ic Scholars ' Party)
O rde B arn N ew  O rder
Orde Lam a Old O rder
orm as organisasi m assa  (m ass organisation)
o rm as-ex tra m ass organisation affiliated w ith political parties and 
relig ious bodies external to the un iversities
O sa-U sep after O sa M aliki W angsad inata , general ch a irm an , and 
U sep  R anuw id ja ja , general secretary , the P N I leaders 
supported  by the arm y in 1966 - acronym  fo r righ t w ing 
o f P N I
Pancasila Five B asic P rincip les o f the R epublic  o f  Indonesia : 
b e lie f in G od, hum anity , un ity  o f the  nation , dem o cracy , 
and social ju stice
P ark indo P arta i K risten Indonesia  (Indonesian  C hristian  Party)
P an itia  Penyu luhan  A sim ilasi C om m ittee fo r A ssim ilation Inform ation
Partai K atolik C atholic Party
P artindo P artai Indonesia  (Indonesia Party)
P elopor Pioneers, e lite  reg im ent o f the Police M ob ile  B rigade
Pepelrada Penguasa P elaksanaan D w ikora D aerah  (Regional 
A uthority  to Im plem ent D w ikora, m artial law  authority)
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Peperti Penguasa Perang Tertinggi (Suprem e W ar A uthority)
peranakan acculturated  C hinese com m unities in Indonesia
Perhim i Perhimpunan M ahasiswa Indonesia  (Indonesian  
U niversity  S tudent A ssocia tion)
P erm esta Perjuangan Semesta  (The Total S truggle, regional 
uprising  in Sulaw esi in late  1950s)
P erm ina Pertambangan M inyak Nasional (N ational Oil 
C orporation)
P em u d a  Islam Islam ic Y outh
P em uda M arhaen is M arhaen Y outh  (PN I youth  organ isation)
P em uda R akyat T he P eop le 's  Y outh  (PK I youth  o rg an isa tio n )
Pertam ina Pertambangan M inyak dan Gas Bum i Nasional (S tate O il 
C orporation , a sta te -ow ned  oil com pany)
Perti Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah  (Islam ic E ducational 
M ovem ent)
P G R I Perserikatan Guru Republik Indonesia  (R epublic  of 
Ind o n esia 's  T each ers ' U n io n )
P II Pelajar Islam  Indonesia  (Indonesian  Islam ic S tudents)
PK I Partai Kom unis Indonesia  (Indonesian  C om m unist 
Party)
P L N Perusahaan Listrik Negara  (State E lectricity  Enterprise)
PM B Perhimpunan M ahasiswa Bandung  (B andung  U niversity  
S tudent A ssocia tion)
PM Ü Pergerakan M ahasiswa Islam  Indonesia  (Indonesian  
Islam ic U niversity  S tuden t M ovem ent)
P M K R I Perhimpunan M ahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia  
(C atholic  U niversity  S tuden ts ' A ssocia tion  o f  the 
R epublic  o f Indonesia)
P N I Partai Nasional Indonesia  (Indonesian  N ationalist Party)
P om ad Polisi M iliter Angkatan D arat (A rm y M ilitary Police)
P P D Perusahaan Perangkutan Djakarta  (Jakarta T ransport 
Enterprise)
P P M I Perserikatan Perhimpunan M ahasiswa Indonesia  
(Federation  o f  Indonesian  U niversity  S tuden t 
O rganisations)
P R N Partai Rakyat N asional (N ational Peop le 's  Party)
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PR R I P em erin tah  R evo lu s io n er  R ep ub lik  Indonesia  
(R evolutionary  G ov ern m en t o f the R epublic  o f 
Indonesia)
pribum i indigenous, n o t e thn ic  C h inese
priyayi m em ber o f Javanese  aristocracy  or bureaucratic  elite
PSI P artai Sosia lis Indonesia  (Indonesian  Socialist Party)
PSII Partai Sarika t Islam  Indonesia  (Indonesian  Islam ic 
A ssociation Party)
R P K A D Resim en P ara  K om ando  A n gka tan  D a ra t  (A rm y Para- 
C om m ando R egim ent)
R R I R adio R ep u b lik  Indonesia  (R adio  o f the R epub lic  o f  
Indonesia)
santri strict adherent o f  Islam
Sarekat Islam Islam ic L eague, early  nationalis t organisation
sarjana /sa rjan a  m uda degree, d ip lom a
Sastra Letters, L iterature
S ek b er-G o lk ar Sekretaria t B ersm a G olongan  K arya  (Jo int S ecretariat o f 
F unctional G roups)
S eskoad Sekolah S ta f  K om ando  A n g ka ta n  D a ra t (A rm y S ta ff  and 
C om m and C ollege)
SM P Sekolah M enengah  P ertam a , ju n io r secondary  school
SM A Sekolah M en en g a h  A ta s , sen io r secondary  school
S O B S I Sentral O rganisasi B uruh  Seluruh  Indonesia  (A ll- 
Indonesia  F ederation  o f  L ab o u r O rganisations)
S O K S I Sentral O rganisasi K aryaw an  Sosialis Indonesia  
(Indonesia Socialist E m ployees O rganisation)
SO M A L Sekretariat B ersam a O rganisasi M ahasisw a  L o ka l (Joint 
Secretariat o f L ocal U niversity  S tudent O rganisations)
Spri S ta fP r ib a d i  (Personal S ta ff  o f the P resident)
STO V IA School Tot O pleid ing  van  In landsche  A rtsen  (School fo r 
the E ducation o f N ative  D octors)
suku b an g sa ethnic group
S uper S em ar Surat Perintah Sebelas M a re t  (Letter o f Instruction o f 11 
M arch)
T am an  S isw a nationalis t schoo l sy stem , lit. 'G arden  o f  s tuden ts '
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T H H K Tiong H oa Hwee Koan, the C hinese  A sso c ia tio n
totok lit. pure  or fu ll-b looded; refers to C h in a-b o m  In d o nesian  
C hinese
T ritu ra Tri Tuntutan Rakyat (T he P eop le 's  T h ree  D em ands)
turba turun ke bawah  (dow n to the peop le)
U B K Universitas Bung K a m o  (B ung  K am o  U n iv ersity )
U K I Universitas Kristen Indonesia  (C hristian  U n iv ersity  o f 
Indonesia)
U I Universitas Indonesia  (U niversity  o f  Indonesia)
U P K B Urusan Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa  (B ureau  fo r the 
P rom otion  o f N ational U nity)
U S D E K Undangan-undangan dasar 1945; Sosialisme d la 
Indonesia; Demokrasi terpimpin; Ekonom i terpimpin; 
Kepribadian Indonesia  (The five gu id ing  p rincip les o f 
S ukarno 's g o vernm en t after 1960: the 1945 
constitu tion; Socialism  ä la Indonesia; G uided  
dem ocracy; G uided  econom y; N ational identity)
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An explanatory note on primary sources 
Soe Hok-gie's diary:
The original manuscript consists of six separate parts as follows:
(i) 4 March 1957 to 16 July 1958: 20 entries of unknown format.
(ii) 10 December 1959 to 20 March 1964: 39 handwritten entries in a quarto- 
size school exercise book, 77 pages handnumbered sequentially.
(iii) 7 January to 21 January 1966: 16 foolscap pages of single-space typescript 
titled 'Hari2 mendjelang taufan didunia mahasiswa'; dated on the final page 25 January 
1966 but covering all of the above period.
(iv) 1 January to 29 December 1968: a commercial 1968 diary book of A5 
dimensions; the early entries are fragmentary and often unintelligible, some of them 
merely records of appointments or rough notes from meetings; as the year progresses the 
entries become more expansive and once more take on the form of a conventional diary. 
The volume also contains names and addresses of friends and acquaintances.
(v) 22 October 1968 to 18 October 1969: an A4-size spiral notebook containing 
139 pages of almost daily handwritten entries; the diary begins during Soe's visit to the 
United States in October 1968. During this period he made two sets of diary entries, one 
in this notebook and another in the 1968 commercial diary listed above. There is also an 
additional 16 pages of research notes compiled from books and interviews during his 
period in the US.
(vi) 19 October to 10 December 1969: 25 pages of daily handwritten entries in a 
foolscap-size notebook.
Shortly after Soe's death, his brother Arief Budiman and a group of friends 
formed a foundation, Yayasan Mandalawangi, to arrange for the publication of an edited 
version of the diary. By 1972 a trial printing had been made of an incomplete draft.
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However at this point the project stalled, apparently because of opposition to the 
publication of the diary from various quarters. It was not until 1983 that LP3ES finally 
managed to release the published volume under the title Catatan Seorang Demonstran, 
with a lengthy and useful introduction by Daniel Dhakidae.
Despite its success and the considerable interest it generated, the published 
version of the diary is marred in several respects. To begin with, there are a considerable 
number of typographical and transcription errors. Soe's handwriting presents occasional 
difficulties and in places the meaning of certain passages has been distorted or rendered 
obtuse. Secondly, the diary contains a bewildering number of references to individuals. 
Some are well-known public figures, but many more are friends and acquaintances of 
Soe from different periods of his life who are unknown outside that narrow context. 
Despite some explanatory notes at certain places on other matters, the reader is given no 
assistance in coping with this problem. Furthermore, the issue has been compounded by 
the editors' decision to use pseudonyms where the diary touches on sensitive and private 
matters regarded as potentially embarrassing to certain people. But this has not been an 
entirely satisfactory solution: those inside the small student circle were immediately able 
to identify everyone in spite of the pseudonyms, while several individuals whose actual 
names had been retained were deeply offended.
Finally, there were a number of unspecified passages deleted or amended in the 
published version. While these were mostly references of a sensitive personal nature, 
despite the claims of the editors to the contrary there were also several damaging 
references to public figures that were considered too dangerous to publish in their original 
form.
In the preparation of this study I have drawn on a photocopy of most of the 
original manuscript which I was able to make during a visit to Jakarta in 1978. At that 
time the first part of the diary - that section covering the years 1957-58 - had 
unfortunately disappeared or been mislaid. Consequently I have had to rely on the 
published version for those entries.
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In preparing translations of passages from the diary (and also from Soe's other 
private and public writing) I have tried to retain the original feel of his characteristic prose 
style. The places where any words or sentences have been omitted have been indicated
by a series of period m ark s ..... Any foreign language words, usually English, in the
original are rendered here in itallics. Wherever it has been necessary to add additional 
words for the sake of comprehension, these have been enclosed within square brackets 
[]•
In almost all cases I have used the actual names of people as they appear in 
Soe's original text. The only exceptions to this are references to individuals of a personal 
nature and a passage from a private letter where I have deleted several names for obvious 
political reasons.
Soe Hok-gie’s journalism:
The articles detailed in the listing below have been drawn from all those 
Indonesian newspapers to which Soe was known to be a contributor. It nevertheless 
remains an incomplete list of his journalism. In addition to the essays he wrote under his 
own name (almost always appearing in full, rarely with just his initials 'shg'), Soe also 
prepared news items and reports for both Kompas and Sinar Harapan on a variety of 
matters, but especially about university and students affairs. These were published 
without a by-line. There were also occasional essays which he decided to write 
anonymously and on at least one occasion under a pseudonym. I have only included 
such articles below where I have found strong corroborative evidence verifying these as 
Soe's work. I have been unable to locate complete files of the Jakarta weekly Djaja or the 
Jakarta edition of Mahasiswa Indonesia which may both contain additional articles written 
by Soe. Unless otherwise noted, references to Mahasiswa Indonesia here refer to the 
West Java edition produced in Bandung.
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